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of the

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for the

History of Religions

Tokyo and Kyoto

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MARUZEN
In Memoriam
Raffaele Pettazzoni
The death of Professor Raffaele Pettazzoni, President of the I.A.H.R., in December of 1959, was made known to us by Dr. C. J. Bleeker. All of us here in Japan were greatly shocked and could not help feeling deeply grieved with the great loss to the I.A.H.R. The Japanese Organizing Committee for the Ninth I.C.H.R. should like to express our sincere regrets over his death.

Without any hesitation it can be stated that Professor Pettazzoni has given of himself as an able president for nearly ten years to the continuing development of the I.A.H.R. As we all know, he showed himself as an eminent scholar in his studies in the history of ancient religions, and tried to bring forth a synthesis of both the historical and phenomenological studies. Moreover, the comprehensive work of Professor Pettazzoni about the elementary form of “god” was a good example of his extensive knowledge and of his projected work.

At the Ninth congress Professor Pettazzoni took the trouble to visit Japan in spite of his advanced age. Dr. Pettazzoni was a little bit tired on his arrival and fearing become worse we took him to hospital for three days. After his recovery, he graciously received members of the congress which greatly expediated the proceedings. Surely he helped to make this congress possible, and for his generosity, we would like to express the heartfelt thanks. His memory will long live with us.

On September 11, two days after the congress, Professor Pettazzoni left Japan for Rome where he passed away.

When we look back in the history of the I.C.H.R., all eight congresses had been held in Europe since 1900. The fact that the Ninth congress was held outside Europe for the first time was epoch-making in the history of the I.C.H.R. Even as early as the congress in Amsterdam, it was rumoured that we had been given honor to hold an international congress in Japan and at the Eighth congress in Rome, it was notified to hold the Ninth congress in Japan in 1958.

With the Japanese Association for Religious Studies, taking the initiative, a committee for preparation was established in 1950 and hereafter their preliminary plan for the congress was promoted on a national level by all the major groups concerned.

Thereupon, the Japanese Organizing Committee for the Ninth International Congress was established in the Science Council of Japan in 1957 to organize and carry out the congress.
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Lectures and Papers
Special Lecture
“Have we not all one father? Has not one God created us? Why then are we faithless to one another?” These words of the prophet Malachi (2, 10) were repeated several decades ago by a Jewish rabbi as he extended his congratulations to a Catholic bishop on the occasion of his consecration. The belief in one God should indeed awaken in the faithful among all the high religions the consciousness of belonging together in one family and their obligation to stand together fraternally. But thus it has been in the history of religions. The faithful among the higher religions have opposed one another again and again, indeed if not engaging in bloody persecution, then despising the followers of other religions as deplorably ignorant who must be led with all possible speed to the true church and religion. How many human beings have become the victims of religious wars, how frequent was the oppression of other religious consciences, how numerous were the martyrdoms suffered in courageous confession of individual faith!

Although in more modern times religious persecution has passed from the hands of religious to totalitarian political powers, the deeply irrational contempt for other religions is still widespread. Indeed in Western Christianity to-day it has in certain respects become more widespread than in the eras of Enlightenment, Classicism, and Romanticism. If we ask why the sense of unity should be most hindered from that quarter where it ought be most vitally fostered, we will find the reason for this paradox in the sense of absoluteness characteristic of one segment of the higher religions. In An Historian’s Approach To Religion (the best theological book of the last ten years, though not written by a theologian), Arnold Toynbee suggests that those three religions of revelation which spring from a common historical root, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, have a tendency toward exclusivism and intolerance. They ascribe to themselves an ultimate validity. While the faithful among the Indian and Far Eastern religions recog-
nize the other religions in-so-far as they discern in them another manifestation of the essentials of their own religion, the three religions mentioned above are so exclusive that their followers often enough look upon other religions as the outgrowth of error and sin. Thereby they transfer the absoluteness which is an attribute alone of the divine and eternal to their own system of faith without seeing that this divine absolute can also be comprehended in entirely different forms of thought and devotion.

There is indeed something essentially true in Toynbee’s objection. The Indian religions are a bulwark of more than two thousand years of toleration. Two hundred fifty years before Christ, King Aśoka, one of the noblest figures in world history and the great promulgator of Buddhism, proclaimed to his subjects not only tolerance but also love for other religions. He states in one of his famous edicts carved in rock:

> The divinely favored King Piyaḍasi honors all sects, both the ascetic as well as the local. He honors them with gifts and tributes of all kinds. But the divinely favored one does not lay so much weight upon gifts and tributes, but rather that in all religions there might be a growth in essence. The reason for this is that no praise for one’s own religion or reproach of other religions should take place on unsuitable occasions. On the contrary, every opportunity ought to be taken to honour other religions. If one proceeds in this way, he furthers his own religion and renders good to other religions. Otherwise he does harm to his own religion and reproaches other religions, and all of this out of admiration for his own religion. When he would magnify his own cause, he rather does all the more harm to his own religion. Unity alone profits, so that everyone will listen and gladly listen to the other religion.

Even among the Christian theologians of all periods there have also been those who have noted the revelation of God in the non-Christian world. Thus Justin, the martyr-philosopher of the second century, stated, “All those who have lived by the Logos, i.e. by the eternal, divine World-Reason, are Christians, even if they have been taken as atheists, as Socrates and Heraclitus.”

Thus Origen who not only held the view that God has sent prophets to all peoples in all times, but who also admonished his fellow Christians to respect heathen forms of worship and sacred images. Thus Nicolaus of Cues, a cardinal of the Roman Church who regarded all religions as different expressions of the Word of God. Thus the Swiss reformer Huldrych Zwingli who believed all great heathen to be found in heaven — to Luther’s consternation! Thus the spiritualists of the sixteenth century, above all Sebastian Franck, who confessed that God had spoken more clearly in such heathen personalities as Plato and Plotinus than through Moses. Thus Friedrich Schleiermacher who glorified the great unity of all religions in his Reden and affirmed that true Christianity is free of that drive toward exclusive rule and “despotism”. Thus the Swedish Lutheran Archbishop Nathan Söderblom, who declared on his death-bed, “God lives, I can prove it by the history of Religions”. And as there are such examples in Christianity, so also in Judaism and Islam there are pious men of thought who are free of exclusivism and who succeed in understanding the revelation of God in other religions. We may find examples among the Jewish Chassidim and the representatives of Reform Judaism, and also among the Muslim Sufi of Arabia, Persia, and Turkey.

But Toynbee’s reproach remains correct, that the majority of the representatives of the Church and Christian theology are exclusivists, and that may indeed look upon intolerance as a necessity and glory of Christian doctrine. The reigning tendency of current protestantism, the so-called dialectical theology, denies every revelation of God outside the Christian Bible and looks upon the non-Christian religions as merely the attempts of self-apotheosis which are under the judgment of God. They say there is no unity of Gospel and religions, and a unity of religions is conceivable only in the sense of a perversion of all the forms of extra-Biblical piety whether Christian or non-Christian.

This gloomy picture of religions, however, does not correspond to the truth. Modern science of religion, analyzing the totality of the religions out of their immediate living expressions in word, text, and art, shows us an entirely different perspective. Through the corporate efforts of various modern scientific disciplines such as philology, ethnology, prehistory and history, archeology, psychology, sociology, and philosophy, the methods of the science of religion have become increasingly broadened and refined. In this manner we are brought to a more comprehensive and profound view of religion and the religions than was possible in past generations, particularly those of the Enlightenment and Romanticism which advanced so far in the science of religion. This study, in which scholars of greatest stature participated, men like Friedrich Max Müller, Nathan Söderblom, Rudolf Otto, Tor Andrae, Alfred Loisy, Gerardus van der Leeuw, Raffaele Pettazzoni, has given us a host of insights by which century-old prejudices have been removed.
The first impression conveyed by the study of the history of religion is that of the wondrous wealth of religions. That ancient saying, that awe is the beginning of philosophy, applies also to the science of religion. This sense of awe in the presence of the vast many-sideness of religious phenomena permeates Schleiermacher’s immortal Reden über die Religion. This sense of awe, however, is related not only to the fullness of religious forms, ideas, and experiences, which Schleiermacher described as “having developed out of the eternally present bosom of the universe”. It is also related to the individual phenomena of the high religions now open to our spiritual world.

Think of the enthusiasm with which Leibniz praised religion and philosophy, the boundless accolade Schopenhauer heaped upon the mysticism of the Vedā Upaniṣhads, and the soaring hymn which August Wilhelm Schlegel and Wilhelmina von Humboldt sang of that great mystic poem of Indian teaching, the Bhāgavatāgītā! With what devotion did Max Müller reveal to the West the beauties of the oldest bible of man, the Rigveda, and with what wonderment did Richard Wagner and Anatole France speak of Gotama Buddha! And with what enthusiasm has Walther Eidlitz lately disclosed the miraculous world of Hindu Bhakti, i.e. Krishna mysticism, to the Western world!

The second fruit of the religious quest is esteem for other religions. Hindus and Buddhists, Muslims and Mazdayasnas, Jews and Christians are filled with the same earnestness, sincerity, ardent love, obedience, and readiness to sacrifice. Often enough Christians have been put to shame by the deep piety, courageous confession, and active love for the brother demonstrated in other religions. Thus did the fiery Florentine prophet Savonarola declare to his countrymen: “Jews and Turks observe their religion much better than Christians, who ought to take a lesson from the way the Turks bear witness to the name of God.” And in Lessing’s “Nathan the Jewish Wise” we read the exclamation, “Nathan, Nathan, you are a Christian; by God, a better Christian than ever was I!”

More important than these initially direct and rather emotional impressions of other religions is the insight into the falsity of numerous polemic judgments of past times. Throughout many centuries, the Christian polemic made Mohammed out to be a deceiver and paragon of baseness, until philological and historical inquiry moved him back into proper perspective and did justice to his religious genius. The climax of several centuries of Islamic study is the work of a Swedish Lutheran bishop, Tor Andrae, who clarifies with profound and devoted understanding even those features of the prophet which time and again had been the occasion of harsh judgment upon him. Hinduism had long been regarded as a confuse and bizarre polytheism until study of the texts has clarified the energy with which Indian theology comprehended this significant absence of duality, the unity of the divine beings, and the inwardness with which Indian Bhakti mysticism embraced the redeeming favour of the one Saviour God. For decades, western theology was represented by the opinion that ancient Buddhism was nothing more than an atheistic philosophy and ethic which led to the nothingness of Nirvana, until penetrating studies established that Gotama Buddha taught a mystic way of salvation leading up to the supreme reality which is the goal of all mysticism.

In displacing deep rooted prejudices, scientific inquiry into religion has discovered more and more of the close relationship existing among outwardly differing religions. Innumerable parallels between Christianity and other religions have been discovered in recent decades by the so-called Religionsgeschichtliche Schule. One really must say that there is no religious concept, no dogmatic teaching, no ethical demand, no churchly institution, no cultic form and practice of piety in Christianity which does not have many parallels in the non-Christian religions. Examples are the belief in the Trinity, in creation, in the incarnation; the concepts of a Virgin birth, vicarious suffering, the death and resurrection of the redeemer God, the inspiration of sacred scripture, the sole efficacy of grace, forgiveness of sin, infused prayer, imitation of God, the glory of paradise, the fulfilled kingdom of God, the priesthood and monasticism, sacraments and liturgical ceremonies including the rosary. All these are not only Christian but are universally religious and universally human. One needs only to consider the pictures of the Divine Mother with her child as it appears to us from the dawn of time throughout the entire history of religions to the Madonna of the Far East—Kwanon, the Buddhist incarnation of mercy—and compare these with the Christian pictures of the Mother Mary and her child to realize that Christian and non-Christian humanity alike have knelt before one and the same image.

Non-Christian religions provide the student of religion with countless analogies to the central concepts of the Christian faith and ethics; farther more, the pre-Christian world of religion reveals itself to the student as the source and origin of definite Christian ideas, forms of doctrine, cultus, and organization. It is beyond dispute that post-biblical Christianity took over many elements from ancient metaphysics and ethics, the oriental hellenistic mystery-religions, and the Hermetic and Neo-platonic mysticism, and even from popular pagan piety and
legal wisdom. This is precisely the great objection which Protestant theology has always made against Catholicism, that it has taken over so many pagan elements into Christianity. But modern studies have shown that it is impossible, in view of the relationship of Christianity to the pre-Christian spiritual world, to make a sharp cleavage between the New Testament and later Christian literature. The so-called History of religions’ School has revealed the intimate connection between the Old Testament and ancient Oriental religions, and between New Testament Christianity, late Judaism, and hellenistic-oriental syncretism. Eissfeldt asserted: “The presuppositions and concepts of the history of Religions’ School have prevailed and become the common good of theological science.” The two volume work of the German theologian, Karl Schneider, which appeared 1954 “Geistesgeschichte des antiken Christentums” shows that early Christianity was thoroughly absorbed in hellenistic-oriental environment, and that the entire early Christian thought and life was penetrated by hellenistic thought and expressed itself in hellenistic forms.

These variant insights illumine that unity of religions which Schleiermacher intuitively grasped when he stated in his Reden: “The deeper you progress in religion, the more the whole religious world appears as an indivisible whole.” And as the great Anglo-German scholar of religions, Max Müller inceasingly proclaimed, “There is only one eternal and universal religion standing above, beneath and beyond all religions to which they all belong and can belong.” Modern phenomenology of religion has confirmed this comprehensive unity by pointing out the similarities in the world of religious phenomena. The same was done by the psychology of religion with respect to the realm of religious experience, and the sociology of religion. It is one ribbon that encompasses the lowest and highest religion. This unity becomes especially clear in religious language; the high forms of religion, the most subtle mysticism as well as the most vigorous prophetism constantly speak the language of primitive magical religion without being conscious of it. The cultic dromenon has become legomenon, the magic religious act survived in the pious language of imagery.

Within the great unity spanning all religious forms and levels, the higher religions represent a closer unity. Although the differences are quite considerable that exist between the mystic religions of redemption and the prophetic religions of revelation (and even among the latter there are great differences between the closely related Judaism, Zoroastrian Mazdaism, Islam, and Christianity) important as these differences may be, they are overarched by an ultimate unity. There are seven principle areas of unity which the high religions of the earth manifest (Confucianism and Taoism, Hinduism and Buddhism, Mazdaism, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity).

The first is the reality of the transcendent, the holy, the divine, the other. Above and underneath the colorful world of phenomena is concealed the “true being.” (to ontos on), as Plato says, the “reality of all realities” (satyasya satyam), “the one without a counterpart” (ekam adityam) according to the Upanishads, “the eternal truth” (alhaqq) in Islamic Sufism. Above all things transient rises the great cosmic and eternal order, the Tao of ancient China, the riam of ancient India, the Logos of ancient Greece. This reality is constantly personified in religious imagery as Jahwe, Varuna, Ahura Mazda, Allah, Vishnu, Krishna, Buddha, Kali, Kwan-yin; it appears under the human imagery of the king, the queen, the father, the mother, the friend, the saviour, the bride-groom, and the bride. The personal and rational elements in the concept of God, the “Thou” towards God, however, at no time exhaust the fully transcendent divine reality. They are only preparatory, in Rudolf Otto’s beautiful image, “the cape of good hope, the foothills of a mountain range which is lost to your eyes in eternal darkness.”

Secondly, this transcendent reality is immanent in human hearts. The divine spirit lives in human souls. The human spirit is, as Paul says, the temple of the divine spirit; “God is nearer than our life-vein,” as it says the Koran. He is “interior intimo meo”, “more inward than my innermost being”, as Augustine said. The ground of the human soul is identical with the all-permeating divine power; the Atman is, according to the mysticism of ancient India, one with Brahman. And the Christian mystics speak of the acies mentis, “the peak of the soul”, with which it touches God, of the “birth of God in the ground of man’s soul”.

Thirdly, this reality is for man the highest good, the highest truth, righteousness, goodness, and beauty, the summum bonum, “the highest good.” This phrase is common to all mystics. We find it equally good in Laotse’s Tao-teh-king, in the Bhagavadgita, in the old Buddhist canon, in Plato, Plotinus, and among the Christian mystics. This highest good is the ultimate goal of all longing and striving of the high religions. “What is not the eternal,” said Gotama Buddha, “is not worthy of man’s rejoicing, not worthy that man should welcome it nor turn to it.”

Fourthly this reality of the divine is ultimate love which reveals itself to men and in men. The God of the Gospel is outgoing and forgiving love. “God is love,” says the Johannine parable. Goodness and
all-encompassing care make up the characteristic of the Tao of Lao-tse.  

"The great heart of compassion" (mahākarunā-cittam) is the inmost essence of the divine in Mahāyāna-Buddhism, and this heart is open to all men: just as the light of the moon is reflected in all kinds of water, the muddiest puddle as in the crystal clear mountain lake and in the endless ocean, so this divine heart of love reveals itself in all levels of mankind.

Fifthly, the way of man to God is a way of sacrifice, The path of salvation begins everywhere with sorrowful renunciation, resignation, the via purgative, ethical self-discipline and ascetism. This path to God finds its continuation in meditation, contemplation, and prayer. In gesture and speech, prayer among the high religions compares to that of the primitive and ancient peoples. The words of prayer in which human beings in need have prayed to the Superior Being, thousands of years ago, have survived to the present. But a change in content occurred in high religion. The exclusive, or at least, central object of prayer is God himself according to Augustine, "you shall ask of God nothing other than God Himself"—a saying quite similarly reiterated by the Persian Islamic mystic Sa'ādi. As far as human wishes were included in prayer, the object of the petition is liberation from all that separates from God, and conformity of the human will with the divine. The prayerful cry "Not mine, but Thy will be done", has come from the lips of Christian as well as non-Christian men of prayer, ancient philosophers, and the pious men of Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim religions. And in so far as prayer is concerned with the whole world, it is the kingdom of God upon earth that is besought: kṣattra vairya in Persian Mazdaism, malkuth Jahwe in Judaism, the basileia tou theou in earliest Christendom. All pious men pray, partly in words, partly without words, partly in complete solitude, partly in the community of the faithful. And the great saints of all high religions "pray without ceasing", as Paul says. Their whole life is, as Origen said, "One single, great continuing prayer". In the last analysis, however, the prayer of the faithful is manifest not as the ascent of man to God, but as a revelation of God in the heart of man. The greatest Islamic mystic poet, Dschelal-ed-din-Rūmī relates that a person who prayed almost came to doubt God because he received no answer from God to his prayer. Then came this message from God himself: "Your cry 'O God' is my cry 'I am here'—in a single cry 'O God' are a hundred answers 'Here am I'." This faith reminds one of a word of God that Pascal believed he had heard: "You would not seek me if you had not already found me," and of the confession of Paul (Rom. 8, 20) "we do not know how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with signs too deep for words." Because the eternal God himself is present in the soul of man as its secret ground, spirit, and spark, the soul creates a bridge between the finite and infinite by prayer and meditation. In this, too, all high religions agree, that their saints and devotees together form one great invisible chorus of prayer.

Sixthly, all high religions teach not only the way to God, but always and at the same time the way to the neighbour as well. A neighbour is not merely every man without exception, but every living being. The mystic way of salvation is not completed in the via contemplativa, in the "flight of the alone to the alone", as Plotinus said. Rather it finds its necessary continuation in service to the brother, the vita activa. When Gotama Buddha had achieved perfect enlightenment under the bodhi tree, he withstood the temptation of remaining in undisturbed silence. Out of compassion for all beings perishing without his message of the way of salvation, he resolved to preach to all the sacred Truth disclosed to him. Meister Eckhart declared that if someone in his highest rapture notices a sick man in need of a bit of soup, it would be better for him to leave his rapture and serve the one in need. Confucianism, Taoism, Brahmanism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Mazdaism, Islam, and Christianity, all preach brotherly love. The Buddhist canon contains a hymn of brotherly love even as just the Christian New Testament. According to the words of Buddha all works of merit do not have one sixteenth the value of love. According to 1. Cor. 13, all the magnificent gifts of special grace are worthless and useless in comparison to the freely given, sacrificial, forgiving, and patient agape.

This love has no limitations. "As a mother protects her own child, her own son, with her love, so the disciples of Buddha have boundless love for all beings." This universality of love finds its most wonderful expression in the formula of the Buddhist canon concerning the meditation of love, compassion, and mutual joy; the contemplative monk

lets the power of love which fills his heart, spread throughout one quarter, yea beyond a second, third, and fourth quarter, above, beyond, sideways, in all directions, in all completeness, he lets the power of love that fills his heart stretch out over all the earth. Such is the extent of that great, wide, and boundless love which is free from hate and malice.

In like manner, he radiates his compassion, joy, and holy equanimity throughout the entire cosmos. In its breadth and depth, this meditation on love measures up to the universal intercessory prayer which is firmly rooted in Christian liturgies as well as in the individual
prayer of the great Christian Saints. This love excludes no living being, it encloses even the subhuman creatures of the animal world. The Christian saints compete with Buddhist and Hindu Saints in their love of animals. “St. Francis was a Buddhist,” an Indian Yogi once told me. One can just as well turn this around, and say “Buddha was a Franciscan.” The two currents of Christian love and Buddhist compassion for all living beings flow together in the saying of one of the greatest Eastern orthodox mystics, Isaac the Syrian, a saying that is at once entirely buddhist and christian:

What is a merciful heart? A heart inflamed for all creatures, men, birds, and animals, yes even for demons and all that is, so that by the recollection or sight of them tears fill the eyes because of the power of mercy which moves the heart in great compassion.

In later Mahāyāna-Buddhism this contemplative love takes on a strongly active character. Love becomes the selfless service to all beings. “As the element of water brings growth to all grasses, shrubs, and herbs, so the pure Bodhisattva gives bud to all beings through the testimony of his love. He makes the good qualities of all beings grow.” His task to which he has dedicated himself in a solemn vow, is the conquest of all suffering in other living beings through his own vicarious suffering. “I take upon myself the burden of all suffering, the salvation of all living things is my vow ... I must take upon myself the whole load of suffering of all beings ... I must bring the roots of the good to maturity, so that all beings attain infinite happiness, unimaged gladness.” This Buddhist love includes the love of the enemy. The early Christian writer, Tertullian, asserted that the love of the enemy was an exclusive characteristic of Christianity. In this he was profoundly mistaken. All high religions of the earth, not only the Eastern religions of redemption but the pre-Christian religions of the West, know the commandment to love the enemy. The wise Lao-tse emphatically demands, “to reply to adversity with mercy and goodness.” Loving the enemy has been commanded in India since the earliest times. We read in the heroic epic Mahābhārata: “Even an enemy must be afforded appropriate hospitality when he enters the house; a tree does not withhold its shade even from those who come to cut it down.” In the other epic, Rāmāyana, we read: “The noble man must protect with his life an enemy who is in distress or who out of fear has surrendered himself to the protection of the enemy.”

Buddhist literature contains wonderful examples of love for the enemy, as in the stories of King Long-Sufferer and his son Long-Life and of Prince Kunala. The spreading of the concept of loving the enemy in pre-Christian times proves the validity of Lessing’s statement, “Christianity existed before evangelists and apostles had written.”

The faith that God is love, and the commandment that man shall become like God in this all-embracing love which includes enemies, constitute by themselves alone a strong sense of community among all high religions. The concept of humanity is basically no mere rational or purely ethical idea, but a deeply religious one. We of the West inherited this idea from the ethics of the Greek and hellenistic religion as well as from the propheticism of Israel whence came early Christianity. But the Eastern cultures, too, have arrived at the idea of humanity by way of their religions. Confucius said, “All men dwelling between the four oceans of the world are brothers of noble men.” The corollary of the concept of humanity is the idea of universal peace. Lao-tse and his disciples appeared in China as mankind’s first apostles of peace. Of the latter, a saying traditionally attributed to Tswang-tse says, “Through burning love they sought to unite fraternal the people of the world ... they forbade aggression and ordered weapons to be laid aside so that mankind might be rescued from war .... With this teaching they spread over the entire world.”

Love is God’s doing. It flows not from the small heart of man, but from the eternal love of God. But as love flows forth from the heart of God, so it flows back to him again; the neighbour to whom man renders love, is God himself in human disclosure. The ancient Greeks spoke of Zeus secretly approaching us in the stranger, the suppliant, the fugitive, and the companion as Zeus xenios, phyxios, hykesios, and metoikios. Buddha taught his disciples to care for him even in the form of his sick companions. According to Jesus’ prophecy of judgment (Matth. 25, 31 ff.), the Messianic judge will count every act of charity as done unto him and every such person neglected as the neglect of him, a thought briefly and concisely summarized by the extra-canonical saying of Jesus “If you have seen your brother, you have seen your Lord.” Homo homini Deus - Man in need is God in disguise, and his permanent incarnation. “Here is thy footstool, there do thy feet rest where the poorest and lowestest, where the lost do live”, ist the prayer of Rabindranath Tagore. Where there is so great a love, the barriers between religions must fall, and if until now they have not fallen, the only reason is that they have not taken seriously the consequences of their most ultimate and profound principles.

Seventhly, love is a most superior way to God. On this way all high
religions reach out toward the ultimate goal of divine infinity in which all finiteness finds its fulfillment, even though this goal may be visualized in different images. The kingdom of God, heaven, paradise, the land of happiness (sukhavāti), Brahma-Nirvāṇa and Parinirvāṇa—these are all but various names for one reality, the “highest blessedness” (paramam sukham), as the Buddhists say. Though this blessedness now be imagined as a dissolving of the finite into the infinite (the Upanishads compare it to salt dissolving in water, and Buddha compares it to rivers flowing into the sea) or as the vision of the divine countenance or as a uniting of the soul with the heavenly spouse—it is one and the same reality to which the pious soul keeps looking while in this state of finiteness, and which it already anticipates within this finiteness. This bliss, however, is as the final existence for the finest spirits in the high religions a total and universal one, it excludes the cruel and godless idea of the popular belief in an eternal punishment in hell. The living things have found redemption. This doctrine of Mahāyāna-Buddhism is contiguous with the Mazdayasnic doctrine of the universe which is ultimately filled only by divine beings, and with the Christian doctrine of the restoration of all things (apokatastasis hapanton), advocated by Origen (following early Christian gnosticism) and promulgated by the great Church fathers of the East, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, and professed by many Christian saints in opposition to popular dogmatics.

Thus there is an ultimate and most profound unity of all high religions, including ancient Buddhism, which in spite of its apparent anti-metaphysical agnosticism reveals a mystic religion of redemption equal to the noblest forms of mysticism of all times and all religions. This unity exists in spite of all differences in doctrine and cultus; one need not establish this unity artificially but, like a diver, simply lift up out of the deep that treasure which rests upon the ocean floor. Occasionally, however, such a precious treasure emerges on the surface of the water by itself and is visible to all. “One of the most astounding facts of the history of religions,” Max Müller points out, is the admission of Buddha to the Roman Calendar of saints. One of the most widespread medieval legends of the saints was that of Barlaam and Josaph; it is nothing other than the legend of Buddha entering in the Eastern as well as Roman Church via Persia, Arabia, Syria, and Byzantium. St. Josaph, whose remembrance is annually observed in the calendar of the Greek orthodox Church as well as in the Martyrologium Romanum, is none other than the Bodhisattva. This occurrence has symbolic meaning; it proves the validity of the statement of the renowned traveler-discoverer Marco Polo, “If Buddha had been a Christian, he would have been a great saint of our Lord Jesus Christ—so good and pure was the life that he led.” Such saintly persons we find in great number in all high religions. And only because the living saints of the various religions are so similar to each other could it happen that the founder of the greatest Eastern religion of redemption was admitted to the throng of canonized Christian saints.

With respect to this great unity of the high religions one can only repeat the prayer of Cardinal Nicolas of Cues: “It is you, O God, who is being sought in the various religions in various ways, and named with various names, for Thou remainest as Thou art, to all incomprehensible and inexpressible. Be gracious and show Thy countenance.... When Thou wilt graciously perform it, then the sword, jealous hatred, and all evil will cease and all will come to know that there is but one religion in the variety of religious customs (uno religio in rituum varietate).”

One of the most important tasks of the science of religion is to bring to light this unity of all religions. It thereby pursues only one purpose, that of pure knowledge of the truth. But unintentionally there sprouts forth from the root of scientific inquiry into truth not only a tree with wondrous blossoms, but also with glorious fruit. When Helmholtz discovered the eye-mirror a century ago, he was pursuing no practical medical purpose but only a theoretical research purpose. But through his research zeal he brought help to millions who suffer with eye-disease. The same is true of the scientific study of religion. Its inquiry into truth bears important consequences for the practical relationship of one religion to another. Whoever recognizes their unity must take it seriously by tolerance in word and deed. Thus scientific insight into this unity calls for a practical realization in friendly exchange and in common ethical endeavour “fellowship” and “cooperation”.

This unity and fellowship are as little a syncretistic mixing of religion as it is a conversion from one system of religion to another. Schleiermacher’s Reden contains the sincere warning, “If you want to compare religion with religion as the eternally progressing work of the world spirit, you must give up the vain and futile wish that there ought to be only one; your antipathy against the variety of religions must be laid aside, and with as much impartiality as possible you must join all those which have developed from the eternally abundant bosom of the Universe through the changing forms and progressive traditions of man.” Rabindranath Tagore agrees with this warning against antipathy toward the variety of religions and the will of one religion to dominate. He
states, “The attempt to make their own religion the ruling one everywhere and for all time is natural to men who incline toward a sectarianism. Therefore they do not want to hear that God is magnanimous in the dispensing of His love, or that His dealings with men are not limited to one blind alley which comes to a sudden halt at one point in history. If ever such a catastrophe should break in upon mankind that one religion should swamp everything, then God would have to provide a second Noah’s ark to save his creatures from spiritual destruction.” Joy in the individuality of another religion is the ultimate joy in God himself. Schleiermacher asks the question, “Is its general extension shall Christianity reign alone eternally and as the only religion of mankind?” And he answers, “Christianity despises this despotism; it honours each of its own elements enough to acknowledge it gladly as the centre of a special system; it will not only produce an endless diversity in itself, but also look outside itself…. It likes to see other and younger forms of religion emerge close to its own form from all points, even from those areas which Christianity hold to be the most extreme and dubious borders of religion at all. The religion of all religions cannot gather enough material together for the most delicate side of its most intimate viewpoint, and as there is nothing more irreligious than to require uniformity among mankind at large, there is nothing more un-Christian than to seek uniformity in religions.”

Toynbee, in the book mentioned above, recalls the wonderful statement that the defender of dying pagan religions, Quintus Aurelius Symmachus, used against the church father, Ambrosius, “The heart of so great a mystery can never be reached by following only one way.” To this Toynbee adds the comment, “We can take the statement of Symmachus to our hearts without being disloyal to Christianity, but we cannot harden our hearts against Symmachus without hardening them against Christ; for what Symmachus preached is Christian love of which the Apostle says that it will never cease. Though there be prophecies, they shall pass away, and though there be tongues “they will cease, though there be knowledge, it will pass away.” The deeper our reverence for God, the deeper also must our reverence for other religions be. He who has penetrated the mystery of religion will cease wanting to simply convert the believers among the other high religions; moreover, his desire is two-fold, to give and to receive, to represent the purest form of his own religion to others and in turn to learn about the most intimate character of the beliefs of others. He does not want to conquer those religions, but unite with them at a higher level. He would not “destroy” them but “fulfil” them (Matth, 5, 17); he does not want their death, but (as Rudolf Otto said) he wants “no religion to die before its ultimate and most profound meaning has been told.” The meaning of true mission is not propaganda or conversion, nor domination of others, but brotherly exchange and brotherly competition. In this sense we must not only wish that Christian mission continue among the religions of the East (Max Müller said that for every missionary he would rather send out ten more), but also that the religions of the East send missionaries to us as Leibniz had already desired in the introduction to his Novissima Sinica. Such a mission does not lead to syncretism and eclecticism, but to “such growth in the essentials” as Ashoka had demanded from the different religions, and that means nothing other than growth in love toward God and man.

If the religions thus learn to understand each other and cooperate, they will contribute more to the realization of humanity and thereby to world peace than all the noteworthy efforts of politics. A torn humanity which has passed through so many catastrophes, which has ruined itself through so many wars, which is still bleeding from so many wounds can be saved by one thing only which is rooted in and proceeds from Divine love as it lives in the high religions, primarily in their saints and martyrs. Cooperation in the conquest of racial, national, economic, and social problems will by itself lead to the securing and maintaining of world peace. Responsibility before the eternal God and selfless love for the brethren, these alone warrant the greatest security. Satyagraha (the apprehension of truth), ahimsa (the inviolability of all life), parâtmâ-samâtâ (the identity of all alien spirits), parâtmâ-parivarâtana (the self-transformation into an alien soul), mahâ-maitârî (great, all-embracing love), and mahâ-karunâ (great compassion) are age old religious ideals which Indian saints realized centuries before Christ and which Gandhi put into practice anew in our century. Gandhi is likewise an example for the unity of religions. He drew not only from the treasure store of his Indian forefathers, from the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgita, but also from the Koran and the New Testament, mainly from the Sermon on the Mount. He believed in the mysterious unity of Divine revelation in all high religions.

A new era will dawn upon mankind when the religions will rise to true tolerance and cooperation in behalf of mankind. To assist in preparing the way for this era is one of the finest hopes of the scientific study of religion. It was this hope that possessed one of its greatest pioneers, Friedrich Max Müller. Therefore this essay shall be concluded with the same words of the last hymn of the Rigveda to Agni (X 191) with which Max Müller closed his inaugural address as President.
of the Arian section of the International Oriental Congress in London in 1874:

"United come, united speak, let our spirits agree! . . .
Let your efforts united be, united your hearts!
Let your spirit united be, that you may be firmly bound . . .
Peace, peace, peace."

In the original language, and in the solemn manner of recitation of ancient India this verse resounds yet fuller:

Sam gacchadhvam saṃ vadadhvam saṃ vaḥ manāṃsi jānatāṃ . .
Samāṇī vaḥ ākūtiḥ samānā hṛdayanī vaḥ,
Samāṇam astu vaḥ manāḥ, yathā vaḥ susaha asati.
Shānti, Shānti, Shānti.

Section 1

Primitive Religions
Through the famous work *Lapponia*, published in Latin by J. Schefferus in 1673 and soon afterwards translated into English, German, French and Dutch—but into its author's new mother tongue, Swedish, not until 1956—, the bear-hunting ceremonialism of the Lapps has become internationally well-known scholars among. Schefferus' sources are Swedish-written manuscripts on the religious customs and conceptions of the Lapps, composed by clergymen in Swedish and Finnish Lapland and submitted to the Swedish Academy of Antiquities. These originals were published 60 years ago but not translated into any major language. The same applies to all other documents on bear-hunting, including the following bear festival, which have come into being after Schefferus, from the first monograph on this subject, written in 1755 by another clergyman from the southern part of Swedish Lapland, P. Fjellström, until the still living reminiscences of the old customs which have been recorded in our own days. A convenient survey of the *Swedish Research on the Religion and Folklore of the Lapps*, a part of which consists of bear ceremonialism, is given by A. Hultkrantz in *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (of Britain) 1955 (Vol. 85, Parts I/II, pp. 81–99). The paper also contains an abundant bibliography. The main features of the Lappish bear ceremonialism may, however, be found in modern monographs and handbooks in English. The American, I. Hallowell, has a very conscientious chapter on the bear rites of the Lapps in his well-known work from 1926. But he draws on Schefferus and an older Swedish investigation from 1910. In *The Mythology of All Races*, the late Finnish ethnographer and folklorist, U. Holmberg, (later: Harva) has treated the same subject in the volume on Finno-Ugric and Siberian Mythology (4, 1927). Whereas Holmberg-Harva as always in his outstanding works, is rather restrictive in his comments on the facts presented to the reader, the Swedish philologist B. Collinder in his very instructive work on *The Lapps* (1949) confines himself to general
psychological reflections. The Finnish specialist of South American Indians, the late R. Karsten, also devotes a chapter of his book on *The Religion of the Samek* (1955) to the bear-feast. But his interpretations are based on ideas derived from the history of religions of the 19th century. Lastly, E. Manker, Cusator at the Nordic Museum in Stockholm, who has done such valuable work for the recording of the Lappish culture of ancient and modern times and *inter alia* published the great monograph on the magic drums of the Lapps, has mentioned the cult of the bear in his comprehensive work on the Lapps, translated into French (1954). But to those few pages and the Swedish papers on which they are based, unfortunately, applies the same criticism as to Karsten’s book. Manker has, however, stressed the resemblances between the bear rites of the Lapps and those of many Siberian tribes and of the Aino.

Summing up one regrets to say that the valuable original sources on the bear ceremonialism of the Lapps are neither collected and critically sifted in a Swedish edition nor are they, with the exception of shorter abstracts, internationally available. On the other hand the Scandinavian and Finnish specialists who have had access to these documents have not generally been acquainted with modern research on the religion of the ancient hunters, especially in the circumpolar areas. Such being the situation, the present author is planning a translation with commentary on the most important texts. As a preparatory work he has published two papers in Swedish in which he discuss general methodological problems, translates and interprets Finnish bear songs and rites, as they are closely related to those of the Lapps, and gives a survey of the present state of research on the attitude of the hunter towards his game in the northern Eurasian-American and other cultural connections (in *Kyrkohistorisk Årsskrift*, 1953, and in *Kungl. Vetenskapssamhällets Uppsalas Årsbok*, 2, 1958). And in a paper written in English he has shown that the myth of the origin of the Lappish bear ceremonialism, reported by Fjellström in his work of 1755, bears close resemblances to corresponding myths in the whole circumpolar area and may be traced both to mediaeval Nordic sagas and present-day Scandinavian folklore (in *Ethnos* 21, 1956). Besides, as a supplementary source of the hunter’s religion this folklore has hitherto been rather neglected, as nearly all interest has been concentrated on beliefs and customs connected with agriculture.

There are also fragments of various extents extant of Lappish bear songs which have been used at the arrival of the hunters in the village and during the cutting up and the cooking of the meat and also accompanying the feast itself. As among the Finns and the Finno-Ugric speaking Voguls and Ostyaks of North-Western Siberia these songs are dramatically performed as a dialogue between men and women. The bear himself also takes part in the singing played by one or the other group. As only a few lines of the abstracts of Holmberg-Harva and Collinder are devoted to a comprehensive eighteenth-century document with 48 elements which is still unknown to Hallowell, it may be convenient to treat it more in full. The text consists of a very corrupt Lappish which is followed, however, by a Swedish paraphrase and the recorder’s description of the actions of the singing Lapps.

The successful hunter is telling of his hunt and while doing so receives from his wife or some other person a plaited birch twig. In the first song, which like each of the following has its own melody, the hunter is exhorted to wave the twig up and down. In the meantime the women hang bits of brass chains and a linen rag at the end of it, singing: “Wind the linen rag round the twig in a place where the sun cannot be seen.” Then the bear is introduced, saying: “Oh, dearest! This single twig is for my sake” – the twig seems somehow to represent the bear or its tail. The twig is put aside and the drinking of distilled spirits is started. After a dialogue between men and women on the successful hunt and the great pleasure this gives, the women thank the game itself: “Honours and thanks to you, dear and beloved bear who has made such a good felling mark!” The clergyman – recorder adds that it is a superstitious and sinful thanksgiving to honour a dumb animal instead of God who governs and sustains all creatures. The Lapps really mean what they say and do not use any metaphorical expression, he asserts. Then the women impersonate the bear which says: “I intended to go to my old place, but these young men hindered my journey”. The hunters take the role of the animal and continue: “Now I come from the great and wide forests, where I have been, to thickly-peopled country.” The women, still impersonating the bear: “Look, look at these young men, how they come on their skies; the nail is shining; out here, when I hear the ski-staff creak.” The leading hunter underlines this self-exhortation: “Run, run out from the hut that thou hast wound the twig of the bear-hunter” – one may conclude that this woman apparently represents the bear, leaving its den. The bear in the shape of the women says in its turn: “The bear-hunter runs in and out through the hut” as a “hare-foot”, an allusion to the shoes of the Lapps, made of soft reindeer skin – surely also alluding to the quickness of the hunter. The successful hunting thus having been re-enacted in dramatic form, the hunters’ final arrival at home with the game is accompanied by special songs – it is not easy to distinguish
between the first coming and the second one.

The women, longing for the arrival of the bear which the men have called a long time ago, and thinking of the coming feast, now ask: “What has become of the felling mark of the bear?” The men, now arriving, speak on behalf of the animal and express their coming joy in this song: “Now I come travelling over mountains and valleys.” The old Lapp women, hearing how the Lapp is shouting to the reindeer, joyfully take up this tune: “To whom belongs the voice I hear, to the swan or to the bear-hunter?” When the driver of the bear is within earshot of the Lapp huts, the women there sing: “Now I hear the singing of the bear song from the end of the forest.”

When the reindeer oxen driving the bear come home, they are decorated with strips of worsted dyed with alderbark juice in three different places. The women underline this with the following words: “The reindeer ox has got a curious mark, my dear bear-hunter!” The men in their turn make red stripes of alderbark that has been chewed in a bowl, on the head, on the neck and below or between the shoulders of the animal. This is commented on by the women: “The bear is riding after a red-dyed reindeer ox.”

The men whose; of it is to flay the bear sing while doing this: “The bear is riding wide open with an outstretched (?) nose; the bear is lying on its side with a pointed nose.” When the men hang the kettle on the hook they sing: “Up, thou kettle of silk, thou hast been quiet long enough.” This pet name for the kettle is used, as is usual in Lappish poetry, because of the lovely bear meat which is to be cooked in it. The Lapps who put the meat in the kettle represent the bear and ask: “The fork (with the claws) dives into the water (properly speaking: the swallow is a water bird – according to an ancient belief it is sleeping at the bottom of the sea during winter); what do you bring into the kettle? You bring a bird (literally: joy).” The men, moving their ladles in the boiling kettle, request grease from the bear, singing: “Grease I ask for in the hand scoop.” Reproachingly they continue: “What bear is this who does not give a spoonful of grease. I remember the time when I got two, even three more spoons of grease from the smallest bird (lit.: marsh tit).” The women repeat the demand: “Grease, grease I request from this bear”. The animal itself exhorts them: “My old men, blow away the foam!” Having done this the men invite the old women to a grease feast with the following tune: “The grease is ready (literally: the butter is done).” While boys, called “the body-guard”, serve this favourite food, the old women reply: “Grease (i.e.: butter) I ask for, who am I sitting crooked behind the door.” During the cooking of the lungs the men sing: “I am very happy to see the wild duck floating on our water.” When the head is ready to be taken out of the kettle, after the liver has been boiled, the following song is used as a flattery by the Lapps: “What have you got in the kettle, o bear-hunter? What have you got in the kettle that is chatting, chatting with such a daring tongue?” Taking the meat from the kettle the men sing: “The water-bird (i.e. the fork) dives into the burning rapids (i.e. the boiling water). What do you see? I see fish fins (i.e. the bear meat) move.”

When the meat and the broth are served, the men sing this song: “Divide thou thyself (the meat), dear bear-hunter, who art the right divider.” Afterwards the old women quickly clean the hut, saluted by the men in the following way: “The old women do their work (as quickly) as the ermine does its work.” Having finished their cleaning, the women, at the request of the old men, chew as much alderbark as will fill a wooden bowl with the juice. The dye is used to streak the bear-hut in three places. The hut is called the bear-hut because the bear has been flayed, cooked and divided there. The women are not allowed to come into that hut nor to eat there, only the men. Announcing that they have finished chewing the alderbark the women sing to the men: “Now my bowl is full of alderbark juice.” It is then taken to the men by the “body-guard” appointed for the purpose.

When the men have finished dividing the bear meat into equal parts between themselves, they invite the women to a meal in the following manner: “Please sit down now, old women, and take the brass-shafted knives in your hands.” Such a knife is indispensable at a bear feast. When the food is taken to the women the men sing: “I get food, old women, from the same dish.” When the food is brought in, the women are not allowed to see the men who serve before having looked through a special brass ring and spit at the men with the chewed alderbark; exactly the same rite as when the men tell the women that they have shot the bear. When they have blessed the food and started eating the women sing this tune: “Be welcome, thou food of the people, food of the people!” The drinking of the broth is accompanied by this song: “Here my bear is coming, having become a brewer who gives a full drinking bowl.” And the bear himself replies: “Please, eat, eat, my old women with brass-shafted knives in your hands!”

When they have said their prayers the women, well satisfied and perhaps drunk, take up this wonderful thanksgiving hymn: “I thank you, dear bear, that I too may partake of the same meal!” Then the old women sing again: “The old men, the old men, they...
carry drink hither”, since the broth is here called drink. The widows have also been invited, but they must content themselves with the most humble places at the door. They do not take this amiss and sing the following song: “I thank the bear-hunter who invited me to the meal at the farthest end of the bench.”

When the men intend to leave the bear-hut or kitchen they sing as follows: “Now the bear has left my alder-hut empty.” After this and while making up their minds to go to the old women, they wash thoroughly and console themselves in this manner: “The bear told us that he would come again to the young boys”, which the reporter declares to be a dangerous, heretic doctrine, because it implies the resurrection of the bear in order to get new game. And the reporter, himself a clergyman, recommends the clergy in the Lappish parishes strongly to oppose such a doctrine.

In every Lapp hut there is a so-called holy door just opposite the ordinary door. At that door a Lappish woman is never allowed to sit, even less to pass through it. The food of the Lapps, e.g. milk and cheese, their copper kettles and wooden vessels are stored up there. On solemn occasions the husband sits there, but he does not pass through the door except when he has shot a bear. This special door is not found in the temporary huts built by the Lapps when they move with their reindeer, only in the permanent winter huts. Here that part of the hut is regarded as holy, even if the Lapps stay there only for one day.

When the men have left the bear-hut and already entered through the holy door, they wash thoroughly in water mixed with ashes from nine burnt birch tinders and sing: “Wash yourself well, a bear man, in water with 8 to 9 birch tinders.” Having done so they continue: “Where are the old men going with 8, 9 sacks on their back,” a song for which the Lapps can give no explanation. All the old women now have white linen cloths before their faces so that they cannot see the men. The latter sing the following song of joy: “I am very happy to see the old women with snow white linen cloths on their heads”. In the end the women are allowed to look at the men although through the brass ring. All the men are now indiscriminately sprinkled through the ring by the women with the alderbark juice they have in their mouths. This is confirmed by the men with the following words: “They have sprinkled me with their mouths full of alderbark juice.”

When the women have finished, the men produce the bear tail which is adorned by the women either with bits of brass chains, beads and ribbons, or with copper coins covered with cloth. The men sing on behalf of the bear: “Now I come again wandering in search of brass,” which superstition according to the reporter is a clear manifestation of their belief in the resurrection of the bear. The old men for the last time take up the part of the animal in the following song of joy: “Now I withdraw with joy over mountains and valleys.” All the partakers in the bear-hunting are given bits of brass chains as insignia, each one receiving it from his wife. Then all the songs are repeated except for the first two, and there is plenty of schnapps.

This bear feast lasts for three days, and the same tunes and ceremonies are used each day. No dog is allowed to be loose when the bear is flayed and prepared, all are tied up. If some unfortunate dog gets loose and snatches a bone or something else from the bear he must pay for it with the corresponding part of his own body. The bones of the bear are buried to wait for their slow resurrection. It is forbidden to smear shoes and boots with bear lard, otherwise the animal will slay its hunter. On the other hand bear grease put into the hunter’s barrel should warrant the death of the game, the truth of which the reporter denies, having unsuccessfully tried that means. The Lapps take it as an evidence of the usefulness of the bear rites that no bear has ever hurt them or their reindeer, whereas he has often slain the Swedes and their domestic animals.

The recorder finally insists on the fact that the art of singing the bear songs is a very peculiar one and difficult to imitate. The Lapps thoroughly preserve the songs as a secret and when asked they deny their knowledge of them, although they may surrender to bribes.

Summing up the main features of the content of these bear songs they are as follows:
1. The bear is treated as an honoured guest who receives gifts and is flattered. At the same time he is the real host of the festival, offering himself as the feast food.
2. The bear which comes from the forests and mountains is believed to go back there, that is to return to life (note: the necessity of the bones!) to be hunted again and receive the same honours.
3. There are no traces in the bear songs quoted here of a master or spiritual controller of the animal (“Herr der Tiere”).
4. The language used by the singers is a highly metaphorical one and in that respect corresponds to the general hunting language. There the usual names of the animal and its different parts are carefully avoided and replaced by terms taken from other fields of animal and natural life.
5. Many magical precautions are necessary to protect the hunter,
his family, his cattle and his village. Among these the use of alderbark juice is the most important.

6. There are many special regulations concerning the women, e.g. that they are not allowed to cook the food nor to eat it together with the men.

7. These different features may be confirmed and supplemented by other Lappish sources. They have their correspondences in other circumpolar bear rites, and they bear an especial likeness to the Finnish ceremonies and also to the contents of the more fully developed Finnish bear songs.

SOME ASPECTS OF ATAYAL RELIGION AND THEIR IMPACT ON ATAYAL CULTURE

BY

ERIKA KANEKO

The Atayal inhabit the Northern interior of Formosa. They are of unspecialized Mongoloid stock and resemble in physical type and culture peoples of Southeast Asia. Within the 9 groups into which the Formosan aborigines are usually classified, the Atayal are one of the largest. They are divided into a number of more or less independent and frequently warring sub-groups and number according to a Japanese census of 1930, 33,000. Their habitat lies at an altitude of over 1000 m. Hoe agriculture of millet, dry-land rice and sweet potatoes, supplemented by hunting and fishing are their means of subsistence. Before their enforced pacification they were notorious as one of the most aggressive tribal groups and widely feared for their practice of head-hunting. Atayal sociology centers round the nuclear family and its extension the local group, which is, however, no longer exclusively composed of blood relations. Descent is reckoned patrilineally. A social institution running frequently parallel to the local group is the ritual group with the original function of communal worship of common ancestors. This restrictive character has been lost along with other distinctive features of Atayal social organization. Social institutions on a higher plane are limited to village or regional chieftainship of a very undetermined character and temporary federation of sub-groups for strategic or economic reasons.

The Southeastern group of the Atayal is known as Sedeq and is distinguished from the Atayal proper by reason of somatological characteristics, language and cultural traits. Compared, however, with the neighbouring tribal groups, Atayal proper and Sedeq prove to be an ethnic entity, their distinguishing differences being due to historical factors.

According to Atayal belief man consists of body and soul. The soul is reported to dwell in the pupils, according to other versions in the pulse, in the whole body, or even without it. It is called "utux, liutux" or other local variations and in its wide meaning includes all forms of...
supernatural existences. Personal deities, however, are not known to the Atayal who attribute their existence to birth from a split rock or tree, respectively. The word "utux" is derived from common Indonesian "anitu". A distributional study within the Atayal area shows that the variant "utux" is limited to the center, being older, whereas the younger form "liutux" has a marginal distribution. This result is corroborated by linguistic findings and incidentally reflects the process and progress of Atayal expansion.

According to more recent fieldwork the Atayal soul conception is further complicated by the inclusion of a life giving soul-substance, as distinguished from the soul which lives on after corporal death. It is not known whether this belief is limited to recently surveyed areas, or common to all Atayal and only overlooked by past research. The functional difference between soul and soul-substance is not in all instances recognized and clearly expressed by the Atayal. The original meaning of the term "lunglungan", used to denote this substance, is not known to me.

The fate of the soul after death is diverse. It varies dependent on several factors. A person's way of dying is decisive. It is a strict rule that somebody on the point of death must be attended by his relations, the grade and extent of relationship being usually prescribed, but locally variable. At the moment of death the dying person's hand must be held. No explanation of this, as to transfer of power or life, is known, but the custom is common to all Atayal. Failure to observe it is followed by the most dire consequences for the dead, who is forever barred from a proper after-life and the survivors who suffer pollution, ranging from mild forms which can be cancelled out by strenuous purification, to the extreme, where a whole subgroup, consisting of 8 villages, is forced to abandon homesteads and entire possessions. In order to ensure entry into the ancestor's country, other subgroups consider it necessary, to make the appropriate preparations for internment within the house, while the patient is still breathing, sometimes to the extent of forcing him to die in the exact (squatting) position he will occupy in his grave. The distribution of this custom coincides with others, limiting the attendance on a dying person to the nearest relations and the trouble taken to the barest minimum. The dead are greatly feared. Together these believes and customs form a "complex" to be mentioned again.

Another factor deciding the fate of the soul is the kind of death met with. Violent death of any description, excluding, however, in most cases suicide, is considered impure. Its victims are either abandoned or interred superficially at the place of accident. Their souls will never reach the ancestor's country, but hover for ever where they died, or where their property was abandoned, a permanent danger to all passers-by and a potential force of evil. The souls of the dead are supposed to possess a varying degree of power, sometimes limited to evil or to a small range of effect, not exceeding their own relations. The number of dead souls is infinite, including all people who ever lived.

The next world is called "utux'an", or whatever the local pronunciation of the word for soul or ancestors may be, plus the suffix 'an', denoting locality. Life there is thought to correspond with life on this plane and to be in some sense its continuation, even perpetuating village feuds. A notable exception is, however, that man is spared some of the more irksome inconveniences besetting him here. Thus it is said that one half or two thirds of the effort spent here will ensure full success over there. This belief is so firmly rooted in Atayal thinking that suicides of people disgusted with their luck, and feeling confident of an improvement hereafter, account for a large percentage in the high incidence of Atayal suicides.

The end of the journey to the land of the ancestors is marked by a bridge spanning a yawning abyss. Sometimes the rainbow is identified with it. On crossing this bridge, every man has to display his hands which ought to be stained with the blood of his head-hunting victims. Only if these stains prove irremovable in spite of vigorous scrubbing, is he admitted and joyously received by his ancestors. A successful headhunter's tattoo is the condition according to an other version. Women are only admitted, if they have been skillful and diligent weavers. People without the necessary skills are thrown from the bridge and perish. It is interesting that all people, not only men, are to undergo an examination and reflects Atayal thinking which does not discriminate between the sexes and has produced a very well balanced division of labour. On the other hand, the emphasis on headhunting and weaving gives us an indication of the temporal position this complex occupies in Atayal culture history. It was obviously introduced roughly at the same time as both these cultural traits which have become leitmotives of Atayal culture. The problem is now to determine whether they were already an integral part of Atayal culture at the time when we first get hold of it.

As far as weaving is concerned, the word used for it, is of common Indonesian stock and very ancient. The concept of weaving is, moreover, very closely connected with all terms appertaining to "soul" and "life". Thus the words denoting "good luck", at the same time
“friendly, benevolent spirit” and “inescapable fate” contain references to weaving. “To die” means literally “to stop weaving at the soul”. All this suggests considerable integration of the concept. In the same way the expressions used for head-hunting and litera

Concerning the distribution of these characteristic features, we are somewhat short of direct information. We can prove their presence in the Southwestern corner of the present Atayal habitat, from where migration took place. From this nuclear area numerous waves of migrations branched out to the Southwest, Northwest and Northeast. The original home of the Sedeq was slightly Southeast of the Atayal nucleus and their separation seems to date back very far. In determining the possible origin of the cultural complex we have in mind, the position of the Sedeq should prove important. Unfortunately sources at disposal do not state its exact distribution there. We are merely assured that Sedeq believes do not essentially differ from those reported in this respect from other areas. An exception is the village of Batakan. There the complex must exist, because we are told that the bridge into the ancestor’s country is called Papaq Waqá. This is the name of a mountain peak in the far West, round which the flood-myth of the Atayal proper centers. However, the people of Batakan only use this name as a synonym of xakau-utux, the “soulbridge” and are no longer aware that it is the name of a real locality. A further place quoted as landmark en route, also points to a real locality further West. So far all evidence points to the West, or more exactly to the small nuclear area, where Atayal and Sedeq first lived and strongly suggests that the complex was part of Atayal culture before its expansion.

It is, however, generally assumed that head-hunting and the more complex form of weaving spread in the course or wake of some Megalithic culture. Paradoxically all evidence of Megalithic cultures is in Formosa, so far, strictly limited to the Eastcoast and its hinterland. Is it, therefore, conceivable that Megalithic thinking, in this case implying ancestor worship and our complex, may have spread contrary to the course of Atayal expansion in an East-Westerly direction, set off by impulses received from contact with people either in possession of a Megalithic culture or knowing of it? If this proves correct, the bearers of these impulses can only have been Sedeq. In favour of this hypothesis we submit that the habitat of the Sedeq extended down to the Eastcoast, before it was reduced. Their subsequent head-

hunting expeditions to this area, later inhabited by sinicized tribes and Ami should have also provided some opportunity of getting acquainted with ideologies originally foreign to them. It is furthermore established by means of genealogies that there was definitely some revertive movement of population from East of the Central Range to the West.

Lastly, there is the evidence of a further and distinctive layer of beliefs and related customs which had a catastrophic impact on Atayal culture. It is the before mentioned complex, characterized by extreme fear of the dead and minimum burial practices, in turn followed by abandonment of the dwelling-site and the entire property. The consequences of this procedure on Atayal culture are obvious and are amongst others responsible for the observed retrogression and dis-integration of Atayal culture. Interment within the house was general in Formosa, before prohibited as unhygienic by the Japanese Occupational Authorities. With the other tribal groups it was, however, an expression of their deep emotional connection with the dead with whom one formed an eternal entity. Fear never entered into this relationship and nobody thought it necessary to leave a dwelling-site just because one’s dead were buried there. An explanation of the very different Atayal situation with reference to the generally ambivalent attitude to the dead is unsatisfactory. Likewise does the answer that a significant distinction is made between those died recently and those dead already a long time, meet only part of the problem.

We must therefore assume at least two main streams of religious conceptions and related customs for the Atayal. The later one shows definitely evidence of being overlayed and therefore older, in all places where it occurs. We may one day be able to associate it with those elements in Atayal genealogy which cannot be identified with any known line of descent. Pending further information, we may adopt the working hypothesis that the second and presumably younger complex reached the Atayal from the East, but before their general expansion and via the Sedeq who had already parted from them.

At the same time it is not suggested that the other complex, characterized by fear, represents necessarily the original belief of all Atayal or the religion of the people found in the area by them. Further research may throw light on these problems.

In closing, one more feature of Atayal thinking should be mentioned. As shown in an other paper*, almost every local group identifies the place

to where their souls retire (the ancestors land) with a real geographical locality. Corpses are laid out in the direction which they are supposed to take to this destination. A detailed study treating every case on record, reveals a close relation between this imaginary ancestors land and actual tribal history. The location of the next world coincides either with the original village with which they may have been out of contact for many generations, or a specially important place on route to their present site. Very often the imaginary journey of the dead retraces with startling faithfulness the progress of the individual migration of their ancestors although they themselves are no longer aware of this fact. I might add that this trait is to varying degrees apparent in all Formosan Mountain tribes.

Basing on religious concepts and their associated customs we have attempted to throw some light on tribal and cultural history. In process we have again been made aware of the decisive rôle religion plays on all aspects of a people's culture and on its very life.

Note: After having read the above paper at the Congress, additional evidence of a further megalithic center in Central Formosa (Hori) has been brought to my knowledge. In the light of this information it now seems highly probable that the deep colouring of Atayal culture with megalithic thinking was effected from this center prior to Atayal dispersal. The differences in the respective believes and customs between Atayal proper and Sedeq, and some significant variations found amongst the widely dispersed Atayal themselves should prove due to contacts with the Eastcoast megalithicum. I am deeply grateful to the Editing Committee of the Congress for kindly allowing me to publish this addition.

PROPHETISM AND MESSIANIC BELIEFS
AS A PROBLEM OF ETHNOLOGY
AND WORLD HISTORY

BY
WILHELM KOPPERS

Among the tribal peoples, and particularly those of America, Africa and Oceania, certain revolutionary movements and currents have long been known that have come to be designated as Messianism and Prophetism.

In the past such movements were studied on a geographically limited scale that confined them to particular parts of the world. Recently, however, an Italian author, Dr. G. Guariglia, has completed a study on this subject that has a universal basis. The manuscript was written in Vienna and bears the title: “Prophetismus und Heilserwartungsbewegungen bei den Naturvölkern Amerikas, Ozeaniens, Australiens. Mit einem Anhang über Asien” - Prophetism and Expectations of Salvation Among the Natives of America, Oceania and Australia, with an Appendix covering Asia. In view of certain facts that have now become better known, the author has intentionally added to the title the word “Heilserwartung”, that is, the expectation of salvation. These movements and currents are not always a question of messianism or prophetism, but more often simply the faith or belief associated with one or another of the expectations of salvation or some similar and related movement.

As far as tribes are concerned, an almost general characteristic of these movements is that they are anti-European, thus directed against all white men and often also against their religion, against Christianity, both protestantism and catholicism. We shall see, however, that this general feature also has its exceptions.

A brief survey of the whole problem will first be made. To this end the work of Dr. Guariglia will be basic. He has kindly given permission to make use of his material, for which I wish to thank him here.

1. North America

As early as 1675 in southwestern North America a medicine man
named Pope led his fellow Pueblo Indians in a rebellion against the Spanish. Of particular significance, however, was the Ghost-Dance movement that appeared much later, beginning in 1869, and again in the territory of the United States. It is known that because of the alienation of land and the decimation of the bison herds, the position of the Indians had become increasingly critical and precarious. The primary aim of this movement, which was partly carried by an eschatological and messianic momentum, was the resurrection of the dead Indians and the annihilation of the white man. The name Ghost-Dance movement was selected because the resurrected Indians were expected to join the dancers in the form of spirits. The Ghost-Dance movement spread through fifteen North American Indian tribes. In 1890 the Sioux Chief, Sitting Bull, at that time the prophet and leader of the movement, was killed. The disappointment and disillusion resulting from his death signified the end of the movement. A noteworthy fact is that the Navaho Indians rejected the entire Ghost-Dance movement because, within the context of their religious beliefs, they could not desire the return to life of the dead.

2. Mexico and Central America

With regard to pre-Columbian Mexico the legend of the "White Saviour" who was expected to come from the East, deserves our attention. It will be a task for future research workers to determine if there is concrete confirmation here indicating a relationship with the Old World. On the other hand, it is known that after the conquest of Mexico by the Spaniards a prophetical "Heilserwartung" movement also appeared here, a movement that was similarly oriented against Europeans, European culture, and Christianity. The principal aim of this movement were the removal of all innovations, the reintroduction of old customs and order, the return of the god of prosperity and happiness accompanied by the deceased ancestors, the massacre of the white man, and the establishment of an earthly paradise with an abundance of all desirable possessions and without labour or pain or sorrow – in short, a chiliastic conception.

3. South America

The oldest known liberation movement in South America took place in the Cauca Valley, Columbia, in 1576. The movement was of a prophetical nature and was directed against the Spanish intruders and their religion, Christianity. They were all to be swallowed up by an enormous flood following which a life of freedom, peace and prosperity would be established on the Indians' native soil. The Spaniards were able to suppress the movement.

In other parts of South America, especially in Paraguay and Brazil, the migrations of the Guarani-Tupi became famous; their aim was to discover "the land without evil and without death" lying somewhere in the East. Among the first migrations were those of the Tupinambas which took place between 1530 and 1612. The Tupinambas quit the region of Pernambuco in order to escape Portuguese subjugation. Other groups evacuated those parts of Paraguay in which their ancestors had come in contact with Christianity, particularly through the reservations set up by the Jesuits. This circumstance fully verifies the fact that these movements were also influenced by the presence of strong Christian elements. These migrations lasted about four hundred years and during this time vast areas of Brazil were crossed and recrossed. Thus, here, too, a main factor to consider is the advances of the invading white men from whom these people endeavored to escape. These Indians are filled with a pervading pessimism. Their medicine men appear often also as prophets; they are supposedly in contact with mythical beings who are the bringers of salvation. A final cataclysm, the destruction of the world, is feared, but this will be followed, it is believed, by a restoration (the "land without evil"). In the background there is still an earthly paradise in the form of a chiliastic conception.

4. Africa

The prophetical movements in Africa connected with Islam will be left unreviewed. Moreover, it can be stated that the Pygmies, the Bushmen, the Hereros, as well as certain tribes in parts of East and West Africa and in the Spanish colonies in Africa have remained free from all such prophetical movements.

In the remainder of Africa and in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and reaching into the present, numerous prophetical movements have developed which, generally speaking, were directed – and to some extent are still directed – against European influences and partly also against Christianity. As a general rule, these movements in Africa have somehow been connected with protestant missionary activities. Earlier research has established that the main reason for this is linked to the known fact that protestant missionaries attribute such a prominent place to the Bible and Bible reading. It would appear that the Bible stories, especially those of the Old Testament, have often acted as a stimulant.

Through these movements native protestant churches were founded.
In 1884 (1896) the so-called “Ethiopian Church”, a branch of the American Methodist Episcopal Church, was founded in southern East Africa (Rhodesia). The designation, “Ethiopian”, has nothing to do in this case with Ethiopia, but simply serves here as an equivalent for “African”. In 1898 the American Negro, Bishop Turner, was called to Rhodesia for the purpose of reorganising this “Ethiopian Church”. Bishop Turner is the creator of the slogan, “Africa for the Africans”, a phrase which has never been repressed and which can be heard more clearly today than at any other time.

Finally, there are the movements which were started by the protestant Hottentot, Hendrick Witbooi (1880-1905) who belonged to the so-called Rheinland Mission. Hendrick Witbooi tried to create enthusiasm among his people for a migration to the north, where a “paradise-like, beautiful country” awaited him and all those who believed and followed him. The parallel, at least from a purely external point of view, with the South American Guarani-Tupi movement is striking, for they, too, were in search of the “land without evil and without death”.

5. Oceania

Oceania has also experienced such “Heilserwartung” movements, especially on the island of New Guinea and in the remaining part of Melanesia. They are also found, but to a lesser extent, in Polynesia and Micronesia, while for Australia only one example is currently known.

In Oceania these movements are also connected with the activities of Europeans, and partly with missionary efforts, both Catholic and Protestant. Therefore they are not exclusively connected here, as they are in Africa, with protestant activities.

The first pertinent reports date from the year 1855. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the movements increase in number, especially during the critical periods resulting from the effects of the two World Wars.

Although these movements are generally in some way hostile to Europeans, they are usually not directed primarily against their material goods. These are very much appreciated, even desired – the creations of modern science such as large steamships and aeroplanes not excluded. There is even the belief, which among the Oceanians is fairly widespread, that all these products of the Europeans actually originate from the ancestors of the natives. The ancestors manufacture these things and send them to their people, but the Europeans know how to prevent the delivery of these goods to the natives; one of their methods is that of changing the names and addresses on the packing cases.

It can be seen that the ancient ancestor cult constitutes a strong and decisive factor in the Heilserwartung beliefs of Oceanian tribes. The Japanese knew how to use this circumstance to their advantage when, during the Second World War, they landed on New Guinea in 1942. To the New Guinea natives they could represent themselves as their returned ancestors. They, the Japanese, were naturally much better people than the Europeans and the Americans, and the natives should thus have every reason to ally themselves to the Japanese side.

From observations based on conditions in Oceania, and especially those in Melanesia, it was believed that “Heilserwartung” movements, that expectations of salvations were found only among people with some form of cultivation, however primitive. This is true for a majority of cases, but not all cases. This generalization is made untenable not only by the fact that the primitive hunting tribes of North Australia have a peculiar eschatological faith (a belief in the end of the world) and a corresponding movement, but also by the appearance of similar beliefs and movements among the North American hunters already discussed. We will return to this question again later on.

In connection with the distribution of the desired and appreciated material goods mentioned above, including those things believed to have been provided by the ancestors, a new term, that of “cargo cult”, was coined. The term characterized the conception that the allotment of goods would, to a certain extent, be accomplished by automatic means, that is, through transport by large ships. Accuracy, however, demands the statement that this mechanical interpretation was not as widespread as has been frequently believed. More prevalent by far are those cases in which not purely material goods, but goods of a spiritual nature are expected, usually through the mediation of a Heilbringer – a bringer of prosperity and happiness.

It is by no means uninteresting to note here that conceptions related to the cargo cult can still be found today in Hindu India. Among the uneducated groups there is the belief that the inventions, discoveries and achievements which have made the West so powerful were known to the Indians of the Vedic period. The monkey god, Hanuman, who carries a flaming mountain, is believed to have really handled the first atom bomb; the “flying beds” (udan khatli) of Hindu mythology are believed to have been early aeroplanes; the secret of penicillin is believed to have been learned from India’s sacred books. Unfortunately all these achievements have been forgotten – and this because of European machinations. Max Müller is accused of having reserved the reading
of the Vedas for himself so that the Indians have completely forgotten them.

6. **Asia**

The data concerning the "Heilserwartung" movements in Asia have not yet been sufficiently examined. Since the present discussion grants prominence to those native movements relative to Europe and Europeans, all derivations attributable to Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Lamaism will be excluded.

The few examples of prophetical and messianic movements that are known to have occurred among those native groups influenced by Europeans fit well into the pattern with which we are now familiar. Examples of this kind have been reliably described for the Altai-Turks and the Munda tribes of eastern India.

In 1904 a native prophet initiated a "Heilserwartung" movement among the Altai-Turks that was clearly oriented against the Russians and their priests, although the movement was also permeated strongly by Christian elements. Recent research reports have not confirmed the Russian assertion that this movement had been inspired by the Japanese. A similar movement among the Austroasiatic Munda tribes of Chota Nagpur, India, appeared in the first decades of the nineteenth century and was directed against the British administration.

Let us try now, on a temporary basis, to draw some valid conclusions from the material that has been presented here. I say "on a temporary basis" because, according to a reasonable estimate, we have at our disposal about a thousand individual reports concerning such movements among native peoples, of which barely two hundred have been examined. Wherever such sources are available they must all, of course, be examined, but this has not yet been possible. Thus, any conclusions can only be drawn with certain reservations. But these can be useful in making us aware of questions that have until now either never been considered or have never been given sufficient attention. For this reason, and from a methodological point of view, they can prove to be particularly instructive.

**Conclusions**

1. I wish to emphasize again that only those expectations of salvation, only those "Heilserwartung" movements fall within the scope of this discussion that in the course of the last 450 years have resulted from the contact of natives with Europeans. Therefore, those movements that originated directly through Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, et cetera, are excluded. It is not known whether the native peoples referred to here were subject to such movements prior to the arrival of Europeans. The Mexican legend of the White Saviour, which was certainly known earlier, constitutes an exception and, at the same time, a problem for future research.

Generally speaking, sooner or later, and together with the Europeans, the Christian missionaries also came, both the Catholics and the Protestants.

2. Within the range of the pertinent factual material that could be reviewed all "Heilserwartung" movements are in some way induced by European culture and by the principal religion of Europe, Christianity. In some cases they are also more or less strongly influenced by European culture and Christianity. This is undoubtedly interesting and instructive, especially from the standpoint of the study of interrelationships, on which the discipline of ethnology and prehistory are always particularly dependent. The obvious advantage in this present case is the availability of reports which are sufficiently numerous and moreover encompass a fairly broad span of time.

3. In spite of these advantages we must guard against hasty and inadmissible generalizations and simplifications. The problems which face us here are preferably and correctly referred to as problems of acculturation. It is easy to show how difficult and complicated the aspects of the problem are. The main components with which we are concerned cannot be seen as complete and unified structures. This is certainly true of the various non-literate groups. But this is also true for the various European people, the colonizers. This is, in fact, also true for their religion, which is split into two main groups, catholic and protestant. On the other hand a certain unity can still be said to exist. In one sense this unity is what is understood when the term Occident or the phrase Western culture is used; in another sense it is the Christian religion of salvation which is the same for both catholic and protestant missionaries.

The unity with which we are here concerned has also been clearly seen by Katesa Schlosser, who made an especially detailed study of this present problem. In her article, "Der Prophetismus in niederen Kulturen" she writes: "The most astonishing thing about the teachings of the prophets is the similarities, in many cases the alikeness of the teachings regardless of religion or geographic area." (Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, Volume 75, pages 60-71; see page 67).

4. It appears that among the "Heilserwartung" movements a
differentiation must be made between the basic tendencies that continually recur and the individual manifestations that strongly vary. One of the basic tendencies or elements is the feeling of inferiority found among aboriginals that expresses itself in the conviction that they are being exploited and oppressed. The idea of salvation is most often taken from the Christian religion in a distorted and mutilated form in which it can become a contradiction of Christianity.

The basic and main tendencies of the "Heilerwartung" movements can ultimately and positively be traced to contacts with Europeans; these tendencies are partly negatively oriented and, at least to a certain extent, partly positively oriented. That is, salvation and liberation are desired, but the attainment of this salvation and liberation is desired without any help from foreigners.

5. That single manifestations can vary has already been emphasized. In this connection it has recently been pointed out that on the basis of such "Heilerwartung" movements there is one particular manifestation which has been noticed among various non-literate groups, a manifestation that in spite of its external similarities cannot be interpreted as resulting from culture contact or cultural relationship, but must be regarded as an independent development. I am referring to the killing of domestic animals such as pigs and dogs, the destruction of gardens, etcetera, manifestations that have been noticed in South Africa, North America, Melanesia and the Philippine Islands. The individual manifestations of this kind from New Guinea and from North America, for example, certainly cannot be placed in direct relationship to one another. But the question is whether the correspondence of the individual manifestations can be attributed to the likeness or the similarity of the basic tendencies. Often connected with thoughts of deliverance and salvation are those thoughts of an eschatological and chiliastic nature, and thus not far removed from the thoughts of an expected earthly paradise are those of the destruction of presently existing things.

6. Yet it must be recognized that in these latter cases it is not methodologically permissible simply to arrange the manifestations in a mutual relationship. The question arises whether or not it is possible to come nearer a solution by attempting to establish, whenever possible, a criterion of quantity through the discovery of several interrelated culture elements. A fact to consider is that such remarkable customs as the killing of domestic animals are repeatedly found precisely in association with those movements which on the basis of main tendencies already have much in common. In relation to the present question

Lowie has expressed himself remarkably in his article, "Le Messianisme Primitif, Contribution à un problème d’Ethnologie" published in Diogène, Number 19, July 1957, pages 1-15. He first stresses that in regard to innumerable cases there can be no doubt concerning diffusion and cultural relationship. But he makes exceptions precisely in those cases with which we have here been concerned. Lowie is undoubtedly right in refusing to acknowledge a direct interrelationship between the individual phenomenon such as the killing of domestic animals, etcetera. But he is not right in considering them as independent cultural parallels and as independent developments. He has overlooked the fact that these phenomena are always associated with particular culture groupings. This fact cannot be ignored and demands an explanation.

7. I would like to conclude this presentation with a summary of what can currently be said about the "Heilerwartung" movements particularly in regard to the aspects of scientific method. The nature of the subject demands an extension in both space and time. But my task now is not to enter into details, for this would carry me too far. Perhaps it will serve to broaden and to deepen our understanding, and provide a clearer and more impressive formulation of the whole problem if, at least, I make the following observations.

8. A recent valuable monograph concerning the important complex designated as "Russian messianism" has been written by Dr. Emanuel Sarkisyantz; it was published in Tübingen in 1955 and is entitled "Russland und der Messianismus des Orients: Sendungsbewusstsein und politischer Chiliansmus des Ostens." It is evident in this case that one of the main components of the complex is intimately connected with Christianity, not with its western, but with its eastern variant. It is also evident that Russian messianic beliefs survive primarily through opposition to western Christianity. In this sense the watchword is permitted: Neither the first Rome, nor the second Rome (Constantinople), but only the third Rome (Moscow) has validity. Characteristic of Russian messianic beliefs is the feeling of inferiority. This feeling of inferiority is not only found in Russian messianism but also in the Russian personality itself, and in the past this has repeatedly played a comparatively important role. It is problematical whether or not the technical achievements in Russia during the recent past have changed the bases for the assumptions that have been made. No one can say when or how or if there will be other sequences and effects. Yet it appears to be worthy of note that Sarkisyantz is forced to record significant current changes in Russian messianism. This is not to detract from his work, which has particular significance in the ideological battle
occasioned by the existence of Communism.

9. It is well known that Islam considers itself a prophetic religion. Today there is no longer any doubt among scholars concerning Islam's strong dependence on Judaism and an even stronger dependence on Christianity. Thus much more understandable, is the fact that Islam, in a way similar to Christianity, has repeatedly occasioned prophetic-messianic movements in areas of Africa and Asia (Indonesia). Sarkisyanz devotes a considerable part of his book to this fact and he does so in an instructive manner. Briefly summarizing, he writes: "Even up to the present day popular Islamic belief anticipates and expects the appearance of the Mahdi who, sanctioned and led by God, will be the bearer of the universal revolution that will mark the end of history, a revolution that will smother the present godless unjust world in an ocean of blood, a revolution that will win the entire world for Islam and fill it with justice in the same way as it is now filled with injustice and oppression."

10. No additional proofs are necessary to demonstrate that Christianity itself, in its very essence, that is, with regard to its doctrine of salvation, is rooted in the Old Testament and therefore in Judaism. Viewed in this way the "Heilserwartung" movements among non-literate that were described in the first part of this paper can finally be traced by one of their main roots far back into pre-Christian time.

11. But even this does not seem to finalize the problem. Farther east, in India, doctrines of salvation appear between 700 and 500 BC. Quite naturally the question arises whether or not there is any relationship between those of the eastern Mediterranean and those of India. There can be no doubt that just as there are single superficial similarities there are also differences at fundamental points. While the doctrine of salvation of the Old Testament is a deliverance from moral evil (from sin) that is thought and believed to be effected by the Godhead through the intentional and free-willed cooperation of man, the Indian doctrines of salvation concern self-salvation that is allegedly achieved primarily through right knowledge. In spite of this basic difference there may be connections between the Indian and Mediterranean systems. Such connections have often been assumed, but in my opinion they have not yet been convincingly verified.

12. In the course of this exposition we have occasionally come across the fact that the so-called ethnologically old population groups, (the primitive hunters and gatherers), such as the Pygmies, the Bushmen, and generally also the Australian aboriginals, have had no "Heilserwartung" movements. The fact that these so-called "remnant peoples" of the world live in places difficult access, confirms, of course, our thesis, that, really speaking, the movements referred are due to European influence. But it cannot be said that all hunters and gatherers have remained free of such movements and ideas. The well-known North American conditions, in particular those obtaining in California and in the plains area, contradict such an assertion. But it must be realized here that favourable economic conditions (acorn harvests and bison herds) could not only make it possible for large numbers of people to live together, they could also facilitate the origin and spread of such prophetic movements (Ghost-Dance!). Apparently, however, we are dealing here with exceptions.

13. Finally, it seems noteworthy that though the ethnologically old peoples generally lack "Heilserwartung" movements, it is precisely among such groups that a belief in an ethical High God is relatively widespread. It is to professor Father Wilhelm Schmidt's special merit that he brought convincing proof for this in the twelve volumes of his well-known work, "Der Ursprung der Gottesidee". A worthy acknowledgment of this grand achievement has recently been given by E. A. Hoebel (Man in the Primitive World, Second edition. Now York 1958, p. 552) in the following words: "The indefatigable Austrian anthropologist Wilhelm Schmidt has confirmed it with his stupendous four volume (recte: twelve volume) work Der Ursprung der Gottesidee." It has often been said, and to my thinking rightly so, that it is difficult for us to imagine that the palaeolithic humans were essentially different from these ethnologically old people. The conclusion that naturally follows, that palaeolithic man was a complete man, fully man, a culture-building man provided with the same or at least similar religious equipment or capabilities, cannot be seriously doubted.

But this thought will not be followed any further. The last question which interests us here is whether, perhaps, it can be implied that, on the basis of the belief in a high god found among ethnologically old people, they also had a kind of soteriology that would make a doctrine of salvation, in the formal sense of the word, unnecessary. On page 396 of the sixth volume of "Der Ursprung der Gottesidee" Wilhelm Schmidt points out that the idea that at the end of time God would return in order to restore "those happy times" (of the beginning) is rarely found in the religions of his "Urkulturen" or primitive cultures. Such ideas are found among some of the Andaman Islanders, among the Maidus of north-central California, and among some Selish tribes. Such scanty information cannot, naturally, be used as convincing proof
for the presence of a general doctrine of salvation among the ethnologically old peoples. In connection with this Eliade expresses a thought which deserves our attention. "It follows," he writes, "that the apparent lack of ideas found among primitive cultures does not prove that they are incapable of theoretical thinking, but that they have a 'style of thinking' which is very different from the speculative efforts and the way of thinking of the Greeks. One can also find among the ethnologically less developed tribes (among the Australians, the Pygmies, the Tierra del Fuegians, et cetera) a complete system of interrelated and interdependent truths. This total system does not only represent a "Weltanschauung" or world view, it also represents a pragmatic ontology (one could say soteriology), in that man, with the help of these truths, attempts to save himself, attempts to orient and incorporate and coordinate himself with this reality." (Mircea Eliade, "Die Religionen und das Heilige." Salzburg, 1954. Pages 59 f.)

With this I conclude my exposition. I hope to have indicated that, as far as the state of present research allows, the science of ethnology, when methodologically properly applied, is capable of making and is entitled to make an important contribution to the most significant problems and questions of humanity. Above all, where problems and questions of world history are to be treated, the services of ethnology, I believe, simply cannot be dispensed with.*

* It might interest readers to learn that Dr. Guariglia's book is now in press and will be shortly published in Vienna by Verlag Ferdinand Berger, Horn-Wien, Austria, under the title of "Prophetismus und Heilserwartungs-bewegungen als völkerkundliches und religions-geschichtliches Problem".

THE TWO TYPES OF KINSHIP RITUALS AMONG MALAYO-POLYNESIAN PEOPLES

BY

TOICHI MABUCHI

In older anthropology, some institutional emphasis on a particular relation with maternal relatives under a patrilineal system was regarded as a vestige of a matrilineal system in the past. During the last few decades, however, more elaborate studies on kinship systems in various parts of the world have raised a number of problems along different ways of approach. The present paper intends to differentiate two types of kinship rituals which involve affinity relation between unilateral kin groups and to compare them with each other and additionally with similar instances among other peoples than the Malayo-Polynesian. While the kinship systems of Malayo-Polynesian peoples are in the main bilateral without any bias toward either the paternal or the maternal side, unilateral trends come to the front in rather discontiguous areas, thus more or less overshadowing this bilateral character. Leaving aside the more dispersed "matrilineal areas", we shall focus our attention on what may be called the "patrilineal areas" in both Malaysia and Oceania where two types of kinship rituals are respectively found, in somewhat sharp contrast with each other.

First, we shall deal with the instances from the Bunun and Tsou central among whom there is a grading series of patrilineal kin organization, from patrilineage, via sub-clan and clan, up to phratry. Solidarity of respective patrilineal kin group is emphasized also in grading series in both secular and ritual life, and the phratry among the Bunun and the clan among the Tsou is an exogamous unit1). In those overtly patrilineal societies, it deserves attention that a certain bond of relationship with the maternal patri-clan is not only recognized but also emphasized in various aspects of life. In this regard, it is important to note here the spiritual or magical authority of members of the maternal patri-clan over the children of their clanswomen who have married out. And the blessing or curse of the maternal relatives

1) Mabuchi 1952.
is though to be highly efficacious.

The bond of relationship between the child and its maternal patri-clan is affirmed positively soon after the child is born. It is necessary repeatedly to reinforce and strengthen the bond of relationship with the maternal patri-clan in order to assure the efficacy of their benediction so that the child may grow healthily. This assurance is constantly sought in a series of rituals which continues even after the child is grown up; members of the maternal clan are invited to a feast on those occasions, and occasionally gifts are presented to or exchanged with them. As the Bunun express it, these gifts are “presents for looking after one” or “presents for being affectionate”, implying the expectation that members of the maternal patri-clan or their spirits will take care of or show affection to the child. The bond thus established with the maternal patri-clan continues into adult life. One must always be cautious and respectful to them, because while they have the power to oversee and protect, they themselves or their spirits may become angry and can bring evil influences to bear. They stand also in the position of supervisor and they may curse one for one’s outrageous behaviour. Nevertheless the primary expectation is that the ideal maternal relatives indulge, aid, and warmly entertain the children of their married-out clanswomen.

It is not the place here to enter into details of rituals assuring the bond of relationship with maternal patri-clan. However, very important and significant to the later discussion is a certain ritual of the Bunun which they simply call “the exchange” or the “ritual of exchange”. It is held within a year after the eldest child, irrespective of whether it is male or female, is born. Shortly after the feast celebrating the first-born child in which the members of the maternal patri-clan dwelling in adjacent hamlets come to participate, the parents and the baby accompanied by some family-members of clansmen visit the mother’s natal family and when possible, other families of the maternal relatives, and present usually iron implements and occasionally basketry or pottery made by the male, and each family of the maternal relatives gives in return a pig to the baby. In connection with the items of these gifts, it may be remembered here that several times during her married life a woman receives present of a pig from her natal family. She raises it and when it is fattened she uses it in a feast for her husband’s clan-members. On the other hand, a large quantity of millet-beer is brewed in her husband’s family, and the members of both the husband’s clan and the wife’s natal clan come to attend the feast. While the members of the wife’s natal clan are forbidden to partake of the pork concerned, the members of the husband’s clan politely serve the former with millet-beer.

Such items of gift or feast may be reminiscent of the so-called male and female gifts in both Malaysia and Oceania.

The spiritual predominance of maternal relatives under a patrilineal system as found in central Formosa has its parallels, if not counterparts, in the “patrilineal areas” of Indonesia, namely, among the Batak of central Sumatra and in various localities of eastern Indonesia. And the kinship system in its ideal pattern may be summarized as the following: several, at least three, patrilineal clans stand in a circulating marriage relation in such a way that clan A is the bride-receiving group with respect to clan B and a bride-giving group with respect to clan C, while clan B and C in turn are respectively bride-receiving and bride-giving groups toward each other, or some clan or clans other than A; asymmetrical cross-cousin marriage, i.e., marriage with mother’s brother’s daughter is prescribed or preferred, so that sisters or daughters is automatically excluded; and in connection with this circulating marriage relation there is latent or traced back to the past, a sort of double unilateral descent, into which, however, we shall not enter here, because the problem is not very relevant to the present discussion. In any case, such a marriage relation is fairly different from that of central Formosa where marriage with the members of the maternal patri-clan is also forbidden and thus, maternal relatives are not the bride-giving group in the children’s generation. Furthermore, the exchange of sisters or daughters is somewhat frequent in central Formosa, or there is often found there what may be called “delayed exchange” in which the family or clan B gives a woman to the family or clan A and afterward demands in return a woman from A in the second descending generation. In Indonesia, however, it is not certain to what an extent the reality conforms with the above-mentioned ideal pattern. In Tanimbar of eastern Indonesia, only the eldest son is usually prescribed to marry mother’s brother’s daughter, so that the circulating marriage relation is not consistently observed by all the children in each generation. By the way, in west Sumba where the existence of a manifest double unilateral
descent system is recently reported\(^6\), it is rather usual to marry father’s sister’s daughter instead of mother’s brother’s daughter, thus, the marriage relation is not circulating and unidirectional, but bidirectional, a situation somewhat reminiscent of the trends found in central Formosa.

Meanwhile, it deserves notice that in Indonesia there is found a widespread distinction between the male gifts and female gifts which are offered in exchange respectively from the bride-receiving group and the bride-giving group on various occasions such as that of the marriage ceremony, rituals for the children and so on, each with some magico-spiritual implications similar to those found in central Formosa. The male and female gifts here consist of those goods produced by or belonging to the male and female respectively. Among the Batak, male gifts are called “knife” and female gifts “cloth”, each term representing respectively iron implements or other male goods and textiles or other female goods. In Tanimbar, male gifts include palm-wine, the yield of fishing and hunting, ornaments for men, and weapons, while the female gifts consist of textiles, the crops of farming, and ornaments for women. Leaving aside some probable fluctuation in kinship system, it would be possible to characterize the kinship rituals of Indonesia by referring to the two features as the following: on the one hand, spiritual predominance of the bride-giving group (including maternal clan members) over the bride-receiving group (including those born of the married-out clanswomen of the former) and on the other hand, the presentation of male and female gifts in definite direction, the former from the bride-receiving group and the latter from the bride-giving group\(^7\). We shall tentatively call such a kind of kinship ritual the “Indonesian type”. And the instances from central Formosa seem to be akin to this type.

The instances reminiscent of the Indonesian type are found among the Waropen of West New Guinea on the one hand\(^8\) and among the Kachin of Upper Burma and several ethnic groups in Assam such as Rengma Naga, Lushai and Old Kuki on the other\(^9\).

In some islands of western Polynesia and marginal Melanesia such as Samoa, Tonga, Fiji and the Admiralties, the situation is in a sense the reverse of what is found in Indonesia\(^10\): sisters and their descendants in the female line spiritually predominate over the brothers and their descendants in the male line. At the same time, both the male and female gifts are exchanged along the same lines and directions as in Indonesia, with magico-spiritual implications of similar kinds. With these two features as focal points of reference, we may be able to speak here about the “Oceanian type”. In these islands of central Oceania, genealogical relation, in both the male and the female line, is primarily an important factor in tracing the kinship relation, and such a situation is unfavourable to the development of a well-defined unilateral kin group such as the clan which transcends and partially neglects genealogical ties. However, those related in the male line live in a contiguous locality and tend to collaborate with each other in economic and political affairs, whereas those related in the female line disperse in various localities. Secular privileges are mainly kept and inherited in the male line and patrilineal relatives tend to form somewhat vaguely defined patrilineage. Nevertheless, sisters and their descendants are not disregarded but respected in various ways, and furthermore they are thought to have the power to bless or curse the brothers and their descendants. The general trend may be summarized that “neither the male nor female line is completely disinherited; the former inherits temporal power, the latter spiritual” (Mead 1934). Moreover, especially in Tonga and Fiji, indulgence to the sister’s son is emphasized to such an extent that he is privileged to take any property belonging to the maternal uncle. However, the range of “descendants” in either the male or the female line is highly variable between the islands. Thus, in Samoa, a distinction between the descendants respectively of the male and the female line continues for a number of generations because of the regulation prohibiting marriage between genealogically traceable relatives, whereas third cousins in the Admiralties and cross-cousins in Fiji are permitted or even preferred to marry each other and consequently both the male and the female lines perpetually converge and diverge. In Tonga, while cross-cousin marriage is not rare among nobles, commoners disfavour marriage between such near relatives. The distinction between male and female gifts is clearly recognized especially in Samoa and the Admiralties, while particularly in Fiji and to some extent also in Tonga, gift exchange seems to be less systematized in this regard.

Something partially reminiscent of the Oceanian type seems to be found in the Okinawan islands in that a belief in the magico-spiritual predominance of the sister over the brother is still existent\(^11\).  

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6) Wouden, van 1936.  
7) Ossenbruggen, van 1935; Kroef, van der 1934.  
8) Held 1947 and 1951.  
9) Lévi-Strauss 1949, chap. XVI–XVIII.  
10) Gifford 1929; Mead 1930; Mead 1934; Firth 1936.  
In some family rituals the sister of the head of the family comes to play an important role. In default of a sister, the father's sister will come, and even a daughter or son's daughter can substitute for such women. Legends tell about various events caused by the blessing or curse of a sister or father's sister, and historical documents record the important role of the sister or father's sister in agrarian rites, the vestige of which is still found in several localities. In Okinawan folklore, weaving seems to represent female activity or even the female principle, and it has been the custom to give her textiles, usually a towel, to her brother or brother's son in an emergency affecting him with a view to protecting him spiritually. It should be taken into account that all these women, from father's sister to son's daughter, are those exclusively related in the male line, not including the descendants of sister or father's sister. Certainly, most of the Okinawan islands remain unexplored in this regard, but in any case it would be premature unreservedly to classify Okinawan instances with the Oceanian type. Some Japanese folklorists have pointed out a number of features in folk beliefs and customs suggesting that the belief in the spiritual predominance of sister over brother presumably once prevailed in Japan proper, but we are not yet in a position to systematize these materials.

By comparing the instances from Tonga and Fiji with those of the Bathonga in southeast Africa, Radcliffe-Brown noticed the similar trend in kinship behaviour especially between mother's brother and sister's son in both areas, and he pointed out that under the patrilineal system as found among the Bathonga there is a tendency "to extend to all the members of the mother's group (family or lineage) a certain pattern behaviour of a son toward the mother" from whom "he expects care and indulgence" and "on the other hand it is to his paternal kin that he owes obedience and respect". And he compared the indulgent mother's brother of the Bathonga with that of the matrilineal Baila among whom mother's brother has a power even of life and death over his nephew and niece.

It may be added here that notwithstanding matrilineal descent the ancestral spirits of the father are mainly responsible for the welfare of the children and are appealed by them. It would be somewhat natural to find such trends respectively in patrilineal and matrilineal societies, and to add a supplementary instance, among the matrilineal Minagkabau of central Sumatra the paternal relatives are indulgent and generous toward the children, who feel quite at home among their paternal relatives in sharp contrast with their situation among their maternal relatives.

However, Radcliffe-Brown did not take into account the spiritual predominance of the sister and her descendants over the brother and his descendants in central Oceania on the one hand and the Indonesian type of kinship rituals on the other. In the latter, the bride-giving group or maternal relatives assume the role of patronship as well as supervisor and thus, they have a power to bless and curse the children born of the married-out clanswomen, naturally including sister's children. In Africa, too, we have at least two instances partially reminiscent of the Indonesian type: among the patrilineal Swazi of South Africa, a woman's ancestors may affect the health of herself and her children, though she enjoys a specially privileged position in the home of her married brother, and among the pastoral and patrilineal Nuer of the Upper Nile, the curse of a mother's brother is greatly feared especially because the cursed person may lose his entire herd of cattle, and a sister's son who fails to carry out certain duties or who fails to observe certain interdictions concerning his mother's brother may develop a serious disease which may be fatal.

It would deserve notice here that, after having compared the social structure of the Kachin with that of the Batak, Leach points out that the features of social structure of the Lovedu, south Africa, "reflect the Kachin pattern in reverse" and "in particular it appears that when there is a status difference between the 'wife giving' and 'wife receiving' local descent groups, it is the latter and not the former which rank the higher". And ideally six localized patrilineages marry "in a

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12) Yanagita 1940.
13) Radcliffe-Brown 1925; Junod 1936, 2e partie, chap. I-D.
14) Richards 1950.
circle with brides going one way and cattle the other," the mother's brother's daughter marriage being preferred to. But here the cattle seem to represent the male gift and the millet-beer from the side of wife giving group the female gift. Moreover, according to the authors of *The Realm of a Rain-Queen* to which Leach refers, "every sister is potentially priestess and guardian of her brother's household" and "the sister even wields a certain amount of authority in the house of her brother." 19) All these features are rather "Oceanian" in type, thus, "the Kachin pattern in reverse." And yet the authors tell about "the importance of the mother's side of the family" and "nothing of interest or importance takes place without their presence; even at the annual harvest beer offerings given to the gods on the father's side, relatives on the mother's side, who are not concerned in the religious aspect of the ceremony, will be present for the beer and social amenities." In this regard at least, we can notice a sort of respect institutionalized for the mother's side of relatives, that is, the wife-giving group.

By the way, the instances from the patrilineally oriented Lakher of southern Assam would deserve notice for their particular customs and beliefs as compared with those from the above-mentioned Rengma Naga, Lushi and Old Kuki which are suggestive of the Indonesian type. Among the Lakher, while a man failed to behave politely to his maternal uncle (and his wife) would certainly be involved in the payment of an "atonement price" and the maternal uncle is entitled to a share in any wild animal shot by his nephews, he in his turn has to give shares of any animal he shoots to his nieces and in default of his nieces, to his nephews. The maternal uncle is also bound to help his nephews and nieces if they are in distress, and it is to him that they turn for help even more than to their parents, and vice versa. Moreover, it is taboo for a maternal uncle to curse or insult his nephew, and insults and quarrels between maternal uncle and sister's son must be atoned by sacrifice, or terrible misfortune would occur 20). Such series of obligations as well as religious sanctions might be regarded as something ambivalent or intermediate between the Indonesian and Oceanian types.

In this connection, it would be well here to remember Hocart's remark on the Laws of Manu with regard to the selection of the persons who, in their capacity of vehicles of the departed spirits of paternal relatives, partake the sacrifice at the funeral feast. Besides the

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19) Krige & Krige 1947, Chap. V.
20) Parry 1932, Part III.
21) Hocart 1924.
22) Hocart 1915 and 1923.
23) Hocart gives attention to the Fijian term for cross-cousin, *tauvu*, implying "god to one another": "if a man is a representative of his mother's god or ghosts, he is a god to his cross-cousin, and since the relationship is reciprocal, his cross-cousins are gods to him" (Hocart 1923 and 1952, Chap. XXV). Where there prevails the women-exchange, including symmetrical cross-cousin marriage, as in Fiji, the distinction between the bride-giving and bride-receiving groups would become confused and blurred out to a large extent.

Brahmans and other religious functionaries, they are the mother's father, mother's brother, sister's son, father-in-law, daughter's son, son-in-law and 'maternal relation' of the feast-giver 21). Thus, they include the men of both the bride-giving and bride-receiving groups, but none of ego's group, i.e., the paternal relatives. Hocart compares this instance of India with those of Fijians, Tongans and the South African Bathonga among whom the mother's brother's son, daughter's son and more especially the sister's son consume the sacrifice in their capacity of representatives of the gods or the departed spirits 23). Except for the mother's brother's son, these features are rather Oceanian in type 23), whereas the case of the Manu seems to suggest a combination of or non-divergence between the Indonesian and Oceanian types as it were, both the bride-giving and bride-receiving groups being equally of ritual importance to each other. By taking into consideration all the instances as above, including those observed by Radcliffe-Brown, we might be able to postulate two possible lines of divergent development of the patronship of maternal relatives under patriline: in one direction, the generous or even indulgent aspect of the patronship might have been more and more emphasized, thus, leading to the Oceanian type, and in another direction, still preserving their patronship, the role of supervisor might have been more and more elaborated, thus, resulting in the specific power to bless or curse the children born of the married-out clanswomen, a situation corresponding to the Indonesian type. Yet, the kinship relations involved are viewed from somewhat different angles respectively in these two types: in the Oceanian type, the relation between brother and sister is the focal point, whereas in the Indonesian type the relation between the maternal kin group and the children of the married—out kind women that between the wife—giving group and the wife-receiving one comes to the front.
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INDONESIAN TYPE

- Inferior
- Superior
- More superior

A, B and C . . . . . the brother and his descendants in the male line respectively.
On the Concept of life after death, two types of belief are distinguished by E. B. Tylor: one is the concept of transmigration and the other is that of future life. Although the two belong to two different systems of thought, Tylor says, they are closely related in reality and they are distributed widely in the world. Each of them can be found at the most primitive stage and their traces are even in the higher religions. The concept of transmigration is further divided into that of reincarnation and of transmission to lower animals. And about future life he points out that the other world may be located on earth, in the west, underground, on the sun or the moon, and in heaven. They are treated in this order as if they appeared successively on the stages of evolution. He further points out, as to the quality of the life, the continuance theory and the retribution theory, the former of which is in vogue among primitive peoples (E. B. Tylor: P.C., 3rd ed., II, pp. 2-103). Although Tylor's theory of life after death, as stated above, is logically excellent, his historical investigation is not sufficient.

In the theory of the concept of future life by H. Spencer, the subject is considered in connection with the other elements of culture. For instance, he says that the formation of the idea of the nether world is based on the custom that cave-dwellers bury the dead in caves (H. Spencer: P.S., 5th ed., 1906, I, pp. 200f.) and that the formation of the orientation of the other world depends on the migration of peoples (pp. 201-8) and that from the relationship of the conqueror and the conquered appeared the idea of plural other worlds, etc. (pp. 208f)

W. Wundt studied more psychologically the relationship of the other world with the other elements of culture such as burial customs. First primitives perceived the Geisterdorf in the environment (Elemente, S. 392f), then the concept of the nether world is formed by facts like
fear towards the dead, the impression of the sunset, and the nature of the shadow soul (Elemente; S. 394–8) and that of heaven from the contraposition of the nether world, the custom of the platform burial and the ascension of psyche. (Elemente; S. 400–402).

There is another scholar who relates the idea of the other world located on the sea bottom with the sea burial and that of heaven with cremation. (E. Uno: Facts and theories of Religion, 1931, pp. 300f.)

II

As methodology, it is excellent to study the idea of life after death in connection with the other elements of culture. However, let us limit our subject here to the relationship of the idea with burial customs. It is probable that a psychological or logical relationship exists between a particular concept of life after death and a certain form of burial customs. We cannot deny it but since the religious ideas and customs in primitive society have their own historical background, the psychological relationship should only be traced and investigated in its original form. Further a religious idea is nothing but an idea, while burial customs are actual disposing methods of the dead, therefore we must admit as possible the case, in which the concept of life after death might have no relation with it at all.

Of primary concern for us here is the relationship in reality between the concepts of life after death and the burial customs in peoples. In this paper, putting aside the psychological viewpoint, I will report the result of an extensive historical and empirical examination on the coexistence of a particular form of the concept of the other world with a particular form of burial custom in Oceania. Although some scholars underestimate the extensive study method, I think this method inevitable when the study aims at historical solutions.

In what I call Oceania are included Indonesia, Melanesia, New Guinea, Australia, and Polynesia. The extent of the area seems to be too large, but it was necessary in order to get sufficient variety of phenomena. The cases collected from ethnography are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burial customs</th>
<th>Idea of life after death</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Guinea</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Melanesia</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polynesia</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>81</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

I tried to collect as many cases as possible and their number may be increased hereafter. Of course it is not desirable that the number of cases of burial customs is not equal to that of the concept of the other world. This is due to the descriptions of ethnography. The reasons why, nevertheless, I collected the cases are (1) that I wanted to show the scale of research by the number of cases, (2) that the cases on the one side seemed to be helpful in conjecturing the other side and (3) that they were important materials in tracing the distribution.

The way of the disposal of the dead is logically divided into two types: dry burial type and wet burial type. As to the former type, there exist such forms as cremation, platform or tree burial, mummification, burial exposing the dead, cave burial, and the burial of sepulchre. Interment and sea burial can be cited as the latter type. In fact, however, there are so many points to be considered, such as formal or informal burial, the differences by social position, sex, and age, the dead's posture and orientation, and the treatment of the dead's bones, that it is difficult to arrange them well. But the result I have arrived at by now is as follows.

III

(1) It is widely known that F. Graebner used the platform or tree burial type as an index for mapping out the western Papua culture circle. This burial type can be found in Central Australia and the Northern Territory, among such tribes as the Unmatjeras, Kaitishes, Warramungas, Gnanjis, Wadumans, and Forest River Tribes. Connected with this burial type are such elements as the extended position of the corpse, the ban of silence during the period of mourning, the custom of acquiring the power of the dead, double burial and the respect for the long bones, and no grave offerings. The soul of the dead is believed to return to the camp of the mythical ancestors after the disposal of the bones, but also to be reincarnated into this world again. This is the belief in the so-called spirit child. The platform burial type can be widely seen in New Guinea, Melanesia and Indonesia. Some keep the original form, but it is mostly found in a mixed form. The burial customs among the Gnanjis, Binbingas, Maras, Allauas, Uurlingararas and Karawa, are accompanied by the customs of endocannibalism and the installation of the bones on the platform, and also with the belief in reincarnation.

(2) In Southeast Australia, simple burials are generally practised. Both sitting position and extended position can be found. The sitting position is presumably due to the influence of an other type of culture and the original type was the extended position. The other world is in
heaven and it is clearly connected with the idea of a Supreme Being. I have collected about 20 such cases. However, in one part of Southeast Australia, relatively many cases of platform burial can be seen and also some of mummification (among the Unghis, Kurnais, Narrinjeris etc.). The existence of some cases of the belief in reincarnation concerning children among the Euahlayis etc. seems to be ascribable to the influence of the culture in the central part of Australia. This type of culture of simple burial and the concept of the other world in heaven can also be found among the Negritos in South East Asia. But it does not exist in its pure form.

(3) Among the tribes in the southern part of Australia, that is, among the Wailpis, P'ladapas, Wongamulas, Lurityas, Matutaras, Matataras, Pitjintaras, Antakirinjas, East Laverton tribes, Kalgoorlie Norseman, etc., the open-grave interment is practised, but this custom seems to be the product of a mixture of interment and the tree burial in points like the method of the disposal of the dead and the use of the fluid out of the dead body. The idea of life after death of these peoples, which practise that burial, is inconsistent. (R.M. Berndt and T.H. Johnston: *Death Burial and Associated Ritual at Ocea, Oceania* XII. 1942, pp. 207f.). This is also due to mixture. The open grave interment exists also among the Baining of New Britania, Siara District of New Ireland, and St. John's Island. And it is also found among the Kumans of Central High Land of New Guinea, though not as the regular burial custom.

(4) Over the southern parts of Melanesia (the archipelagos of the Banks and the New Hebrides), are distributed peoples who bury the dead in a sitting position, dig them out after an indefinite period of mourning and practise endocraniolatry. The idea of the soul of the dead is developed there, and the worship of the soul and the destruction of the property of the dead are practised. The other world is underground (Panoi and Banoi, etc.). The Sulkas of New Britain show the same type of culture. East New Guinea is another region where the concept of the nether world varies. Rosalind Moss classified the types of the nether world in two groups, namely, that of the southern part of Melanesia and that of Papua, and she described some characteristics of each type. (R.Moss: *Life after Death in Oceana*, 1925 pp. 53f.). However it seems to me that both types were originally the same. The fact that the nether world in Papua includes the original man and that the other world is more bright, seems to be the result of a mixture with the platform burial culture. The existence of the interment and the worship of the skull in East New Guinea and the

outstretched position of the dead except among the Wagawagas can be cited as evidence. The relationship of the volcano with the nether world and that of the cave burial with it do not appear to be decisive (cf. W.H.R. Rivers: *History of Melanesian Society*, 1914 II, p. 263).

(5) Among the peoples in Indonesia, (among the Bontocs, Kankanais, Tinguans, Dusuns, Land Dayaks, in Sumba, Wetar, Toradja Ceram, Savu, Roti, Leti, Luang-Cermata and Babar, etc.) it is generally believed that the other world is on earth. The burial custom is the interment accompanied with the exhibition of the dead's body for a considerably long period and sometimes with the practice to get rid of the fluid from the body. There is a fixed idea that the other world is on an island off the coast in New Guinea (the Yabins of Finschhafen, the Tumcles; Eastern Group of Torres Strait Islands, the Solomon and D'Entrecasteau Islands, etc. The burial customs in these districts are not uniform and seem conspicuously influenced by the platform burial. As stated above, the orientation of the other world was related to migration by H, Spencer, and W. J. Perry tried to verify it concerning Indonesia. (Perry: *Orientation of the Dead in Indonesia*, JRAI, XLIV, 1914). However, although the idea of the orientation of the other world on earth is generally clear, it seems to me that the other world in the west can not be treated on the same level.

(6) The idea of contraposition of heaven and underground can be seen in some parts of Polynesia and Southeast Australia. The other worlds of heaven and underground in Polynesia are connected with social classes; generally that of the nobles is in heaven and that of the common people underground. In this case, however, the nether world does not mean hell. The characteristics of the nobles' burial customs here are the sepulchre, mummification and platform burial (such as seen among the Marquensans, Maoris, and on the Society Is.), whereas the form of the common people is interment. Since the sitting position can also be seen among the Hawaiians, the Society Islanders, Maoris, and Mangaians, it seems to me that nether world and burial customs here are of the same kind as in South Melanesia. In other words, the contraposition of heaven and the nether world is due to the mixture of the peoples. As the heavenly world, however, contains a stratification, it is not the same as the one in the most primitive societies. Heaven and the nether world in Southeast Australia comprise distinctions like the worlds of light and darkness and the worlds for the good and for the wicked. The ethical unification is strong there. Since in Southeast Australia interment in a sitting position is practised and, though rarely, some cases of preserving the skull are found the idea seems to be the

(7) The supersensible idea of the other world in the west among the primitive peoples can be seen in the southern parts of New Guinea (such as in the western group of the Torres Strait Islands-Kibu, Kiwai Pahuans-Adiri or Woibu, Binas-Adiri), and in any case there exists a strong relation with the sun. It seems to have no direct relation with migration. In the burial customs there arises what can be considered as a mixture of the interment of the sitting position and the platform burial, therefore the idea of the other world in the west can be thought of as the product of cultural mixture. But the origin of the concept of the other world in the west among the Semangs is doubtful. (Tanase, J.: *Origin of the Idea of Western Pure Land*, Journal of Ryukoku University. No. 346)

(8) It is widely known from the Southeast Australians and the Negrillo tribes, (cf. Congo Negrillos, etc.) that the most primitive peoples have the customs of interment and the idea of the other world of heaven, but it can be hardly thought that this is the only type of culture among the most primitive peoples. In the original type of culture of the Veddas and the Kubus among whom the melangan is practised, the idea of the other world seems to have been very weak.

(9) Some cases of sea burial exist in Melanesia, but there are not many peoples who practise it as the formal burial. The idea of the other world connected with it is so hard to distinguish from the one connected with other burial customs, that its relation with a particular other world can hardly be confirmed.

(10) The custom of cremation can be partly seen in civilized Malay and partly in primitive Malay, but both are influenced by the culture of India. It is also widely seen among the Tasmanians and in the northern part of Melanesia and sporadically in Australia and New Zealand but its coexistence with a particular locality of the other world can hardly be verified.
It cannot be contradicted that there are hardly two types of religion to be found which differ more considerably in their conception of God than the so called father-religion and mother-religion. Christianity offers a clear instance of the father-religion. Characteristic for the Christian idea of God is the beginning of the prayer which Jesus taught his disciples, namely: "Our Father which art in heaven." Christians know and adore God as their heavenly Father. This name indicates that the love and the care which God shows to his creatures is experienced and understood like the prudent and far-seeing behaviour of a good father towards the children he has to educate. God is the heavenly Father which means that He is a great Lord who governs the world and human life as He deems best in His wise and inscrutable counsel.

There have always been people who did not call God the heavenly Father but the great Mother. They were the followers of the so called mother-religion of which antiquity offers the best instances. At that time people venerated everywhere in the countries around the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea a Mother-goddess who mysteriously brings forth all life in a maternal way.

It has often been contended that this Mother-goddess is merely a personification of nature which as we know creates life, abundantly and multifariously. There surely is a connection between the Mother-goddess and the incessantly creating nature. But they are not identical. The character of the Mother-goddess shows features which cannot be explained as mythological signs for certain processes in nature. The Mother-goddess represents a religious idea which has its value in itself. So it is generally thought that she is less remote from her adorers than the deity of the father-religion. The latter is the divine king, the heavenly lord over against whom man is merely a slave, or dust of the earth. This conception is wrong. The Mother-goddess can also be inaccessible. She is the divine Lady, who keeps her adorers
at a reasonable distance and whose nature is impenetrable. For she
is not only the Great Mother but also the Virgin; indeed, the Virgin-
Mother. The last term indicates the mystery of birth which she causes
to take place. The heavenly Father creates out of nothing. The
Virgin-Mother brings forth without impregnation. Both occurrences are
equally mysterious: the origin of the world and of life is a secret. The
Great Mother who continuously brings forth her children and again
receives them after their death in her womb, knows the secret of life
and death. This means that she also possesses the highest wisdom.
No wonder that people have many times consulted her, and that by
means of an oracle. For it was known that the Great Mother could
grant a kind of wisdom which nobody would scorn with impunity.
Thus the Mother-goddess of antiquity is a fascinating personality.
It is worth while to consider some representatives of this type of deity.
This paper may serve to sketch the religious significance of the goddess
of the earth, of Ishtar, of Isis and of Kybele.

The earth has likely in the first place been conceived as the Great
Mother. This is perhaps the oldest conception of God which farming
people have formed. No wonder that the earth has been taken as a
maternal being. For the earth is on the one hand passive and
patient; on the other side she lavishly brings forth the vegetation,
she nurses the animals and she gives mankind life and sustenance.
Therefore the people of antiquity called her “Mother Earth”.
In their evaluation she was the primeval mother, because she was the oldest
divine being. Greek mythology tells that Gaia, the goddess of the
earth, came into existence immediately after chaos, which was present
at the beginning of all things. Sophocles calls the earth “the oldest
of the gods, the everlasting, the indefatigable”. Euripides praises the
earth because she, as he says, “is rightly called the mother of all things”.
In one of the choirs of a tragedy of Aeschylus the invocation is heard:
Ma Ga, Ma Ga, i.e. Mother Earth, Mother Earth. This cry, consisting
of two letters, reminds of the stammering sounds in which a child calls
for its mother.

Actually the goddess of the earth is a formless being. It is hardly
possible to design her image. Therefore she could appear in various
shapes. She is not only present on the fruitful fields, but also in the
meadow, abounding in flowers, in the wild forests and on the untrodden
tops of the mountains. One could meet the divine Lady everywhere.
It was the Greeks who experienced her nearness in this way. Many
Greek goddesses are merely forms of appearance of Mother Earth.

The earth, which gathers her creatures after their death in her
womb, often functions as the realm of the dead. The abode of the dead
was thought to be under the surface of the earth. However this
netherworld was not only the residence of heartless death but stood
also for the source of true life which proves to be divine and sponta-
aneous because it arises from death.

The goddess of the earth, who knows death and who produces
life is also thought to possess the highest wisdom, which she com-
 municates by oracles. The oldest oracles were probably given by the
goddess of the earth. In this way Themis, the goddess of justice came
into existence. It has been proved that her name originally indicated
the holy hill, the residence of the goddess of the earth who gave oracles.
Thereupon the meaning of themis shifted into that of divine command-
ment. As goddess she became the personification of social and cosmic
order. Themis, the daughter of Gaia, the goddess of the earth pro-
claimed a wisdom which showed the way of life.

Already the oldest inhabitants of Mesopotamia venerated a
goddess of the earth, a great Mother, whom they called Nin or Inanna
and who later on was named Ishtar. The companion of this goddess
was Tammuz, the god of the fresh green and young cattle, who
periodically dies and revives. Inanna acted both as his mother and
was the goddess of the earth. In this way Themis, the goddess of justic e
came to be a prayer she is asked to punish a rebellious prince. In our opinion it
is a queer contradiction, that the goddess of love displays such warlike
and bloodthirsty manners. The Babylonians apparently did not detect
any contradiction here. War was to them a holy undertaking and
therefore had creative power. In this respect war corresponded with
vegetation and love, which revealed the same creative force, evoked
and furthered by Ishtar. Thus she appears as a powerful and dangerous
mistress in the epos of Gilgamesh. When this hero despises her love
and kills the bull of heaven together with his friend Enkidu, Ishtar
is offended to such a degree that she causes the sudden death of Enkidu
and makes Gilgamesh suffer atrociously. Ishtar appears here as the
mighty goddess whose love can be disdained on solid grounds, as she is
Also the Egyptian Isis belongs to the category of the Mother-goddesses. In her case there is no apparent connection with nature. Her special gift is high wisdom. That means that she knows the secret of life and that she possesses the capacity to awake life. That appears from the wellknown myth which tells how Osiris died by the murderous design of his brother Seth and how he revived, thanks to the care and the wisdom of Isis. Isis raised loud lamentations as she found the mutilated corpse of her husband. These lamentations for the dead were not only the effusion of her sorrow but had also magic power, in so far as they aimed at the resurrection of Osiris. Thus Isis exclaims as wailing woman: “lift thyself up, thou shalt not die, thine soul will live.” Isis, the wise goddess, who knew the secret of life could thereby cause the resurrection of Osiris. In comparison with the active Isis Osiris is a sympathetic but rather passive figure. No wonder that Isis later on overshadowed her husband. This is the case in the mysteries of Isis, which found a wide dispersion in the Hellenistic age and which are known to us by the wellknown story of Apuleius about his initiation into these mysteries. It thereby appears that Isis made high demands to her followers. They had to wait for their initiation till Isis called them. The divine Lady is merciful, but she wishes to be obeyed.

A typical Mother-goddess is Kybele, the Magna Mater, the great Mother from Pessinus in Phrygia who made her entry in Rome in 204 B.C. in order to assist the Romans in their struggle with Hannibal. Thereby Kybele is placed in the full light of history. For we are ill informed about the original Phrygian Kybele. However it is known that in her native country she was the goddess of vegetation, dwelling on the tops of the mountains and in the wild forests, connected with wells and rivers which further fertility. Moreover she is the mistress of the wild beasts, among which the lion was her favourite riding animal. As the myth narrates she fell in love with Attis, a rarely beautiful young shepherd, from whom she extracted the promise of chastity. Attis broke this promise for the sake of the lovely young nymph Sagaritis. In her anger Kybele killed the nymph. Stricken by deep sorrow Attis castrated himself under a pinetree so that he died. Mourning her lover Kybele wandered thereupon through the mountains. Luckily Attis revived and the two lovers could celebrate their reunion. Apparently the death and the resurrection of Attis were dramatized in the cult of Kybele which in the Hellenistic age took the form of a mystery-play in which the votaries were initiated. A typical feature in the character of Kybele is that she could bring her followers into a state of rapture which sometimes was so strong that it led to self-castration, a deed which the Romans abhorred. By and by the cult of Kybele passed through a process of spiritualisation. This proves that the enthusiasm which the goddess awoke, even in its cruder forms, aimed at liberating man from the fetters of his earthly existence. Kybele could make such a strong appeal on the people of antiquity because she roused the truly human longing for freedom of spirit and soul.

Closing my short paper I express the hope that I managed to make it quite clear what were the religious motives prompting the veneration of the Mother-goddess, the divine Lady.
THE CHANGE OF THE JAPANESE RELIGION  
IN THE PRE-CLASSIC PERIOD  
BY  
MATTHIAS EDER

By "pre-classic period" we mean here the time before the compilation of the official Shintō sources such as the Kojiki (712) and the Nihon shoki (720). These documents mark, as far as religion is concerned, the end of a development which started in the late Stone Age (Yayoi culture) with the adoption of higher forms of agriculture as the basis of existence and social and cultural life. The most outstanding and decisive innovations in this stretch of time were the formation of strata brought about by a differentiation of economic power due to new chances for accumulation of wealth, the formation of clans predominantly on the basis of common territorial interests, clan alliances resulting in the formation of small States, rivalries among these, and the final hegemony of the Yamato clan.

The adoption of irrigation fields for rice planting, the use of iron for making agricultural tools, and the increase of the population permitted the cultivation of vast and fertile plains like that of Kanto. Village communities increased greatly, consisting first of kinship groups, then built on a territorial basis of interests. Of greatest importance for the accumulation of wealth was the storing of cereals with the ensuing social differentiation and stratification.

From the earliest times the feeling of their dependence on the gods was always very strong among the inhabitants of these islands and it is no wonder that the great economic and social changes resulted in changes and developments also in the religious field. Their final stage we find recorded in that part of the Kojiki which is called the Jindai-kan, the volume on the Era of Gods, which was compiled during the reign of the Emperor Kimmei (539-571). That is a century and a half before the entire Kojiki, or Records on Ancient Events, was concluded. During these decades events in history were heading toward the consolidation of the country under the leadership of the Yamato clan and for the transition from a State based on clan alliances and clan hierarchy to a State modeled after the Chinese T'ang Empire in which the emperor was regarded not only as its center but as its embodiment. This uncontestable position of the emperor was secured by making him the offspring of a god who was sent down to Earth by the Supreme Gods of Heaven for the exact purpose of ruling all islands of the country.

When we say this codified divine ancestry and position of the Emperor is the terminus ad quem of the religious changes and developments under consideration here, we do by no means imply that the entire vast field of religious phenomena, beliefs, concepts and values came along all together. In fact, large areas of them have remained almost untouched and unchanged until our times, and can, in combination of old written sources, tell us much about the starting point of the guided developments of the religion as it was conceived by the ruling class.

At the basis of the Japanese religion we find nature and ancestor worship, magic and shamanism. We find the worship of mountains, water and the sea. On mountain passes dangerous spirits received offerings, and spirits of trees had to be dealt with reverently when boats or shrines were built. Trees were seats of gods and heavenly pillars. Stones multiplied like living beings. Flowers were inhabited by spirits and falling leaves were infested by spirits of epidemics. Spirits who had caused the death, were believed to be dwelling in a human corpse, and the fear of impurity contracted by contact with a dead was in fact the fear of those evil spirits. The residence of the deceased soul was thought to be somewhere on this earth, far away beyond the sea, on an island, or in the vastness of mountains.

In contrast to this concept of the residence of the souls, another one emerged at the dawn of history. This presented a vertically conceived heaven into which only descendents of heavenly gods were admitted, while those of earthly gods went to the underworld. Popular religion still does not know such a distinction. The vertical concept of Heaven appeared together with a new attitude towards corpses which were then elaborately treated and buried in huge tumuli under a great number of tomb-figures. Only noblemen and officials above the third rank were accorded burials of this costly kind. The new treatment of the dead appeared combined with a new concept of souls many of which were now made gods. The deification of men had begun, namely of powerful clan chiefs; first of all, of the Yamato clan. In the Jindai-ki, that is the Era of the Gods, many gods who were previously gods on Earth, were promoted to an existence in the Takamanoohara, the center of which is the sun-goddess Amaterasu, the
ancestors of the Imperial Family. No gods were originally subordinated to the sun-goddess. According to the oldest myths the gods originated in a reed-sprout, to this Izanagi, the father of Heaven, and Izanami, the mother of Earth, were no exception. Before everything else a primordial chaos reigned. So far we have before us a naturally grown mythology, cosmogony and theogony. Then Izanagi and Izanami begot the islands and numerous gods, among them the sun-goddess Amaterasu. Accordingly, the sun-goddess and all other gods are blood-relatives and form a large family. Amaterasu was procreated first of all the gods with the expressive intention of her parents to make her the ruler of the gods and the country. She then ordered her grandson Ninigi no Mikoto to descend to Earth to rule there. The Emperors therefore, as descendants of Ninigi, ranked above the gods who were the ancestors of the various clans. As objects and forces of nature, these were and still are objects of worship of folk religion. At the bottom of the procreation myths lays a cosmogonic myth in so far as the gods procreated by Izanagi-Izanami originally were but objects of nature. Their position as ancestors of clans was but a political construction.

In the light of the above analysis an answer is found to the question as to whether or not ancestor worship was a constituent part of the old Japanese religion or only a later import. Ancestors of families and sibs are still worshipped in modern times, either directly as family or sib gods, or modified to earth-gods (jigami), mansion-gods (yashikigami), mountain-gods (yamanokami) or others, and worshipped commonly by their groups to the same extent as the kinship consciousness goes. Only a minority of the so-called ujigami or clan-gods were blood-related ancestors of their respective clans, the majority of them being but guardian gods of their communities which were gradually formed on a basis of common territorial interests. The fact that the myth of the Divine command to Ninigi was added to the procreation myths implied and presupposed ancestor-worship. The ancestor-gods in the proper sense are deified human beings, but the clan-ancestors of the myths were originally nature-gods who were later made humanized ancestor-gods. We find that the formation of a great part of the myths was politically masterminded.

The guided development of the myths resulted in changes also in the field of religious cult. The older periods did not know fixed and definite places of worship. Female shamans were in charge of the acts of worship. The need for definite places of worship felt by the growing agricultural communities brought about the construction of shrines, first not so much for the purposes of the worship itself but for storing the objects used in it. The first shrines looked like the residences or palaces of the rulers of the time. In them were kept objects, such as mirrors, swords, pearls, which served as temporary seats of the gods during the worship. The shrine ministers were chosen by the gods themselves through shamanistic vocations or divination. Shrine ministers for administrative purposes were a later addition. The Izumo Fudoki (compiled 733) recorded for the country of Izumo 184 communities with an official shrine minister and 215 communities without one. With the growing importance of the clan-god for the unity of the clan and for the prestige of the clan ruler, the number of appointed male shrine administrators and ministers increased and the female shamans were pushed aside to a marginal position or left the shrines to continue their functions in villages on a private basis, mostly as necromants.

The above enumerated and described changes of the old Japanese religion were effected by the dynamics of economic and social changes in the country, and are not layers or strata brought in by arriving bearers of differing cultures. However the impact of foreign ideas and concepts, for instance of gods and Heaven, may have contributed more or less to the changes, the explanation of which we have attempted.
THE RELIGION OF THE DASYUS

BY

MARYIA FALK

To begin with, I must apologize for taking you back from very familiar ground and rather rough and unexplored ground. Our chairman just told us that few of us would know anything about Dasyu religion, while I must say no one knows it, because it is unexplored ground and it is 100 percent unknown as yet. Moreover if I call it like a contradiction in terms, because we are accustomed from olden times, for the last 120 years or so, and in India longer than that, to Arya sort of oppose Aryas and we are at a history of religions congress and not at an Orientalists congress), were considered to mean (the word was considered to mean) slave or enemy or demon. Rather, all sorts of funny, and, deprecatory meanings, were attributed to the word. Well, the Aryas were supposed to be a race, afores things. Aryas were supposed to be the designation of the Aryan race, of those people who invaded India some time in the second Millenium B.C. presumably. Some people presume it was in the 14th or 15th century B.C. Other people assume it was much later for a peculiar reason, because in Mitani, documents were discovered some 20 years ago, showing that certain Vedic gods were worshipped by the kings of Mitani of the holy kingdom, ruled by Mitani princes. They worshipped Miitra-VaRuna, the first Indra, Miitra-VaRuna and the two Aisvins.

This is not of course a convincing argument. Some people argue that the Aryans may have migrated from India to Western Asia. Other people, of course, maintain that the Aryans were on their way to India and the Vedic religion was already proper to the Aryans before, long before, they came into India, the result being that some time in about 1,000 B.C. or even later, the Aryans were supposed to have come into India. Now, this is quite impossible for the good reason that we know we have history in India at about 1,000 B.C. The Atharva Veda, which is at least 2,000 years younger than the Rg Veda, was already composed, and the king, who was a great protector of religion at that time, was contemporary at the period of the Atharva Veda. It is datable.

Anyway let me come back to words. I happen to be a philologist, and I am rather attached to words as an etymologist. What does Arya mean and what does Dasyu mean? Arya obviously means the descendant of the something in Ara, or Ari. Now, here the great quarrel arose, because there are both words, used in the Rg Veda, Arya and Ari. It was supposed until now that Arya means the descendant of the Ari. But the great difficulty arises, namely Ari means always the enemy, the invader, the opponent, and so forth, whereas Arya means the holy man, the man versed in religion, the man who performs the Vedic sacrifice. This is the Arya. Where does one come in with the other? Until one point became clear to me from an analysis of Rg Vedic hymns, namely that Ari is not at all an Aryan word, that Ari and Arya do not belong together.

Now Ari was incidentally found by a study of Western Asian texts. Ari is a very current ethnic name in Western Asia and especially among Ariic East. In the Nus6 personal names, Ari is a very general ethnic designation. Everybody, or nearly everybody, is an Ari. Now the question may be raised whether the Hori word, pronounced hory, whether it was not by any chance pronounced Ari. Into this I cannot go. So I cannot say whether Ari simply meant the holy. In any case I can prove that quite a number of Hori terms, words, names have come into the Vedic vocabulary. There are about 170 such words which are not of Sanskrit, not of Indo-European origin, and are introduced into the Rg Veda. So there we are faced with the fact, the Hories were at some time in the second Millenium B.C. present in India. This is one point.

The other point is the etymology of Dasyu or Dasa. For some reason or other which is hardly explainable, it was always assumed that Dasa meant the enemy, the demon, the slave and all sorts of negative things. However no one paid attention to the fact that Dasa, Dasyu is connected with the Dasa which occurs only once, and this Dasa is connected with dasa meaning luminous, astral and so on; and finally that it goes back to the verbal root das meaning luminous, to shine, to shine astrally, to shine as a star.

Now I cannot go into further details, because the time left to me may be very short. Therefore I must simply state my conclusion, that the Dasas were the descendants of the Dasa that is of the star, and that Dasa was simply the name, or I might say, the cast name or designation
of the astronomer.

Now this can be proved in great detail, because the ancient, the oldest Vedic religion is pure astronomy. It is a purely astronomic religion. The Dāsa would then be the descendant of the Dāsa of the star, and I will tell you in a few words how it comes about.

This religion based on astronomy is a cosmology which builds up the cosmos in two distinct parts: one being the hypo-cosmic world consisting of three spheres. The outermost heaven which is called Varuna and which is also personified, because everything, every concept, every sphere, every datum, we may say so in general, is a person. This outermost sphere which embraces everything is called the all embracing Varuna. Varuna means the embracer or the enfolder. The second sphere which is enclosed within this sphere is called Mitra. Mitra has been interpreted in many ways. It means also the compact. It has a sociological impact.

If I have any time, I shall go into details about this.

Mitra (the sacred sphere) and the third sphere, which is at the same time the uppermost sphere, form a structure, which is very difficult for us to understand. The innermost is the uppermost at the same time. The construction is that of an egg, and not only the structure is that of an egg, but the meaning is that of an egg, because the uppermost one has no name at all. It is called only the third, and the third is the Embryo. He is never born. He is ever unborn. He may not be named. He is so sacred that he is absolutely unnamable. He only has archetypes or representatives in the cosmos: one of these archetypes being Soma. Therefore the name Soma is indirectly attributed to him. Later Soma becomes the name of the moon. Now, Mitra, Varuna and Soma form the hypo-cosmic world, which is connected and yet separated from the cosmos.

The cosmos is built up of the vault of the sky, and it has several regions, one being the uppermost region of the polar region, the Polar of the sky, or you see the Polar star which at that time was alpha and several constellations, amongst which is alpha major, which has great importance, which, alpha major is the seven rṣis, the seven great sages. are alpha major.

Besides, well just to make it short, below this sphere is the sphere of the thousand stars. Thousand means innumerable. The stars of the upper region. Still below is the region of the Zodiac. The Zodiac consisted of eight signs at the time. Later it was developed into 12 signs, but it is already a later period. The oldest Rig Vedic religion has the eight signs of the Zodiac, which are mostly represented by animals, one is still a human figure. That is the virgin, or she is the direct archetype of the Mother Goddess.

From the upper thousand regions to the Zodiacal region extend branches which are the rivers of Dhārās. Dhārās also mean, well they mean so many things. Anyway they are called dhārās. Therefore the upper region of the sky is called Sahasradhārā, and Dhārās.

Now the signs of the Zodiac are the Kṣatrasya padayas, the lords of the regions, of the eight regions. Everyone presides over a region. This is extremely important, because every Ārya is, so to say, initiated to his regional lord. When he is an adolescent, he undergoes a certain form of initiation, which consists in dying and being reborn; dying to this life and being reborn into the life in the sky. This initiation enables him to perform Yajña or sacrifice. He is therefore called Kumāra. Kumāra nowadays in modern Sanskrit means the prince, but the Kumāra literally (again I come back to a word) means not really dead, not really dying. His death is not the real death but only a figurative death. He is being, so to say, killed, and, so to say, resurrected to the new life, the sacred life. This dying and resurrection is his initiation to his astral lord in the Zodiacal signs.

Now, where he stands when the sacrifice begins is the top of the earth. The top of the earth is the top of the earthly mountains on which he is supposed to stand when the sacrifice, the Yajña, is ready. The Yajña itself is a journey. The journey starts from the top of the earth and it branches out a long a ray, because the Zodiac is a wheel. These rays start from the top of the cosmic mountain, then they widen out into the lotus flower and finally there are the eight rays branching out into the Zodiacal signs. These rays are called Āras. The central ray, is also a reed. This reed which is the Hiranyāsta is called the golden stay. It is a column, hollow inside, that is why it is called a reed.

The journey actually goes on upwards and downwards. I will tell you what the difference is between going up and going down. One goes up when consecrated; one goes up in sacrifice; one goes up in the act of death. One goes down in being born to the netherlife; one goes down after every sacrifice in the so-called reward; Jīva, the one goes down when one is reborn, because every life (what we call life, or what we may call a soul. Soul is a very approximate rendering) goes up at death to be merged in the heavenly lake which is called Āra, the sum total or the derivative of all the Āras.

There all the Jīvas foregather. Every family has got its own sum total of Jīva. They go and dwell there in the heavenly lake which is called Āra. From the Āra they are rained down again into the
Kṣaterasya padeyasa, into Zodiacal signs. Every family belongs to a sign
and from there signs the āras (who are also called Maruts on this occa-
sion) are being rained down again onto the top of the cosmos, onto the
alter, and that is how they are reborn so that very Ārya (Ārya means
he who belongs to an Āra and he who comes from the Āra). every Ārya
is already born sacrally from the Mitra-Varuṇa, Mitra-Varuṇa being
together the father and the mother. Therefore the Jīva, before being
born dwells pīlas whāstā in the womb of the twin parent. The twin
parent is nothing but the original mother goddess divided, later sub-
divided into the father Varuṇa, and into the mother Mitra. Mitra was
still feminine at that time, and there is proof for this fact.

Now, Mitra and Varuṇa engender, originally their child is the ever
unborn third, the Embryo which ever dwells in heaven. But there are
archetypes of this Embryo; the first archetype being the golden column
or the golden reed, who is the human being, the Hiranyastūpa, the man
who is the golden column. He ever stands in the centre of the cosmos.
His head is above the cosmos; his body is within the cosmos. Through
this body this whole process goes up and down. He is the first
archetype of the supernal archetype, the third. He is therefore
called Trīta, the third. Trīta coincides by his head with the trīṣyā,
with the third, in heaven. Through Trīta the whole process of Yajña
takes place.

Now after a man or a woman is born and after he reaches the age of
adolescence, when he is to be initiated into the community of Āryas, he
is initiated by being, so to say, killed; and there are all, every family,
every rśi tribe has got its particular manner of initiation. Some by
burning, some by burying, some by beheading. There are others which
initiate by squeezing in the cleft of a tree. These different modes of dying,
of course are not real. This is why he is called Kumāra or Kumārī,
the one who does not really die. He is being released. After he is
supposed to be dead, he is released and this release is called by several
verbs. jan, muci. Muci means to release and jan means to be born.
Several other words are also used. He is born again to the higher life.
Then he enters the community and every day before dawn he is
supposed to offer sacrifice which is not really offering but it is travelling.

He starts upon a journey. That is to say in meditation, yuga,
Yoga, what is later called Yoga, already existed then. The word was
not yet frequent, but it becomes frequent in the Rg Veda. He is trans-
lated into his Kṣaterasya pade, into his regional lord with whom he is iden-
tified. Along with his Kṣaterasya pade he travels into this Sahasradhāra,
into the regions of thousand dharas through the dharā which are rivers.

From there again he proceeds to the pole of the sky; thence he travels
on to the hypo-cosmic region, and the journey is accomplished when
he enters the realm of Varuṇa first, thence of the Mitra, finally of the
third. There he becomes the highest god. For a time he becomes,
the third himself, the Embryo.

Now, there is a sort of syncretism already existing at this earliest
stage. The Embryo at a late stage was made absolutely unnamable,
and this is why he has to be distinguished from another aspect of the
Embryo who is the personification of the Āra, the sacred lake which
I told you, is the sum total of the Jīvas. Originally both were one. But
this is a very ancient stage which is hardly to be traced. In the ancient,
but not the original Rg Veda (we have not got the original Rg Veda),
in the ancient stage the two were already sort of separated. The Āra
is considered to be the first archetype of the third, and this is where the
evening sacrifice, the second Yajña, or the second Vrata of the day
Vrata means about as much as "Vow" means in our language or the
performance. The second performance, the evening performance is
for the sake of descendency. As the early, the morning, the pre-dawn
performance is for the sake of the deification of man himself, the
evening performance is for the sake of the family; so that the family
should increase; so that the family should get children from the
heavenly lake where the souls of the lives are kept.
The evening performance brings about the birth of the Jīvas onto earth,
so that children should be born and the family should reproduce itself.

Now this pīnicatric religion, this movement up and down, is the
essence of the Dāsa or Dasya astronomic religion. Now how come
the Dāsa became quite the opposite of Ārya in the classical E-g Veda?

I told you in the beginning about the so called Āryan invasion,
which I consider to be an Ari invasion, a Horic invasion into India.
These people had a goddess called by several names, near Eastern names,
and one of these names is likely to be the near Eastern Kumāṭi. ('Pi'
being a suffix and kuma is just the word Kumāra taken over.) Another
of these names is Indra, being the later name of the God Indra. There
is large evidence to the effect that Indra was originally a woman:
that he became a man only when the syncretism between the Ari religion
and the Ārya religion took place. This god Indra is the headman of
the second Āryas who called themselves Āryas, but who originally called
themselves Aris. Indra himself is called Arharisvati, Arhari is another
of these words which you find in the Nasī personal names. Svāhi
means he who shot. Arhari means as much as a river
meant some 20 years ago.
Here is the Rg Veda, “I am, the lord of these people whom I am going to subject.” This was the title of Indra Arharišvani.

Now, later a syncretism took place between these two religions, but first there was about, not a 30 years war, but probably a 300, or more likely a 600 years war. A war mostly of words, mostly of opposing rights and rituals. The main field of this great battle between the ancient and the new religions was the Soma ritual. About this I am publishing a book very shortly in five volumes, so I think that I may dispense with details.

Anyway what we consider to be the Āryan invasion in India is no Āryan invasion, but the Ari invasion. The Ārya religion existed in the 4th Millenium B.C. It can be dated being an astronomical religion. It belongs to the period of the Bull, because bull is the first of the signs. Now the Bull goes from 4,000 B.C. to 2,600 B.C. After 2,600 the Mośa or the Ārya is the first animal.

So there you are, you know where we stand with the oldest Rg Vedic religion, which is the Dasya religion. Later, of course, when the Āryas, the second Āryas as they called themselves, came in, the Aris would not allow (I am quoting a stonza from the Rg Veda) the Dasyus to use the Āryan names “Yaunānaraṇa Āryanāna Dasyavay,” who did not allow, who did not concede any longer the Āryan names of the Dasyus. They called them the Dasyus. They changed the meaning of Dasya which meant astronomer, the descendant of the star, into the meaning of slave or subject person. I am not going into questions of phrase. I think these arguments are rather out of place.

We do not know anything about the Āryan race. All that we know from India is that the Āryans were not a white people at all. The Āryans called themselves Varṣa, Hiranyakāp. They were golden coloured; most probably they were yellow. But I am not concerned with racial problems. The language used at the time was certainly an Indo-European language. We did have some sort of Indo-European people already in the 4th Millenium and most certain in the third Millenium in India. Now these Indo-Europeans are traceable in Crete as well, because from the latest readings of Crete, we can find Indo-European names long before the Greeks came into Greece. So we know that they were Indo-Europeans. And most probably this religion as I have been able to connect it with the religion of Mohenjo-daro, Harappā and so on, the Indus valley civilization, is the Dasya civilization. Very probably these Indo-Europeans are connected with pre-Greek Greece and probably with pre-Italic Italy.

**SOME PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH TAO-CHIAO (道教) AND ZEN**

**HSIEN-SHU (仙術) AND ZENJÔ (DHYĀNA)**

**BY**

KENJIN FUKUI

Tao-chiao (道教) religious Taoism may be said to be the only religion brought into being by the Han race. It worships Lao-tzu (老子) and places importance on the ways of shên-hsien (神仙) and it was greatly influenced by Buddhism—a fact which can in no way be denied. In process of time it allowed itself to be a free imitator of Buddhism. It follows then that Tao-chiao bases itself on Taoist ideas and takes in the ways of the shên-hsien, thus coming to assume the form of a religion.

In later times, however, it will be found that Tao-chiao did not confine the object of its worship to Lao-tzu alone; rather it looks upon Yüan-shih T'ien-tsuen (元始天尊) as the supreme god. In this, Tao-chiao is seen in its developed form. In this form, Tao-chiao may be divided into three large groups—(1) Ancient Tao-chiao, which existed before the fifth century, the time of K'ou Ch'ien-chih (寇謙之) of the Northern Wei (魏) dynasty which was represented by Wu-tou-mi Tao (五斗米道), T'ai-p'ing Tao (太平道), Tien-shih Tao (天師道), etc., and which might be styled primitive Tao-chiao; (2) Older Tao-chiao, chiefly represented by the Ch'eng-i (正一) sect, which has been headed by a hereditary descendant of the founder of Tien-shih Tao with its headquarters in Mt. Lünn-khu (靈虎山) in Chiang-hsi (江西) province; (3) New Tao-chiao, which is chiefly represented by Ch'üan-chen Chiao (全真教). It was founded in the eleventh century but received its final form by Ch'iin Chang-ch'un (丘長春) in the Yüan (元) dynasty, who evidently introduced elements of Confucianism and Buddhism. Its headquarters is the Po-yün Monastery (白雲觀) in Pei-ching.

May we point out that it is improper to translate — as is usually done — both Tao-chiao (道教) and Tao-chia (道家) by the same word "Taoism." Such a translation is objectionable on scientific grounds. Tao-chiao is a school that is grounded on the so-called teachings of Huang-ti (黃帝) and Lao-tzu (老子) and contains in its essence no
religious element. On the other hand, Tao-chiao, it is to be noted, is religious in nature. Taoism may well serve as an equivalent of the former but for the latter, the expression “religious Taoism” or “Taoistic religion” would be a more appropriate translation. It is to be regretted that the failure to recognize this distinction has led to serious confusion in the discussion of their subject.

Religious Taoism, then, has for its ideal image the so-called “shen-hsien” (神仙, acquisition of perennial youth and immortality, something like Elysium and the elixir of life). In Taoist sutras frequent reference is made to shen-hsien and jang-shu (准術), that is the ways of realizing that ideal. Here I should like to consider the relation between these “ways,” such, for instance, as ju-ch'i lien-tan t'ai-hsi or in religious taoism and ch'an-ting (禅定, fixed attention) in Buddhism. These “ways” are clearly mentioned in Pao-p'u-tzu (抱朴子) which was written in the Tung Chin period. They are also dealt with in the well-known Huang-ting Ching (黄庭经).

It is quite plain that attainment of longevity and immortality was sought by a special method of respiration aimed at regulating breathing and by the composure of mind. Particularly noteworthy is the close resemblance between t'ai-hsi (胎息) and tiao-hsi (調息, prānāyāma, restraint of breath) of Yoga. The same may be said of the relation between ts'un-ssu (存思) and tso-ja (坐卧行, meditation) or ch'ang-ting (長定, fixed attention). The resemblance may also be extended to samādhi (三昧, absorbed attention). Thus it is easy to associate Tao-chiao with zenjō (禅定) of Buddhism.

From the preceding it may be understood why some authorities place emphasis on the relationship between Tao-chiao and zenjō (禅定) of Buddhism. The frequent quotation of words of Lao-tzu (老子) and Chuang-tzu (莊子) in Zen literature, for instance, seems to favor this view.

It may be presumed that the resemblance between some elements, t'ai-hsi (胎息) and tiao-hsi (調息, prānāyāma), for instance, was due to mere coincidence, and that the greater part of these resemblances were caused by independent development. In this connection we may note that early in the later Han dynasty An Shih-kao (安世高) and Lokaraksä (支倉 treaties), for example, brought out Chinese translations of sutras bearing on Zen and that in the Tung Chin dynasty Kumārajiva (鸠摩羅什) and his disciples displayed a remarkable activity in translating. In Tao-chiao nothing is to be found of such thorough and detailed methods of self-discipline as are given in Buddhist writings on Zen, and no traces are discernible in religious Taoism of any influence it might have received from Buddhism.

We now turn our attention to the difference between the objective of jang-shu (准術) and that of zenjō (禅定, dhyāna). The former has for its ultimate goal the nourishment of life and immortality, the latter aims at the acquisition of the wisdom of prajñā (般若), which is considered correct and excellent, using zenjō (dhyāna) as a necessary preliminary or a means to the end. In this respect, zenjō differs from the theory which sets the highest value on contemplation itself. Next to be noted is the fact that ts'un-ssu (存思) believes in the existence of gods, Wu-ts'ang Shen (五倉神), the gods of the five viscera, and meditates on the god indwelling in each of the organs. As an instance may be mentioned Li-ts'ang Fa (理藏法) described by Wei Po-yang (魏般陽) in his Chou-i ts'an-t'ung-ch'i (周易參同契). He defines each of the viscera. Judging from the literal meaning of the term, ts'un-ssu (存思) evidently does not signify an entrance into the realm of self-forgetfulness, but a solicitude for the grace of the gods of the viscera in view of their subtle working. In this, it may be observed, lies its difference from the so-called tso-wang (坐忘) and hsin-chai (心齋) of Chuang-tzu (莊子), which insist on self-forgetfulness.

From the foregoing it may be concluded that, considering the date of the translation of literature relating to Zen thought, there is no tangible evidence both in chronology and in essence, to prove the influence of zenjō (dhyāna) on hsien-shu (仙術). Especially noteworthy is that instance of anthropocentrism, a characteristic of Chinese thought, found in the interesting fact that Tao-chiao (religious Taoism), which has immortality of the body for its ultimate objective, deifies each of the internal organs.
All enduring religious groups possess, and must possess, effective methods for transmitting their lore from the older to the newer generations. Their specific techniques for religious education vary from culture to culture, and from sect to sect. Academic instruction in religious literature is not always the primary means of indoctrination. Hinduisn, for instance, insures the masses' continuing familiarity with its mythology by employing a host of effective audio-visual devices. It makes use of cantillation, pageantry, drama, ballet and opera, separately and in combination, in forms which vary from region to region and from cult to cult.

The North Indian Kṛṣṇa-cult perpetuates its lore partly through a hieratic drama called the rās lilā, which deals with the entire cycle of legends of the child Kṛṣṇa. More than a score of troupes of professional actors of the rās lilā make Mathurā District their home and headquarters. In their tours they go even as far as Bombay, Gujarat, and Bengal. They have been a part of the religious life of Mathurā and the Kṛṣṇa-cult for at least four hundred years; references to them in sixteenth-century Hindi literature attests that they are at least that old. The question which we ask now is whether such mystery plays of Mathurā may not have been a persisting support of the Kṛṣṇa-cult, arising in a much more ancient time.

A theory that Indian drama began in Mathurā, and particularly in religious dramas of the Kṛṣṇa-cult, has been popular with scholars for more than a century. It was first proposed in 1836 by the pioneer Indologist Christian Lassen.1 In 1873, Albrecht Weber believed he had proved Lassen’s hypothesis true when he found, in Patañjali’s Māhabhāṣya of the second century B.C., a reference to artists called saubhikas, who obviously presented the Kṛṣṇa-stories in some visual manner to their audiences.2 Unfortunately, continuing re-examination of the passage by scholars has shown that it does not necessarily refer to actors nor to mystery plays. M. Winternitz, in particular, demonstrated the weakness of Weber’s understanding of what the work of the saubhikas was. But even while doing so, Winternitz took care to protect the plausibility of the theory that there had been an ancient Kṛṣṇa-drama. He remarked in concluding, “This is not to deny that in the time before Christ there could, nevertheless, have been dance-plays in which the hero and herdsman god Kṛṣṇa was celebrated. The fact noted long ago that Śaurseni, the dialect of the Śrāsenā in Mathurā, stands in the foreground among the Prakrit dialects used in the drama, seems indeed to evidence a special relationship of the drama to Mathurā, the home of the Kṛṣṇa cult.”3 Thus Lassen’s hypothesis stands today where it stood a hundred years ago. For sufficient reasons of long standing it is still widely favored. But it is still unproved.

Evidence will be offered now that the myths of Kṛṣṇa were being enacted in Mathurā as long ago as about 100 A.D. We are not concerned here with the question of whether the classical Indian drama did, or did not, arise from these ancient Kṛṣṇa-plays. We are interested in showing that the Kṛṣṇa-cult has employed the stage in religious education from a very early time.

We appeal to an inscribed tablet which was unearthed in Mathurā in 1890. George Bühler published it, along with many others, under the title, “New Jain Inscriptions from Mathurā.”4 The tablet was found on the pavement of a court adjoining two ancient Jain temples. No surface feature of the slab or its inscription indicates that it was erected by Vaishnavas. Bühler points out certain hints that it might be related to Viṣṇuism, but he does not pursue the matter; and by publishing it in a collection of Jain inscriptions he distracted attention from the question of its sectarian origin. The inscription itself commemorates the erection of the tablet to a nāga or serpent-deity named Dadhikarṇa. One prominent Vaishavaha historian has therefore classed it among the documentary remains of the serpent-cult.5 By examining the text closely, however, one can discover a great deal that has been unnoticed about the religion of the persons who composed it. It is inscribed in the written characters of the first or second century A.D., and is worded in a mixed Sanskrit-Prakrit language of those centuries, as follows:

| siddham (sam.) | . . . | (di) 5 etasyam pū(ṛrvāyaṃ) |
| bhagavato nāgendrasya dadhikarpasya st(ā) - |
| ne sila/ṣṭātīṣṭātī māṭhurān(ām) |
| śailākāśānāṃ cāndakā bhrāṭrākā iti vi(gṛ) - |
| yamānāṇāṃ teṣaṃ putrehi nandibalapra - |
be regarded as the same as the Mahabhiṣṣya, the sūtras of Śailāla, who are being praised as the Čandaka Brothers. May the merit of this gift be for their parents, preferably; may it be for the welfare and happiness of all beings!

Bühler says rightly that the śailālakas of this inscription must be regarded as the same as the śailālins mentioned in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya IV. 3. 110, where they are described as actors who follow the sūtras of Śīlā. We add that assurance is given in several places in Patañjali that the stage performance of the narrative material is not mere pantomimists or mute dancers, but are actors in the full sense of the word. In Mahābhāṣya IV. 2. 66 Patañjali says that śailālins are nāṭas (śailālino nāṭaḥ), and he makes it clear elsewhere that the stage performance of the nāṭa was vocal. “The nāṭa sang (āgāṁ nāṭaḥ),” he says in II. 4. 77; and in I. 4. 29 he remarks that one hears a nāṭa (nāṭasya śṛṇot), and that people set out for the theatre saying, “We shall hear the nāṭa, we shall hear the granthikā” (rangāṁ gacchanti nāṭasya śṛṇyāṁ granthikasā śṛṇyāṁ iti). We know therefore that the śailālakas of our inscription were not mere showmen but were capable of enacting narrative material in words.

With what religion did the plays of these śailālakas deal? Not the slightest basis is found in the text for connecting them with Jainism. Nor is the finding of the slab amid Jain ruins of any great significance, when one considers that it was found lying loose on a pavement, to which it might have been carried from some non-Jain sanctuary. Nor does the obvious fact that the actors were worshipers at a serpent-shrine tell the whole about their religious allegiance. There is sufficient evidence at hand to show that they were primarily Vaiṣāyas, participating in rites which were commonly observed by Vaiṣāyas.

First there is the fact, already noted by Bühler, that the serpent Dadhikarna to whom the actors’ sons dedicated the slab was already assimilated into an early form of the cult of the child Kṛṣṇa. Dadhikarna’s name occurs in the Harivāma, in a list of righteous and beneficent nāgas invoked in a prayer which Saṃkṛṣṇa himself is said to have composed and used, and which all readers of the purāṇa are urged to include in their regular ritual practice. Secondly, it is probably worth while to note that the tablet was dedicated in some month and year which can no longer be read, on a fifth day. Now, since the age of the major nāgas at least, the commonest time for making offerings to nāgas has been the fifth of the light fortnight of the month Śrāvāṇa—the universal Hindu festival of Nāgāpācām or Śerpent-fifth’. On that day Hindu parents with their children go in family groups or in groups of families to places where cobras are known to live, and offer saucers of milk and other gifts. It is reasonable to view this tablet as a memento of such a festival visit by several close-knit families of Hindu actors. In erecting a tablet to the nāga on the fifth they were making no gesture peculiar to some restricted serpent-worshipping sect. They were doing only what any prosperous Hindu family might have done.

So far we have merely shown that there is no reason why this family of actors could not have been Vaiṣāyas. That they actually were Vaiṣāyas must be shown by more positive evidence. Such proof is found in the fact that the śailālakas are spoken of as “...those actors of Mathurā who are being praised as the Čandaka Brothers (māthera’ya śailālakāḥ cāndako bhraṭtāḥ iti)” (II. 4. 77). Please note that “the Čandaka Brothers” is not guaranteed to be their name in sober genealogical fact. “Cāndako bhraṭtā” is followed by “iti”, it is given in quotation marks so to speak; it is the name under which the praise of these actors is being sung, it is what people call them, it is their stage name. What does “Cāndako” mean? “Cāndako” is a Prakritization of the Sanskrit “cāndrako”, an adjective derived from the noun candra, the moon. “Čandako” means “lunar,” and our actors are being called “The Lunar Brothers.” Why? Because they are famous for their performance of the roles of the two brothers who are the Lunar Brothers par excellence: Saṃkṛṣṇa and Kṛṣṇa!

Sanskritists might raise a grammatical objection: does not cāndako bhraṭtāḥ show the Sanskrit endings of the plural number, and must we not therefore suppose that the words refer to three or more brothers, not to two? No, in this particular mixed language the plural forms do double duty for the dual as well. There is no grammatical reason why they should not refer to Kṛṣṇa and his brother.

One could suppose if one wished that these actors were called the Čandaka brothers because they were the offspring or the pupils of someone named Čandra or Kanda. Since we know nothing of any such person, this interpretation would be wilful. There are objective
reasons, on the other hand, for understanding "the Cândaka Brothers" to be an epithet for Saṅkaraśaṇa and Krṣṇa. First, Vaiśṇava literature makes a considerable point of the lunar descent of these two brothers. A long section of the Harivarṣa traces their ancestry in detail, through Budha, Purūravas, Yadu and others, from Soma or the moon.\(^{10}\) Secondly and more conclusively, we find in the Nānaghāṭ Inscription of the first century B.C. an easily-recognizable variant on the term cāndaka, in immediate combination with the names of Saṅkaraśaṇa and Krṣṇa. A Sātavāhana queen of that time opened her inscription on the wall of a cave in Western India with an invocation of her favorite gods as follows. I quote the transliteration and translation of Bühler in the *Archaeological Survey of Western India* for 1883:\(^{11}\)

(ōm nama praṇāpayo Dhammaṇa nama Idasa nama Saṅkaraśaṇa-Vāsudevāṇa Mañjuna-sūtāṇaṃ (mah)īmā-v)atāṇaṃ...

"(Om adoration) to Dhārna (the Lord of created beings); adoration to Indra, adoration to Saṅkaraśaṇa and Vāsudeva, the descendants of the Moon, (who are) endowed with majesty..." The phrase, "Saṅkaraśaṇa and Vāsudeva, candasaṁśānam," enables us to say with confidence who the Cândaka Brothers of the Mathurā inscription were. They were actors in Vaiśṇava mystery plays, famous for their portrayal of the two leading personalities of the older Krṣṇaite mythology, Saṅkaraśaṇa and his brother Vāsudeva or Krṣṇa!

One further bit of significant information about these actors can be wrung from the words of the Mathurā inscriptions; their activities extended beyond their home town. The tablet at the shrine refers to them as "... those actors of Mathurā (māthuraṇ(ām) saṅkaraśaṇaṃ ...teṣaṃ...)." Why? The tablet was being erected in Mathurā. Since they were prominent members of a public profession, to tell their fellow-townsmen that they were from Mathurā was seemingly to add useless and belittling information. Why should these actors' sons make their fathers seem obscure persons? The point that the composer was making was that they are not obscure persons, but are famed far and wide. The boys who erected the slab are referring to their actor-fathers as their audiences were accustomed to refer to them. Their "public" evidently called them "the actors of Mathurā." What audiences called them the actors of Mathurā? Not the crowds of Mathurā itself, for there the phrase would have little meaning. It was outside Mathurā, in other towns, that they were famed as the Mathurān actors who played the parts of the Lunar Brothers.

Thus we can be sure that Vaiśṇava mystery plays were being enacted in the first or second century A.D. not only in Mathurā. Then as now, troupes of actors were going abroad from that town to stage in other places the legendary deeds of Krṣṇa.

## References

6) Bühler, *op. cit.*, p. 380
9) Bühler, *op. cit.* p. 374, in his introduction to the grammar of the inscriptions.
11) *Archaeological Survey of Western India* V (1883) p. 60ff.
The possibility of influences from the side of Indian and non-Indian foreign religions on the later Buddhism has already been realized by some scholars. For the time of early Mahāyāna the studies of Sylvain Lévi, Jean Przyluski and recently M.-Th. de Mallmann have brought to light some evidences which seem to furnish us with the proof that for instance the formation of the mythical "Buddha of Immeasurable Light" Amitābha, cannot be understood as independent from Zoroastrian theories. The third phase of Buddhism, the Vajrayāna, is supposed to have undergone still deeper influences of foreign creeds. Those due to Shaktism seem evident to me, but also surprising Vishnuit traits and probably affinities with the religions of the Middle East should be taken into consideration. I may not insist that influences of western religions, if proved, would be a matter of importance for the interpretation of the late Buddhism. Until now those influences have only been conjectured, but I think there are two verses in the Kālacakra Tantra, the fundamental text of the latest Buddhist system in India, which proves that its authors were well-versed in non-Indian religious doctrines.

According to its own literature the system, called "Wheel of Time," has been brought 967 A.D. to India from the country of Sambhala, which until now has not yet been localized with sufficient accuracy. This date is not to far from that given by the Tibetan historians Bu-ston and Tāranātha, who have told us that the Kālacakra came to the country of the Buddha during the reign of the Bengal king Mahipala I (acc. 978). The question of the exact localization of Sambhala will be discussed in another study of mine, based on Indian and Tibetan historical and geographical sources. Dealing with that matter it will be of importance for the Sambhala problem, whether we can identify the often mentioned river Śītā with the Tārīm as in other Sanskrit sources, or whether we must acknowledge that in the Kālacakra texts Śītā means the river Iaxartes. Any way, for our present purpose it seems sufficient to keep in memory that the tradition unanimously ascribes the origin of the system to a country outside of India, located vaguely in the North or North-West, a region of Buddhist missionary activities, where Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and Islam must have been well-known to the followers of the Enlightened One.

The Muslims are mentioned in the Kālacakra Tantra very often be the worst enemies of Buddhism. Especially the text depicts a terrible eschatological battle which will end with the definite Buddhist victory over the Muslim gangs. This conception makes clear, that the Kālacakra really did not originate in India herself. For the year 967 A.D. precedes the first efficacious Muslim invasions into India proper, which took place under the auspices of Mahmud of Ghazni (about 1000 A.D.). But Buddhist Central Asia had been pressed by the followers of Mohammed already for three centuries.

The verses 151 and 152 in the first book of the Kālacakra Tantra prove to be a document of crafty syncretism. They furnish us with the lists of non-Buddhist religious teachers, Indian as well as non-Indian, classified according to the 3 Guṇas or “constituent parts of matter” which are derived from the Sāmkhya terminology and have been adapted by the Kālacakra. Most appreciated and associated with the Guṇa sattva (goodness) are two groups of Indian Rājs (seers): the seven seers of Ursa Major (Marci, Atri, Angiras etc.) and the seven seers who govern the planets and days of the week. Less appreciated are already eight incarnations of the god Vishnu (fish, tortoise, boar, man-lion, dwarf, “Rāma with the axe,” Rāma and Krishna) who belong to the Guṇa rājas (passion).

But associated to tamas (darkness) we find a series of real heretics, teachers of the Mlecchas or barbarians:

ardhā nāgāhā danubhujagakule tāmāsānaye 'pi pāña mūṣeṣau śvetavastri madhumati mathaniyo 'ṣṭamaḥ so 'nāhakaḥ syāt
sambhātāh saṃptamasaya sphaṭa mahāviṣaye dāgadādau nagarāyam yasyāṁ loke 'suraṅgo nivasaṭi balavān nirdayo mlecchāmūrtāḥ

Out of these heretics three are mentioned in line one, the other five in line two. Only the seventh one is already well-known: Madhumati (Moneky-intellect) is an adequate Indian representation of the name of the prophet Mohammed, if we realize that in Buddhist Church language, the so-called Hybrid Sanskrit, this name obviously was pronounced Mahumati. Only about Mohammed the text furnishes us with further details in line 3 and 4: “The origin of the seventh one becomes manifest in the realm of Makha (Mecca) in the town of
Bagada (Bagdad) etc., where in the world there is dwelling the body of the Asura-demons, the powerful, merciless manifestation of the barbarians'. The erroneous localization of Bagdad in the district of Mecca, the holiest city of the Muslims, seems due to the fact, that Bagdad at the time of the Kālacakrā Tantra was the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate and therefore the centre of the contemporary Islam.

The eighth heretic is given only by a nickname: Mathanya "He who will be destroyed". There is no doubt we meet here with a hint to Kṛmaṇati, according to the Kālacakrā a future prophet of the barbarians who will be defeated as head of the Muslims in the terrible eschatological battle by the Buddhist Saviour and World Emperor Rudra Cakrin. According to prophecy the Mathanya will be blind.

The sixth heretic is named Śvetavastrin "He who possesses a white garment". Taking into consideration the character of the whole list of names which includes only those of barbarians from outside of India an allusion to the Śvetāmbara Jaina Church and to Mahāvīra seems highly improbable. As we shall see our list has been arranged strictly according chronology: therefore Śvetavastrin can be no one but Mani. Manicheism plays an important rôle in Western and Eastern Turkestan also in the 10. century. If we look at the representations of Manichees on Central Asiatic paintings they always wear white clothing and caps (cp. A. von le Coq, Chotscho, plate 1). Even a Tibetan historiographer of the 16. century, Dpa bo gtsug laṅ 'p'ring ba, is still informed about Manicheism. The passage, clearly an interpretation of our Kālacakrā verse, runs in the following way: "In the South of Sambhala, in the country of Persian barbarians, Ardha, the king of the Persians, practised the false religion founded by Mana i.e. (Then came) the teachers of the barbarians, Anogha etc." Obviously the historiographer takes the Ardha of our verse for king Ardashīr I (died 242 A.D.).

The reading of the heretics number four and five, corrupt in the Sanskrit text, has been restored with the help of the old Tibetan translation which reads 'mouse', in Sanskrit Mūṣa, and "lord", in Sanskrit Iṣa. Here we find the names of Moses and Jesus, derived surely from Arabian or Muslim sources. Also the name of the third heretic can be restored according to the Tibetan translation which furnishes us with a name "He who has a boar", in Sanskrit Barahī. This is the sanskritized form of Ibrahim, or Barahī, the Abraham of the Bible. Barahm could easily be understood as acc. case by the Indians who abstracted therefrom a nominative case Barahī. Abraham as well as Moses and Jesus are well-known in the Muslim tradition as prophets and predecessors of Mohammad.

The second name of our list, Anogha, has been only transliterated in the Tibetan translation, but here we find in the Kālacakrā commentary by the great Lamaist scholar Bu-ston (1290–1364) an elucidation which takes Anogha for a man "who is without illness leading to death" (śid po nad med). Anogha is therefore Henoch, about whom already the Genesis gives the information that he never died. Henoch belongs to the holy personages of Manicheism as well as of the Mohammedan religion.

Considering our list, starting with Henoch (as no. 2) and going on with Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Mani and Mohammad, ending at last with the future heretic of Buddhist eschatology we see that the Tibetan historiographer cannot be chronologically right in identifying Ardha with Ardashīr, king of Persia, Ardha must have preceded Henoch, and in the beginning of such a list of prophets can be located only Adam, who is common to Manicheism and Islam. Ardha is a learned sanskritization of a Middle Indian Addha. This Addha has been abstracted from a supposed accusative Addham (=Adam) as Barahī from Barahī.
ANCESTOR WORSHIP AND NATURE WORSHIP
IN ANCIENT CHINA
— ESPECIALLY THE CONCEPTS OF TI (帝) AND TIEN (天) —

BY
SUETOSHI IKEDA

As is well known, the characteristics of the religion in ancient China which centers around the worship of Ti (帝) and Tien (天) have already been discussed by a number of eminent scholars, both at home and abroad. And there is, I am afraid, little or nothing to add. However, recent investigations into non-documentary materials, such as Oracle Bones (卜辞) and Bronze Inscriptions (金文), have thrown new light on this subject, so on the basis of these literary documents I would like to reopen the discussion by putting special emphasis on the concept of Ti or Tien which developed from the period of Yin (殷) to that of Chou (周).

It has been generally pointed out — and there is good reason to believe — that ancestor worship was characteristic of religion in ancient China.

But if seen in the light of the Oracle Bones (B.C. 1300–1027), some complicated aspects appeared in the religious phenomena at the end of the Yin period.

There is a proverbial saying that "the people of Yin pay religious homage to gods (殷人尚神)," so there were many ancestor gods (that is, the ancient lords 先公 and kings 先王) that became the objects of a great number of festivals. This fact is clearly shown by the greater part of the Oracle Bones hitherto excavated which treat of the affairs of festivals.

At the same time, however, a belief in Shang-ti (上帝) or Ti which is the same god as Shang-ti can already be found. Ti in his capacity of deity does not only confer happiness, harvest and food upon kings and kingdoms by his good will, but also brings about unhappiness and misfortune by his ill will. In this capacity Ti may be regarded like a remote ancestor god. But there are three points of difference:

First, one of the functions of Ti is to confer rain which is of prime necessity for agricultural communities, and to some extent he also holds the power to regulate the weather.

Second, in spite of the fact that Ti thus presides over the rain he does not become the direct object of prayer for rain and harvest, but, on the other hand, ancestor gods become the object of prayer.

Third, furthermore, no festival is held in honor of Shang-ti or Ti. Of these points, the second and the third point may seem a little strange, but these and the first point show that Ti is an absolute ruler of both nature and man, thus differing from the other deities. From these facts we may safely conclude that Ti may be looked upon as the Supreme Being equivalent to the later Ti and Tien. But it is open to question among scholars whether Ti, in other words, this Supreme Being, assumes the religious character of a remote ancestor god or a nature god.

Recently Chen Meng-chia (陳夢家), a Chinese scholar, in his systematic study of the Oracle Bones, has regarded Ti as a nature god, in which, he believes, there is no personality. His assumptions are based chiefly on the above two facts, i.e., that Ti does not become the object of festivals and that he does not become the object of prayer for rain and for harvest. So this Chinese scholar asserts that Ti should be distinguished from the ancestor gods. There are other scholars who are of the same opinion.

The following four points, however, suggest that, to some extent, personality may be ascribed to Ti and that, at the same time, Ti shared the character of ancestor gods, although he is not the same as an ancestor god. The four reasons for the recognition of personality in Ti are as follows:

1. The functions which Ti possesses are like those of the ancestor gods except for the regulation of the weather.
2. Ti is always a dictator as are the kings of the Chou period and holds his court which the courtiers attend.
3. Ancestor gods invite Ti as Pin (賓客) while they themselves are invited as guests by each other.
4. In the Oracle Bones of the later period, Ti has already become the appellation of the dead kings, as, for instance, Ti-chia (帝甲) or Wen-wu-ti (文武帝).

So I think that in the Oracle Bones, Shang-ti and Ti possess a dual character, having not only the aspect of a nature god but also the aspect of an ancestor god. Again, in the Oracle Bones, natural phenomena, such as the sun, stars, rainbows, clouds, winds, rain, mountains, rivers, or directions, such as east, west, south, north, the four cardinal points of the compass, etc. are deified, and when these deities become the
objects of festivals, they are treated like personal gods. Moreover, it is difficult to find any essential difference between remote ancestor gods and nature gods like 天 (Mountain), 河 (River), 地 (Earth), though there have been discussions as to what kind of gods they are.

The reasons are (1) that the character 天 (Tien) which itself means ancestor god is often added to the above-mentioned Mountain, River, and Earth, and (2) that all these gods become the objects of great festivals like Liao (祭) and Yu (山) as well as the objects of prayer for rain and plenitude.

The characteristics of the religion which appear in the Oracle Bones may be summarized in the following way:

No distinct line of demarcation can be drawn between the nature gods and the ancestor gods, so there is naturally much mixture of ancestor worship and nature worship, which gives the impression of pantheism. The theory of animism may be applied to clarify such a religious mixture, but it will remain more or less doubtful to draw conclusions in this way, because clear instances of animistic phenomena can be found in China as late as the period of Western Chou (西周 B.C. 1027-771), much later than the period of the Oracle Bones (B.C. 1300-1027).

The conception of Shang-ti or Ti as Supreme Being has been handed down to the Chou period (B.C. 1027-256), but it was in this period that the concept of Tien first appeared. In the Bronze Inscriptions dating from the early Chou period the thought of Tien can already be found.

Its synonymous words, such as Shang-tien (上天), Huang-tien (皇天), Hao-tien (昊天), as well as Shang-ti, Huang-ti (皇帝), Huang-shang-ti (皇上帝), or Huang-tien-shang-ti (皇天上帝), are very frequently found in Shang-shu (尚書) and Shin-ching (釋經) as well as in the Bronze Inscriptions. We can hardly find any difference in conception among these different names. But both Ti and Tien are not only dreadful beings but also personal gods, acting in the capacity of absolute rulers, who command and watch the kings and kingdoms and confer fortune or misfortune on human beings in accordance with their actions. In this respect there is no fundamental distinction between the Ti of the Oracle Bones and the Ti and Tien of the Chou period, except that Tien possesses more of the elements of a nature god than Ti, as is shown by the structure of the character “天” (Tien) which stands for the physical sky above us and a personal god at the same time. In this connection you may remember that the Shi-ching contains the expression Tsang-tien (蒼天 the blue sky). However, some scholars attempt to confine the Ti of the Yin period to the ancestor god in contrast to the Tien (heaven-god) of the Chou period. But this distinction would seem too formal. The reason is that, though the conception of Tien appears for the first time in the Chou period, the functions of Tien are not basically incompatible with those of the Ti of the Yin period.

However, the absolute dignity of the Ti or Tien of the Chou period is far more strongly reinforced than that of the Ti of the Yin period, and, accordingly, far more markedly influential than the ancestor gods. Moreover, three new elements are added to Ti and Tien, which cannot be found in the Ti of the Yin period. The three elements are:

1) Ti and Tien serve as principles of politics and ethics rather than as the objects of pure belief.

2) The Ti of the Yin period bears no blood relationship with the kings, while the Tien of the Chou period is regarded as father of all the people and, as is frequently pointed out, the king is the son of Tien, that is, the son of Heaven who has received the will of Tien, that is, Heaven’s will.

3) Ti and Tien are attended by the king’s ancestors on their right and left and become the objects of solemn sacrifices.

The addition of these new elements may be due to a political and moral consciousness which developed during the Chou dynasty, culminating in the king’s high privilege by which he presided over the festivals of Tien.

In this respect the Chou dynasty was quite distinct from the Yin dynasty; hence, it was generally said that “the Chou people pay homage to Li (Culture) (周人尚礼).” The Chou people had come to reject the religious naïveté of the Yin people and entertained unbelief in Tien as well as doubt about divination and oracles which had up to that time been regarded as absolute; while, on the other hand, a gradual adjustment of the mixed religion as seen in the Oracle Bones had appeared with the establishment of the feudal system in this period. That is to say, in the Chun-Chiu (春秋) period (B.C. 722-481) three divisions were made with respect to the objects of homage. These were heaven-gods and earth-gods with the characteristics of nature gods on the one hand, and human souls functioning as ancestor gods on the other. In addition, each god in every division is graded according to his place in a hierarchy, and thus emperors (王), princes (公), chief ministers (卿), great officers (大夫), and scholars (士), each one in conformity with his rank, are honored by festivals.

In this way religious ceremonies and rituals were all assimilated
into politics under the name of Li (Culture), often expressed by the formula "the great affairs of state lie in ceremonies and wars (國之大事在祀與戎)." In other words, rituals and ceremonies were observed as if they were an application or a conversion of religious principles to politics rather than a pious expression of belief.

In this light, the worship of ancestors appears as the basis of the clan-system, together with a further expansion of pantheism, while, on the other hand, the worship of nature, that is, the worship of Ti and Tien functions as a source of politics and ethics; from then on, both worship continue side by side. And these two religious phenomena, that is, ancestor worship and nature worship, come to be unified without any conflict or confusion, since ancestors are not of a different order from Ti or Tien and politics and ethics are also based on the clan-system.

Here I may add in passing with regard to the assimilation of these two religious phenomena that the festivals of Tien were observed along with those of the ancestors and that the appellation of Ti (禘) -festival signified also the great festival of the ancestors. These facts may serve as hints of evidence for a religious harmony rather than indications of a mixture of Heaven-God and ancestors.

In short, the thought of reverence of Heaven in the Chou period developed on the basis of the harmony of these two elements. And moreover, the religious aspect carried over from the Yin period become the naive conception of Presiding Heaven of the Mo school (墨家), while the development of the political and moral aspects resulted in the deistic Heaven of the Confucian school (儒家).

In view of the above-mentioned transitions and changes of the religious facts from the Yin to the Chou period, we find similarities as well as changes.

First, the aspects of similarity may be summarized in the following three points:

1. The personal character of the deity which is seen in Ti and Tien throughout both dynasties,
2. Ancestor worship, and
3. The unification of nature worship and ancestor worship.

What factor, then, was at the basis of these series of religious facts? I would say it was a traditional ideology which may be epitomized as respect towards humanity common to all cultural phenomena.

Next, the aspect of change is found in the politicization and moralization of religion. What, then, was the motive power behind such a change?

In the first place, it was a geographical factor, in other words, the difference of religion due to the difference of race. In more detail, the difference between the Yin people of a southern character who flourished in the east and progressed towards the west and the Chou people of a northern character who flourished in the west and progressed towards the east. Hence, the difference of their respective religions.

So considered, the thought of reverence to the physical sky which appeared in the Chou period may ultimately be traced to the original life and temperament of nomadism.

In the second place, it was a temporal factor, in other words, the development of racial consciousness with a change in state organization. Though we may already find the germ of the feudal system at the close of the Yin dynasty, this dynasty was basically a tribal state. But with the establishment of the feudal system – more precisely of a city state as an historian has recently put it – and with the development of spiritual culture in the Chou dynasty, religion finally fused with politics and morals.

In this way we reach the following conclusion:

First, I must point out the humanism in ancient China which became the common source of religious changes, and secondly, the politicization and moralization of religion, that is, the weakening of religious consciousness. These two factors may explain why no religion peculiar to China developed there.

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SUETOSHI IKEDA

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The gnostic work in Coptic, Pistis Sophia, was written in Egypt at the end of the third Christian century. The central theme of this book is, as we know, the description of the fall and salvation of the heavenly being Pistis Sophia. Originally, according to this narrative, Pistis Sophia had her home in the transcendent sphere of light, more precisely in the 13th aeon, but as she was seized by a longing to rise still higher, she came in conflict with her surroundings and fell. She looked down and saw a light which she thought she could use to rise higher up. In order to seize this light she left her heavenly dwelling and went down to Chaos. But no sooner had she got down there, than she was caught in matter and incapable of freeing herself. In her distress she called on the Light, asking to be led back to her original home. Then after repeated lamentations, she is freed by the Bringer of Light, the Son of Light, who led her safely through the dangers of the universe back to the sphere which she left. In other words the theme here is: the fall, imprisonment, and deliverance of the primeval soul.

Round about in this work we find a number of shorter or longer quotations from biblical texts both from the Old and the New Testament. These quotations, especially from the Psalms of the Old Testament prove on closer examination to be particularly valuable to those who want to describe the peculiar gnostic system which the book represents. For this purpose the quotations from the psalms are highly suitable, for they are rendered in two versions one more literal and one more free. This, together with the fact that the coptic versions rest on the Greek translation of Septuaginta, gives us no less than four versions of every separate poem, namely: 1) The Hebrew original, 2) the Greek text of Septuaginta, 3) the verbal Coptic version, and, 4) the free, Coptic rendering. By comparing these versions, the peculiar character of each of these layers stands out clearly. Particularly profitable is the comparison of the Hebrew original with the free Coptic translation. Such a comparison demonstrates clearly the quite considerable distance between the system of thought of the Old Testament, created as it is out of a collective community belief, and the gnostic system of Pistis Sophia, which was formed by a mystic who built it up on intuitive experience and philosophic-speculative thinking, and we get some idea of the way in which the latter uses and arranges a material which primarily belongs in a completely different connection, in the representation of his own thinking.

In chapters 41 and 43 Pistis Sophia gives a rendering of psalm 88 of the Old Testament. It is a typical cult poem, intended to be used at the temple in a concrete situation, namely at the purging ceremony during illness. Primarily the poem was made for the king. He is the speaking "I". He represents himself as having been ill from his youth, dying and on his way to Sheol, the dwelling of the dead. In his distress he goes to the temple to subject himself to the prescribed purgation — let himself be purged with hyssop, as is said in psalm 51 — and to state his complaint as a part of this ceremony. Let us hear how the Hebrew poem goes:

2) Jahve, God of my salvation, I have cried day and night before thee:
3) Let my prayer come before thee. Incline thine ear unto my cry:
4) For my soul is full of troubles and my life draweth nigh unto the grave.
5) I am counted with them that go down into the pit: I am as a man that hath no strength;
6) Free among the dead, like the slain that lie in the grave, whom thou rememberest no more; and they are cut off from thy hand.
7) Thou hast laid me in the lowest pit, in darkness, in the deeps.
8) Thy wrath lieth hard upon me, and thou hast afflicted me with all thy waves.
9) Thou hast put away mine acquaintance far from me, thou hast made me an abomination unto them: I am shut up, and I cannot come forth.
10) Mine eye mourneth by reason of affliction: Jahve, I have called daily upon thee, I have stretched out my hands unto thee.
11) Wilt thou shew wonders to the dead? Shall the dead arise and praise thee?
12) Shall thy lovingkindness be declared in the grave? Or thy faithfulness in destruction?
13) Shall thy wonders be known in the dark? And thy righteousness in the land of forgetfulness?
14) But unto thee have I cried, Jahve, and in the morning shall my
prayer prevent thee.

15) Jahve, why castest thou off my soul? Why hidest thou thy face from me?

16) I am afflicted and ready to die from my youth up: While I suffer thy terrors I am distracted.

17) Thy fierce wrath goeth over me, thy terrors have cut me off.

18) They came round about me daily like water, they compassed me about together.

19) Lover and friend hast thou put far from me, and mine acquaintance into darkness.

We find here the same leading ideas, with which we are familiar from other writings of the Old Testament. As regards the concept of god, Jahve is the living, personal and merciful God to whom man in affliction may turn. He gives salvation to him who prays 'ālōhē yēšēh'ātī, as the poem says (v. 2), but at the same time he who also punishes with suffering and pain: "Thou hast laid me in the lowest pit, in darkness, in the deeps" (v. 7). He can do so because he is the Lord of heaven and earth. In both places he has unlimited power. At the gate of death, however, even his power stops. "Free among the dead, like the slain that lie in the grave, whom thou rememberest no more: and they are cut off from thy hand" (v. 6). "Wilt thou shew wonders to the dead? Shall the dead arise and praise thee?" (v. 11). The answer is, of course, "no", for in the world of the dead it has no meaning to invoke God. He can only help the living.

The cosmologic and anthropologic ideas which the poem represents, correspond also to those which we know from other Old Testament writings. Existence is divided in three: heaven, earth, and the underworld. Man lives his life on earth. He has his good and evil days before the countenance of his heavenly master, but when his life on earth is finished, the relation between him and Jahve is also finished. After life on earth only a shadow existence follows, without God and without hope. The salvation of which the poem speaks, is stamped by this view. Relief from pain of the body and deliverance from death of the body is here the question.

If we now turn to the Coptic versions of the psalm, it strikes us immediately that there is a completely different way of thinking here. Let us study the introduction to the poem: "Jahve, God of my salvation, I have cried day and night before thee!" In the free Coptic version this runs: "Light of my salvation! I praise you in the high place and I praise you in Chaos." The concept of god is clearly a different one. He who prays in the Old Testament invokes Jahve. Pistis Sophia invokes the Light. An Israelite could very well imagine that Jahve gives light, but he could not imagine that Jahve was the Light. Here Light, nōyin, as it is called in Coptic, is clearly personified and is a term for the supreme god. "Hear, O Light, my penitential prayer!" (v. 2). Light sends salvation, just as it is Light which sends punishing disaster. So far there is parallelism here with the Hebrew version, yet Light is something quite different from the idea of a strictly personal God of the Israelites. For Light is also something impersonal, a kind of force giving life or power, which is in each separate individual. For lower down in the poem it is said: "I called on Light with all the light that is in me" (v. 9). The gnostic god we meet here, is thus both personal and impersonal, an acting individual god and an impersonal life-giving force. In other words we have here a concept of god of a typically mystic character. The Coptic translator has simply substituted his nōyin for the Greek kūpios, meaning Jahve, and interpreted his concept of god into the poem.

It is equally easy for him to substitute his own idea of the cosmos for that of the Old Testament. For the world is no longer divided into three. It does not consist any longer of heaven, the earth, and the underworld. It is divided into two parts, a superior one and an inferior one. He calls them πτωτός ἡλίξις and πέντες (v. 1), "the high place" and "Chaos". For Chaos is here, as one might be tempted to think, not a term for the grave, even though it stands where the Hebrew original has qābār, nor is it a term for the underworld. Chaos is a collective term meaning material existence, immanence. This is evident from the fact that the Coptic translator identifies Chaos with ζυγή (v. 6). Between these two worlds, the superior one, the world of Light, and the inferior one, the world of matter, there is, according to the Coptic translator, a sharp dualism: The superior world is the abode of the spirit, πνευμα (v. 8), the inferior, material world is only matter, conceived as dark (v. 3), forceless (v. 5), and perishable (v. 5), indeed, according to its essential nature, already dead, σμιώτ (v. 6). The Old Testament does not know of any such contrast between transcendence and immanence. On the contrary, the idea here is that this world, created as it is by God, must necessarily be good.

With what is said here, follows also that the anthropological ideas in the Coptic version differ widely from those of the Hebrew text. The Hebrew psalm describes an earthbound and perishable human being face to face with his heavenly, supreme master. The fate of this human being lies wholly in God's hand and is conditioned by God's justice.
and mercy. On the other hand, in the Coptic version, the fate of the praying, in case Pistis Sophia, is already in reality determined by his heavenly origin. "My light has gone down to Chaos", παραλείψας τε και επεκαινύ (v. 3). "I rose and went down", αἴχθος ἴστι εις ἐπεκαίνυ (v. 15). It is, of course, because Pistis Sophia has the inner light, which we heard about, that she can point to her heavenly origin. For she got her body when she stepped into matter: "I have become a material body", λύγῳ τοῦ γεωσμάτος γεγομένη (v. 4). "I have become like matter", λύγῳ τοῦ γεωσμάτος γεγομένη (v. 5). She has still her heavenly counterpart, her θύμος τοῦ θεοῦ, in heaven (v. 18). So we have again to do with a typically mystic idea: man as the bearer of a divine spark, which for a time is tied to the perishable matter and longs to be delivered. The Coptic translator takes it for granted that also the Hebrew poem represents this view.

While salvation in the Hebrew poem was deliverance from physical suffering and threatening death, salvation here is deliverance from matter and return to the sphere of light. To the Israelite, salvation was a gift from God. Here in the Coptic version, salvation is ultimately a natural consequence of the supreme Light's realization of his plan with the world. For Pistis Sophia's lot is not accidental. It is a part of the world plan. This is evident from the following statement: "You have carried out your purpose with me", ἔτελε ἐπ' ἡμῖν (v. 7).

What we have seen here, proves what I mentioned in the introduction, that the Coptic translator represents a completely different thinking than the Hebrew author. The difference is apparent in all main points of the two systems of thought, in the concept of god, in the conception of the cosmos, in anthropology and soteriology. In the presentation of his ideas, the Coptic translator uses material of widely different origin. He takes the Old Testament as his starting-point, but reshapes it completely by introducing Greek ideas of the origin of the soul, and Iranian ideas of a transcendent world of light. He does not, however, bind together casual, loose ideas. His thinking is harmonious. Just therefore he goes beyond the adopted scheme in a number of places, therefore he also substitutes to a large degree new formulas for old ones. With this impression it is natural to ask: Why does he at all use these biblical texts since he has to make so many changes? The answer must be that he is rooted in a strong and irresistible tradition. The book as a whole attests this. We have here a characteristic Jewish-Christian gnosis. Or the answer may be that he wishes to represent his teaching not as something new, but
ANCIENT IRANIAN RELIGION AS IT APPEARS IN BUDDHIST TEXTS: ITS POLYANDRY AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICES

BY

SHINYA KASUGAI

In the second century of the Common Era, at the time of King Kanishka, Iranian culture appeared in India as we see from archaeological evidence.

The travel diary of Hiouen-thsang, in the seventh century, contains references to two Iranian customs in the Kapiṣa state: one in the marriage customs, the other in the exposure of corpses. He states that these are the customs of the non-Buddhist religion of Dinabha. These passages cannot be connected with the Manu-Dharmaśāstra or Yajnavalkya-Dharmaśāstra which already indicate existence of a complicated Indian caste system with more than fifty castes, and which had developed from the mixtures of the original castes.

The marriage custom described by Hiouen-thsang must be a variant of the system mentioned in the Wei-shu thus:

Mostly they take their sister, elder or younger, as their wife or concubine. Not only that, but they had no aversion to marry their noble parents.

This fact, mentioned in historical annals, can be traced in such Buddhist texts as the Abhidharmaśāstra; there one reads:

They are permitted unpurified action with their mother [by Hiouen-thsang] (Taisho, No. 1558, vol. XXIX, p. 241b).

They marry their mother and so on [by Paramārtha] (Taisho, No. 1559, vol. XXIX, p. 85 b).

In these passages we recognize a style of marriage termed khavāvātadāta in the Avesta or khavāvātadā in Pahlavi, which was a type of endogamy recommended by the Zoroasterians. This custom had already disappeared with the period of modern Iranian religion.

These materials were found in texts in the Mahāvibhāṣa, second century, it says:

(112)
sister-in-law, or with a younger sister-in-law. This may not be interfered with by society. The reason why is as follows: (a) women are like cooked food. They must be used for eating. Thus all women should be used for sexual intercourse. (b) Women are like utensils. They must be used for their purposes. Thus all women should be used for sexual intercourse. (c) Women are like a road, which must be used for coming and going. Thus all women should be used for sexual intercourse. (d) Women are like the water of a river. It must be drawn and used for bathing. Thus all women should be used for sexual intercourse. (e) Women are like the fruit of a tree. It must be used as food. Thus all women should be used for sexual intercourse.

In another statement about the Maga of the Western Brahmanus (Nub-phyogs na bram-se mchu-shyes):
they are permitted sexual intercourse with every woman without punishment.

These passages of the Karmaprajñapātiśastra may be related to the to the passage of the Mahāvaibhāsa. Moreover, the date of the Karmaprajñapātiśastra, which is older than the latter, must be close to the second century before the Common Era.

Passages similar to the above are found in the Rajataramgini which was composed in the fourteenth century by Kalhana, historian of Kashmir. The first volume of this work refers to the Gandhara-Brahmans who are identical with the Maga of the Western Brahmanus. The passages of the Rajataramgini refer to these Brahmanus as “mleccha-varinsa-ja” (born in the mleccha), “dvijādhamana” (lower class Brahmanus).

It was their habit to have sexual intercourse with their sister, without punishment (bhaginnivarga-sambhoga-nirajjajiva) and with their daughter-in-law (swnusā-samgali-sahā), and they gave their own wives to other (ārāda); and it was their habit to buy or sell their wives (bhūryā-vibhūraya-kārin). Such habits of the Gandhara-Brahmanus were criticized as sinful (pāpin) by this author.

These materials extend from the Karmaprajñapātiśastra of the of the second century before the Common Era to the Mahāvaibhāsa of the second century of the Common Era and to the Abhidharmakośa of the fourth century. In this body of materials the name changed: Maga, Western Brahman became Mleccha, Western, Binaka [頻那柯], Dinabha [提那跋]. In these changes we can see social change and the acceptance of new styles of religion.

With regard to the religious practices of this non-Buddhist religion, the Abhidharmakośa says:

It is recommended by every Brahman in that area that men and women should worship the image of a cow, drink water eat grass and move about and have sexual contact with each other without distinction.

These religious practices were closely connected with modern Hindu practices. The grass mentioned may be related to the religious grass “adarha,” and the use of water is common to the rites of snānam (washing) and ṛitanam (bathing).

Aside from these two practices, the statements are unusual. It would seem that the details of the cow image and of free sexual intercourse require new interpretations, and one may conclude that the Iranian society of Northwestern India practised polyandry in the Kushana period. The women were held in common and the old women were sacrificed at holy places.

Later the cow, under the influence of Mithraism, was associated with the sun. These developments entered India with the Saka-tribes which invaded India.

In a sense, the words, (cow, water, grass) of the passage can be assumed to bear certain relation with the First Chapter of Kāthaka Purāṇa (Kāthaka, I.3).

These are preliminary conclusions only; but they suggest new paths for research which will open new and interesting problems.
PLANTS FOUND IN BUDDHIST Sanskrit LITERATURE
—ON BODHIVRIKṢA AND AÇOKA IN AÇVAGHOSĀ'S WORKS—

BY
HIDEO KIMURA

The kinds of plants found in Buddhist literature are so many that I cannot describe them all here. Descriptions of these plants may be divided into three: religious, lyric and medicinal. The Bodhi and Açoka trees which I am going to speak about are mainly described religiously or lyrically. In Buddhist art, as well as in literature, these two plants have been more frequently treated than any others. I shall speak about them with special reference to the Buddhacarita (The Life of Buddha) and the Saundarananda by Açvaghoṣa, a great Buddhist poet who is supposed to have lived from 50 to 150 A.D.

I. Bodhi Tree (Bodhi, Bodhivrikṣa, Bodhidruma)

In botanical parlance the Bodhi tree is called Ficus religiosa Linn., which belongs to the Urticaceae or Moraceae family. In the therapeutics of Ayurveda and Yunani, Ficus religiosa has been traditionally used for medical purposes. In the 'Indian Medicinal Plants' by Kirtikar & Basu, Plakṣa and Parkati, are mentioned under item No. 1181 as Sanskrit names for Ficus infectoria. In the 'Anekartha Tilaka of Mahipa' (circa 1175-1434 A.D.) II, 204, 'Plakṣa' is used as a synonym of 'Açvattha' (Ficus bengalensis). Therefore, it may be safely concluded that Açvaghoṣa's usage of 'Plakṣa' for Ficus religiosa is the earliest reference which can be found. He calls this tree 'Açvattha' in the following passage of Buddhacarita:

"Then, having determined to attain the Enlightenment, He with resolve approached the root of an Açvattha tree, Where the surface of the ground was covered with green grass."

Further, he depicts the scene how, after Gautama has taken his seat under the Açvattha tree, Kāmadeva, the god of love, marches towards its root with his three sons and three daughters to disturb Gautama's mind absorbed in meditation. The çūka goes as follows:

"Then, having seized his flower-made bow and five arrows which infatuate people, The disturber of the minds of living beings marched near to the root of the Açvattha tree, accompanied by his children."

In the above two çūkas Açvaghoṣa uses the name 'Açvattha' for Ficus religiosa in conformity with the usage traditional since the Rigveda. We may presume, then, that Açvaghoṣa intentionally used 'Plakṣa'..."
and 'Aśvattha' in describing Gāutama before his Enlightenment, and 'Bodhi tree' after his becoming a Buddha. In the 27th gālaka of the 13th chapter of the Buddhacarita, the term 'Bodhi tree' is used:

"Having encircled the foot of the Bodhi tree,
Such the troops of demons stood on every side,
With eagerness to seize and injure Him,
Awaiting the command of their chief."\(^{113}\)

Again, the 32nd gālaka of the same chapter reads:

"When they saw the host of Māra with intention to harm crowding around the foot of the Bodhi tree,
Cried loudly in the sky the beings (gods) with righteous mind,
Desiring that the people of the world will gain liberation."\(^{114}\)

The host of Māra failed to perturb Gāutama intent on deep meditation.

The 42nd gālaka of the same chapter gives the following description:

"But when scattered over at the foot of the Bodhi tree,
The shower of sparkling embers became a shower of red lotus petals,
Through the operation of the Greatest Saint's mercy."\(^{114}\)

It is easily surmised that 'Bodhi tree' suits Buddha's Enlightenment better than 'Aśvattha' and 'Plakṣa'.

In Amarakośa II, 4, 20 cd-21 a., five names are enumerated as synonyms of Ficus religiosa, that is, Bodhidruma, Caladala, Pippala, Kuñjāraṇa and Aśvattha.\(^{113}\) In the 'Botany Part I - Medicinal Plants' p. 104, Aśvattha, Bodhidruma, Pippala, Čuḍidruma, Vṛkṣarāja and Yājnikā are mentioned as different Sanskrit names of the same Ficus religiosa.\(^{114}\) Its local names are as follows: 'Jari,' 'Pipers' and 'Pipal' in Gujarāthi; 'Pipál' and 'Piplí' in Hindi; 'Jari' in Uṛīya; 'Arani,' 'Asvathama,' 'Pippala' and 'Ragi' in Kannad; 'Marathi names Ashoka, Jasundi; and its Tamil name is Asogam.\(^{117}\) This plant is a large, erect and evergreen tree. Its young shoots are drooping and beautifully light to deep crimson. Its branches spread down, its leaves are sessile or subsessile and each leaf consists of 3 to 6 pairs of leaflets; its flowers in dense corymbs are 3 to 4 inches in diameter and are orange when they bloom, but gradually turn bright scarlet. Its corymbs appear straight from big trunks or from terminal branches. The time of its flowering is from January to June. According to Ayurveda prescriptions, its bark, flowers, and seeds are especially useful as medicines for diseases of women.\(^{116}\) It may be supposed that, because of the medical usefulness and of the beauty of its flowers, this plant became a favorite among people. The tree is also important to young lovers; it is said that, if a beloved lady kicks the tree, flowers burst forth. This idea has become a favorite subject of poets. Below I quote a famous poem from Kālidāśa's work, Meghadūta 'Cloud-messenger'; it reads,

"Here the red Āçoka with its trembling buds and the beautiful Bakura are found near the bower of Mādhavi creepers engirdled by a hedge of Kurabaka plants;
The former (Āçoka) longs with me for the left foot of my friend;
The latter for the wine in her mouth under the pretext that wine is necessary for the buds to burst open."\(^{119}\)

In this poem, a poor young Yakṣa, separated from his beloved says, 'I wish to be kicked, like Āçoka, by the left foot of my darling.' From such romantic ideas, fine paintings and sculptures have been created, with a beautiful young lady standing under a flowering Āçoka tree.

In India I saw the image of a beautiful lady engraved on a stone pillar at Ajanta; she was standing under a flowering Āçoka tree. The im-

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\(^{113}\) A shopalava; its Kannad names are Ashoka, Ashuge, Anthunala, Kenkali, Kusage; its Marathi names Ashoka, Jasundi; and its Tamil name is Asogam.

\(^{114}\) This plant is Saraca indica Linn. or Jonesia Asoka Roxb. of the family Reguminosae or Fabalpinoideae. Its Hindi name is Ashok; its Gujarathi name Ashoka, Ashuge, Anthunala, Kenkali, Jasundi; its Tamil name is Asogam.

\(^{115}\) Ficus bengalensis,

\(^{116}\) Ashoka, Jasundi; and its Tamil name is Asogam.

\(^{117}\) Ashopalava; its Kannad names are Ashoka, Ashuge, Anthunala, Kenkali, Kusage; its Marathi names Ashoka, Jasundi; and its Tamil name is Asogam.

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\(^{119}\) Ficus bengalensis,

\(^{111}\) Ficus religiosa, commonly called Pippala (Skt., Pippala; Hindi, Pipal, Pipli; Marathi, Pimpal; Gujarathi, Pipal), planted near or in the premises of Hindu or Buddhist temples is a common sight even today. In Buddhist paintings and sculptures, the scene depicting Buddha's Enlightenment always contains the Bodhi tree; in some cases, the Bodhi tree shaped like a halo is placed at the back of Buddha, and it also occurs that the Bodhi tree symbolizes Buddha Himself.

II. Āçoka Tree

Āçoka in Skt. means 'not feeling sorrow'. This plant is Saraca indica Linn. or Jonesia Asoka Roxb. of the family Reguminosae or Fabalpinoideae. Its Hindi name is Ashok; its Gujarathi name Ashoka, Ashuge, Anthunala, Kenkali, Jasundi; its Tamil name is Asogam.\(^{117}\) This plant is a large, erect and evergreen tree. Its young shoots are drooping and beautifully light to deep crimson. Its branches spread down, its leaves are sessile or subsessile and each leaf consists of 3 to 6 pairs of leaflets; its flowers in dense corymbs are 3 to 4 inches in diameter and are orange when they bloom, but gradually turn bright scarlet. Its corymbs appear straight from big trunks or from terminal branches. The time of its flowering is from January to June. According to Ayurveda prescriptions, its bark, flowers, and seeds are especially useful as medicines for diseases of women.\(^{116}\) It may be supposed that, because of the medical usefulness and of the beauty of its flowers, this plant became a favorite among people. The tree is also important to young lovers; it is said that, if a beloved lady kicks the tree, flowers burst forth. This idea has become a favorite subject of poets. Below I quote a famous poem from Kālidāśa's work, Meghadūta 'Cloud-messenger'; it reads,

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The former (Āçoka) longs with me for the left foot of my friend;
The latter for the wine in her mouth under the pretext that wine is necessary for the buds to burst open."\(^{119}\)

In this poem, a poor young Yakṣa, separated from his beloved says, 'I wish to be kicked, like Āçoka, by the left foot of my darling.' From such romantic ideas, fine paintings and sculptures have been created, with a beautiful young lady standing under a flowering Āçoka tree. In India I saw the image of a beautiful lady engraved on a stone pillar at Ajanta; she was standing under a flowering Āçoka tree. The im-
pression of its elegance and beauty is still vivid in my memory.

Limited as my knowledge is, I did not find an instance in the Veda and the Pāṇiniyākaraṇa in which the term Açoka is used as the name of a plant. But the Yuddhakaṇḍa 113, 36-40 of Rāmāyana (its oldest part is assigned to 3 or 4 cen. B.C.), gives the description of the scene in which Māruti, the king of monkeys, is glad to have found Sītā under an Açoka tree in Lankā or Ceylon. It is probably due to the worship of Sītā-Rāma that people consider Açoka a sacred tree. Its leaves are hung as decorations in places where ceremonies are held. Some Hindu women drink water with its flowers, believing that the merit of the tree can repel misery and sorrow from their children. In the Bengal district, women eat its buds on the 6th day of the Cāitra month named Açoka-ṣaṣṭhi. Cāitra is the name of a lunar month, which corresponds to March and April. A Buddhist tradition tells us that, while the oldest part is assigned to March and April a Buddhist tradition tells us that, while its leaves are hung as decorations in places where ceremonies are held.

Some flowers, Gautama Buddha was born from her in the garden Lumbini. Queen Sītā-Rama supported herself holding a branch of an Açoka tree with flowers, Gautama Buddha was born from her in the garden Lumbini. In this poem, the word 'Bodhisattva' is an honorific for Gautama. Aśvaghoṣa does not say clearly what kind of tree it was whose branch Queen Māyā grasped. Everybody marvels at the beautiful stone engraving recently discovered at Nalanda which represents the scene of the birth of Baby Gautama with the queen supported herself by a branch hanging low with a weight of flowers. Standing as it were ashamed at the shine of our beautiful hands. Aśvaghoṣa mentions this plant in such a way, though in an amorous connection, with the intention to emphasize the pains of loves in order to take away sensual enjoyment which causes us to sink into the depth of suffering and to persuade us, by rejecting sensual pleasures, to attain the Enlightenment which is free from pains and sorrows, which Açoka literally means.

NOTES
2) According to Chinese tradition, Shushō-tenki-setsu, which is the theory that the point-marks marked at every Varsha from the next year after Buddha’s Mahāparinirvāṇa are counted in China.
3) Tilia Miqueliana might have been brought to Japan by Chinese Buddhists and has been treated with great respect. Afterwards it was planted as a holy tree in Buddhist temples. Tilia Miqueliana is the same species as Shina-no-ki, Tilia cordata, in Japan. The species Tilia is planted by the roadside as decoration in Europe and has become famous due to the song ‘Lindenbaum’ by Schubert. See Y. Tsukamoto, Genshoku-kaō-zukan or ‘The Flowering Plants Illustrated by Coloured Pictures’ Vol. II, p. 49.
5) Sāryanārāyana Cāudhari, Saundarananda: sa suvarnapinayugabhūr riṣabhaṅgagātr āyatekṣasah/ plakṣam avaniruham abhyagamat paramasya niçayavidhīr bubhūtsaya//
6) V.S. Agrawala, India as Known to Pāṇini p. 211. Though identified so, no ground for this identification is mentioned.
7) The commentary of Raghuvamsa of Kālidāsa (Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay, 1948), XIII, 71: Prarohāḥ cākhāvālamabhibhir adhomukhār mālār jätāāya jātavah āvamā sah na sthitān.
8) Kirtikar & Basu, Indian Medicinal Plants No. 1178; only Vata is mentioned as its Skt. name. Botany Part I – Medicinal Plants p. 102 enumerates Avaroha, Bahupāda (= Bahupad, -pāda), Bhringin Jātala and Vata as its Skt. names, though Nyagrodha is mentioned as Kannad’s name. Amarkoṣa (circa 300 A.D.) II, 4, 32 (Poona, 1941), nyagrodho, bahupad and vatah are Skt. names of Ficus Bengalis.
10) Budhacarita XII, 7, tato dhanu puspamaya Çrihitvā çarān jaganmohakarārç ca pañca/ so çvatthamalām sasuto bhayagacchad asvāthāyākāri manasaḥ praṇānam// which I quote here. The Buddha-Karita of Asvaghosa XIII, 7, tato dhanu puspamaya Çrihitvā çarām tathā mohakarārazya ca pame/ so çvatthamalām sasuto bhayagacchad asvāthāyākāri manasaḥ praṇānam//
11) Rīgveda (circa 2000-1000 B.C.) X, 97, 5, (Poona, 1949) acātvethe vo niśadami parce vo vasāt kriya/ gobar iha it kilkaśa yat sanavathā pūrasam//
12) Buddha-Karita, XIII, 27; Budhacarita, XIII, 27, evamvidhā bhētāgaśāḥ samantāt tad bodhiśalam parivārya tathābh/ jīfakṣavaç caiva jīfāmāvāç ca bhartur niyogam pariśālayatāḥ//
13) Ibid. XIII, 32, tad bodhimālam samavekṣya kīnma himsatānā mahāvalem tena/ dharmātmaḥbhūr lokavinokakāmār bhābhīva hāhākṛtam antarikṣe//
Ten years ago Essenism was known to us mainly from Jewish, but non-Essenic, sources written in Greek: Josephus and Philo. Both of them are enthusiastic in their descriptions, with a kind of pride, that the Jewish religion was able to produce so high a standard of virtue and "philosophy". They do not seem prepared to admit any foreign element in the Essenic movement; but owing to certain features of the Essenes as described by them, suspicion arose about their Jewish orthodoxy.

50 years ago Essenic doctrine and practice mostly were considered a syncretism of Hellenistic, Pythagorean, Persian and Indian elements with Jewish traditions. Many of these suspicions may be easily discarded for lack of evidence; but one was especially tenacious: the claim, that the Essenes adopted essential parts of their discipline from Buddhism. The author of the article "Esseni" in Pauly-Wissowa, W. BAUER, e.g. thought that for Essenic celibacy and cenobitism there is scarcely any parallel except Buddhism, and RADHAKRISHNAN still now holds that "two centuries before the Christian era, Buddhism closed in on Palestine," just on account of Essenism.

Now after the discovery of Essenic literature near the Dead Sea such statements have to be re-examined. It is true, that some doubts have been raised about the identity of the Qumran people and the Essenes. Even some "anti-Essene traits" have been maintained in Qumran literature, always supposing that Josephus and Philo are unquestionable sources. But now most of the scholars agree on the identity of the Qumran community with the Essenes in general, though we must admit differences in the community itself according to the degree of austerity professed by its various groups. Even according to Josephus there were a sort of lay members, living dispersed in the country, to whom marriage and private property were allowed. But this does not invalidate the evidence that the main group was living in voluntary celibacy and cenobitic poverty, proba-
bly in only one place, Qumran. Whoever knew as little as Pliny the Elder of the Essenes, knew at least this much, that they abstained from sexual intercourse and private acquisition. These two traits were considered essential and peculiar to Essenism in the proper sense, and just for these two, but especially for the first, there seems to exist no fundament in Judaism. Apart from the legendary school of Pythagoras and some obscure Tracian sect, the Dakoi, even Josephus could not point out any similarity in religions known to him. If any dependence on foreign influence has to be maintained, little choice seems to be left besides Buddhism. Perhaps even Josephus was already aware of this parallel. The enigmatical passage in Antiquities 18,1,5 about the Dakoi is probably corrupt; and if the conjecture I propose in Vetus Testamentum is right, that we have to read “sakôn tois podistais”, in the sense of Buddhists, instead of “dakôn tois plestois”, this would be the first mentioning of Buddhism in the West.

Examining the possibility of Buddhist influence on Essenism from the side of Buddhism, we are handicapped by the lack of clear evidence. Buddhism surely had a history of more than 300 years, when Essenism arose, even if we assume as early a date as the time of Antiochus Epiphanes for the origin of the Essenic movement. But probably it is not before Asoka (+232 B.C.) that a remarkable diffusion of Buddhism can be reasonably assumed. More problematic is its expansion outside of India, especially to the West. The first contact of India with the West was made by Alexander. But the famous Indian sage Kalanos who accompanied the King as far as Persia and burned himself there alive, was surely no Buddhist. The first notice about India in Greek literature we owe to Megasthenes, who made a journey to Pataliputra (Patna) about 300 B.C. In his report “Indica” he divides the Indian “sophistai” into two classes: brachmanoi and samanaioi. The latter are certainly identical with pali samana and sanskrit śramaṇa, “mendicant”; but at that time this word probably did not mean Buddhist monks, but rather Brahmanic hermits. King Asoka, himself a convert to Buddhism, was the first to make Buddhism known beyond the frontiers of India. According to his Rock Edicts II and XIII, he sent Buddhist missionaries to the kings of Syria, Egypt, Macedonia, Cyrene and Epirus. Many scholars think this was a plan never realized, as there is no trace left of their activity. Asoka’s missionary efforts can be traced only as far as Afghanistan, the old Bactria, thanks to an Aramaic inscription from the 3rd century B.C. found near Kabul in 1938. The account of the Milindapañha, that Menander, the greatest of the Indo-Greek kings in the 2nd century, was converted to Buddhism, seems to be legendary. But the Indo-Scythian kings of the Saka dynasty probably had been Buddhists already before they invaded India for the first time under their king Mauwes or Moga about 62 B.C. On one of the coins of this king Tarn identified an image of Buddha. To the same first century B.C. belongs the testimony of Alexander Polyhistor about monks and nuns, semnai and semnaii, in India, who lived in celibacy and practised other austerities. By these he apparently understands Buddhist bhikkhus and bhikkhunis. Cyrilus Alexandrinus probably relies on the same source, when he mentions the samanaioi as the peculiar form of ascetism for Persia and Bactria. Under this name Buddhism seems to have been known in the West during the last three centuries before Christ. But this knowledge was rather scarce and vague; it did not clearly distinguish between Buddhist and Brahmanic ascetism. As most conspicuous features the sources regularly mention extreme poverty (“gymnosophists”) and celibacy.

From the general conditions of that time we cannot gather more than a dim possibility of Buddhist influence. Trade connections between India and the Mediterranean countries were steadily increasing from the 3rd century B.C. on, but they left no traceable cultural effect in the period that interests us.

If we now try to apply these historical dates to our question, all what may cautiously be said is, that in the remote little Syrian province called Judaea of the beginning 2nd century B.C. at best a rumor may have penetrated about celibatarian Buddhist communities in India. The question is, whether such a vague knowledge would prove a sufficient motive for Jews of the Maccabean period, to accept or imitate this way of living. Considering the difficulties of such a life, stronger impulses seem to be required. At the time of Antiochus Epiphanes there were certainly many Jews who, under the pressure of religious persecution were prepared to imitate Greek manners; but their motive was far from ascetical enthusiasm. No Jew who had religious zeal enough to embrace the austerities of Essenism, would have done so for the sake of an un-Jewish ideal, even if it were imposed on him by political pressure. What we know now about the Essenes especially from the findings of Qumran is, that they were a movement directly opposed to that of the liberal group of Hellenizing Jews, that is, extremely pious, conservative and nationalistic. The first small group that gathered in Qumran about 150 B.C. were led by those insistent priests, who refused any collaboration and coexistence even with other less conservative priests, especially the “Wicked Priests” of Hasmonean origin.
They considered these as traitors of their Jewish traditions. For people of such attitude, accepting a foreign doctrine or way of life is nearly a psychological impossibility. What remains puzzling, is that they themselves gave up their traditional way in the two points of celibacy and cenobitic poverty. Perhaps we should be obliged to take our refuge to the theory of Buddhist influence, if we could not point out any positive reason for their doing so; but such reason now seems to be available.

Before Qumran, we knew next to nothing about the reasons which called forth Essenisim. Philo and Josephus, it is true, leave us the impression, as if pure love of “philosophy” and ascetism induced them to this kind of living. Perhaps both of them did not know any other reason, or they did not want to present any other to their Greek readers. Pliny ascribes it even to “vitae paenitentia”, weariness of life. According to these authors the Essenes were so meek and pacific, as to avoid not only carrying or fabricating arms, but all trades connected with war. Nothing is said about their Messianic expectations and political aspirations. If we now have to identify, as we must, the first Essenes with the Maccabean hasidaios and with the authors of the Qumran literature, quite a different picture emerges. They voluntarily joined the first Maccabean liberty fighters and are lauded for their bravery. A fanatic product of their fighting spirit is the Book of War. It may have originated from a later period of Essenisim; but this would only prove, that their militant attitude never relented. They prepared the Holy War against all kind of “Kittim”, i.e. Gentiles and Unbelievers, till their complete extermination or conversion. The fuel for this fervour was provided by their Messianic ideal, which was both religious and political, and their belief in the Great Day of Yahwe soon to come. In the beginning they had been glad to join the Maccabean army; but when the Maccabean movement reached its goal and developed to nearly the contrary of their lofty Essenic ideal, they separated and went underground to wait for the big occasion, the Day of the Messiah. Being a latent army, they had to continue community life and discipline of a garrison. Their celibacy and poverty was, therefore, motivated militarily, not ascetically, though later ascetical motives may have been added. During Holy War, the Israel soldier had to abstain from sexual intercourse and from any care for private affairs or property. For the Essenes the campaign lasted longer than they might have expected; but as they did not know the day or hour of the Messianic miracle, they had to stay always prepared. In times of Greek and Roman occupation, such a latent army had, of course, to be

**Notes**

2) Eastern Religions and Western Thought, reprint 1955, pag. 158.
4) There can be no doubt, that both of them have strong tendencies; but the textual trustworthiness should not be questioned in the way it is done by DEL MEDICO, Les Esseniens dans l’Oeuvre de Flavius Josèphe, in: Byzantinologie, XIII. (1952) pag. lsqq.
5) STRUGNELL in JBL, June 1958, pag. 107: “We must now take the identification of Qumranites and Essenes as proved.”
6) Hist. nat., 5, 17: “Sine una femina, omni venere abdicata, sine pecunia, socia palmarum.”
9) De Lubac, pag. 12.
10) What may be reasonably held, is the possibility of a diplomatic mission, which had no effect at all.
11) ALTHEIM, Weltgeschichte im Griechischen Zeitalter, I, Halle 1947,25-43. Meanwhile a new Asoka inscription (in Greek and Aramaic) has been discovered at Kandahar (Afghanistan), which was presented to this congress by Prof. DUVONT-SOMMER (see his resumé, and the Journal Asiatique, 1958, 1-36).
12) ALTHEIM, op. cit., II, pag. 83; but cf. RENOU-PILLAY, L’Inde classique, II, § 2225.
13) TARN, The Greeks in Bactria and India, 1938, 403 sq.
Eschatology in ancient Egyptian religion is relatively well known as far as it concerns the individual fate of man after death. Much information is provided us by literary and archaeological material. The royal burial-places, the pyramids as well as the rock-tombs of the New Kingdom, bear lasting witness to the immense importance ancient Egyptians attributed to the funeral destiny of their kings. Private graves and epitaphs prove the belief in the hereafter being an outstanding characteristic of common religion too. Thus individual eschatology was a fundamental trait of ancient Egyptian religion.

Archaeological testimony is confirmed and completed by the extremely large mass of mortuary literature of which we discern the three great groups of the Pyramid Texts, the Coffin Texts and the Book of Dead. We are also relatively well informed about the rites for the dead, about prayers and offerings for them and about legal contracts to enforce the perpetuation of these rites performed especially by the *hmr w hpt*, a certain class of priests devoted to the service at the graves.

The ancient Egyptians spent a great part of their wealth to devising means of defeating death and securing eternal life. According to Egyptian belief this depended on the preservation of human bodies and the correct fulfillment of the prescribed rites of an Egyptian burial. From there the esteem of these facts in Egyptian thinking is well understandable. Perhaps the best example for that is to be found in the famous story of Sinuhe. Sinuhe, a high-rank courtier in the beginnings of the Middle Kingdom, was a political fugitive from Egypt to Syria. Not before he had become an old man he came back to Egypt. The preponderant motive of his return from abroad was the prospect of a real Egyptian burial promised him by king Sesostris I.

Thus the ancient Egyptians connected with their rites their belief in an eternal being of the individual. Physical death then was a mere transition from one state of life to another. The sepulchre was frequently
named h.t n.e nhk, "house of eternity", the dead were considered as "blessed" ones, and the region of the dead, generally expressed by the western quarter of the heavens, was not seldom praised like in the following verses\textsuperscript{3}:

"I have heard those songs that are in the ancient tombs, and what they tell extolling life on earth and belittling the region of the dead. Wherefore do they thus concerning the land of eternity, the just and fair which has no terrors? Wrangling is its abhorrence, and no man girds himself against his fellow. It is a land against which none can rebel; all our kinsfolk rest within it since the earliest day of time. The offspring of millions of millions are come thereto, every one. For none may tarry in the land of Egypt, none there is who has not passed yonder. The span of earthly things is a dream; but a fair welcome is given to him who has reached the West."

The rich documentation of Egyptian conceptions of life after death enables us not only to perceive a chief religious trait in this faith but also to distinguish several stages in the historical development. We are well informed about the preponderance of the royal immortalization during the Old Kingdom as about the different and controversal trends during the First Intermediate Period after the fall of the Old Kingdom, when a socially broader class took possession of the former royal texts of immortalization inscribed at the inner walls of the pyramids since the end of the fifth dynasty\textsuperscript{3}. The dead had to be brought to life again by magical passes, but also a radical scepticism as to man's fate in the hereafter took place. The culmination of religious concepts was the belief in a heavenly hereafter dependent on a judgement before the great god, i.e. the sun-god Re. But finally the murdered and resurrected god Osiris identified with Chenti-Imentiu, the local divinity of Abydos, was victorious and with him the judgement of the dead and their continuous life in the netherworld.

All these facts of individual eschatology are relatively well known, and famous Egyptological scholars have investigated the particular stages of its development\textsuperscript{4}. Thus the task of researching work concerns nowadays chiefly interpretation of facts, but not so much exploring.

It is not the same thing with universal eschatology. For individual eschatology is only the anthropological part, but not eschatology as a whole. Our knowledge of the universal destiny of mankind and of this world according to ancient Egyptian conceptions is comparatively small. Questions about this topic which is in close connection with the Egyptian ideas of time\textsuperscript{5} and history\textsuperscript{6} still widely unknown, are therefore a worth subject for religious research.

From our material known at present only some important texts out of the beginnings of the Middle Kingdom, a period so remarkable for its religious activity, make statements about the theological conceptions of a universal end of history and mankind. We find evidence of this idea in a statement of the god Atum in a chapter of the Book of Dead whose origin dates from that epoch\textsuperscript{7}. There in the form of a dialogue, so frequently employed by the literature of this time and so convenient an expression for the discussion of opposing religious opinions during the period, Atum and Osiris treat eschatological problems. The following section of this dialogue is important with regard to the universal end of history\textsuperscript{8}. There Osiris as representative of the mortal mankind asks:

"Atum, what is my duration of life?" — And this is Atum's answer: "Thou art destined for millions of millions of years, a lifetime of millions. Further, I shall destroy all that I have made, and this land will return into Nun, into the floodwaters, as in its first state. I alone am a survivor ....\textsuperscript{9}, when I have made my form in another state, a serpent which men do not know and gods do not see."

The first statement of this text is that of a very long duration of history. No sudden end of mankind in an apocalyptic sense is expected during the actual generation of that time. A final end of this world, however, is surely proclaimed. There is no doubt about this statement, absolutely contrary to the cyclic thinking of history in the Old Kingdom, being made twice in the text concerned.

The first expression for the destruction of this world caused by Atum is made with an allusion to the return into Nun. Nun is the god of the primeval floodwaters, and leading back to that state where Nun is all in all means reducing creation to the original state of chaos. This correlation between the first and the last times of history is a well-known scheme of eschatological thinking\textsuperscript{10} expressed in the best way possible by the words:

\begin{quote}
\texttt{ιδον ποιώ τὰ ἔσχατα ὡς τὰ πρῶτα.}
\end{quote}

It is but another expression of the same idea when Atum foretells his future state in the animal shape of a serpent. For according to Egyptian mythology Atum as creator is considered as a serpent\textsuperscript{12}. His final return to his primeval state is a typical conception of eschatological thinking.

Universal eschatology is also proclaimed in another important literary document from the beginnings of the Middle Kingdom. The "Tale of the Shipwrecked Sailor\textsuperscript{13}" tells the story of an Egyptian
official who went to the mines of the king by ship. He was shipwrecked and reached an island called Punt whose ruler was a serpent who delivered lessons to the Egyptian clearly to be understood as religious revelations. It was a deplorable misunderstanding judgning this story to be a fairy-tale and the serpent, so well documented as a heathen god by Ethiopic tradition14), being merely a product of fantasy15). Only a religious interpretation is able to recognize the importance of this account and of the eschatological part of it16). This is contained in the foretellings of the destruction of the island given by the serpent-god. The eschatological scheme of a correlation between the beginning and the end of history is also to be found in this account. For the island which will be destroyed by a large flood is, according to Egyptian thinking, closely connected with the conception of the primeval hill surrounded by the floodwaters before creation.

Ethical motives are often connected with the conception of a destruction of mankind. In a dialogue between Atum and the god Thot from the Book of Dead17 we find evidence of this conception, Atum complains the corruption of mankind, the children of Nut18):

"O Thot, what is it that has happened? It is among the children of Nut. They have made an uproar; they have seized upon quarreling; they have done evil deeds; they have created rebellion; they have made slaughters; they have created imprisonment. Moreover, in everything which we might do, they have made the great into the small. Give thou greatly, Thot!" - With his answer to Atum Thot refers to the destined end of mankind: "Thou shalt not see evil deeds, thou shalt not suffer. Their years are cut short and their last months are curbed."

The verdict of Thot is in close relationship to the account of an intended annihilation of mankind. This, however, similar to the contents of the story of Noah's Flood, is finally prevented by the sun-god Re. The idea of this possible destruction dominates the so-called "Book of the Heavenly Cow", whose contents is the "Deliverance of Mankind from Destruction"19). This Egyptian myth anticipates, as the motive of the Flood in general does, the universal eschatological end of history in intention and nearly-performance.

Universal eschatology is not a common sign of ancient Egyptian understanding of history, but especially characteristic of that period of politic weakness and contemporary so alive an epoch of spiritual activity, which began after the downfall of the Old Kingdom. The turbulent times of the rising Middle Kingdom rendered occasions for melancholy. Therefore it is not astonishing that, according to the

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9) The following words : "together with Osiris" are to be judged as an interpolation.
THE SUCKLING OF THE PHARAOH AS A PART OF THE CORONATION RITES IN ANCIENT EGYPT
LE RÔLE DE L’ALLAITEMENT DANS LE CÉRÉMONIAL PHARAONIQUE DU COURONNEMENT

BY
JEAN LECLANT

Une des scènes relativement fréquentes de l'iconographie égyptienne est celle qui montre Pharaon allaité par une divinité. En fait, l'inventaire de ces représentations est infiniment plus riche que ne le laisse supposer la liste des références bien connues groupées rapidement par Alexandre Moret dans son étude fondamentale, "Du caractère religieux de la royauté pharaonique" (1902), p. 64.

Dès l'Ancien Empire, au temple funéraire de Sahourê, on voit le souverain allaité par la déesse Smat-wrt ; la déesse est debout ainsi que le roi, figuré de grande taille, de sorte que son visage est à hauteur de la poitrine de sa nourrice. Au temple funéraire de Néourserré, la déesse qui a une tête de félin et le roi, de grande taille, sont aussi figurés debout. Un très beau relief du Musée du Caire (n°38133) nous montre le roi Ounas allaité par une déesse, cette fois à tête humaine. L'allaitement de Péri est aussi connu par des reliefs de son temple funéraire (G. Jéquier, Le monument funéraire de Pépi II, t. II, pl. 30–33) et également peut-être, comme l'a suggéré H. Ranke (Journal of the Near Eastern Studies, IX, 1950, p. 228–236 et pl. XIX), par un relief conservé à Princeton : sur celui-ci, le souverain est figuré comme un enfant de petite taille, nu, paré de la tresse de la jeunesse, assis sur les genoux de la déesse.

Pour le Moyen-Empire et les époques postérieures de la civilisation égyptienne, nous pourrions dérouler un long inventaire des scènes d'allaitement royal ; mais ce n'est sans doute pas ici le lieu de présenter en détail les diverses pièces de ce dossier. Remarquons seulement que, sur un thème général, les Égyptiens ont connu de nombreuses variantes. Le plus souvent le roi est représenté debout ; sa taille est celle d'un adolescent, assez grand pour que sa bouche soit à hauteur du sein de la déesse qui est figurée debout elle-même ou parfois assise ;
ce dernier cas est celui notamment d’une représentation très célèbre du temple d’Abydos. Mais le roi peut aussi être figuré comme un tout jeune enfant, généralement nu, portant la tresse de la jeunesse, posé sur les genoux de sa nourrice divine qui est alors assise sur un trône.

Dans tous les cas, il s’agit d’une figure en quelque sorte idéale de l’allaitement, et non pas de l’image d’une scène réelle. Le roi n’est représenté comme un adolescent, un jeune homme déjà grand de taille, que pour des raisons de convenance plastique ; il faut qu’il n’y ait pas disproportion entre la déesse et lui et, conformément aux lois du dessin égyptien, qu’une disposition stricte du tableau se trouve assurée. Ces proportions imaginaires suffiraient déjà à indiquer que c’est là non pas une représentation réelle, mais une figure symbolique. Mais, de plus, certains détails insistent, de façon décisive, sur son état d’enfant, plus même, de nourrisson : il est nu-ce qui, normal pour un bébé, pourrait sembler choquant de la part d’un jeune homme ou d’un adulte ; il porte la tresse de l’enfant ou une bulle pendue à son cou ; il tient souvent à la main l’oisillon qu’affectent les gamins, détail réinterprété, nous le verrons dans un instant, comme un motif de domination. Enfin la déesse allaitant n’est pas elle-même dans l’attitude réelle de la nourrice égyptienne ; celle-ci, évidemment, ne donnait pas le sein debout, mais elle ne le faisait pas non plus à proprement parler assise ; l’attitude normale de la nourrice égyptienne est à genoux, comme le montrent les hiéroglyphes notant les mots de "nurses" et "soins de nurserie", ainsi que les représentations de la vie domestique. Ainsi, le caractère idéal, symbolique, de l’allaitement royal apparaît manifeste.

En ce qui concerne les scènes de l’Ancien Empire auxquelles nous nous sommes référé au début de cet exposé, il convient sans doute de les rapprocher de plusieurs passages des Textes des Pyramides dont nous avions tenté de préciser la signification au Congrès des Orientalistes de Paris, en 1948. En ces textes, les soins nourriciers, allaitement et aussi "nurserie" en un sens plus large (on berce l’enfant, on le baigne), résultent du fait que le roi défunt est assimilé à petit enfant, à un bébé qui vient de naître. Le roi, mourant, renait à une vie nouvelle ; dès lors recommence pour lui un nouveau cycle d’existence, nouveau-né, puisque renaissant, il avait besoin des soins de la puériculture, et avant tout de l’allaitement ; aussi des nourrices divines lui tendent-elles le sein.

L’allaitement divin, le roi le connaît non seulement à sa mort, mais encore lors de sa venue au monde. Dans les représentations comme dans les textes, on insiste — a posteriori évidemment — sur sa
juridique, cf. A. Moret, A.H. Gardiner, W.K. Simpson);
f) la montée royale;
g) l’accolade du roi en présence de la Grande Ennéade et de trois groupes de trois “âmes” (c’est l’“embrasement”, šmn);
h) l’intronisation : de façon exceptionnelle, le roi est tourné non pas en direction du dieu, mais vers l’extérieur; il est agenouillé en avant du dieu Amon qui pose ses mains sur la couronne et ainsi la “vivifie” en présence de l’Ennéade des dieux : geste de protection et d’“animation” qui caractérise aussi toute une série de statues, qui sont donc des mémoriaux de l’intronisation; l’une des plus célèbres est le groupe de Toutankhamon et d’Amon conservé au Musée du Louvre; lorsqu’on a voulu couper le fluide divin, on a brisé les bras de la divinité et on a fait perdre ainsi au roi, pour l’éternité, le bénéfice de cette attitude.

Cependant, le couronnement et les fêtes jubilaires qui répètent le couronnement avec des épisodes à ce point semblables qu’il est le plus souvent presque impossible de distinguer entre couronnement et fête Sed, sans doute aussi les scènes d’apparition royale (ḥt nswt) qui sont en connexion avec les précédentes, comportent bien d’autres moments qu’il est difficile d’intercaler à leur juste place, car les documents les présentent en règle générale hors de leur contexte. Ce sont l’onction, la réunion des Deux-Terres (sma-lawy), la procession autour du mur, l’établissement de la charte des noms royaux et la proclamation de ceux-ci, l’inscription du nom sur l’arbre isd, la confection des “annales” royales par Thoth et Seshat, le lancer des quatre oies, le tirer des flèches, l’érection du pilier ḏjed.

Il est d’ailleurs difficile de juger si les scènes qui illustrent ces différents thèmes correspondent à des actes réels ou si ce sont seulement des figurations constituant des allusions mythiques – ou plus exactement symboliques –, des images qui évoquent des thèmes en rapport avec le couronnement, mais qui ne correspondent pas forcément à des cérémonies effectivement exécutées durant celui-ci (cf. S. Schott, Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, 1, 1955, p. 200). La représentation que nous rangeons dans le cycle du couronnement, et sur laquelle nous voulons présentement attirer l’attention, celle de l’allaitement, pose précisément ce problème, et fournit, croyons-nous, un élément de réponse.


s’était, le demi-frère et successeur d’Alexandre (à la fin du IVe siècle av. J.C.), mais elle reproduit vraisemblablement la disposition déjà adoptée par Thoutmosis III au début du Nouvel-Empire (XVe siècle av. J.C.)


Cependant, sans être aussi explicites, plusieurs autres tableaux gravés dans les temples égyptiens confirment ce témoignage, en raison
des inscriptions qui les complètent. Celles-ci indiquent qu’”il y a allaitement pour qu’il y ait un roi” (ren n rsut, Wörterbuch, II, 436, 8). En Nubie, au temple de Beit-el-Wali (Roeder, p. 111-114, § 425-429 et pl. 57 a), lorsque la déesse Anoukis allaite Ramsès II qui est coiffé de la couronne bleue avec uraeus et porte à la main une massue, elle lui dit : “Je suis ta mère Anoukis, maîtresse d’Eléphantine, qui (te) nourrit dans mon giron pour être roi des Deux-Terres, ô maître des Deux-Terres”.

La scène sans doute la plus caractéristique est celle du temple de Seti Ier à Abydos (Porter-Moss, Topographical Bibliography, VI, p. 5, n 49 ; J. Capart, Temple de Séti Ier, p. 17, n. 1), où Ramsès II est allaité par Isis et quatre formes de la déesse Hathor. Que la taille du roi soit ici sans importance est évident : en effet, dans le premier tableau, Isis porte sur son bras le roi, tout petit enfant, nu, muni cependant de la couronne bleue à uraeus et du sceptre hka; mais ensuite, le souverain est représenté comme un grand adolescent qui s’avance vers la poitrine de ses nourrices, les quatre Hathor, vêtue du pagne royal à rabat et portant le sceptre hka. Dans chacun des cas, le roi a reçu une couronne différente. Tandis qu’avec Isis, il porte la couronne bleue, il présente, face aux Hathor, successivement la couronne blanche, la couronne rouge, l’atf, puis le nms. Les textes sont explicites, et par conséquent particulièrement importants. Au-dessus de chacune des Hathor est gravée la phrase “J’allaite ta personne avec du lait, dit la déesse, de sorte que tu assembles les Deux-Terres avec tous les rekhryyou dans ton poing, ô mon fils”. Dans plus d’une scène d’allaitement, le roi reçoit la promesse d’avoir tous les pays sous ses pieds.


On peut donc parler d’”allaitement de puissance.” En l’allaitant et en consacrant ainsi son passage de prince à roi, la déesse donne au souverain une promesse de victoire. C’est pourquoi l’enfant allaité est souvent figuré dans une attitude de domination. Plusieurs auteurs se sont étonnés de ce que ce nourrisson si débile soit représenté triomphant des ennemis ; on a vu là une inconséquence, ou bien on s’est extasié sur ce contraste d’un frêle enfant et des ennemis terrassés. En fait, en étant couronné, c’est-à-dire, par une transposition bien caractéristique des anciens Égyptiens, en étant “allaité pour devenir roi”, Pharaon est déjà désigné comme un vainqueur. Aussi, dans la scène de l’allaitement, le roi, bien que représenté en enfant, est-il généralement équipé en triomphateur. Il porte le plus souvent à la main le sceptre hka, emblème de la domination, ou parfois une massue. Sa tête est parée de la couronne bleue, la hry. Celle-ci, nous semblent-il, est essentiellement la coiffure du couronnement (cf. e.g l’inscription du couronnement d’Horemheb, l. 17 et 20, ainsi que les remarques récentes de W.K. Simpson, Journal of Egyptian Archaeology, 41, 1955, p. 112 – 114), et secondairement seulement un casque de guerre. Quand on veut insister sur le caractère d’héréditaire, de successeur d’un Pharaon, on le dote de la couronne bleue : ainsi les images du roi barbu, donc en deuil (Chr. Noblecourt, Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, XIV, 1947, p. 192-198) le montrent avec la hry. II en est de même pour le souverain qui accomplit les rites funéraires en faveur de son prédécesseur, telle la scène fameuse de Ay célébrant le culte sur le mur Nord du caveau de Toutankhamon. La
couronne bleue semble caractériser la royauté renaissante et par destination triomphante. Et c'est parce que le couronnement implique en lui-même la victoire que cette couronne a pu être considérée comme une coiffure de combat.

Parfois, nous l'avons noté, le roi enfant tient à la main un oiseau. En fait, la scène de genre (L. Keimer, *Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale*, XXX, 1931, p. 306-311), est devenue elle aussi une figure de domination. Car l’oiseau placé sur un nid, c’est une composition qui a un sens : c’est le *rbty* placé sur le signe *nb* ; le prince qui, par l’allaitement, devient un souverain, affirme son pouvoir sur tous les *rehrbyton*, les peuples soumis.

Toutes ces remarques montrent que, dans l’allaitement, il s’agit bien davantage que de l’absorption magique d’un breuvage d’éternité ; c’est plus que le geste d’une protection magicque ou qu’un simple rite d’adoption, comme le pensait en particulier Maspero (*Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology*, XIV, 1891-2, p. 308-312).

Cerise cette dernière idée n’est pas totalement absente, puisque aussi bien il s’agit d’une espèce d’initiation. En parvenant à sa nouvelle dignité, Pharaon entre dans le monde des dieux. Et la symbolique de l’allaitement se conjugue avec celle du souverain "cherubin des dieux" attesté par les épithètes *sfyt et mḥr*. En dehors des scènes d’allaitement proprement dites, il arrive encore que le roi soit figuré comme un enfant. C’est en particulier le cas de la très célèbre statue de Ramsès II présentée (plutôt que protégée) par Houroun, découvert par M.P. Montet à Tanis (P. Montet, *Mélanges Maspero*, I, p. 497 sq. et pl. II). Le souverain est tourné dans le même sens que la divinité : c’est, nous l’avons vu, l’attitude respective de Pharaon et du dieu, lors de l’intronisation ; à cette série appartiennent aussi les images du roi poussé devant lui par une vache, nous y reviendrons dans un instant ; et enfin toutes les statues où le souverain est présenté devant lui par Horus le faucon. Toutes ces représentations sont des variations, très diverses certes, sur un thème commun. La statue de Ramsès II et Houroun de Tanis est un témoignage de la richesse et de la complexité du symbolisme égyptien. Si elle atteste un jeu cryptographique sur le nom de Ramsès II et magnifie la piété de ce roi pour Houroun, elle figure avant tout la présentation par le dieu-faucon du souverain-bambin, c’est-à-dire dans un thème de renaissance, où sa marque de souveraineté est rendue manifeste par le signe *nsw(t) (la “royauté’) qu’il saisit. Les représentations du roi-enfant relèvent donc de la même symbolique que celles de l’allaitement. Comme elles, elles insistent sur le passage d’un état ancien à un nouveau, sur l’avènement d’un souverain, sa consécration, c’est-à-dire la naissance de Pharaon, un roi-dieu toujours destiné au triomphe.

Il faut remarquer que les soins nourriciers ne semblent pas en eux-mêmes caractéristiques d’un lien plus particulier entre le roi et telle ou telle déesse. On rencontre, donnant le sein au roi, Mout et les autres formes de la déesse-mère : Isis et Hathor, mais aussi, suivant les lieux, Amon, Mert Seger, Toureis, Renenoutet, Neith, Selkmet à Memphis, une parèdre de Montou à Erment. Les textes eux-seuls, à l’exclusion de toute figure-attraction parfois les soins nourriciers à un dieu; ainsi Thoutmosis III est dit avoir reçu les soins nourriciers d’Amon qui "a établi son apparition sur le siège d’Horus et l’a fait dominer les Neuf-Arcs". Dans l’inscription du couronnement de Horemheb, c’est Amon-Ré, roi des dieux, qui a donné les soins nourriciers au souverain.


Si l’allaitement, rite de renaissance, est par excellence un symbole de “passage”, il n’est pas étonnant qu’on le trouve figuré sur les contrepoids de collier *menat*, les *menat* étant elles-mêmes par excellence des instruments de renaissance. Au Portique des Bubastites de Karnak, dans la scène de l’allaitement du roi Chechanq qui porte la *menat*, la déesse Hathor offre au souverain, de sa main droite, la *menat* en même temps que son sein. Le texte gravé sous la scène mentionne “le premier renouvellement de la fête Sed du roi.” Un joli contrepoids de *menat* en faïence dont je dois communication à l’amitié...
William C. Hayes, Conservateur en chef au Metropolitan Museum of Art de New York (Acc. n° 41. 160. 104) comporte au revers une colonne de légende avec le prénom et le nom de Taharqa, souverain de la XXV ème dynastie dite “éthiopiennne.” A la partie supérieure du recto, la déesse Bastet à tête de lionne, est représentée debout, en train d’allaiter un personnage que sa double couronne désigne comme le roi ; il est nu, paré seulement d’une bulle en forme de cœur ; plus petit que la déesse, de sorte que sa bouche est à la hauteur de la poitrine de celle-ci, on ne peut dire cependant que sa taille soit celle d’un enfant ; il a le visage d’un homme : l’artiste ne l’a pas particulièrement flatté en lui donnant les traits ingrats qui caractérisent certaines images des rois kouchites.

Le thème royal de cette scène est accentué par la décoration de la partie circulaire du bas ; on y voit le faucon royal couronné du pschent et dressé sur le sḫy, encadré des symboles du Sud et du Nord.-D’autres éléments de menor présentent des scènes comparables ; on renverra seulement ici à un très beau fragment à incrustations d’electrum et d’or du Musée de Berlin (n° 23733) autrefois dans la collection von Bissing (G. Roeder, Aegyptische Bronzefiguren, Berlin, 1956, pl. 64 e, §634 e, p. 467-468 ; cf. p. 473, § 640 e et fig. 720), offrande du “gouverneur de la ville et vizir Horsiese” Il montre un jeune homme nu, paré de la tresse de la jeunesse et d’une bulle en forme de cœur. Ce n’est pas, comme on l’a dit, Horsiese : les signes de ce nom sont en sens inverse de la figure-mais le roi, caractérisé par son uraeus ; le souverain porte à la main gauche la menor et, de la droite, il brandit le sistre devant la déesse Sekhmets éontocephale, assise sur un trône. Le symbolisme royal de cette scène est évident ; encadrée des emblèmes du Sud et du Nord, elle est supportée par le sma-tawy, flanqué d’oiseaux ṣḫy en adoration ; les nids-corbilles où ils sont posés sont des signes de fête.- Ces contrepoids de menor sont-ils en rapport avec des fêtes de couronnement proprement dites ; ne sont-ils pas plutôt en relation avec des fêtes Sed ou mieux avec des “apparitions royales”? En tout cas les scènes qui y sont figurées, en particulier celle de l’allaitement qui nous intéresse ici plus particulièrement, s’intègrent dans les thèmes du cycle qui insiste sur le “passage” de Pharaon dans sa royauté triomphante.

Quoiqu’il en soit, de tels documents confirment que Pharaon, ce souverain-dieu, connaît trois naissances marquées chacune par un allaitement ou, de façon plus générale, par des soins de nurserie : non seulement la naissance au jour, celle que connaît tout humain, et une naissance à la survie, dans l’au-delà (c’est la renaissance après la mort) ; mais encore, entre les deux, Pharaon subit un “passage” essentiel ;
ANCIENT WORSHIP IN CHINA

BY

SOJUN MOROTO

Today (Sept. 29th) is, by our lunar calendar, the fifteenth of the seventh month. The Obon-festival as one of the most important annual events is being celebrated universally in rural parts of Japan. Today is, so to speak, “All Ancestors’ Day.” In Japan ancestor worship makes one of the main features of folk religion. So it is in China, where we can find the most developed forms of ancestor worship, a typical in the history of religions. If we want to elucidate the general nature of ancestor worship the examples of China may be helpful to give us valuable hints; so I want to take up the ancestor worship of the Chinese in order to formulate a general idea of an ancestor as a subject of the science of religion.

When we treat of Chinese culture, positive researches of its historical facts are certainly indispensable, but at the same time an analytical study of the standard forms of the culture is also important. In my opinion we can find such standard forms in the classical ritual books, especially in 李氏 Li-chi, where ideal types of social institutions are illustrated in their standard forms with complicated regulations. These regulations of the institutions presuppose, like our laws, that they should be strictly observed, and historically speaking, they have been tolerably respected. But on the other hand, these regulations were supported, again like our laws, by theoretical reflections of the participants themselves. And naturally in the old regulations we can expect to find valuable discussions now pervading our scientific studies, that may possibly provide positive materials for the theoretical study of our present-day science of religion.

In principle, the regulations prescribed for official as well as private ceremonies of all kinds put the rules for the king in the center, or at most, explain the rules for the upper classes while emphasizing class distinctions. Traditionally these ceremonial rules have been emphasized not to go down to the common people. However, so far as religious ceremonies are concerned, every citizen, high or low, is equally authorized to present family offerings to his own ancestors, even in the humblest ways, and I am of the opinion that the fundamental spirit which flows at the bottom should apply not only to government officials but also to the common people. Consequently, the ritual forms for the king, which represent most developed types, are likely to elucidate the general nature of ancestor worship. According to the religious theories that we find in the classical ritual books, such as 周礼 Chou-li, 仪礼 I-li, and 礼记 Li-ji, sacrifices for ancestors as auspicious ceremonies are sharply distinguished from the ordinary ceremonies of funeral rites and mourning. Confucian philosophy characterizes them respectively as positive and negative, antagonistic to each other. Ancestor worship is quite different in nature from funeral rites; there is an unpassable cleavage between them even if the former succeeds directly the latter without a day’s interval. These facts testify to the belief that ancestors cannot be a mere extension or natural development of the dying men or corpses, and that the world of ancestors essentially has nothing to do with the idea of tomb. As a result, a special principle must be found to explain the essential nature of ancestors and their world.

In the ancestor worship, a special temple is generally dedicated to forefathers to present them with proper offerings, and in this temple system I propose to see the fundamental principle which accounts for the nature of ancestors. As a rule, an ancestral temple consists of fanes, the number of which varies according to the family’s social status; namely, the ancestral temple of the king consists of seven fanes, but they are reduced to five in the case of lords and princes who come next to the king in the feudal hierarchy. Then these five are reduced to three for the higher officers next in rank, and only one is assigned to lower officers, allowing none to the commoners. In spite of these differences in the temple system, however, the nature of the ceremony observed there should be the same as stated above, whether it is performed by a king or a commoner.

Now, in the ritual books, it is prescribed that out of the seven fanes of the king, one is for the first ancestor, three are for half of the remaining ancestors, and another three for the other half. Their ground plan may be sketched thus:
Concerning this temple system with seven fanes, two contradictory theories appear in the same ritual book, Li-chi. One view is set forth in its third book, “Royal Regulations”, while the other appears in the twentieth book, “Law of Sacrifices”. The former puts stress on the first ancestor, while the latter regards the father as the most important. Let me consider first the former view which has been traditionally held authoritative. According to this view, ancestors are divided into three groups, each with its distinct nature, namely, the first ancestor, remote ancestors, and the lately deceased.

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### Ancestral Temple

**Fane No. 1**
- **First Ancestor**

**Fane No. 3**
- **Remote Ancestors**

**Fane No. 5**
- **Great-grandfather**

**Fane No. 7**
- **Father**

**Fane No. 2**
- **Remote Ancestors**

**Fane No. 4**
- **Great-great-grandfather**

**Fane No. 6**
- **Grandfather**

When the seven fanes of the king are reduced to five for lords and princes, the two fanes, No. 2 and 3 that are put aside as negligible, are of remote ancestors. They make one group. In the case of higher officers, fanes No. 4 and 5 disappear, and finally another two go out leaving only one fane for lower officers that should belong to the first ancestor, judging from the context of the ritual book, though it is not clearly stated. These four outgoing fanes are those of great-great-grandfather, great-grandfather, grandfather and father, who are believed to be still within the bond of kinship with the present, and therefore commonly grouped together to be called “four kinship ancestors”. They constitute the second group. The last group has the first ancestor as the founder of the family. He appears whenever a fane is allowed; he is too important to be neglected even in the simplest ceremony of lower ranks. Moreover, he belongs to neither of the lineage halves, neither to chao, nor to

Those ancestors who have lost their personal figure are all removed to the fane of the first ancestor or his substitute to participate in the seasonal oblations in his honour. This fact proves that they continue to exist as ever even if they have lost their individuality. Indeed, they cannot claim definite personality, but their existence itself is not doubted at all. Without figure and individuality, they are no more the dead, and cannot but exist in a cluster under the cover of the first ancestor or of a culture hero as his substitute. They have already receded outside the range of kinship and have entered a circle of remote forefathers. A receptacle fane for these remote ancestors is particularly named t'iao, distinguished from those of kinship ancestors. Out of the seven fanes, two are t'iao and the other five ancestors are worshipped at their proper fanes, miao, with special reverence. These five important ancestors having their proper fanes, namely the first ancestor and the four latest forefathers, are located on either end of the lineage; I propose to call this phenomenon the “Polarization of Ancestors”.

The last of the three groups, that is the first ancestor, has again
his own fane, which is recognized as unremovable for hundreds of generations. This means that he is an eternal being having his own personal figure. As the founder of a family, the first ancestor would naturally belong to the group of remote ancestors without a figure, but if he should have a fane, the reason why he recovers his individuality after so many generations must be sought elsewhere. He may often be proved to have had a historical existence, but the temple system shows that he is clearly distinguished from the other remote forefathers. As a matter of fact, he is eminently of mythical nature, and it is this mythical nature that gives birth to his personality in spite of its remoteness and antiquity and thus assures him a separate fane. The first ancestor is, in reality, a mythical ancestor, a kind of immortal deity.

When critically analyzed by outsiders, the ancestors may be divided into three groups, or at least two types may be distinguished among them, the human type and the mythical type, and two different natures — the mythical and human — seem to be combined in the body of the first ancestor. But for the subjective view of the family members, these different groups or types are comprehensively understood as united in one continuous line of forefathers. They call these different kinds of ancestors indiscriminately by the same word. The forefathers of a family as a whole make up a single body, and I am of the opinion that the first ancestor as a mythical being furnishes the basic principle in the organizing different groups into one whole body. Moreover, he constitutes the source of holiness for other forefathers, considering that regularly at fixed time all of them are brought to the fane of the first ancestor to participate in his oblations. He embraces in himself the kinship ancestors as well as the remote forefathers, when they are deprived of their fanes in the lower ranks. In this way the entire group is comprehensively understood as one line of forefathers with the first ancestor as its center.

In contrast with the above authoritative theory that sees a complicated structure in the world of ancestors, another unpopular view offered in the “Law of Sacrifices” seems to treat all ancestors simply as dead.

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<th>Lower Officers</th>
<th>Commoners</th>
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<td>Four Kinship Ancestors</td>
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To begin with, a remote-ancestor-fane is allotted only to a single
THE DEIFICATION OF GOTAMA THE MAN

BY

HAJIME NAKAMURA

When a religious order changes and develops, the figure of its founder changes and develops accordingly. Gotama Sakyamuni is called a Buddha, for he realized the eternal truth (dharma). So, everybody who has realized the truth should be called a Buddha according to his teaching. He is neither a supernatural being, nor a mysterious personage, nor, needless to say, the transcendent God.

In the scriptures of early Buddhism, ideas differ with layers or portions. In the earlier layers, especially in the gāthā (poem) portions, Gotama, the founder of Buddhism, was in every respect regarded merely as a superior man.

In later days Buddhists used to address Gotama just as "the Sage of the Sakya Clan" (Sakya minus in Pali, Śakyamuni in Sanskrit), but in early Buddhism, the disciples of Gotama addressed him just as "Sakka (=Sakya)." Addressing him only as "Sakka" without using any honorific title is not found in the prose portions, but in the poem portions. It is likely that early Buddhists regarded Gotama merely as a superior man who belonged to the Sakya clan.

In the eyes of later Buddhists, addressing Gotama Buddha merely as "Gotama" without using any honorific appellation was impolite. Antagonists or unbelievers addressed him as "Recluse Gotama (śramana Gotama)"). In older poems, however, he is addressed merely as "Gotama" without any honorific appellation. To illustrate: not only his lay believers, but also his monk disciples followed the same usages. Brahmins, and occasionally those who were converted to his teaching, addressed him: "O, you, Gotama." It is likely that his disciples also called him "Gotama." It is in rather late poems that the appellation "Gotama Buddha" was used.

In older poems, a Brahmin youth or an ascetic addresses Gotama with the word "my dear (mārīsa)" which corresponds to the Sanskrit word mādīsa, meaning "somebody like me." In these cases Brahmin youths addressed him as if they had been talking to an intimate friend. Gotama was not yet described as deified.

In older poems, moreover, Brahmanistic appellations are often found. There an ascetic or a religious who has attained the perfection of religious practices is called a Brahmin (brāhma), and Gotama Buddha was not an exception. In prose portions, however, this designation is never used. We are led to the following assumption when Buddhism first developed Brahmins were highly respected throughout society, and Buddhists had to adopt the term brāhma, admitting the actual supremacy of the Brahmins. In later days, however, the Buddhist order became very powerful and influential; Buddhist monks came to be respected more than Brahmins, and so there was no need of deliberately calling eminent monks Brahmins. Jains also called eminent ascetics 'Brahmins' only in the earlier stage of the development of their religion. By the way, it seems that the poems, both Buddhist and Jain, in which ideal ascetics are called Brahmins, were composed before King Asoka, for in his edicts the two religions were distinguished from Brahmanism.

Buddhas in general, as well as Buddhist ascetics, were called 'anchorite (isi)' in early Buddhism. There are many cases that Buddhhas or Gotama were called 'Great Anchorite (mahāesi)' parallel to the fact that the Jain ascetics who attained perfection were called mahāesi in the older Jain poems. After the lapse of some time, the notion of the Seven Preceding Buddhas developed with Sakyamuni as the seventh, and he was referred to as 'the seventh of anchorites' he was addressed "O, you seventh anchorite!" Prior to the rise of Buddhism the conventional idea of the Seven Anchorites (saptarṣi) or the Seven Sages (vipra) can already be found in the Rg-Veda; the term anchorite was closely associated with the number 'seven'. This notion may have influenced Buddhism. Moreover, Sakyamuni was called a 'divine seer' (devīṃ = devaṛṣi). These appellations betray the fact that in the early stage of the development of Buddhism and Jainism, the believers of the two religions regarded their founders merely as great sages. After the deification of Buddha had made a progress, however, the believers came not to like him being called a great sage. The term 'great sage' in poems was paraphrased as the Lord (bhagavat) in prose literature explaining the foregoing poems.

Just as ascetics were called 'sages' (muni) in those days, so was Gotama addressed as Sakyamuni or 'the great sage' (mahāmuni). The monks, who were his disciples, were addressed with the same appellation. The term muni was probably used as an adjective.
meaning 'practicing self-restraint'\textsuperscript{26}, and later it was specifically used as the appellation of a sage, as is evidenced in the Brāhmaṇa literature and the Jain scripture. In early Jainism a \textit{muni} meant a sage or Mahāvīra,\textsuperscript{27} Buddhism just adopted it into its own phraseology.

In those days the knower of revelation, i.e. the man who possessed the knowledge of the Veda, was called a \textit{vedagā}, and Gotama or a sage who attained the supreme knowledge was called by the\textsuperscript{28} same appellation.\textsuperscript{29} He was addressed as 'one who knows the Veda'\textsuperscript{30}, or 'one who is possessed of the knowledge of the Three Vedas' (\textit{teviśja}),\textsuperscript{31} 'one who is possessed of the threefold knowledge'\textsuperscript{32}. In Buddhist theology the threefold knowledge is usually explained as meaning (1) remembrance of former births, (2) insight into the future destiny of all beings, and (3) recognition of the origin of misery and of the way to its removal, but at the outset these three must have been set up as corresponding to the knowledge of the three Vedas, and as replacing them. In the scriptures of early Buddhism a Brahmin who is well versed in the Three Vedas is called a \textit{teviśja}. Moreover, the Buddha or a sage who has attained perfection is called 'one who has attained (the realm of) Brahmā' (\textit{brahmāpatta})\textsuperscript{33}, or 'a Brahmin youth who has bathed, i.e. who has finished his studies' (\textit{mahālakṣa = Skr. snātaka})\textsuperscript{34}. In Brahmanism a Brahmin who is well versed in the sacred lore of the Veda (\textit{śruti})\textsuperscript{35} or a wanderer who spends the life of an itinerant (\textit{punyatāpa})\textsuperscript{36} was highly respected, but older Buddhist poets say that the designation of the terrible \textit{yakkha} must have denoted some super-natural, mystical being, different from the uncanny being as is known in later Buddhist literature in general.

The notion of \textit{yakkha} in the older portions of the Buddhist scripture is the same as that in the Jain scripture, where \textit{yakkhas} are regarded as something gentle, and they are mentioned along with dragons (nāga) and spirits (bhūta)\textsuperscript{44}. "The \textit{yakkhas} who are gifted with various virtues, (live in the heavenly regions, situated) one above the other, shining forth like the great luminaries, and hoping never to descend thence."\textsuperscript{47} This statement is supported by archaeological findings. Statues with the inscriptions "\textit{yakka}" or "\textit{yakkhind}" have been found. Their countenance looks serene, composed and lovable; there is nothing uncanny, bizarre, nor terrifying. We are led to the conclusion that the gāthās in which Buddha was called \textit{yakkha} must have been composed before or during the Maurya, or, at the latest, the Śūdra dynasty, and that the descriptions of the terrible \textit{yakkha} figures were composed after the Śūdrā dynasty, probably after 75 B.C.\textsuperscript{48}

In addition to the above-discussed appellations of Brahmanistic origin, various appellations of non-Brahmanistic origin were also assumed and used in early Buddhism. The religious of non-Brahmanistic religions in those days were called ascetics (\textit{samana}, \textit{śramana}). Buddhist monks claimed themselves to be such, and Gotama was called a \textit{śramana}\textsuperscript{49}, just in the same way as he was called "\textit{samanā Gotamo}" by unbelievers\textsuperscript{50}. It means that early Buddhists introduced the appellation which was prevalent among religions of those days. In the process of deification of Buddha the appellation "\textit{samanā Gotamo}" came to be used only by non-Buddhists, and not by Buddhists who replaced it with the honorific appellation "\textit{bhagavat}" or "\textit{Buddha}". Comparing the poem portions with the prose portions of the Pali scriptures, we find this change.

In those days an ascetic who had attained supreme wisdom was called 'kevalin' (one who is fully accomplished)\textsuperscript{41}. In Jainism also such a religious was called \textit{kevalin}, an appellation preserved up to later days. Buddhists also called Buddha \textit{kevalin}, but in later days (even in the prose portions of the scripture) they gave up this appellation.
which was common to other religions. In some older poems Buddha was called one who has a host of followers (ganita), which was commonly applied to excellent non-Brahmanistic thinkers in general. In this case Gotama was not deified, but was regarded as possessing the same qualifications in society as other thinkers. He was respected as 'teacher' (satttha). He was not only one who saw the truth, but also ‘one who speaks the truth’ (saccavādin). Jain saints also were given the same epithet (saccavā.)

All in all, Buddha was a religieux endowed with virtues. He was a man who had got rid of evil passions (vitaraga); he had conquered his passions and a host of devils. Therefore he was called a victor (jina), a conqueror in the battlefield (vijitasamgraha). In the same way Gotama Buddha was called a 'great hero' (Māhāvīra) just as such an ascetic as Mahāmoggalāna. Or he was simply called a 'hero' (vīra). Such terms are commonly to ideal ascetics in Jainism.

Sakyamuni is the “man who reached the further shore of existence” (bhavassa pāragū) conquering delusion native to human beings. This qualification, however, can be applied to all ascetics who have attained the aim, as well as to Sakyamuni. In Jainism an ascetic was described as ‘one who goes to the further shore’ (pārago). Buddhism owes this characterization also to Jainism.

Sakyamuni is extolled as ‘one who has eyes’ (cakkhumā), ‘all-seeing’, “the eye of the world”, all of which mean nothing but ‘one who had insight’. Ordinary ascetics also were called ‘one who has eyes’. It was regarded as possible to confer this kind of ‘eye’ to ordinary people.

As Buddha was through and through a man, he was called ‘the supreme among men’ or ‘the supreme among all living beings’, and occasionally ‘the most excellent among gods and men’. He is the ‘lord of men’ (janinda), a great man, on the one hand, and, on the other, someone familiar to oneself like ‘my father’, ‘my grandfather’. He is nothing but a ‘good friend’ to people, just as we are good friends to each other in every day life.

In so far as the above-mentioned appellations are concerned, they were applied to both Gotama and ordinary ascetics; there was no difference between them. They were all men. The concept of Buddha portrayed above is different from that noticeable in the Buddha worship in the age of King Asoka. The poems and phrases in which these appellations or epithets are mentioned must have been composed before the Maurya dynasty or, before the reign of King Asoka at the latest.

Next I want to discuss the process by which Sakyamuni came to be deified as evidenced in the Pali scriptures in general. However, due to lack of time, I must set forth my views very briefly.

With the lapse of time some appellations or epithets which had been applied in the above-mentioned poems went out of use, having been regarded as inadequate for Gotama Buddha who was already in the process of being deified. Even if some of them continued to be used, they were no longer conspicuous. Certain appellations, however, persisted through the process of deification, and came to be regarded as peculiarly Buddhistic in later days (e.g., buddha, sambuddha, cakravartin). It was now prohibited to address Gotama as a mere man. Probably during the reign of King Asoka Gotama was already regarded as a supernatural or divine being, as a consequence of the gradual process of deification. (atideva, devatideva). He works wonders; he is omniscient. His figure betrays some physiological features which can not be noticed in the figures of ordinary men. He was linked to secular authority; he was declared a religious counterpart of the Universal Monarch (cakravartin). His reminiscence that he had been reborn as a human being many times was popularized, and the idea of the Seven or Twenty-Four Preceding Buddhas was propounded, Faith in Buddha was exalted, thereby completing the deification of Gotama. This change can be noticed in the later portions, especially in the prose sections, of the Pali Scriptures.

1) e.g. Sn. 1063; 1069; 1090; 1113; 1116; MN. I, p. 386 G.; Therag. 536.
3) This appellation does not imply any hostility. (Kern : Manual of Indian Buddhism, p. 63, n. 4).
4) Sn. 228, 448; 1057; 1083; 1117; 1135; 1136; Sn. I, p. 127 G.; 143 G.; 143 G.; Therag. 375; 536; 1251; Therig. 136; DN. II, p. 123 G.
5) Sn. 376.
6) Therag. 119; Sn. 699.
7) Sn. 461; 487.
8) Sn. pp. 86; 91.
9) Therag. 1089; 1219; 1223.
10) Gotama Buddha, Therag. 91.
11) Sn. 814; 1028; 1036; 1038 1047; 1092.
12) A devaputta or Mahābrahmā addresses Moggalāna with mārasa. (Therag. 1179; 1199).
The concept of the true Brahmin is found in Utt. XXV, 19-35. In the Jaim scripture a Brahmin is called mahārāna, which is a vernacular form of Skr. brāhmaṇa. The Ardhāmāgadhī Dictionary by Ramachandra mentions a second meaning: an ascetic who preaches that none should stay any one, which can be found only in the Uttarajjhayana, Ayāraga, Sāyugadanga and Thāṇa. It seems that he took the word for mā+ + rāna. The concept of the true Brahmin is found in Utt. XXV, 19-35. So it was only in the earlier stage of the development of Jainism that a true ascetic was called a Brahmin.

15. Sn. 356; 1025; 1126.
16. Sn. 481; 915; 1054; 1061; 1083; Therag., 533; 713; 1106; 1118; Therig. 868; 870; 900. MN. II, p. 100, G.; Itiv. 26 G.; 84 G.
17. Āy. I, 3, 3, 3; I, 5, 5, 1. (ed. by Schubring, pp. 16, I, 8; p. 25, I, 4; mahāsū, Utt. XII, 47. (All these passages are āgāhā).
18. Issistama, Therag. 1240.
19. Issistama, Sn. 356; MN. I, p. 386 G.
20. Sn. 1116.
21. e.g., Itiv. 26; MN. II, pp. 99–100.
22. Sn. 164; 700; 1052; 1058; Thera. 1257; Therig. 320. The explanation of muni resembles the Jain definition of mahāmrna (Ay. I, 6, 2, 2).
24. Therag. 1087; 1252; Therig. 293.
25. Itiv. 53 G. Therag. 896; 897; 1168; 1169.
26. In some passages it is not clear whether the word muni is to be interpreted as a noun or an adjective. In the following verse it seems that it should be interpreted as an adjective. ... kṣayakumarā viśamūnīm māmamūnīm / māmamūnīm kṣamamūnīm / (M.A. 87 G.)
27. Āy. I, 6, 1, 5; I, 6, 2, 2; I, 6, 5, 4.
28. Sn. 485; 489.
29. Sn. 322; 472; 479; 503; 528; 629; 733; 749; 846; 880; 947; 1049; 1059; 1060; AN. IV, p. 340 G.
30. MN. I, p. 386 G.
31. AN. I, p. 185 G.; MN. I, p. 386 G.
33. MN. I, p. 386 G.
34. Sn. 521; 846; MN. I, p. 386 G.
35. Sn. 534.
36. Sn. 537.
37. Sn. I, pp. 81 G.; 196 G.; DN. III, p. 196 G. This appellation was not solely applied to Buddha. Indra addresses a daughter of a gāndhara: 'a daughter of the Angirases.' (Angirasi paṇī maśi dhamma arakhañē, DN. II, p. 265 G.) This appellation is not used in the Jaim. Angiras is a half-mythological personage and his descendants are called Āngirasa in the Rg-Veda. Such sages or teachers as Kṛṣṇa, Ājīvagiri, Cavyana, Āyāśya, Sanvarta and Sudhanava are called descendants of Angiras. Such rites as āyana and divākara are relevant to them in the Brāhmaṇa literature. (A.A. Macdonell and A.B. Keith: Vedic Index, vol. I, pp. 11 and 53)

39. Rg-Veda, IV, 2, 15. cf. sapta priyaśāh, RV, IV, 1, 12.
40. Therag. 868–704; 1240; Vinaya II, p. 195 G.
41. AN. III, p. 346 G.
42. 'nāo samāyāmisa ve pārge lattha se māhāske. (Āy. I, 9, 3, 1, v. 8)
43. e.g. MN. I, p. 386 G. cf. Sn. 478; 875; 876.
45. Sāyugadanga II, 2, 1.
47. viśākhīṃ sīheṃ jākāha uttara-vahārā/mahāsukha vā dīppāntā....
49. Sn. 520; AN. IV, p. 340 G. etc.
51. Sn. 82; 490; 519; 878f.
52. Sn. 481; 585; AN. II, p. 9 G. (according the reading of the Siamese edition).
53. U. Wogihara (Sanskrit-Japanese Dictionary, s.v.) explains the word hāllīvat only as 'a meditating ascetic,' and he mentions no Chinese equivalent. This means that this word was not used in later Buddhist works.
54. Sn. 955; 957.
55. Sn. 1009; p. 51.
56. DN. II, p. 128 G.; 256 G.; 262 G.; 272 G.; Therig. 336; Itiv. 84 G.
57. Therig. 252–270.
58. Āy. I, 8, 6, 5; I, 8, 7, 5. Daśavakyālīka, IX, 3, 3.
59. Sn. 11; 214; 465; 499; 507; 529; 1071; MN. I, p. 386 G.
60. Āy. Sn. 439; 440.
61. Sn. 581; 586.
63. SN. I, p. 233 G.; Itiv. 82 G.; AN. IV, p. 340 G.
64. Sn. 862; 543; Therag. 132; 527; Therig. 293; 301; 335; DN. II, p. 287 G.; Vinaya I, p. 43 G.
65. Therag. 1154.
66. SN. I, pp. 50; 51 G.; Therag. 528.
67. Itiv. 100 G.; AN. II, p. 9 G.; Therag. 38. cf. pāragu, pāragata, Itiv. 38 G.
69. Āy. I, 2, 2, 1. cf. pāranga muni, Āy. I, 6, 5, 6.
70. Sn. 160; 405; 406; 562; 570; 596; 992; 1028; 1115; 1127; DN. II, pp. 123 G.; 166 G. 167 G.; 256 G.; 262 G.; 272 G.; SN. I, p. 121 G.; Therag. 149; 998; Dhp. 275.
71. SN. I, p. 137 G.; Sn. 346; 378; 1062; 1068; 1069; 1069; 1073; 1090.
72. Sn. 599.
73. Later Buddhist theologians classified cakkhu into mamsacakkhu, diibacakkhu and pahinacakkhu. They also used buddhacakkhu, sammacakkhu etc. We should not introduce these interpretations into the early stage of
Buddhism. Insight into the truth must have been just metaphorically designated by the word cakkhu (eye) 74) DN. II, p. 254 G.; Dhp. p. 273. Such an expression is found in the Bhagavadgīthā (XI, 8) also.

75) cakkhuddāna (Pillar Edict, II).

76) Purisuttama, Sn. 544; SN. III, p. 91 G.; Itiv. p. 52 G.; Therag. 623; Therig. 144; AN. IV, p. 325 G.; dvipadānam uttamo, Therag. 1111. Asoka also considered Buddha to be the best man (navottama). (Schiefner: Tārānātha, S. 36)

77) sabhasattānam uttama, (Therag. 623; Therig. 157); appatipuggala, DN, II.p. 287 G.: anomanāma, Sn. i53.

78) devamanussatthāna (Itiv. 100 G.; AN. II, p. 9 G.); sadevahassa lokanna aggo (AN. II, p. 17 G.); lokajettia (Therig. 154).

79) DN. II, p. 278 G.

80) In Buddhist scripture a great man is called ‘mahāsattva’ or ‘mahāpurusa’; in the Great Epic mahāsattva is a masculine word whose meaning is ‘one who has much sattva’ (MBh. XII, 320, 103).

81) Therag. 536.

82) kalyanamitta, SN. I, p. 88. This word is very often used in the gāthās.

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSPOSING THE JUDAEO-CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD INTO GREEK AND ORIENTAL TERMS

BY

PETER NEMESHEGYI

Universal religions by their very nature cannot limit their appeal to a single culture; yet in the process of adaptation to a different culture, they run the serious risk of losing their original features. This was the problem Christianity had to face from the moment it passed beyond the limits of Judaism. Since the Judaic-Christian religion was deeply theistic, it was of the utmost importance to find an appropriate term expressing the idea of the one, personal, transcendent God.

Two possibilities were presented by the Greek and Latin languages of that period. The first was “Zeus” or “Jupiter”, the name of the sky-god, the father of gods and men. It is uncertain whether proselytising Jews ever tried to use this name to express the idea of Yahweh, the God of the Old Testament; but there seems to be an indication of this in a curious passage of the Roman historian, Valerius Maximus. He says that in the year 139 BC the Jews were expelled from Rome because “they tried to corrupt Roman customs by practising (or spreading) the cult of Jupiter Sabazius”1). Here the words “cultus Jovis Sabazii” certainly stand for the cult of “Yahweh Sabaoth”. Sabazios himself was a mystery-god of Phrygian origin, often identified with Dionysus-Bacchus; and several inscriptions show that in the West he was invoked under the name of Jupiter Sabazios2). Did then the Roman Jews try to explain their religion by describing the cult of Yahweh as “cultus Jovis Sabazii”; or was it only that the Roman authorities carelessly used the name of the well-known Phrygian god in place of the barbaric Hebrew name? It is not easy to give a definite answer to this question. However, this experiment of identifying Yahweh with Jupiter was not repeated, and later the Christian missionaries definitely

1) Valerius Maximus, 1, 3, 3: “…Judaeos qui Sabazii Iovis cultu Romanos inicere mores conati erant…”

2) cf. Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart: „Sabazios“.

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rejected it. For them Zeus-Jupiter was the proper name of a wicked
demon who was unjustly usurping the honour due to the one true God.
In fact, Zeus appeared too human in his various images, and his name
was involved in too many scandalous myths, to allow of any connection
with the transcendent and all-holy God of Israel.
The other possibility remaining for Jews and Christians to translate
the name of Yahweh into Greek and Latin, was the word "Theos" or
"Deus". But neither did this word seem more proper for the purpose
than Zeus-Jupiter. At the time when the translators of the Septuagint
chose it to express the God of Israel, it was the word used by the
Greeks to describe the vaguely personified forces of the universe. These
forces being manifold, there were inevitably many "theoi", all of them posterior to matter and none transcending this world.

Through the activities of the Greek philosophers, however, the concept of Theos had undergone considerable development by the time
that Christianity first came into close contact with Hellenic culture. Unfortunately, there is no time to follow in detail the course of this
interesting development, but only to indicate its outcome - in the conception of "Theos" according to the philosophers of Middle Platonism.
If we examine the works of Plutarch, Albinus, Atticus, Celsus, Apuleius, Numenius, Maximus of Tyre, Philostratus, the pseudo-Aristotelian "De Mundo", and the Hermetic writings, we find an idea of God which in its main lines is common to them all, and which can be characterized as follows: -

"Theos" is Father of the world and therefore absolutely transcending it; He is ineffable, surpassing all human intellect; He is
unique, immutable, incorporeal, simple, eternal, perfect, impassible, without beginning or end, outside space and time; He is intelligence continually in act; He is good, and bestows His benefits on everyone; He knows no envy, and gives without seeking to receive; He possesses all virtues in the highest degree; He is noble, just, truthful, gentle, a friend, and a father; He is...

15) Albinus, Epitome, IX, 1; X, 3; XVI, 2; Plutarch, De Iside, 56; ed.
Weber: 373 E; Apuleius, De Platone, I, 11: "ultramundanus, incorporeus,
quem patrem et architectum huius divini orbis superius ostendimus". This
transcendence of God is missing only in some of the Hermetic treatises, which
have a pantheistic tone, as vg. the 5th treaty.

16) Corpus Herm., XVIII, 12; Celsus, in Origen's Contra Celsum, 7, 42;
Apuleius, De Deo Socratis, III; Maximus, XI, 9; Numenius, fragm., 26. Cf. the

17) Maximus XI, 5; Plutarch, De def. orac., 29: 425F-426A; Corp.
Herm., XI, 5-14; IV, 5, etc. This uniqueness of the supreme God does not
exclude for these authors the existence of other subordinate deities, pro­
duced by the supreme God and Father of all things. Cf. Maximus XI, 5.

18) Plutarch, De E apud Delphos, 19, 392E; ibid., 20, 393A-B; Albinus,
Epit., X, 2; Celsus, 4, 18; 4, 14; Numenius, fragm., 20, 24, 14; Corp. Herm., II,
12; De mundo, VI, ed. Lorimer, 400 b 11-13.

19) Albinus, Epit., X, 7; Apuleius, De Platone, I, 5; I, 11; Numenius,
fragm., 15.

20) Albinus, Epit., X, 7.

21) Plutarch, De E, 19, 392E; Conv. quest. lib., VIII, q. 2. 718D.

22) Albinus, Epit., X, 3.

23) Plutarch, De Iside, 383A; Apuleius, De Deo Socratis, III.

24) Plutarch, De E, 19, 392E; 20, 393C; Celsus, 6, 65; De mundo, VI,
399b 20-22.

25) Plutarch, De E, 20, 393A; De mundo, VII, 401a16-17; Apuleius,
Apologia, LXIV, Numenius, fragm., 14.

26) Maximus, XI, 8.

27) Corp. Herm., XIV, 4; Albinus, Epit., X, 3; Apuleius, De Platone, 1,
5; Numenius, fragm., 11; 25; Corp. Herm., II, 16; XII, 4, 9; VI, title.

28) Corp. Herm., II, 16; V, 10; VI, 1; X, 3; Plutarch, Non posse suaviter
Baudry, p. 11; Apuleius, De Platone, I, 5; Celsus, 8, 21: Maximus,
XXXVIII, 6.

29) De mundo, VI, 399b 22.

30) Plutarch, Ad principlum ineruditum, 3,781A; De defectu orac., 24.
42F.

31) Plutarch, De defectu orac., 24, 423.

32) Plutarch, De superstitione, 6,167D; Corp. Herm., II, 16; II, 17; X,
3; X, 14.
majestic, magnanimous and happy; He is the bestower of bliss, Though separated from the world by His essence, He moves it by His strength, and prevents it from perishing by His love. He is the Father of all men in common, but regards the virtuous as His children.

This noble concept of "Theos", was, then, of immense service to the Christians in the first centuries of our era, when they wished to convey the idea of God the Father to the Hellenistic world; and, in fact, none of the early Fathers of the Church hesitated to recognise the identity of the "Theos" of the Greek philosophers with the God of the Christians.

There were also, of course, considerable differences between the Judaeo-Christian God and the God of Middle Platonism. These differences all stem from a completely different approach to the problem of God. The Hebrews recognized God in the manifestations of His purpose, love and power; whereas the Greeks thought of Him as the ultimate ground of all thought and being.

On the one hand, the Jews regarded Yahweh, in view of His manifestations in their history, as a personal being, a supreme will, commanding faith, righteousness and obedience. Reflecting then more profoundly on this personal and national experience, they came to realize that Yahweh was not only Lord of the history of Israel, but the Lord of all human history and of all the peoples of the earth; that He was, moreover, the absolute Lord of Nature, a will commanding the whole universe. Finally, in Him they recognized the highest, transcendent, spiritual ground of all reality. But in their minds this one, transcendent, ultimate Reality retained the concrete personality and moral will of Yahweh, the God of the Covenant.

The Greek philosophers, on the other hand, began by seeking the ultimate ground of all thought and being. They progressively realized that this ultimate ground must be one; hence that it must be spiritual and hence that it must be intelligence continually in act. Finally, they applied to it the name of "Theos" and conceived of it vaguely as a personal being. This God, however, never really became a living person who could enter into personal contact with men. He was rather a splendid object to be attained by contemplation, and not a living God addressing Himself to men.

This identification of Yahweh with Theos had, therefore, both great advantages and serious dangers. Nowhere in antiquity do both the advantages and the dangers appear more clearly than in the theological work of Origen. The advantage of his synthesis consisted in the fact that he did not simply attach to the same supreme Being the philosophical attributes of a Universal Cause and the more personal attributes of will and love, but in that he identified Being with moral Goodness. Thus a personal Reality, God the loving Father, became the ultimate ground of all thought and being; and from this personal love springs forth, first, the eternal procession of the Son, then the temporal creation of all spiritual and material creatures, and so the whole history of the universe and of mankind. On the other hand, the danger of this synthesis consisted in the fact that in some respects the supreme liberty and dominion of the Christian God is diminished in favour of a more impersonal and neutral "goodness". When these defects were eliminated by the later Fathers of the Church, the identification of the Judaeo-Christian God with the "Theos" of the Greek philosophers remained the corner-stone on which the whole culture of Occidental Christianity was built and on which most Christian thought is still based today.

Other, and perhaps more serious, problems arose, when Christianity turned to the Orient. This is, however, such a wide field of investigation, that for the purposes of the present paper we will omit discussion of the Oriental Semitic and Indo-European languages, and

33) Plutarch, De superstitione, 6, 167E.
34) Apuleius, De Platone, I, 5.
35) ibid.
36) De mundo, VI, 387b17-35.
38) Plutarch, Life of Alexander, c. XXVII, 681.
42) cf. Albinus, Epit., X, 2: "(God) moves as the object of desire moves the desire".
45) De Principiis, 4, 4, 8; vol. V, p. 359, 11-14; ibid. 1, 4, 3-5, p. 65, 10-68, 31; etc.
concentrate our attention on the languages of Central and Eastern Asia.

Perhaps the first time when an equivalent term for the Christian God had to be found in one of these languages, was about 850 AD, when Christian missionaries went to preach the Gospel to the Hungarians. The Hungarian language belongs to the Finno-Ugrian branch of the Ural-Altaic languages, and has a strong mixture of Turkish elements. The word adopted to express the Christian God was “Isten” (pronounced Ish-ten), about the etymology of which there has been considerable discussion. It was thought to derive from the Persian Jezdan, but this derivation is now rightly rejected. According to the recent Hungarian Etymological Dictionary of Bárczi, “the origin of the word Isten is unknown. Its suggested derivation from the Iranian is unacceptable. Perhaps one might consider the opinion, according to which it would come from the old form of the Finno-Ugrian word “ıs” (pronounced ısh), (meaning “very old” or “forefather”), which is the same as “is” (pronounced ısh). But even this suggestion is not convincing and the derivation is un-intelligible”.

The word “Isten” occurs in the oldest written Hungarian text, dating from the beginning of the XIII Century. The same text contains the old-Hungarian form “Is” in the sense of “forefather”. But it is a fact that a suffix like “ten” does not exist in Hungarian. I would suggest therefore, that “Isten” is a compound word — “Is” being in fact the Old Hungarian form for “ıs” (old), and “ten” being a common root-word used in many Ural-Altaic languages, as well as in Chinese, to express Heaven, or rather the supreme Sky-God. If this suggestion is correct, we have here the first case of the name of an Oriental Sky-God being used to express the idea of the Christian God. This translation has proved to be a success. Even today Hungarian Christians pray to God under the name of “Isten". Alas, we know practically nothing of the original pre-Christian character of the Hungarian Isten, and so we ignore the concrete problems which might arise in its adoption for Christian use.

More, however, is known concerning the second occasion, when a similar attempt was made to express by the name of an Oriental Sky-God the idea of the Christian God. This was the attempt of Matteo Ricci, the famous Jesuit missionary, who succeeded in penetrating into China in the XVI Century. After careful study of the Chinese classics, he chose the two names “T'ien” and “Shang-ti", designating the Chinese Sky-God who regulates the order of the cosmos as an omniscient lawgiver. But unfortunately, since the Middle Ages, the Chinese philosophers had tended to reject the interpretation of “T’ien” as a personal God, limiting the meaning of the word to the material heaven, so that Ricci’s translation soon met with serious difficulties.

The first objections to this word came from the Japanese Christians, who had been accustomed from the time of Francis Xavier to using the Latin word “Deus", without attempting to find a suitable Japanese term. In fact, the difficulties for the Japanese in finding such a term seemed insuperable. At the beginning of the oldest Japanese document, the Kojiki, there appears a Japanese Sky-God, Amenominakanushinokami; but he disappears immediately. Very little is known about him from other sources; and by the time of Xavier, he had become altogether a “deus otiosus", and had well-nigh vanished from the popular consciousness. Xavier seems never to have heard about him.

There still remained the word “Kami”; but this seemed absolutely inadequate for the purpose. No consensus has yet been reached about the origin and etymology of the word. It was thought to be generally identical with the other word “Kami", meaning “superior” but...
the works of several scholars, and especially of Prof. Yamamoto, have rather shattered this belief. The syllable “ka” seems rather to be connected with the meaning of “mystery”, “strangeness”, “hiddenness”, but further research is still necessary. No doubt, the Japanese “Kami” is related to the Ainu word for God, “Kamui”; and there may also be some connection with the Altaic designation of the Shaman as “Kam” or “Kami”. As to its content, “Kami” meant the mysterious forces hidden in and spread over the whole universe. Anything whatsoever, which was outside the ordinary, which possessed superior power, or which was awe-inspiring, was called “Kami.” Ancestors were “Kami”; mountains and seas were “Kami”; some extraordinary animals were “Kami”; high-ranking officials were “Kami.” Thus “Kami” was essentially polytheistic and bound up with nature- and ancestor-worship. Francis Xavier is, therefore, hardly to be blamed for not using this word, as he complains in one of his letters, his enemies would tell people that “Deusu” was just a “Dai-use” (a big lie). So Francis Xavier is, therefore, hardly to be blamed for not using this word, as he complains in one of his letters, his enemies would tell people that “Deusu” was just a “Dai-use” (a big lie). Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, the successors of Xavier continued to use “Deusu”. So when the Japanese Christians, taught to invoke God under this name, came to read the works of Ricci, they were scandalized to find in them the names of “Tien” and “Shang-ti”. Their

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56) Yamamoto, Nobuya, Zotei Kannagara no Shuttan to sono Shin-Kaishaku, Tokyo, 1953.
58) The Altaians call the shaman “kami”. In the Old-Mongolian literary language he was called “kami”. cf. N. Pallisen, op. cit., p. 178.
60) “Dainichi” 大日 was the name of the first principle immanent in all things (Maravairocana) according to the Shingon 真言 sect. Its famous temple stands in Nara. Xavier was told erroneously by his interpreter that Dainichi was the name used by the Japanese to express the one God, creator of Heaven and Earth. Cf. F. Schurhammer, Das kirchliche Sprachproblem in der Japanischen Jesuitenvision des 16 und 17 Jahrhunderts, Tokyo, 1927.

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... and the new language spread also to China, with the result that the use of these two names was prohibited by Rome, and “Tien Chu” (Lord of Heaven) substituted for them.

“Tien Chu” was, in fact, the name spontaneously given by one of the first Chinese converts of the XVI Century to the Christian God. When Ricci entered China for the first time in 1583, accompanied by another missionary, Michael Ruggieri, he went to visit a young Chinese merchant who was looking after an altar left there by Ruggieri shortly before. He found that the young man, wishing to explain the nature of the God he worshipped at this altar, had placed nearby a wooden tablet bearing the inscription: “Tien Chu” (Lord of Heaven). From that time this name of God has remained a distinctive feature of Chinese Catholics.

When Christianity returned to Japan in the XIX Century, however, the problem arose once more. The Catholic missionaries decided to form the word “Tenshu” from the Chinese “Tien Chu”; but as a polytheism, it was and is not readily understood by the Japanese people. The use of this word, therefore, has been gradually abandoned.

The Protestant missionaries were the first to adopt the word “Kami”. These missionaries, some of whom came from China, were accustomed to call God in Chinese “Shen”, meaning “Spirit”; and, finding that the Chinese character “Shen” was pronounced “Kami” in Japanese, they seem to have adopted it without any very deep consideration of the matter. But soon violent objections arose from among the Japanese Protestants themselves, who pointed out the great difference in meaning between “Kami” and the Christian God. For, in fact, no Japanese philosophers had developed the concept of “Kami” in anything like the fulness with which the Greek philosophers had developed that of “Theos”.

All the same, it seems clear that the Japanese word for the Christian God will remain “Kami” for the future. The Japanese language is changing very rapidly, especially in this post-war period, and the new
unified dictionaries which register these changes are being used everywhere. A close inspection of these dictionaries shows that the Christian meaning of “Kami” is taken into account in them all. For example, the Tōnō Shinkanwa Jiten, published in 1955, gives four senses for “Kami”: the first, its sense in Japanese mythology; the second, its sense in ancestor-worship; the third, a general definition on the basis of the study of comparative religions; while the fourth reads as follows: “According to Christian teaching “Kami” means the one and absolute Lord, all-knowing and omnipotent, Who created heaven and earth in the beginning, and governs them.” The definition is exact. Other popular modern dictionaries show an almost identical wording.

It appears therefore, that the term “Kami” has proved itself adaptable to the purpose of expressing the Christian God, its very vagueness enabling it to be used with this entirely new meaning.

To summarise our investigations—we have discovered two kinds of religious concepts, whose names have been used to express the one, personal transcendent God of Judaeo-Christian tradition.

First, there is the idea of mysterious superior forces hidden in or behind the forces of the universe. It is expressed variously by the words “Theos”, “Deus”, “Kami”, whose meaning is originally polytheistic—there are many “theoi”, “dei”, “kamigami”. Their meaning has, accordingly, to be deeply modified in using them to express the idea of the one, transcendent, personal God, without adulterating it. In the case of “Theos”, “Deus”, the corresponding idea had been transformed in very large measure by the work of the Greek philosophers, thus immensely facilitating the subsequent work of adaptation for the Christian missionaries. In the case of “Kami”, however, it was only under the influence of Christian thought that the necessary modification was superimposed on the word. Hence there remains much ground for misunderstanding, owing to the fact that so many different meanings can be attributed to this single word.

The other idea is that of the supreme Sky-God, “Isten”, “T’ien”, “Shang-ti”, and perhaps even “Jupiter”. These names had the advantage of referring to one God, Who is usually considered as superior to all other divinities, and as a more or less personal being. But in most cases pantheistic interpretations or mythological fantasies have made it almost impossible to apply them to the Christian God.

68) Chukyōshuppan, Tōyōkanji Jiten, Tokyo, 1956. 69) Sansai, Suisai, Tokyo, etc.
THE IDEA OF GOD IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

BY

KIYOSHI OHATA

We can point out many ideas about religion common to the religion of the Old Testament and Christianity or Jesus’ religion. This suggests that there is a connection between them. Nevertheless, it is sometimes quite dangerous to think that these two religions stand on the same basis of religious thought, or that there exists a continuous stream of thought through them.

I would like to speak here of the idea of God in the Old Testament, not looking for its similarity to Christianity, but rather making clear the uniqueness of the religion of the Old Testament and its difference from the religious ideas of Christianity.

1. The Jahwist says first that Yahwah is Israel’s own peculiar God, who cares only for Israel. This bond is the basis of the story of the two brothers, Cain and Abel (Gen. 4: 1-12). Each brother offered to God the fruits of his labours; but God accepted only Abel’s offering. The angered Cain dared to kill his brother Abel. The Jahwist did not need an explanation of God’s rejection of Cain’s offering. Abel, synonymous with Israel, should be accepted by God. But Cain, the Canaanite, the enemy of Israel, must be rejected by God. Yahwah could not possibly accept the offering of another group, but naturally gave his blessing to his own people. In Genesis 12: 10 ff. the same idea occurs. It can also be seen in the Heilsbeziehung zwischen Gott und Mensch. Here the relationship between God and man is called particularism. It insists on the particular blessings of God to his people. This is the idea which covers the whole Jahwist part of the Old Testament.

The Jahwist says that Yahwah is the “God of Abraham.” (Gen. 28: 13; Ex. 3: 16; 4: 5)

Yahwah is “your God and the God of your father.” (Gen. 43: 23)

The “God of the Hebrews.” (Ex. 3: 18, 5, 3; 9: 1, 13; 10: 3)

Thus, the standpoint of the Jahwist is the same as that of particularism.

2. The Elohist view embraces the Jahwist conception of the bond between God and Israel, and it adds ethical considerations. This is a partikularistische Gottheit.

3. The Prophets’ conceptions of God may best be typified by the Prophet Amos. Amos (about 760 B.C.) says of Yahwah that His power embraces heaven and earth; it reaches to the height of Mount Carmel and to the bottom of the sea (9: 2, 3). Amos considers Yahwah the Lord of Nations in the East and West (1: 3) and the Lord of History (9: 7). Yahwah was admired as a universal God by Amos.

We must not conclude, however, that his view is that of monotheism. Monotheism accepts the idea of a universal God. But it does not extend God’s blessings to a particular nation or tribe. Rather, it extends God’s blessings to all mankind. For the idea of one particular God for a particular nation, I shall use the term henotheism.

Amos admired Yahwah as a universal God, but on the other hand, he says, “You (Israel) only have I known of all the tribes of the earth” (3: 2). This shows that Amos considers Yahwah as one who blesses only Israel. This relationship is nothing but particularism. Thus, we have to conclude here again, that Amos still holds the idea of henotheism.

4. The D Material, established by King Josiah, accepted the basis of the Prophets’ spirit and took up the Prophets’ idea of God. The D material, however, strictly prohibits the worship of gods other than Yahwah; the punishment for such blasphemy was death for the people of Israel. The D material tried to exterminate all other gods from Israel, but not from the world (17: 1-17; 13: 1-12; 13: 12-18, etc.). The D material attempted to concentrate the spirit of the Israelites on Yahwah, and expected the blessing of God for the prosperity of the

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1) Monotheism is characterized by the fact that the Heilsmaacht (the power of grace) of the One God or the One Being goes beyond the realm of a particular nation. It is not predicated on the basis of the power of punishment by the One God which goes beyond his nation to other nations. For even a national god or gods can extend the power of punishment to the enemies of their own nation.

2) The terms “true monotheism” and “tribal monotheism” cause a confusion in the concept of monotheism. That is the reason why I use the term henotheism which is distinguished from monotheism. My usage of the word henotheism is not controlled by the ambiguous terminology of general comparative religion.

3) This quotation from the Prophet Amos refers to the special punishment by Yahwah of Israel which does not perform righteousness. It cannot be denied that behind these words there exists a presupposition of the elect: Israel would be given special grace if she performed righteousness.
nation. The D material thus is based on particularism, and the concept of God is henotheism.

5. Daniel admired Yāhwāh as a God who changed the times and seasons; who did according to his will in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth (4:35).

Further, he says that Yāhwāh is the "God of his fathers". Here again we see that Yāhwāh is a particularistic deity, and that it is again a case of henotheism. But there is that difference that Daniel admitted the existence of other Gods while maintaining that the God of Israel is greater than all the other gods.

6. Deutero-Isaiah has generally been considered to have a standpoint contrary to the general tendencies of the Old Testament, to particularism and henotheism.

Deutero-Isaiah considered God as the Creator (45:9; 42:5ff.; 40:28ff.; 42:5; 45:12; 44:3), the one God in this universe (45:15; 40:26; 45:78; 51:4), the almighty (45:18; 43:10), and a God of benevolence (43:13ff.; 40:23; 26; 40:15ff.).

Deutero-Isaiah, thus, sees God as a universal deity and this standpoint is based on the idea of a universal God.

Deutero-Isaiah, nevertheless, sees a special relationship between Yāhwāh and Israel. He calls God, the God of Israel (41:10; 42:3; 45:2; 48:1), the Holy One of Israel, and the savior of Israel (43:3; 14:15). He also states that the Israelites are the servants whom Yāhwāh has selected (41:8, 10, 18, 19; 42:1; 43:10; 41:12, 21; 45:4; 48:20; 49:17). He believes in Yāhwāh as a creator, who especially created Israel (43:1, 7, 15; 44:2, 24; 49:15; 50:13), Yāhwāh is the savior of Israel from the beginning when he created Israel (43:1, 13, 14; 44:24; 49:7, 26; 50:1-3; 54:8), Yāhwāh is the beginning and the end for Israel (41:3; 44:6; 46:3, 4; 48:12), etc. All this shows that Deutero-Isaiah considered Yāhwāh as a particularistic deity.

The concept of a particularistic deity conflicts with the concept of a universalistic deity. In Deutero-Isaiah, however, the conflict is avoided by the insistence that Yāhwāh is the only almighty God in the universe, but maintains a special relationship with Israel. The salvation of Israel by Him is taken for a promise, for nothing is impossible to Yāhwāh. So despite the outwardly universalistic view there is, basically, the inflexible particularistic view, characteristic of henotheism.

7. From the Priestly code we can reach the same basic attitude. The priestly portions, in the first chapter of Genesis, announce the same idea of creation. But in the parts of the priestly portion concerned with the contract between God and Abraham and the centralization of the Temple of Jerusalem, again we see the same particularism prevailing in the rest of the Old Testament.

CONCLUSION

The examination of the various parts of the Old Testament has proved that there exists particularism as the basis of its thought. The idea of God in the Old Testament identical with henotheism.

There exists one God. He is thought sometimes to be the One God for the Israelites, and at other times as the one God of the Universe. In any case, as far as the special relationship between Yāhwāh, the One Being, and the Israelites is concerned, it is no more than henotheism. The religion of the Old Testament cannot depart from particularism so far as it stands on the basis of a national religion.
SAINT PAUL CHEZ LES MANICHÉENS D'ASIE CENTRALE

PAR

HENRI-CH. PUECH

Le temps n'est plus où, par réaction contre les conceptions classiques héritées des hérésiologues et sous le premier effet des découvertes de Tourfan, certains spécialistes tendaient à minimiser le rôle joué par le christianisme dans la constitution du manichéisme. Il apparaît, au contraire, que la religion de Mani s'apparçante pour une bonne part—peut-être même, pour l'essentiel—aux Gnostes chrétiennes, ou apparemment christianisées, du IIème siècle et que les éléments chrétiens qu'elle a délibérément, systématiquement, intégrés à sa substance y ont été, dès le début, aussi nombreux, aussi importants que ses ingénieurs iraniens, bien plus considérables, en tout cas, que ceux qu'elle a pu, d'autre part, emprunter au bouddhisme. Sans doute un dosage exact est-il délicat à opérer, et il est évident qu'il varie selon que l'on a affaire à des documents provenant des communautés manichéennes d'Occident ou de celles d'Extrême Orient. Mieux encore: il ne va pas sans être divers dans le cas même des textes exhumés en Asie Centrale. L'influence exercée par le christianisme n'en reste pas moins sensible à l'Est aussi bien qu'à l'Ouest, ici patente, plus développée et quasi exclusive, là atténuée et parfois perceptible à de simples traces, réduite à des échos épars et plus ou moins lointains. Pareille diffusion, pareille persistance s'explique, d'ailleurs, assez bien par l'usage d'une littérature canonique ou de formules liturgiques communes. Mon propos n'est cependant ni sans contenir, eux aussi, des reminiscences, voire des citations, de la place qu'y occupent, ainsi que dans l'Hymnaire chinois de Londres, le nom et la personne de Jésus—de renvoyer au mémoire publié en 1926 par E. Waldschmidt et W. Lentz dans les Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Je voudrais seulement toucher ici à un point plus menu, encore mal débrouillé ou, me semble-t-il, négligé: non pas—pour reprendre le titre de l'étude à laquelle je viens de faire allusion—"Die Stellung Jesu", mais "Die Stellung des Paulus im Manichäismus". Dans le manichéisme de l'Extrême Orient, je m'empresser de l'ajouter, car, eu égard à celui de l'Ocident, le sujet serait trop vaste et moins original. Il est assez connu que Paul a joué auprès de Mani comme auprès de ses disciples occidentaux d'un prestige et d'une autorité analogues à ceux que lui avaient accordés Marcion et la plupart des écoles antérieures de gnostes, et qui iront s'accroissant, jusqu'à devenir absolus, chez les Pauliciens d'Arménie, de Byzance et des Balkans, considérés d'ordinaire comme des "néo-manichéens" ou des héritiers du manichéisme authentique. Peut-être même Paul a-t-il été vu par Mani et ses fidèles à travers l'image que les Gnostiques s'en étaient faite. Son portrait était objet d'adoration de la part des Carpocratians; il était par excellence, pour les Valentiniens (Excerpt. Thedot. 23, 2; cf. Irénée, adv. haer. II, 21, 2), et "en image du Paradet (éν τύπῳ Παρακλήτου), l'"apôtre de la résurrection", ἀναστάσεως ἀπόστολος (entendons: de la régénération spirituelle); Origène, dans la XXVe de ses Homélies sur l'Evangile de Luc (p. 162, 4–11 Rauer), parle d'hétérodoxes (de Marcionites, très vraisemblablement) qui se représentaient Paul siégeant à la droite du Sauveur, dont Marcion occupait la gauche; il en mentionne d'autres (disciples, soit d'Apelle, soit de Valentin ?), qui assimilaient l'Apostre au Paradet dont l'envoi avait été promis par le Christ, c'est-à-dire, en quelque sorte, à la troisième Personne de la Trinité, au Saint-Esprit. De tels traits n'ont pas été sans avoir agi sur le manichéisme, sur le culte qu'il a rendu à son propre fondateur ou la conception qu'il s'est formée de lui. Mani comptant Marcion, à côté de Bardesanes, parmi ses prédécesseurs immédiats et connaissant ses ouvrages, il est, en tout cas, probable que c'est le Marcionisme qui lui a inspiré de mettre l'Apostre hors de pair et de fonder sur lui un antijuifisme, la théorie d'un christianisme corrompu par des éléments juifs dont il aurait lieu de le débarrasser. De toute façon, d'après Mani lui-même, et comme l'expose notamment le premier chapitre des Kephalaia coptes (I, p. 13, 18–29), c'est jusqu'à Paul, et par lui, que le message de Jésus se serait transmis et conservé dans sa pureté originelle; à partir de lui, après sa mort, qu'aurait commencé la falsification de ce message, la décadence du christianisme. Paul est, en outre, le grand modèle dont s'inspire l'idéal apostolique, missionnaire, que Mani se fixe à lui-même et à ses Élus: il est le type même, l'exemple éminent de l'apôtre itinérant, qui, au mépris des fatigues et des persécutions, parcourt le monde pour y
répandre la Vérité, y lancer l’appel au Salut. Son nom et celui de Thécle, les aventures que lui prêtent, ainsi qu’à sa compagne spirituelle, les Actes apocryphes, sont ça et là évoqués par maints ouvrages des manichéens occidentaux, notamment dans le Psautier copte. Ses Lettres y sont abondamment citées et utilisées; un de ces écrits—conservé en débris par le manuscrit latin découvert en 1919 près de Thébessa—n’est même qu’un centon de divers extraits d’Épîtres pauliniennes mis bout à bout et succinctement commentés. L’influence du paulinisme sur les origines du Manichéisme, la notoriété de l’Apôtre au sein des communautés manichéennes d’Égypte et du monde occidental sont donc autant de faits bien établis. Toutefois, une question ne laisse pas de se poser : cette influence s’est-elle également prolongée en Asie centrale et orientale? Le souvenir de Paul y a-t-il été entouré de la même ferveur, ou même simplement gardé ?

Un témoignage est explicite; il est malheureusement trop bref. A la ligne 15 du fragment de Tourfan S 1 publié en 1904 par C. Salemann dans les Mémoires de l’Académie impériale de Saint-Pétersbourg (VIIIe Série, vol. VI, no. 6, p. 6) sous le titre “Ein Bruchstück (sic) manichäischen Schriftums im Asiatischen Museum”, une rubrique porte : Abar gutân ‘Paulus fr[estag ë)], “Sur la parole de l’apôtre (?) Paul”. S’agit-il du titre d’un sermon, d’un exposé, d’un Kephalaion relatif soit aux Épîtres pauliniennes, soit à l’un de leurs passages ? Nous ne saurions le dire en toute certitude. L’essentiel est que nous ayons ainsi la preuve – si peuver soit-elle – que le nom et les écrits de Paul n’étaient pas absolument inconnus des manichéens d’Extrême Orient. Il faut néanmoins avouer qu’il est fort rare et très difficile de découvrir dans les débris jusqu’ici publiés de leur littérature quelque citation, ou des échos, de ces “paroles” pauliniennes à quoi le S 1 fait allusion.

Il y a bien une apparente exception, formée par deux autres fragment de Tourfan, d’ailleurs à peu près parallèles, le M 551 et le M 789, édités l’un et l’autre par F.W.K. Müller dans les Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Anhang) de 1904, aux pages 67 et 68. On lit, en effet, au verso du premier : “... je vous sauve (de la) ruine... ce que vous n’avez pas vu avec l’œil, ni entendu avec l’oreille ni saisie avec la main”, et au recto du second : “Afin que je vous sauve de la mort et de l’anéantissement, je vous donnerai ce que vous n’avez pas vu avec l’œil, ni entendu avec l’oreille ni saisie avec la main”. Ce qui fait immédiatement songer à la Ière Épître aux Corinthiens, chapitre 2, verset 9 : Ἄλλα καθὼς γέγραπται ἀ πόθαλμός ὦ καὶ ὥσ πόσιν ὥσς ὥσς ἢ κατά πάντα ἀνθρώπων ὥσ ἡ αὐτή ἢ σαρκίζει. “Mais, comme il est écrit : Ce que l’œil n’a pas vu, l’oreille n’a pas entendu, et qui n’est pas monté jusqu’au cœur des hommes”. Détrompons-nous cependant. En fait, la référence est ici, non pas à Paul, mais à Jésus; non pas à la Ière aux Corinthiens, mais à un évangile apocryphe dont, comme il est bien attesté, Mani et les manichéens faisaient usage : l’Évangile selon Thomas, aujourd’hui bien connu grâce à la version intégrale qui en a été récemment retrouvée parmi les quelque quarante neuf écrits de la bibliothèque gnostique copée mise au jour en Haute-Égypte, près de Nag Hamâdi. Nous savions déjà que la parole attribuée par Paul comme scripturaria, ou d’après quelque Ecriture, a aussi circulé et rapportée par les Actes apocryphes de Pierre (Acta Petr, c. 39 = Martyrium Petr, c. 10, p. 98, 7-10 Lipsius) : “Vous obtiendrez”, déclare Pierre à la foule, “ce dont il vous parle”, c’est-à-dire “ce dont Jésus vous parle” (ἐκείνων τείχεσθε ὧν λέγει ὑμῖν) : “Ce que l’œil n’a pas vu ni l’oreille entendu, et qui n’est pas monté jusqu’au cœur de l’homme (ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρθαλμοῦ ἐδέν ὦ ὥσ ἢ ἢ κατέκοιταν ὦ ὥσ ἢ κατά ἀνθρώπων ἀνέβη). Nous te demandons donc ce que tu nous as promis de nous donner, Jésus sans tache (Ἄιτοιμον ὦ περὶ ὧ ὑμῖν ὑπέχον δοῦναι, ἀμαντία ἲποσου).” Mais c’est plus expressément encore comme Dit de Jésus — et, cette fois, sous une forme littéralement plus proche du texte du fragment 789 que de celui de l’Épître paulinienne — que cette même parole est recueillie et donnée dans l’Évangile selon Thomas. Elle constitue le dix-septième des 114 logia que réunit ce prétendu Évangile et elle y est formulée comme suit (fol. 7r, lignes 5 à 9 de l’édition photographique Pahor Labib) : “Jésus a dit : Je vous donnerai ce que l’œil n’a pas vu, et ce que l’oreille n’a pas entendu, et ce que la main n’a pas touché, et qui n’est pas venu jusqu’au cœur de l’homme”. Nul doute, en conséquence, que ce ne soit ce Dit — et non point, comme on pouvait tout d’abord le penser, I Cor. 2, 9 — que citent ou paraphrasent les deux textes manichéens en question. Force nous est de renoncer à en appeler à leur témoignage.

Voici, en revanche, qui sera moins décevant.

On sait que l’Église manichéenne donne pour fonction à ses Élus, à ses Parfaits, à ses “Saints”, de coopérer au Salut de l’âme divine engloutie dans la Matière ; qu’elle leur attribue, en particulier, la capacité de dégager et de libérer, au cours de leur digestion, les particules émanantes de lumière mêlées à la substance des aliments qu’ils absorbent et qui leur sont offerts en guise d’“aumônes” par les fidèles de moindre rang, par les “Auditores” ou “Catéchumènes”. Le repas des Élus revêtu, par suite, du caractère d’une action sacrée : sainte en son
accomplissement et par les fins auxquelles elle est ordonnée, mais aussi redoutable, périlleuse en son principe, puisque son échec ou sa réussite dépend des dispositions intérieures de qui en est l'agent, de l'état d'impureté ou de pureté où celui-ci se trouve au moment de l'accomplir. En effet, au cas où l'Élu serait souillé par le péché, un tel acte se transformerait d'œuvre pie en sacrilège : au lieu de les sauver par lui et en lui, l'Élu coupable entraînerait à leur perte les parcelles d'âme contennes dans la nourriture consommée ; il les maintiendrait plus tenacement amalgamées au corps, aux ténèbres, au Mal ; il perpétuerait et accroîtrait leur esclavage et leur abjection, les exposerait à de nouvelles souffrances, les vouerait à des épreuves renouvelées. Aussi l'opération ne peut-elle que s'entourer d'extrêmes et strictes précautions et prendre-elle allure et valeur de rite, se conforme-t-elle à un rituel qui en règle le déroulement et assure la validité. Plus particulièrement la gravité de l'acte que le Parfait va effectuer lorsqu'il se dispose à prendre nourriture, le rôle décisif qu'il est appelé à jouer en l'occurrence suivant qu'il s'en est rendu digne ou indigne, amènent l'Élu à s'y préparer par une méditation préalable, à se livrer avant chacun de ses repas à une sorte d'examen de conscience au cours duquel, après une prière d'action de grâces, il s'interroge sur la signification de ce qu'il est près de faire, sur la nature des aliments à absorber, sur sa responsabilité qui lui incombe en tout cela. C'est, du moins, en ce sens que l'on doit, à mon avis, interpréter deux textes de Tourfan, rédigés l'un et l'autre en sogdien : le fragment M 801, paragraphes 749-767, et le fragment M 139, paragraphes 51-91.

Le premier, publié par W. Henning dans les APAW de 1936, no 10, p. 41, et, par malchance, interrompu trop tôt du fait de la mutilation du manuscrit, fait partie d'un formulaire de confession destiné aux Elus. Il en représente une section spéciale intitulée xw'nyzd'n, "la table des dieux", et, comme l'indique un parci titule, concerne la participation à cette sorte de "sainte table", de "table de communion", autour de laquelle se prênnent les repas des Parfaits et que les manichéens désignent en iranien par xwân, en grec et en copiste par tâpâs(e). Il s'y agit des négligences, ou des fautes, dont l'Élu a pu se rendre coupable à l'occasion de ces agapes d'âme plus ou moins existiarchique. Je traduis le passage littéralement, d'après Henning : "De même (Item), en recevant les dons quotidiens de la table divine (entendons : les aumônes alimentaires apportées chaque jour par les Auditeurs, les evdébeiân, les ruwângân, qui sont aussi des diâpa), je ne m'étais pas placé, d'un coeur reconnaissant, dans le souvenir de Dieu, du Bouddha (peut-être, du Dieu Bouddha, Tângri Burxan en ouigour, c'est-à-dire de Manî) et des hommes." 1) De même (Item), je n'entretenais pas comme il convient le souvenir de la lutte originelle (de l'épisode qui domine tout le mythe cosmogonique et sotériologique du manichéisme : le combat engagé, à l'aube des temps, entre l'Homme Primordial et les Belettes du Mal et qui, terminé par la défaite du premier, est à la fois de la chute et de l'engloutissement dans les Ténèbres de l'Âme) avant, de la portion de substance divine amassée en l'Urmensch ; la bataille à la suite de laquelle, comme le résume fort bien s. Augustin dans l'Enarratio in Psalm. CXL, 10 (P.L. XXXVII, 1823), les membres de Dieu sont tous captifs, ont été mélangés au monde tout entier, se trouvent enfouis dans les arbres, les herbes, les fruits : Membra illa Dei, quaæ capita sunt in illo praelio, mixta sunt in universo mundo, et sunt in arboribus, in herbis, in pomis, in fructibus. Je ne pensais pas non plus", poursuit l'Élu, "à ce qui suit : Sous le signe de qui suis-je maintenant ? (sous-entendu : Est-ce sous le signe du Bien ou sous celui du Mal ?) Qu'est-ce donc qui est mangé ? Quels sont les démons que l'on a coutume (pour l'ordinaire) de manger ? De qui est donc chair et sang cela (qui est mangé) ? Quelle dette obligatoire et quel dépôt reçoit donc ? Ensuite : Pourquoi est-ce que je ne figure point dans la catégorie des porcs, des chiens et des yakṣa ? Pourquoi...?"

L'une de ces questions est des plus étranges : ky'y'ty xwrnyy xcy (c'est-à-dire kyxy xwrtẏ jwtkwn), "De qui est chair et sang (la chair et le sang cela (qui est mangé)) ?" L'interrogation ne peut que surprendre, tout aliment caréné étant rigoureusement interdit aux Parfaits. La chair, formée par le Diable et ses suppôts de la part de la matière et se reproduisant chez les animaux par la copulation, est tenue par la dogmatique manichéenne pour particulièrement immonde et souillant absolument celui qui la consomme : omnem carnem immundam, déclare Faustus, dans le Contra Faustum de s. Augustin VI, 1 (p. 284, 16–17), Zycha ; autres références chez P. Alfaric, L' évolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin, Paris, 1918, p. 128). Les manichéens, atteste de son côté un témoignage chinois recueilli par E. Chavannes et P. Pelliot (Journal Asiatique, mars-avril 1913, pp. 348–349), "s'abstiennent toujours de nourriture sanglante". Je crois donc que l'on ne peut s'expliquer que d'une seule manière la question, à première vue paradoxalement et presque inconcevable dans sa littéralité, que se pose ainsi l'Élu : c'est en y voyant un souvenir ou une adaptation du langage chrétien. À suivre celui-ci, "la chair et le sang" sont ceux de Jésus, présents dans les oblats

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1) Dans le Journal Asiatique (CCXLVII, 1959, p. 124), E. Benveniste traduit : "Dans la... réception du don quotidien de la table divine, je n'ai pas été selon le modèle du Dieu Bouddha et des hymnes".
eucharistiques, dans le pain et le vin, ou symbolisés par eux, et, de même que le chrétien ne peut participer à la "sainte table", prendre part à la cène comme à un repas quelconque, ni absorber l'hostie manger le pain ou boire à la coupe, sans se remémorer, avec crainte et révérence, la présence en eux du corps du Christ, de même l'Elu manichéen doit bien se pénétrer du caractère sacré de l'acte qu'il va accomplir et discerner dans le pain, l'eau, les légumes, les fruits, qui lui sont offerts en "aumône", la présence de l'âme vivante, divine et lumineuse, d'ailleurs assimilée à la substance du Fils de Dieu, de l'Homme Primordial, ou—chez certains manichéens occidentaux, tout au moins—celle du Jesus Paibilis, du Christ crucifié dans le monde et dans chacun de ses éléments. Sans doute la correspondance est-elle loin d'être parfaite et l'adoption de termes et de conceptions propres au chrétianisme ne va-t-elle pas ici sans incohérences : le manichéisme interdit à ses Saints l'usage ou l'emploi du vin; il professe, pour sa part, le docétisme, n'attribuant au Christ qu'un fantôme de corps, niant la réalité de l'Incarnation. Surtout, n'est-ce pas là parallèle assimilé plus ou moins à une nourriture grasse et sanglante, répétée maléfique immode, et expressément prohibée, les aliments strictement végétarien qui sont seuls permis à l'Elu et les seuls sur lesquels puisse s'exercer son action libératrice ? Mais, précisément, ces incongruences, ces maladresses, ces difficultés trahissent l'emprunt.

L'interprétation que je viens de proposer n'est pas, au reste, purement conjecturale ou, tout au plus, ingénieuse. On pourrait objecter que, s'il est bizarre de trouver mention de la chair et du sang à propos du repas exclusivement végétarien des Elus, il le serait plus encore de découvrir un souvenir de l'eucharistie textes provenant, non pas de l'Ouest, mais de l'Asie Centrale. A quoi il serait déjà permis de répliquer, par exemple, qu'une des dénominations données à Jesus par des documents de même origine et relevées par Waldschmidt et Lentz dans leur mémoire de 1926 est celle de nigan, "pain", employée entre autres par les fragments de Tourfan M 96 R, strophe 1e, et M 88, I, strophe 1e (APAW, 1926, no 4, p. 35; cf. p. 65) : ce qui est une reminiscence johannique, et même, plus ou moins lointainement, une allusion eucharistique. Nous avons mieux cependant et un témoignage alors décisif—grâce à l'Hymnaire manichéen chinois de Londres, dont une traduction intégrale a été donnée en anglais par Tsui Chi dans le Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, vol. XI, Part I, 1943). Il n'est que d'en lire les strophes 253 et 254 (p. 188 de l'article de Tsui Chi, mais j'utilise ici une traduction plus exacte due à M. Paul Demiéville) :

La pièce dont je détache ces deux strophes se présente comme un discours, un sermon en vers, adressé par les mou-chi aux Elus et aux auditeurs interpellés au vers 1 de la strophe 249 (p. 197) sous les noms traditionnels, stéréotypés, de "frères aînés et cadets lumineux aux bons actes". Il leur est dit—and plus spécialement, semble-t-il, aux Elus—dans le morceau qui nous intéresse :

Sauvez ceux qui sont gravement blessés, et fâchez-les sortir de la sanie et des blessures.

Nettoyez les perles de clarté et tirez-les de la boue et de l'urine.

Les offrandes (kong) merveilleuses (transcendantes) qu'exalte la Loi (ou : qui sont reçues conformément à la Loi),

Ornées et pures, faites-les retourner au Seigneur originel.

Et la chair et le sang de Jesus, c'est cela.

Que ceux (ou : celui) qui sont (qui est) apte(s) à les recevoir (prenne) de cela comme il leur (lui) plaît.

Quant à ceux (ou celui) qui sont (qui est) faux et ingrat(s) (ou : tourne(nt) le dos à leurs (à ses) obligations),

Jésus lui-même (est) faible, et il n'y a pas de route de neige (c'est-à-dire, suivant une métaphore courante en chinois, il n'y a aucun moyen qui permette de se blanchir, de se laver de cette honte ou de cette faute)

Le début du dernier vers ("Jésus est faible") parait peu compréhensible et serait sans doute à corriger : à we, "faible", "subtil", pourrait fort bien être substitué le caractère très voisin lcheng, "sémoigner"; on entendrait alors : "Jésus lui-même témoigne qu'il n'y a pas de voie permettant d'être blanchi, lavé, d'un tel péché"

Tout commentaire de ces strophes serait inutile. Non seulement la chair et le sang sont mentionnés ici et expressément désignés comme étant ceux de Jesus, mais encore ils sont mis en rapport avec les aumônes alimentaires, avec les "offrandes" (kong en chinois, ḍoṇa en grec et en copte) : les Elus sont exhortés à guérir et à sauver les parcelles lumineuses d'âme enfouies et souffrantes en elles, à les dégager de leur gangue d'ordures matérielles, à les purifier et à les restituer à leur substance et source primitive. Les images mises en œuvre, les termes employés sont quasi techniques, familiers à l'Hymnaire manichéen. Nous avons mieux cependant et un témoignage alors décisif-grâce à l'Hymnaire manichéen chinois de Londres, dont une traduction intégrale a été donnée en anglais par Tsui Chi dans le Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, vol. XI, Part I, 1943). Il n'est que d'en lire les strophes 253 et 254 (p. 188 de l'article de Tsui Chi, mais j'utilise ici une traduction plus exacte due à M. Paul Demiéville).
Enfin, la strophe 254 insiste sur la nécessité qui s'impose à l'Élu—leurs libérateur ou leur profanateur éventuel—d'être en état de dignité, d'être exempt de toute faute, de ne se montrer ni négligent ni oublieux envers ses obligations; sinon, pas de rédemption ou d'absolution possible, Jésus même le voudrait-il, ou (si l'on adopte la correction proposée) ainsi que l'atteste Jésus. Il n'y a donc, je pense, aucune hésitation ni aucune audace à interpréter comme je l'ai fait le fragment de Tourfan M 801.

L'accès est désormais facile au fragment M 139, également publié par W. Henning dans le fascicule 10 des Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften de 1936, et qu'il faut conjonqure au précédent en guise de parallèle et de complément. Je n'en retiens que la seconde section, soit les paragraphes 51 à 91 (pp. 50-51 de l'édition indiquée). Ils représentent, semble-t-il, les restes d'une homélie concernant les dispositions dans lesquelles l'âme alimentaire doit être reçue et consommée. On y lit : "Et recevez-le en dépôt comme de l'or (ou, plus simplement, d'après E. Benveniste, BSOS, IX, 1938, p. 499 : "Et recevez-le comme de l'or"). Transmettez-le selon la quantité requise et intégralement à son propriétaire, afin de ne point en arriver à une grande hostilité (à un état d'inimitié). Gardez-le avec précaution. Conservez-le avec une grande fermeté, afin de ne point l'exposer à être souillé avec du sang desséché ou humide. (Conservez-le) dans l'état où cela vous rend, pour sa part, joyeux et heureux. Et tous ensemble, empêchez aussi, de même, que jalouse ou haine (ce qui provoque le dégoût ou la haine) ne lui... naissance de sorte que... vous laissiez devenir. La lutte originelle, blesse... la faute (ou la dette), songez au... jour, lorsque par Àz (la Concepcispence, la personification de la Matière et du Mal).... Commencez (à songer à ceci) : Le corps propre (de chacun), avec quel signe est-il orné ou oppressé ? Au service de qui est-il ? Et qu'est-ce donc que vous mangez ? Car chaque participant au repas (mot-à-mot : "tout buvant et mangeant", ἔστω ἁρρυσσεῖν, "quinconce boit et mange") qui n'en serait pas digne en sera pour ses laborieux efforts, et il sera exclu du Paradis de Lumière. (En revanche,) les justes Elus et les Auditeurs croyants qui reconnaissent la grandeur de l'âme vivante seront heureux au sein du Paradis de Lumière dans la Vie éternelle. (Cher frère,) raffine-toi toi-même et entends de ma bouche la bonne... C'est un devoir et une loi pour ceux qui ont la Connaissance (sont sages) de se tenir dans l'Église et de servir (la Religion) sous ce signe distinctif."

Ici encore, des réminiscences chrétiennes transparaissent au passage, mais—ce qui est mieux—il nous est alors donné d’en préciser la source. Quelque prononcée qu’en soit la couleur manichéenne, cette exhortation à bien se disposer à prendre part au repas rituel fait par androits écho aux instructions de saint Paul relatives aux responsabilités de qui, diglement ou indiglement, avec ou sans discernement, mange le pain, le corps du Seigneur, et boit à la coupe le sang du Christ. Il sufﬁt pour s’en convaincre de mettre en regard le texte même de la 1ère aux Corinthiens, chapitre XI, versets 27-31, dont elle va jusqu’à conserver littéralement certains termes : "C’est pourquoi quiconque mange le pain et boit à la coupe du Seigneur indiglement (sans en être digne, αναφαίρεσθαι) sera coupable (responsable, ἔνδοξος), répondra du corps et du sang du Seigneur (τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ αἵματι τῶν κυρίων), ce qui équivaut à ce que nous avons relevé dans le fragment M 801 et dans la strophe 254 de l’Hymnaire chinois : "la chair et le sang"). Que chacun donc s’espère soi-même (δικαίαμεν ἐστιν τοῦ ἐλευθερίου) et qu’ainsi (οὕτως) il mange du pain et boîte de la coupe. Car celui qui mange et qui boit (ὁ γὰρ κατέβαλλε καὶ πίνων, exactement traduit ici par ὦσσω τὸ καρπὸν, le pain et boit une grande hostilité contre lui-même (κρίμα οὐκ ἔστει καὶ πίνει). C’est pour cela qu’il y a parmi vous beaucoup d’infirmes (de malades) et de débiles (άθλετες καὶ ἀθλοποιούσα), et que les morts sont nombreux (καὶ κοιμώνται ικανοί). Si nous nous discernons nous-mêmes, nous ne serons pas jugés (Εἰ δὲ έκατόοις διεκρίνομεν, οὐκ ἂν ἐκκρίνομεν)."

Voilà donc enfin repérée dans la littérature manichéenne d’Asie Centrale la trace très probable d’un écrit paulinien, de quelques-unes de ces "paroles" de l’Apôtre que visait le fragment 1 de Salemann. La persistance d’un pareil souvenir est d’autant plus remarquable qu’il est quasi exceptionnel et que les raisons qu’il aurait eues les manicheens de ces régions de s’y attacher plus particulièrement. Tout aussi bien—du moins, en principe—auraient-ils pu se dispenser d’intégrer ces bribes de paulinisme dans l’exposé d’une théorie dont l’Iran leur fournissait une sorte d’équivalent, les Mazdéens soutenant, eux aussi, que l’indigène ou l’incroyant est exclu de la consommation du myaza (textes fournis par R. Reitzenstein, Die Vorgeschichte der christlichen Taufe, Berlin-Leipzig, 1929, p. 246, qui fait, au reste, le rapprochement avec les versets mentionnés de la 1ère Épitre aux Corinthiens). En outre, la doctrine et la terminologie pauliniennes ne sont pas si comparables avec les croyances et le rite en question que leur adoption s’impose ou aille de soi. L’almanaque ne va pas, au contraire, sans artifice ni incohérence; il a quelque chose de forcé et n’a pu, semblerait-il, être tenté que sous la pression de quelque contrainte,
sous l’effet de quelque besoin, pour des motifs quelque peu contingents ou extérieurs. En d’autres termes, la combinaison paraîtrait moins concevable en Extrême Orient qu’en Occident, où, pour des fins de propagande notamment, le manichéisme avait tout intérêt à revêtir une apparence et des formes chrétiennes, à adapter ses dogmes, son langage, ses pratiques, à ceux du christianisme. De fait, nous constatons que, dans le monde occidental, non seulement les adversaires et les témoins extérieurs du mouvement ont confondu avec une “communion” le repas—quotidien ou solennel—des Elus, mais surtout qu’au sein même de telle ou telle communauté manichéenne, le rite a reçu une interprétation eucharistique qui tendait à l’assimiler peu ou prou au sacrement de l’Eglise chrétienne. Ainsi, vers la fin du IVème siècle et en Afrique du Nord, l’évêque manichéen Faustin affirme-t-il, au témoignage de saint Augustin (C. Faust. XX, 2, p. 536, 21–23), que lui et ses coreligionnaires ont à l’égard de toutes choses (entendons : à l’égard de toutes les choses en lesquelles est crucifié le Christ et de toutes choses), à l’égard de toutes choses sacrées, “vie et salut des hommes”1 la même attitude, le même respect religieux, que les chrétiens à l’endroit du pain et du calice (Quapropter et nobis circa Vitalitatem et salutem Eternae). Thése que saint Augustin repousse et réfute au chapitre 13 du même livre XX du Contra Faustum (p. 552, 22–p. 553, 15) en mettant précisément en relief les incompatibilités. L’eucharistie chrétienne souligne-t-elle le rite, combien l’emploi du vin; or l’usage du vin est interdit aux chrétiens. Le pain et le vin dans la communion ne sont pas, aux yeux des chrétiens, du pain et du vin quelconques, tout pain ou tout vin, mais des éléments consacrés par une formule et un acte liturgiques devenus sacrés par la présence du corps et du sang du Christ qu’ont produite mystiquement en eux les paroles consacratoires, alors que, pour les manichéens, tout pain, tout aliment, toute boisson, toute chose même, est naturellement et toujours chose sacrée et, pourrait-on dire, déjà consacrée par l’immanence des parcelles de l’âme vivante ou du corps du Jesus Patibilis qui y sont recelées et tenues captives. Saint Augustin ajoute ailleurs—dans l’Enarr. in Psalm. CXL, 12 (P.L. XXXVII, 1823) une nouvelle différence : tandis que, dans la conception chrétienne, c’est Jésus qui sauve celui qui participe à son corps et à son sang sous les espèces des oblates eucharistiques, le manichéisme en vient, au contraire, par un paradoxe monstrueux, à considérer que, dégageant des aliments comme consacrés la substance lumineuse de Jésus, l’Elu est le “sauveur du Christ” et, par là, “de Dieu” (savior Christi, saluator Dei). N’empêche que, tout en marquant ce qui oppose le rite manichéen au sacrement chrétien, saint Augustin a bien saisi le sens du

1 Parallèle établi par son adversaire. Faustin veut insinuer, ou avancer, non seulement que les manichéens éprouvent à l’égard de toute chose vivante en quoi le Christ cosmique ne cesse de subir les souffrances d’une Passion universelle les mêmes sentiments, la même crainte révérencielle, que les chrétiens à l’égard des éléments eucharistiques, mais encore que, plus particulièrement, la participation des Elus à la “table des dieux”, les dispositions dans lesquelles ils s’approprient à prendre leur repas, l’acte même que constitue leur ingestion de la nourriture et de la boisson, sont comparables, sinon identiques, à la participation des chrétiens à la “sainte table”, aux attitudes que ceux-ci observent avant de prendre part à la Cène et en communiant, à leur sacrement eucharistique lui-même. Nous sommes donc bien assurés qu’il y a eu—au moins, chez un adepte occidental, et familier, comme l’était Faustin, des Épitres pauliniennes—essai, plus ou moins factice, d’interprétation en termes chrétiens d’une pratique rituelle propre au manichéisme.

Cependant, le fait qu’une tentative de ce genre se fasse jeter également dans des textes issus des communautés d’Asie Centrale montre qu’il s’agit là de quelque chose de plus général et de plus profond qu’il ne le paraîtrait. Je ne crois pas, en effet, que l’on puisse expliquer entièrement le rapprochement en question par la simple nécessité de couler, à un certain moment et en de certains pays, la propagande manichéenne dans un moule chrétien, ou supposer que nos deux fragments de Tourfan et le passage invoqué de l’Hymnaire chinois ne font que refléter des vues et des préoccupations particulières au manichéisme occidental. Il convient plutôt d’admettre que l’influence exercée par le christianisme sur le manichéisme a été, en l’occurrence, assez forte, et sans doute assez ancienne, pour agir également, ou continuer à se faire sentir, au sein de communautés moins intéressées pourtant que leurs soeurs d’Occident à donner—non sans violence—à l’un de leurs rites l’allure et la valeur d’un sacrement chrétien. On conclura de même que l’autorité et le prestige de l’apôtre Paul ont dû être assez grands aux origines mêmes du mouvement pour que son souvenir n’ait pas été sans subsister—fût-ce anonymement, comme ici, ou sous forme de faibles traces—jusque dans les églises manichéennes d’Asie Centrale et d’Extrême Orient.

C’est là, je pense, le principal intérêt du petit problème et des quelques documents que je viens de présenter.
L'ÉPOUSE INFIDÈLE ET LE CHASTE GARÇON

BY

ALBERT SEVERYNS

Je m'étais d'abord proposé de montrer que, dans l'expression de certains sentiments et surtout de l'amour sous toutes ses formes, les contes mythologiques devaient, et de loin, les œuvres littéraires qui exploitent les mêmes sujets.

Il m'est bientôt apparu qu'une telle recherche dépasserait les cadres d'une communication à un congrès, et j'ai restreint mon enquête à un seul thème—celui de l'épouse infidèle et du chaste garçon.

Sous sa forme la plus ancienne, il apparaît dans le conte égyptien *Les Deux Frères* et dans le fameux récit de la Genèse qui fit mauvais renom à la femme de Potiphar. On y découvre de frappantes analogies, mais ce n'est pas ou moins rapproché.

Nous sommes en présence d'un simple conte, dont la morale finale dépend de l'initiation ou encore le lointain souvenir d'une rencontre analogique, mais ce n'est pas ou moins rapproché.

Cette situation offre un premier avantages, celui de la vraisemblance dramatique, puisqu'elle crée un terrain propice à l'intrigue: si l'épouse est un intime dont la constante présence n'offusque personne, l'épouse dévoilée peut, à moindres risques, provoquer et multiplier les tête-à-tête.

Un second avantage, plus important encore, c'est qu'entre le bienfaiteur et son obligé naissent des liens de caractère religieux qui vont influer sur tout leur comportement. Le jeune homme y puis une force nouvelle pour résister à la tentation. De son côté, le mari ne peut plus obéir au réflexe élémentaire de tuer lui-même et sur-le-champ qui il considère comme un coupable: un scrupule ou plutôt la crainte d'un châtiment divin—paralyse son bras. Ainsi, Proctos dépêche Bellerophon au bout du monde, avec une lettre dont le destinataire est requis d'ôter la vie au porteur; ainsi, Acastos désarme Péée endormi et l'abandonne aux hêtes féroces qui, pense-t-il, ne manqueront pas de lui mettre en pièces. Parce qu'il ne tue pas de sa main un hôte que protègent les dieux et parce qu'il ne le verra pas expirer, l'époux a bonne conscience, tout comme David envoyant à la mort le mari de Bethsabée. Tant il est vrai que le *bouillon du mandarin* ne date pas d'aujourd'hui.

D'entendre tels récits un auditoire grec ne se lasse pas vite, à en juger d'après le nombre des variantes imaginées pour le tenir en haleine.

Certaines de ces variantes vont jusqu'à bouleverser les données initiales.

Par exemple, lorsque l'héroïne se trouve être ou bien une tante par alliance que rebute un neveu, ou bien une pucelle amoureuse d'un petit cousin qui la désigne, ou bien —comble de mauvais goût— une toute jeune femme qui, pendant son voyage de noces, tente de séduire un modeste ami d'enfance.

Il arrive que la variante porte sur le dénouement de l'intrigue, mais en respecte le début. Tel ce conte milésien, qui commence ainsi:

Il était une fois un garçon nommé Antheus, de la maison royale d'Halicarnasse, qui vivait en otage à la cour de Phobios, le tyran de Milet.

Or, la femme de Phobios devint amoureuse du jeune prince. Elle inventait ruse après ruse pour l'attirer dans ses bras. Mais lui refusait toujours, sous
des prétextes divers : il redoutait qu'on les surprît, il se devait de respecter
tout à la fois le dieu de l'hospitalité et l'homme qui l'avait admis à sa table.
La femme rebûtée jura de se venger.

On retrouve ici le personnage de l'épouse déjà mûre qui se déclare
sans vergogne et qui, par ailleurs les plus anciennes de ses devancières
porte pas de nom personnel 2 l. On retrouve l'éphèbe vertueux
où le jeune âge est, cette fois, avoué sans détourn (ταῖς) et qui justifie
pompeusement son refus. Il fait valoir une première raison dépourvue de
toute moralité, puisqu'elle se résume dans la peur d'un flagrant délit.
Sa seconde objection vaut mieux, puisqu'elle s'appuie sur les lois de
l'hospitalité. Car Antheus est encore un hôte, sous les traits nouveaux
d'un otage retenu sur parole.

Mais la variante par excellence de notre vieux conte est celle qui
fait de l'héroïne une femme plus jeune, mariée à un veuf (ou divorcée)
dont les enfants continuent à vivre sous son toit.

Les contes populaires se plaisent à noircir la marâtre. Elle
jalouse les enfants du premier lit, les tourmente
jalouse les enfants du premier lit, les tourmente
d'un otage retenu sur parole. A
celui de la seconde épouse qui aime d'amour le grand fils de son mari,
dans une seule biographie héroïque 22, les deux types sont foncière­
ment distincts—mêmes quand une ressemblance fortuite risque de donner
une semblance fortuite risque de donner le change23.

Au lieu de considérer le second comme une forme régulièrement
evoluée du premier, il vaut mieux croire que le conte de la Marâtre Rebûtée a son point de départ dans notre conte de l'Épouse Infidèle,
dont il constitue un rejeunissement à tous égards remarquable.

Plus encore qu'un étranger de passage protégé par les dieux, le
père aura scrupule à tuer son propre fils, même s'il le juge coupable.
D'autre part, lorsqu'il n'était qu'un hôte, le jeune garçon trouvait déjà
dans ses croyances religieuses une puissante raison de rester chaste.
Maintenant qu'il est un fils, cette même raison religieuse devient péremptoire par la conjonction de deux sentiments aussi forts l'un que l'autre :
le honteux de souiller la couche paternelle et l'angoisse de tomber sous
le coup d'une malédiction qui ameuterait les impitoyables Érinkes24.

Selon certaines versions, par exemple celle qu'on trouve dans la
légende de Phrixos, le fils quitte le toit paternal tout de suite après la
scène de séduction, sans attendre le retour de son père25. Cette fuite
précipitée n'est pas seulement une attitude assez naturelle chez de tout

jeunes hommes : elle empêche un père de commettre le crime inexcusable
de sacrifier sur l'heure un fils qui n'a pas péché contre lui.

D'autres conteurs vont chercher dans l'arsenal folklorique de
quoi empêcher que le père ait sur ses mains le sang d'un juste. À
Poseidon, qui lui avait promis d'exaucer trois vœux, Thésée demande
d'accomplir le premier, en faisant mourir son fils Hippolyte à l'instant,
avant même de l'avoir revu24. Plus astucieux encore, Cynos enferme
son fils Tennes dans un coffre qu'on jette à la mer27—mais qui abordera
sans mal au rivage hospitalier.

D'avatar en avatar, l'histoire de la marâtre rebûtée se dépouille
de tout propos, de tout geste qui pourrait choquer un esprit délicat.
Pour Euripide, Hippolyte est un mystique à l'âme liliale, qu'aucune
contamination n'effleure, et Phèdre une infortunée, qui aimerait mieux
mourir que de révéler l'inadmissible passion dont elle est envahie.

Longue est ainsi la route parcourue depuis le fabliau primitif
où était narrée, avec une sorte de fausse naïveté, la gaillarde aventure
d'une épouse qui, sans l'avoir voulu, resta fidèle à son mari. Profane
à l'origine, l'histoire s'est, avec le temps, chargée de thèmes religieux
qui en ont modifié l'esprit : cette épuration est l'œuvre progressive des
littérateurs. Mais, malgré tout leur savoir-faire, ils n'arrivent pas à
débrouiller complètement la voix des vieux conteurs anonymes qui les
avaient précédés.

Certes, Homère métamorphose en dame de qualité la vamp sans
nuances qu'était la femme de Proetos—mais son Bellérophon garde la
male beauté28 qui troubla les sens d'une hôte essorante. Quels que
soient leurs autres mérites, Péée et Hippolyte sont des sportifs dont
astéridie Phèdre admirent les exploits39 avant de s'enthicher d'eux.
Même chez Euripide, où ne subsiste à peu près rien de ce qui fut d'abord,
Phèdre—contre toute vraisemblance—reste l'odieuse calomniatrice
qu'elle était dans les récits antérieurs. Malgré les moeurs adoucies,
la brutalité première et le réalisme un peu cru ne disparaissent pas tout à
fait. Le conte égyptien du xiiième siècle avant J.-C. montrait la femme
égorgée et son cadavre jeté aux chiens30. La femme de Cynos sera
enterrée vive31, et celle d'Acastos recevra un châtiment plus barbare
encore. Son cadavre est dépecé membre à membre et Péée, victorieux,
fait défiler sa troupe entre les morceaux épars32. Quelle que soit la
signification religieuse ou magique de ce rite sauvage, il donnait matière
té à une scène d'une sombre grandeur, bien faite pour séduire un auditoire
populaire.

Après avoir félicité Homère pour la discrétion dont il use en
rapportant les manœuvres de la femme fatale, Porphyre reproche à

Considérons une dernière fois le cas d’Euripide. L’Hippolyte, auquel j’ai fait plusieurs allusions, est la pièce que nous lisons encore et qui fut couronnée au concours de 428 avant J.-C. C’est la refonte d’un Hippolyte qui avait échoué quelques années auparavant. Le premier Hippolyte est aujourd’hui perdu; mais, grâce à une vingtaine de fragments, nous en devinons les grandes lignes :

Éprise d’Hippolyte, Phèdre lui déclare ouvertement son coupable amour et s’offre sans vergogne. Rebute et criant les racontars, elle brise les portes de la chambre conjugale et déchire ses vêtements pour faire coïtre à une tentative manquée de son beau-fils. Thésée s’irrite, se laisse convaincre et demande à Poseidon de faire mourir Hippolyte. Le dieu envoie la prie et le jeune homme périr dans un accident de char. Apprenant cette mort dont elle est responsable, Phèdre se pend.

Tel était le premier Hippolyte. Mieux que le drame conservé il perpétuait le souvenir des antiques récits, notamment par la brutalité impudique de l’héroïne et la profusion de certains détails. Un tel réalisme déplut aux dix bourgeois d’Athènes qui, cette année-là, jugeaient les contours de tragédie : dans la cité de Péridè, ils formaient une élite aux yeux de qui l’unique ambition de la femme légitime était de ne point faire parler d’elle — ni en bien, ni en mal.

Notes

a) Cette affirmation appelle un bout de commentaire préalable.

Au xviiie-xix siècle avant J.-C. — plus d’un siècle avant le conte égyptien dont il va être question — les Hittites avaient accueilli et adapté un mythe cananéen qui, par certains côtés, ressemble à notre conte. La tablette de Boghasköi qui le rapporte (Bo 2567 I) a été magistralement publiée, traduite et commentée par Heinrich Otten (Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung, 1 (1955), p. 125-150). Malgré quelques regrettables lacunes, elle permet de reconstituer l’histoire qui voici.


A propos de ce mythe, longtemps avant sa publication par Otten, Hrosny avait écrit : "... the goddess Ashertus ... who attempts to seduce the weather-god. On his refusal Ashertush contrives that the refusal should appear to be on her side; evidently a parallel to the Old Testament story of Potiphar’s wife" (cité par Otten, p. 145). J’ai souligné la phrase qui justifierait un rapprochement avec le récit de la Genèse : malheureusement, elle ne figure pas dans le texte authentique publié par Otten. Il serait donc aventurieux d’en faire un abus ; mais on doit reconnaître que certains éléments de notre conte y figurent déjà.

On peut croire qu’avant de l’être en Égypte et en Palestine, l’histoire avait été racontée pour la première fois dans ce milieu syro-cananéen qui, de plus en plus, apparaît comme une plaque tournante de la civilisation.


3) Cela se devine par le contexte, où les deux maris — Anoup et Potiphar — ont un passé détruit eux; le conte égyptien insiste sur la différence d’âge entre le mari et le jeune homme. Dans le mythe cananéen (tsuya, la note), Elkunirska, le mari, est vieux, car le dieu de l’Orage lui donne (par défense) le titre de père; l’âge d’Ashertu n’est pas mentionné.

4) Dans le conte égyptien, c’est Bata, frère cadet du mari.

5) La femme d’Anoup admire la force physique du jeune beau-frère et lui en fait compliment ; l’auteur de la Genèse constate que Joseph avait “belle prestance et beau visage”.

6) La femme d’Anoup ne fait qu’une seule tentative ; la femme de Potiphar revient à la charge plus d’une fois. Quant à la déesse Ashertu (supra, note), elle paraît avoir, à plusieurs reprises, envoyé des servantes messagères.

7) Joseph ajoute la notion de péché. On sait d’ailleurs que la loi juive (Deutéronome, xxii, 22), tout comme le code hittite (E. Neufeld, The Hittite Laws, Londres, 1951, § 197, p. 56), prévoyait la peine de mort pour la femme et son complice en cas de flagrant délit.

8) L’une se fait des marques de coups et se couche, dolente; l’autre arrache au “séducteur” un vêtement qu’elle garde comme pièce à conviction.

9) Alors que Potiphar se contente de faire jeter Joseph en prison, Anoup veut tuer Bata, mais un miracle l’en empêche.

10) Le conte égyptien appelle à son aide un deus ex machina, qui le débarrasse de tout souci d’irrésolution ; le conteur hébreu se dérobe, et nous laisse le soin de découvrir la clé de l’énigme.

11) Anoup égore sa femme et jette le cadavre aux chiens; nous ignorons ce qui devint la femme de Potiphar, l’auteur sacré ne s’intéressant qu’à la biographie de Joseph.

12) Homère, Ihade, VI, 156-171. La femme de Proetes se nomme Anténie chez Hombre; à partir d’Euripide, elle se nomme Théstébée.

13) Dans l’ensemble que constitue Apollodore, III, 163-173 Wagner, on isolera les paragraphes 164-168, 173 contenant l’aventure de Péli chez Acastos, tandis que 163, 165 rapportent l’aventure — toute différente — de Péli chez Eurysthe. Les deux ne souffrent pas d’être juxtaposées comme elles le sont ici ; mais cette maladresse était déjà dans l’Hérodote d’Athènes auquel, en
dernière analyse, remonte le récit d'Aphrodite (cf. Albin Lesky, RE, XIX (1937), 278.)


16) Supra, note 14.


18) C'est l'histoire d'Ochne et de son cousin Eunostos, telle que la racontait la poétesse Myrtis d'Anthédon (Plutarque, Qua. gr., 48).

19) Telle est la sotte variante introduite dans le roman d'amour de Myrtilos et Hippodamie (Schol. EUR., Or., 990; Schol. A in B 104).

20) Parthenios, 14 (Περὶ Ἀριθμοῦ). Rapporté par Aristote et mis en vers par Alexandre d'Étolie, il figurait dans le recueil des Maratres. Il a été simple à la tentative des magiciens de la famille Pélicès.

21) C'est ce que montre l'hésitation de nos sources, les unes la nommant Cléoboëa, les autres Philæzomé. Dans le long morceau (35 vers) d'Alexandre d'Étolie (fr. 3 Powell), conservé par Parthenios, elle est dite simplement la fille de Phobios (vers 26).

22) C'est le cas pour Phrixos, dans la vie duquel paraissent deux maratres. L'une est Ino, fille de Cadmos, Méchance Maratre ; l'autre (différemment nommée selon les auteurs) joue le rôle de la Maratre Reboute. La première était déjà dans Phérécyde (F. Jacoby, Commentaire à FGrHist 3 F 98-101, p. 417-418). La seconde figurait dans un Hymne de Pindare (Schol. Pind., Pyth., IV, 288a), où elle se nommait Démodicé ; Phérécyde y faisait allusion, mais sous le nom de Thémiste.

23) Ainsi dans la légende de Phineus, l'épisode rapporté par Apollodore, III, 200 nous met en présence d'une Méchante Maratre. Idaea qui, d'embâlée, invente une calomnie pour nuire à ses deux beaux-fils en même temps. Malgré les apparences, elle n'appartient pas à un conte de Maratre Reboute.

24) Il suffit de relire la doublureuse histoire de Phoinix (Homère, Iliade, IX, 453-456), où il n'est cependant question que d'une concubine, et non d'une femme légitime. Cf. Deušeronome, xxii, i : "Un homme ne prendra pas l'épouse de son père" ; xxvii, 20 : "Maudit soit celui qui couche avec la femme de son père".

Cet interdit sexuel se retrouve dans le Code hittite (§ 190, p. 54 Neufeld [supra, la note 7]) : "If a man sins with his stepmother, there shall be no punishment ; but if his father is alive, it is an abomination".

Ceci peut nous faire croire que dans le mythe cananéen [supra, note 3], le dieu de l'Orage n'est pas vraiment le "fils" d'Elkunira.

25) Ce détail figure dans une légende étolienne (Ps. Plutarque, De Fluviis, VIII, 3) et dans une légende thrace (Ps. Plutarque, De Fluviis, III, 1). Pour Phrixos, l'histoire était dans l'Hymne de Pindare signalé supra à la note 22.
THE SO-CALLED KING UDAYANA IMAGE OF SĀKYAMUNI BUDDHA MADE OF SANDALWOOD IN CHINA AND JAPAN

BY

ZENRYU TSUKAMOTO

It is said that Buddha-images were made at the time of the first century B.C. in the North-western parts of India where Greek culture was influential. Before Greek culture was introduced into India no Buddha-image had been made. Therefore the fact that many Buddha-images were made as objects of worship indicates that Buddhism was popular among the people. As a matter of course making many images of Buddha made a contribution to the expansion of Buddhism.

Many schools of Mahāyāna and Hinayāna Buddhism flourished in India having Buddha-images as objects of worship in the third century A.D. Those worshipers of Buddha-images came to believe in the legend that the first Buddha-image was made during his life-time and that the image still existed. The legend is as follows:

The Buddha ascended into Heaven where his mother was and preached to her for three months. King Udayana of Kausambi, who was a keen devotee of the Buddha made a Buddha-image of sandal-wood because of the Buddha's long absence from earth. The image is nothing else than the first Buddha-image and naturally had a strong resemblance to the Buddha. Such a story can be found in a chapter of the Chinese translation of Anguttara-Nikāya, Tsong-yi-a-han-King (鍾妻三海經, 巻 28) translated by Sanghadeva of Kasmir in 397 A.D. However it is impossible to find the story in the pāli text. Kao-wang-fo-san-mei-hai-King (鏡佛三海經) translated by Buddhaghosha (A.D. 398-421) also refers to the first Buddha-image of King Udayana. The sūtra states that the Buddha requested the image to propagate his teaching after his demise. It is also stated that this Buddha-image was not made of sandal-wood but of gold.

Though these legends can not be historical facts, Chinese and Japanese Buddhists believed that they were actual events. Therefore they eagerly wished to take a glance at the image and wished to worship.

In China the image was especially revered during and after the period of the Northern and Southern dynasties (南北朝).

Accordning to the Ming-hsing-chi (冥祥記) by Wang-yen (汪謙) of Southern Chi (南齊) and the Kao-seng-ch'uan (高僧傳) Biography of Great Monks by Hui-chiao (慧敘) of Liang (梁), a copy of the first image of the Buddha was brought to China by Shehmo-t'eng (桓摩騰) during the reign of Emperor Ming of the Late Han (後漢明帝) dynasty. What is of significance is that it was a Buddha image made by King Udayana. In the chapter on making Buddha images of Ching-hui-lu-I-hsing (鏡律真相) written by Pao-ch'ang (寶唱) and others by the order of Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty there are some passages concerning the various opinions on the Buddha-image made by King Udayana which are found in many sūtras. There were some such images among the images made at Lung-men (龍門). Hsuan Tsang also states that he found a statue of Sākyamuni attributed to Udayana at the castle of Kosambi and many copies of the image were made and worshiped everywhere. He himself brought a copy of the image made of sandal-wood. Before Hsuan Taeng the belief in the Buddha-image was popular in the Khotan area. In fact Ta-ch'eng-tsao-Siang-Kong-to-King (大乘造像功德論) in which the story of King Udayana's Buddha-image is mentioned was translated by Devaprajñā from Khotan in 692 A.D. “S. 1904” in the Stein collection of various writings found in Tun-huang (莫高) are probably words uttered during a Buddhist ceremonial. In it are these words of faith in the image of the Buddha.

“Again I place my faith in the infinite forms of Buddha images throughout the ten quarters of the universe, the golden image made by King Udayana, his sandal-wood image, the copper image made by King Asoka, the stone image in Wu, the image made by the King of Ceylon, the images of gold, silver, lapis lazuli found in various countries ……”

In the Sui and T'ang dynasties, two temples said their images came from India and were the sandal-wood image made by King Udayana.

I. The sandal-wood image of the Ta-ming-ssu Temple (大明寺) in the province of Ching (荆州).

In a dream Emperor Wu (武帝) of the Liang Dynasty (梁) saw a sandal-wood image of Buddha enter his country. He then expressed
his desire to welcome it. A party was sent out to India which made a copy of the Sakyamuni image made by King Udayana and returned with it to Ch'in-Ling (金陵) in 511 A.D. In 522 A.D., Emperor Yüan (元帝) whose capital was at Chiang-ling (江陵) moved this image there. Ten years later a new temple called the Ta-ming-ssü-Temple (大明寺) was erected and the image was enshrined there. When Tao-hsiān (道玄) of the T'ang dynasty lived, the image was still at this temple. It was revered as an image in Sakyamuni's likeness and its fame spread as many reproductions of it were made. Even during the Sui dynasty a reproduction of this image was made in Ch'ang-an and enshrined in the Ta-hsing-shan-ssü Temple (大興善寺) where it was revered by the people.

2. The Buddha-image of King Udayana in the Lung-kuang-ssü Temple (龍光寺) in Ch'in-ling (金陵).

In 932 A.D., a monk called Jōmyō (十明) of the Kaigen-ji Temple (開元寺) in Kōto (江都) who was a reciter of the scriptures at the court wrote a history of the Sakyamuni image of sandal-wood made by King Udayana (優臘王所造栴檀木像記). He states that originally King Udayana made the five-foot image of Sakyamuni according to exact proportions in India. This image was brought to Kūba by Kumārayāna and then to Liang-cho (梁州) and finally to Ch'ang-an by his son, Kumārajīva. In 415 A.D., Liu-yū (劉裕) moved his capital to Chiang-nan (江南) and enshrined it in the Lung-kuang-ssü Temple (龍光寺).

The version that Kumārajīva brought King Udayana's original Sakyamuni image to Ch'ang-an seems to have already existed during the first period of the T'ang. Tao-hsiān (道玄), however, refuted this in the Kan-t'ung-lu (感通錄) which he wrote in 664 A.D.

On the other hand, Shih-ming states: “In China there are two Udayana Buddha statues. The image at the Ta-ming-ssü Temple is not the original while the one at the Lung-kuang-ssü Temple was moved to what is now the K'ai-yüon-ssü Temple in Chiang-tu by Ch'ing-kuang (程光) Emperor Yang (陽帝) who conquered the Ch'en (陳).”

In 985 A.D. the Japanese monk Seisan (盛算) went to China and while in K'ai-fêng (開封) copied Shih-ming's history of the Udayana image. Seisan further stated that Li-yū (李嵒) who established the T'ang in Ch'in-ling brought the image to the Lung-kuang-ssü Temple (龍光寺). When the T'ang were overthrown by the Sung dynasty, the image was moved to the K'ai-pao-ssü Temple (開寶寺) in K'ai-fêng, the Sung capital. When Emperor T'ai (太宗) ascended the Sung throne, he temporarily brought the image into the palace and worshiped it there until a new temple, Ch'i-shêng-ch'än-yüan (慶聖禪院), was built in the capital and the statue was enshrined there. The statue was held to be the original that King Udayana had carved while Sakyamuni was living and worshipped as such. The Chinese Buddhists came to revere this image as the true image of Sakyamuni rather than the Ching-chou image in which belief was stronger in the early part of the T'ang. In the successive reigns of the Kin (金), Yüan (元), Ming (明), and Ch'ing (淸) dynasties, the statue was enshrined in the respective capitals to be revered by the court and the people alike. This is recorded by Ch'êng-ch'ü-fu (程處符) in the Yüan, by Seng-shao-kan (僧肇乾) in the Ming period, and in detail by the Record of the Udayana Buddha Statue from the West (西域佛事記) written in 1666 A.D. during the reign of Emperor K'ang-hsi (康熾帝) of the Ch'ing dynasty. It states that the image was moved to the Sheng-en-ssü Temple (聖恩寺) in Yen-ching (燕京北京) during the time of K'ai-fêng (鎬京) the capital. While this image was at the Lung-kuang-ssü Temple was moved back to Yen-ching. During the Yüan dynasty it was greatly revered by the court and enshrined in the Shêng-an-ssü Temple and the Jên-chin-tien Temple (仁智殿) at Wan-shou-shan (方善山). During the Ming dynasty it was the Chin-fêng-ssü Temple (鑑峰寺) and during the Ch'ing dynasty the Hung-jên-ssü Temple (宏仁寺) which everyone called the temple of the Sandal-wood Buddha.

In the disturbances of the year 1900, the Hung-jên-ssü Temple at Peking burnt down. The present whereabouts of the image is unknown.

While this image was at the Sung capital, K'ai-fêng, a reproduction of it was made by a Japanese monk named Chônen (智然) in 985 A.D. and brought to Japan. It was called a living image of Sakyamuni Buddha. A small Buddha body was put in its throat, viscera and bowels made of silk were put into its body. A small mirror on whose reverse a figure of Avalokiteshvara Bodhisattva seated on a rock was engraved was put in the place of its heart. The remaining cavity was filled with prints of Buddha and Bodhisattvas; a block print in book form of the Vajracchedikâ Prajñaparamitâ sutra preceded by a picture of the Buddha preaching this sutra; two hand-copied sutras, Puvarnaprabhâsâ sutra and Saddharma-pundarika sutra; a catalogue of the main objects inserted into the Buddha image; the text of the vows of Chônen and Gîzô, written in 972, with the imprint of their reals in vermilion; Chônen's history and his journey; various writings, Chinese coins, etc. This image was enshrined in the Shôryôji Temple (清涼寺)
in Kyoto. It was propagated as the original statue made by King Udayana in the Kamakura period and many reproductions were made to be enshrined in temples elsewhere. It became the center of faith in Sākyamuni Buddha and was revered by many people.


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VASUBANDHU WAS AN EKA-BHĀGA (OR ÂṂŚA)-VĀDIN

BY

YOSHIFUMI UEDA

It is a well known fact among scholars that the yogacāra school split into at least three sub-schools after the death of Vasubandhu. The doctrines of one of these three sub-schools, however, are practically unknown at present, because its texts have been completely lost, and we must necessarily confine ourselves to the doctrines of the remaining two sub-schools. One of them is the school represented by Dharmapāla (380–561). It was introduced into China by Huen-tsang (玄奘) and flourished in China and Japan under the name of Hosso-sect (法相宗). The other is the school whose foundation was laid by Śthiramati, and which was brought to China mainly by Paramārtha (499–590). Śthiramati and Dharmapāla disagreed on many points. But the most fundamental difference between them lay in opposing epistemological positions. Śthiramati's position is called eka-bhāga (or âṃśa)-vāda by Dharmapāla's followers, while Dharmapāla's own position is called tri-bhāga (or Âṃśa)-vāda. Indeed, all the differences between the two systems of the vijnaptimātratā philosophy are based on the difference of their epistemological positions. Both Śthiramati and Dharmapāla wrote commentaries on Vasubandhu's "Trirṣikā", in which each expressed his own particular position which differs considerably from that of the other. What I should like to point out here is that Śthiramati's interpretation is more faithful to the philosophy of the "Trirṣikā" than Dharmapāla's interpretation. In fact Dharmapāla's interpretation is somewhat at variance from the words of the "Trirṣikā". Thus I must but conclude that Śthiramati's view is basically the same as that of Vasubandhu.

In the accompanying sheet you can find the 1st, the 2nd, the 17th and the 20th ślokas of Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā in their Sanskrit original together with their Chinese translation by Huen-tsang (玄奘). What I should like to point out here is that the interpretations of these ślokas of the Triṃśikā differ between the two main sub-schools of the vijnaptimātratā philosophy represented by Śthiramati and Dharmapāla,
in Kyoto. It was propagated as the original statue made by King Udayana in the Kamakura period and many reproductions were made to be enshrined in temples elsewhere. It became the center of faith in Śākyamuni Buddha and was revered by many people.


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(OR AMŚA)-VĀDIN

BY

YOSHIFUMI UEĐA

It is a well known fact among scholars that the yogācāra school split into at least three sub-schools after the death of Vasubandhu. The doctrines of one of these three sub-schools, however, are practically unknown at present, because its texts have been completely lost, and we must necessarily confine ourselves to the doctrines of the remaining two sub-schools. One of them is the school represented by Dharma-pāla (550–561). It was introduced into China by Hiuen-tsang (玄奘) and flourished in China and Japan under the name of Hossō-sect (法相宗). The other is the school whose foundation was laid by Sthira-mati, and which was brought to China mainly by Paramārtha (499–590). Sthiramati and Dharma-pāla disagreed on many points. But the most fundamental difference between them lay in opposing epistemological positions. Sthiramati’s position is called eka-bhāga (or amśa)-vāda by Dharma-pāla’s followers, while Dharma-pāla’s own position is called tri-bhāga (or amśa)-vāda. Indeed, all the differences between the two systems of the vijñānaptimātratā philosophy are based on the difference of their epistemological positions. Both Sthiramati and Dharma-pāla wrote commentaries on Vasubandhu’s “Trinśikā”, in which each expressed his own particular position which differs considerably from that of the other. What I should like to point out here is that Sthiramati’s interpretation is more faithful to the philosophy of the Trinśikā than Dharma-pāla’s interpretation. In fact Dharma-pāla’s interpretation is somewhat at variance from the words of the Trinśikā. Thus I must but conclude that Sthiramati’s view is basically the same as that of Vasubandhu.

In the accompanying sheet you can find the 1st, the 2nd, the 17th and the 20th slokas of Vasubandhu’s Trinśikā in their Sanskrit original together with their Chinese translation by Hiuen-tsang (玄奘). What I should like to point out here is that the interpretations of these slokas of the Trinśikā differ between the two main sub-schools of the vijñānaptimātratā philosophy represented by Sthiramati and Dharma-pāla,
and that the interpretation of the sub-school represented by Sthiramati is more faithful to the original idea of Vasubandhu. Since Dharmapāla's interpretation is not preserved in Sanskrit, and Hiuen-tsang translated the Trisūkṣa according to Dharmapāla's interpretation—which is preserved in Chinese—I shall compare Sthiramati's interpretation with what Hiuen-tsang's translation says.

Please look at the Sanskrit original of the 17th sloka. You will find the expression "tan nasti" there. The word "tad" in "tan nasti" surely refers to atman and dharmas whose nature is of parikalpita-svabhāva, namely, imaginary existence. Now, there is no difference of opinion between Sthiramati and Hiuen-tsang on this point. However, they disagree on exactly which of the preceding words this "tad" refers. It is clear from Sthiramati's commentary that Sthiramati understood this word to be the correlative of the "yad" of "yad vikalpyate." In other words, this part of the sloka is construed by him as "yad vikalpyate ... tad ...," or "that which is mentally constructed ..." And that which is mentally constructed is, according to him, atman and dharmas, and is of the nature of parikalpita-svabhāva; and therefore nasti, does not exist. As against this interpretation of Sthiramati's, Hiuen-tsang translates the word "tad" by "त" and does not treat it as the correlative of "yad". The "Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi," the commentary written by Dharmapāla which Hiuen-tsang translated into Chinese together with the text of the Trisūkṣa, interprets this "त" as denoting atman and dharmas; but if "त" is not the correlative of "yad," which of the preceding words of the Trisūkṣa is the exact word referred to by this "त"? Perhaps we must trace it back to the "atma-dharma-" of the very beginning of the 1st sloka, which, however, is located too far. Thus, I cannot but think that Sthiramati's interpretation is more natural, while Hiuen-tsang's translation is somewhat twisted.

Moreover, Hiuen-tsang's translation of this sloka has another difficulty, namely, he translated "yad vikalpyate," or "that which is mentally constructed" by "vijñāṇa-paritāma." According to the "Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi," this word "vijñāṇa-paritāma" does not mean atman and dharmas; it means the objective. Vijñāna — the consciousness that forms the essence of the reality — develops from itself the subjective and the objective, i.e., that which has the function of experiencing and that which has the function of being experienced; and the word "vijñāṇa-paritāma" refers to the objective that has thus been developed from vijñāna. As mentioned before, atman and dharmas are of the nature of imaginary existence, and are therefore unreal. But the objective is not of the

nature of imaginary existence; it is of the nature of paratantra-svabhāva, i.e., of the nature of being produced by sufficient causes and conditions. Thus, according to Hiuen-tsang "yad vikalpyate" denotes the objective, which, being produced by sufficient causes and conditions, is real; while according to Sthiramati "yad vikalpyate" denotes atman and dharmas, which, being of imaginary existence, are unreal. But if you turn your eyes to the 20th sloka, you will find that the same expression "yad vikalpyate" is definitely declared to be of the nature of imaginary existence by Vasubandhu himself. Hiuen-tsang himself used the word "imaginary existence" to translate this "yad vikalpyate." But is it not inconsistent that he used "imaginary existence" to denote the objective, when translating the "yad vikalpyate" of the 17th sloka and now uses the word "imaginary existence" to translate the same expression in the 20th sloka? On this point, Sthiramati's interpretation is definitely better; he interprets both "yad vikalpyate" as parikalpita-svabhāva, namely, of the nature of imaginary existence.

Now let us turn our eyes to the 1st sloka. Please look at the accompanying sheet. You will find that Hiuen-tsang translates the Sanskrit expression "vijñāṇa-paritāma" by "vijñāṇa-paritāma; (that which has been developed from vijñāna)." But Sthiramati, in his commentary on the Trisūkṣa, replaces this "vijñāṇa-paritāma" by "vijñāṇa-paritāma;" this means that he identifies vijñāṇa-paritāma with vijñāna itself. Now, which of these two interpretations is more faithful to the text of the Trisūkṣa? First, we must notice the fact that the word "paritāma" in "vijñāṇa-paritāma" definitely refers to vijñāna, and that both Sthiramati and Hiuen-tsang agree on this point. This fact will be easily understood, if you compare the Sanskrit original and the Chinese translation of this passage and examine its contextual relation to the first half of the second sloka. The difference of opinion between Sthiramati and Hiuen-tsang about the interpretation of this "paritāma" lies in the fact that the former understands it to be the repetition of the preceding "vijñāṇa-paritāma," while the latter does not. As I said, Hiuen-tsang translates "vijñāṇa-paritāma;" by "vijñāṇa-paritāma;" namely, "that which has been developed from vijñāna." But that which has been developed from vijñāna cannot be vijñāna itself; it has been developed from vijñāna and therefore different from vijñāna. If so, it is logically natural that the word "paritāma" in "vijñāṇa-paritāma;" cannot be the repetition of "vijñāṇa-paritāma;." Indeed, Hiuen-tsang translates "vijñāṇa-paritāma;" and cf. Trisūkṣa (ed. by Sylvain Lévi), p. 15, 1.25 and p. 16, 1.9.
“parināma” by “纏所變” and “能變” respectively; “能變” means that which develops something from itself, while “纏所變” means that which has been developed from vijñāna. But is it not most natural to think that the demonstrative pronoun “saḥ” in “parināmaḥ sa ca tridhā” should refer to what precedes, namely, “vijñāna-parināma”? If so, Sthiramati’s interpretation which identifies the “parināma” of “parināmaḥ sa ca tridhā” with the preceding “vijñāna-parināma” seems to be the most natural, and therefore the most faithful interpretation of the Triṃśikā. Moreover, there is another reason why I cannot but insist that Hiuen-tsang’s translation of this passage is a little twisted. Please look at the Sanskrit original of the 17th sloka in the accompanying sheet. You will find the expression “vijñāna-parināmaṇe yaṁ” at the very beginning of the sloka. It is clear from the demonstrative pronoun “ayam” that the “vijñāna-parināmaṇe” of the 17th sloka should refer to the three folds of vijñāna that are explained in detail in the preceding slokas. Now, this explanation of the three folds of vijñāna in the preceding slokas begins at the very passage of “parināmaḥ sa ca tridhā”. Therefore, we must but conclude that it is the word “parināma” in “parināmaḥ sa ca tridhā” that is repeated by the expression “vijñāna-parināmaṇe yaṁ” in the 17th sloka. If so, this “parināma,” being an abridged form of “vijñāna-parināmaṇe,” is also to be identified with the preceding “vijñāna-parināmaṇe.” Thus I cannot but think that Sthiramati’s interpretation is more natural, while Hiuen-tsang’s one is a little too artificial.

Now, let us try to find out the reason why Hiuen-tsang’s translation came to be a little twisted. As you have already seen, Hiuen-tsang’s translation assumes that vijñāna develops from itself the subjective and the objective, i.e., that which has the function of experiencing and that which has the function of being experienced. Hiuen-tsang assumes the reality of these subjective and objective on the ground that they are of the nature of paratantra-svabhāva. Thus, according to him, ātman and dharmas are unreal; but the subjective and the objective on which these ātman and dharmas are imagined are real. It was because of this interpretation of the vijñāptimātratā philosophy that his translation had to be twisted. But, if we deny the reality of the subjective and the objective and identify them with ātman and dharmas, all the slokas of the Triṃśikā can be interpreted without any twisting. Indeed, this is the standpoint of Sthiramati when he interpreted the Triṃśikā.

Hiuen-tsang studied the vijñāptimātratā philosophy under Śīlabhadra who belonged to Dharmapāla’s school, and so we can know Dharmapāla’s standpoint through Hiuen-tsang’s translation. The difference between Sthiramati and Hiuen-tsang in their interpretation of the text of the Triṃśikā, therefore, came from the difference between Sthiramati and Dharmapāla. And my conclusion is that Sthiramati’s interpretation is more faithful to Vasubandhu’s original idea than Dharmapāla’s one. This opinion of mine may be confirmed by the statement of 成唯識論述記, which says that it was Dharmapāla who first introduced the idea of the subjective and the objective as real entities.**

Paramārtha, who belonged to Sthiramati’s school, also translated the Triṃśikā into Chinese. Since he inserted his own commentary in his translation, we can know his standpoint clearly. To conclude, his understanding of the vijñāptimātratā philosophy is the same as that of Sthiramati. He denies the reality of the subjective and the objective. For him the paratantra-svabhāva belongs only to vijñāna, and all the objects of vijñāna are of the nature of parikalpita-svabhāva. This view is called Eka-bhāga-vāda, because according to this view reality is allowed only to vijñāna, namely samvitti-bhāga, while according to Hiuen-tsang the subjective (darśana-bhāga) and the objective (nimitta-bhāga) are also allowed to be real. Thus, according to Paramārtha, it is Vijiña and nothing else that has the function of experiencing.

Since I have discussed Paramārtha’s standpoint in detail in my book 仏教思想史研究 (Bukkyōshisōshi-kenkyū, 1951, Kyoto), I shall not discuss it here again. Though my argument may not be sufficient to prove that Vasubandhu was an Eka-bhāga-vadin, I am sure it will give fairly strong support to this view.

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Section III
Living Religions
Some Consideration of Spread of Islam in Indonesia*

By

Abdul Mukti Ali

From the historical analysis of the spread of Islam in Indonesia, we may draw the conclusion that Islam did not come to Indonesia direct from Arabia, but from Gujarat, India; and that Islam followed the route to the Archipelago through trade.

The duty of missionary work is no after-thought in the history of Islam, but was enjoined on believers from the birth of the faith. This can be judged from numerous verses in the Qur'an. Moreover, Islam is a prophetic doctrine revealing the way to salvation and redemption, and through its eschatological nature it bears the characteristics typical of an expansive missionary religion. In addition, Islam does not have an exclusive, magical charisma — to borrow Max Weber's term — of the priest such as that of Christianity, but is by its nature a missionary community. Because of the expansive, missionary nature of Islam, every Muslim is a propagandist of the faith. That is why the traders from the Muslim world was the most common missionary figure outside his land, and that is why the faith was certain to follow the routes of trade.

The Muslim settlements in the harbour towns developed into small colonies. Though their influence increased by adoption of such of the customs and habits of the inhabitants, as were not strikingly un-Islamic, speaking the islanders languages, marrying the native women, buying-slaves, etc., the Muslims left alone and sometimes even supported the existing social structure with all its defects and inequalities. Those princes and nobles who did not oppose Islam received the support of the Islamic Law and of the Muslims who joined the courts, as advisers, judges or shahbandars. Besides those Muslims who exercised the secular power, there were Muslims, who had nothing to do with the court authority, and sometimes criticized and objected to the irreligious

* This paper was abridged by the Editorial board.

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behaviour of the courts. They were the 'Ulamā'. Their influence also gained strength through their followers and converts.

The observance of the Islamic faith in the port towns was on traditional lines; the accent was laid on the observance of the prescribed ritual and external behaviour, in accordance with the most elementary religious duties. The man who felt the need of a more personal religious experience and a more deep understanding of the faith had to go to the religious teachers or the 'Ulamā', most of whom were mystics.

Thus we may draw the line, that there were three categories of people: the princes, nobles and officials—the last named being called prijaji in Java—who exercised the temporal power; the second were the 'Ulamā' and mystics Shaykhs who gained influence through their followers—they were called kijahi; and the third were the merchants, artisans and laymen with a great deal of internal differences.

The life of the town, with this social structure, though most of the inhabitants were Muslims, had several things, Islamic and indigenous. With the passage of time, some indigenous customs were eliminated and some of them have remained as they were. Taking for granted the thesis of Van Leur that Islam did not bring either "higher civilization" nor "economic development" in Indonesia, what attraction had Islam for the people in those harbour princedoms? The attraction of Islam for the traders living under Hindu princely rule was rather to be discovered in the world of ideas: Islam gave the small man a sense of his individual worth as a member of the Islamic community. According to Hindu ideology, he was merely a creature of a lower order than the higher castes. Under Islam he could feel himself their equal, or even superior to those who were not Muslims, although he still occupied a subordinate position in the social structure.

Anton M. Brouwer in his book De bronnen van Salatiga, maintains, however, that the success of Islam was due to the weak influence of Hinduism in the Indonesian society. That is to say, that Hinduism did not penetrate deeply enough into the life of the Indonesian society to be able to uproot the remnants of the indigenous faiths, and never won influence in the hearts of the people. The reason which Brouwer gives is that when Hinduism and Buddhism entered the Indonesian Archipelago, the people believed in animism, that is the belief that there are spirits in the universe, which can do good or bad to mankind. They used to pray to the spirits and perform ritual ceremonies, so that the good spirits might do good for them and the bad ones not harm them. This belief is in contradiction with that of Hinduism and Buddhism. Though Hinduism and Buddhism, externally, produced wonderful architectural monuments and numerous temples throughout Indonesia, like Borobudur, it failed to Hinduism the hearts of the Indonesians. It appealed only to the upper class of the Indonesian society, and was like a "cream" on the "cake" of indigenous beliefs and superstitions.

But Islam, in its beliefs, had close relation with the animism of the people. It teaches that above mankind, there is an Almighty Power, and that through the study of the universe, we come to know Him; and the Almighty Power who can do good or bad to us, is Allâh. This simple belief was not unlike the indigenous belief in a higher spiritual force, and penetrated easily into the hearts of the people and outweighed the influences of Hinduism among them.

Although Brouwer's opinion may appear very different from the earlier expressed opinion about the attraction of Islam for the coast dwellers, there is no contradiction between the two views. Indeed they are complementary to each other. Brouwer looked at the matter from the philosophical angle, and the other opinion is based on sociological considerations.

Another reason for the success of Islam in Indonesia, which Brouwer has overlooked is that Islam was spread in the Archipelago very largely by mystics, and mysticism had a great attraction for Indonesians.

After the coming of Islam to Indonesia, the Indonesian laid more stress on mysticism (tasawwuf) and mystical practices (tariqah) than on scholastic theology (ilm al-halâm) and jurisprudence (fiqh). Among the Indonesians, it was not the theologians (mutakallimûn) or the jurists (fiqahâh) who were famous, but, rather, the leaders of mystics orders (Shaykh al-tariqah). For example, the famous Muslim scholars in the last decade of the sixteenth century and in the first part of the seventeenth century in north Sumatra were Hamzah Pansuri, Sjams al-Din of Pasé, Nûr Al-Dîn Al-Ranîrî, 'Abd Al-Ra'dî'îf of Singkal and others. They were sufis. In Java, too, the nine walls were mystics. Another example is the Shaykh Lemah Abang, who said as did al-Hallâj: "'anâ al-Haq" (I am the Truth), and was condemned to death by the walls of Java, not because his belief was wrong, but because his teachings disturbed the peace and tranquility of the society. Until now, the Indonesians do not consider him as apostate (murtad), but
rather as a venerated saint.\(^1\)

It is a historical fact that, except for trifling examples, like that of the Padris, the wonderful success of the Muslim missionaries had been achieved by peaceful means. Buckle said of them: "The Mahometan missionaries are very judicious."\(^2\)

If we may conjecture that Islam came to Indonesia in the early century of the Hijrah, what were the reasons, why the proselytising activities only acquired a great impulse in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries? Perhaps, it was on account of the penetration of the West, that Islam in Indonesia had to mobilise itself and undertake a forceful counter-propaganda against the Christian activities.

Thus Wertheim says: "One can, indeed, sustain the paradox that the expansion of Islam in the Indonesian Archipelago was due to the Westerners."\(^3\)

In any case, it can be definitely stated that it was mainly the arrival of the Portuguese, who brought the spirit of the Crusade, which induced a large number of Indonesian princes to embrace Islam as a political move to counter Christian penetration.\(^4\)

One does, however, need to ask what precisely were the political considerations which induced the princes to accept Islam in the face of the Portuguese penetration? In the first place, it may be that the princes, in adopting Islam, became better able to recruit reliable armies from their Muslim subjects. We have already seen that the urban populations—especially in the harbour towns—were predominantly Muslim. In time of disturbances, these Muslim populations had to be reckoned with. The kijahis could exert great influence on the citizens of the towns. By refusing to recognize the prince, they could seriously impair his position in his struggles with the Portuguese or with the rulers of neighbouring kingdoms, or with pretenders to the throne. On the other hand, by recognizing him as a Muslim prince, by investing him as it were, those influential kijahis and 'Ulama' could reinforce his position considerably. And the greater the number of Indonesian kingdoms converted to Islam, the greater was the incentive to the princes to embrace Islam, it was in their interest to encourage their subjects to follow suit.

As an example, it may be noted, that during the fight between Demak and Padjang in the sixteenth century, the slave armies from Bali, Bugis and Makassar fled the scene of the battle, but the real Demakkers, probably Muslims, continued to offer fierce resistance.\(^5\)

In the second place, it may be that the reason why the princes were induced to embrace Islam was the possibility of joining forces with the powerful Moghul empire, or with other Islamic princes. This possibility is suggested by the date (1568) of the sultan of Atjeh's attack on the Portuguese in Malakka; the fleet was of 300 ships with 15,000 soldiers, among them 480 Turkish artillerists.\(^6\)

In this way the influence of the 'Ulama' or the religious teachers increased.

Meanwhile the Dutch came to Indonesia in the form of the East India Company, and in 1800 their authority was transferred to the Dutch Republic.\(^7\) The Dutch added another group to the Indonesian society. Three classes of people came to rule or exercise influence among the Indonesian people: first the Dutch, secondly the princes and the prijajis, and thirdly the 'Ulama' or the kijahis.

At first, the princes resisted the Dutch, but the conversion of the Archipelago to Islam led to pilgrimage to Makkah, and this strengthened relations with Arabia. A number of Arab devines came to Indonesia. Those devines and the Hajis who were acquainted with the Holy Land increased the power of the Muslim elements who were opposed to secular government and ready to brand the court etiquette as superstition and heresy. Among the Hajis, there were some who during their stay in the Holy Land came in touch with the Wahhabites and accepted their teachings or were influenced by them. It is no wonder that these extreme elements were the bitter enemies of the Dutch, and that Snouck Hurgronje advised the Dutch government to keep its eyes on the 'road to Makkah'.\(^8\) On the other hand it was the Dutch policy to support the Indonesian princes against those extreme Muslims, and to be friend the groups whose attitude to Islam was more superficial and formal.

Meanwhile a new factor came into the scene. Islam penetrated into many parts of the far remote interior of the various islands, and the agricultural areas became Muslim. This strengthened the position

1) See Graaf, op. cit., p. 102.
2) Ibid., p. 300.
3) Graaf, op. cit., p. 351.
4) See, art. 'Hadji Politika ?' in Verspreide Geschriften, op. cit. IV, i, pp. 355 et passim.
of the religious teachers and the Muslim community.

Though the Dutch authorities used to support the princes, conflicts arose between them now and then. When this happened, the princes used to seek support from the religious teachers and the 'Ulama'. By stamping the conflicts with religious colour, it became easy to expand them into general uprisings against the Dutch government. This revealed itself in the Java war, headed by Pangaran Abd al-Hamid Diponegoro, from 1825 to 1830, the Atjeh war, from 1873 to 1904, of which Tengku 'Umar was one of the heroes, and many other wars. These wars reinforced the position and the power of the 'Ulama'.

In these circumstances, the Dutch government was compelled to close its ranks more closely than before to the princes and nobles, the guardians of the secular government, and to the adat chiefs, the exponents of upholding the adat and existing customs, and to respect their position of authority over the population.

Meanwhile the attitude of the Dutch authorities gradually changed. They came to understand what Islam is, and what Islam means to the Indonesians. They realized that it was futile to adopt a hostile attitude to Islam. They invited the 'Ulama' to joint government offices, and confined themselves to taking action only against what they called "fanatical" Muslims. They showed their disapproval of too strict an observance of religious duties on the part of Indonesian government officials.

The extreme 'Ulama' regarded those Muslims who joined the government offices as weak believers. Criticism was raised against them, as well as against the adat chiefs, and sometimes developed into physical conflict against the latter. Thus the Padris sought to purify Islam in general, and in particular fought against the adat practices, which they considered un-Islamic.

But, if the Muslims who became government officials were able to show their strict observance of the religious duties, they exercised a great attraction, by their social prestige, on a large portion of the nobles and priaqis, and let them to embrace Islam, or, if Muslims, to practice it more strictly.

At the same time, the influence of Islam was increased, not by an organization set up for the purpose of propaganda, or by the mild attitude of the Dutch government, or by any other temporary factor, but by "Islam" itself. This was due to two institutions: the mesjid (mosque), and the pesantren (teaching institution).

The mesjids are, mainly, used for Friday prayers. The Indonesians, in accordance with the practice of the Shafi'ite school, used to build their mosques in a centrally situated place, which could easily be reached by at least forty men. Besides the Friday mosques, there are small mosques, built in villages, called langgar in Java, tadjug in Banjarnegara, surau in Minangkabau. These small mosques are meant for performance of the five daily prayers by the inhabitants of the village. Besides prayers, the mosques are used also for teaching the Qur'an, especially the langgars. In short, the mosque has the function of essembling the Muslims. The congregation of the worshippers, the Friday sermons, the conduct of the Imam, the simplicity of the mosques and langgars, all of these impressed the Muslims to be more devout in their religion.

The second Muslim institution which promoted the influence of religion is the pesantren, an institution for religious instruction. The teacher used to teach in an honorary capacity, and receive gifts from the parents of his pupils. The parents who were afraid of the faith of their children being tainted by Dutch influences, used to send their children to the pesantren. The instruction given in the pesantren is solely religious. There are hundreds of thousands of pesantrens in Indonesia, one among them being the pesantren of Tebuireng (Djombang, east Java), which before the second world war had nearly 2,000 pupils.

Thus, if the mosque makes a Muslim more devoted to his religion, the pesantren gives the youngsters religious instruction. That these two institutions have immensely strengthened the influence of Islam in Indonesia is beyond question.

Meanwhile, modern technology invaded Indonesia, along with Western sciences and literatures. In order to intensify the economic development, and also to streamline the colonial administration, modern communication was introduced into Indonesia. The number of schools with western education increased, and at the same time, the Christian missionary activity grew rapidly. Only the upper stratum of Indonesian society, however, came in touch with Western civilization.

1) It is significant to note, that it was not the kiahs who joined the government offices who used to lead the Friday prayers, but those who had no relation at all with the government did it. The people respected the latter more than the former. Moreover, their work was entirely honorary.

2) Snouck Hurgronje says that the native authorities in Minangkabau not only believed that the arrival of the "Satansche Hollanders" (the Satanic Dutch) was a menace to Islam, but that it was the duty of every Muslim to preserve the faith of his brother-in-faith, and to hate the "kafirs" (Verspreide Geschriften. op. cit. IV, p. 26).

3) About "mesjid" & "pesantren" in Indonesia, see Verspreide Geschriften. op. cit., IV, ii. pp. 362 et passim.
and though they adopted it in appearance, very few of them converted to Christianity.

The Muslims being afraid that the invasion of Western civilization might weaken their faith, organized themselves into modern organizations to counter-act the activities of Christian missionaries.

The Muhammadiyyah movement deserves mention as one of those organizations. It adopted, exactly, the ways and means of the Christian missionaries; established schools for boys and girls, also special training and missionary schools for both sexes, to train teachers and propagandists, opened libraries, hospitals and orphanages, and formed scout and youth groups.

This organization gives the Muslims modern education, without fear of their faith being corrupted. In short, the Muhammadiyyah — and many other similar organizations — is able to make a Muslim to call himself a Muslim without having to feel ashamed of his faith in the presence of Westerners; to profess a faith, that is, which harmonizes with the modern age and his own aspiration as a man of his time.

Here again we come across the strange paradox that — without having willed it — the Dutch government aided the spread of Islam in the Archipelago.

Political expediency may have played a role in converting process, but the nature of Islam is another factor which accounts for its spread.

These are a few aspects about the spread of Islam in Indonesia. Islam had in many respects a revolutionizing and moderning effect on Indonesian society.1)

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THE CONCEPT OF "KAMI"

BY

MOTOHIKO ANZU

The object of worship in Shinto, in other words "the divine" in this religion, is at the present day nearly always signified by the single word "kami". However, when the question is studied historically, it becomes evident that "kami" was not necessarily the only word used to express the concept of "the divine". A glance at the Kojiki, Nihon-Shoki, ōtoki, and other classical writings is enough to convince one that various other words, such as mikoto, tama, mono, chi (shi), were also used in antiquity to express this concept. In a word, although these various words—mikoto, tama, mono, chi (shi)—were used parallel to the word kami to express "the divine" in Shinto; with the passage of time they went out of usage one after another, and finally, in the classical writings, only the two words kami and mikoto remained current in the sense of "the divine". Then, in the next stage, the word mikoto also came to be a mere expression of respect and ceased to signify "the divine"; it can probably be said that the only word used until today exclusively in the sole meaning of "the divine" is kami.

The next question is: when occurred the final decisive event by which the word kami superseded the other words—mikoto, tama, mono, chi—and came to occupy the position of the only word referring exclusively to "the divine"? To what century can this change be attributed? In attempting to arrive at a definite answer to this question, it is necessary to proceed with great care; but the word kami probably superseded the other words as an exclusive term for "the divine" some time during the early or middle Heian period, in other words, during the reigns of the two emperors Daigo (reigned 897-930 A.D.) and Suzaku (reigned 930-946 A.D.). In support of this supposition we can quote the jimmyo-chō (Catalog of Names of Shinto Deities) in the Engi-shiki, a compilation of sometimes most detailed regulations dealing with the administration of the fundamental laws, the ryō. The Engi-shiki was completed in 927 A.D. during the reign of Emperor Daigo. The ninth and tenth volumes of this 50-volume work make up the so-called jimmyo-chō, which is a list of names of the deities enshrined in shrines throughout the country to which the central government and the local authorities were to present offerings at the Toshi-goï no matsuri, the spring festival praying for abundant grain crops.

The following are examples of the style of entries in the jimmyo-chō. The first is an example from Otokuni country in Yamashiro (the present Kyōto region):

羽束師坐高御養面神社 大 参 新

The meaning is: "the shrine wherein is enshrined the deity Taka-mimusubi-no-kami in [the place called] Hazukashi."

There are other types of entries, such as the following, which are believed to be simplifications of the above-quoted from:

扇出神社

This means: "the shrine wherein is enshrined the deity Yodo-hime-no-kami in [the place called] Yodo." The entry is read: "Yodo no kami no yashiro," and not "Yodo jinja."

The jimmyo-chō records a total of 2,816 shrines; but not all of them are entered necessarily in one of the two styles quoted above. Among them we find a number of exceptional entries, such as the following:

1. 天照日命神社 Ame-no-hohi-no-mikoto-no-kami no yashiro.
2. 御子神社 Miko-gami-no-kami no yashiro.
3. 姫御名方命彦神社別神社 Take-minakata-tomi-no-mikoto-hiko-gami no (yashiro) no wake-gami no yashiro.
4. 皇子神社 Miko-gami-no-mikoto-gami no yashiro.

Of the four types quoted here, entries ending in the words 命神社, as in the first example, are the most numerous. Next in number are entries such as the fourth example—there are four; there is one entry each in the style given in the second and third examples. The second example, in which the character 神 is repeated twice, is believed to be an error.

The total number of shrines entered in these exceptional styles is 143; out of the total of 2,816, this amounts to about 5 percent.

There are two points which I wish to make here regarding this question. Although amounting only to 5 percent of the whole, there are nevertheless a total of 143 shrines whose enshrined deities are recorded in a different way. In other words, as compared with the usual form ending with the words kami no yashiro, these entries—mikoto-no-kami no yashiro, kami-no-kami no yashiro, mikoto-hiko-gami no yashiro, kami-no-mikoto-gami no yashiro, etc.—all contain more than one of the
words used in Shinto to signify “the divine”. This is the first point; the second is as follows. In these clusterings of synonyms the word-kami comes in terminal position. These two points are important for our question.

The case of duplication of terms meaning “the divine” is a phenomenon based on the same type of psychology. Judging from the fact that in this case the word kami comes in terminal position and that until the present the word has been used exclusively to signify the concept of “the divine” in Shinto; we are justified in concluding that the word kami had by this time superseded all the other words such as mikoto, tama, mono, chi, etc. As mentioned before, the word kami was not used antiquity in any special sense different from words like mikoto, tama, mono, chi, etc. Up to a certain point in time, the word kami was used interchangeably with and equivalently to a series of related words: tama, mono, chi, etc. In his Tamaboko Hyakushu, Motoori Norinaga wrote the following two poems:

神といへば 学びとしくや 思ふらん
鳥なるもあり 虫なるもあるを
いやしけど 防都区唐
龍の類も 神のかたはし

The first poem asks whether all gods are of equal stature, since there are some which are birds, even some which are insects. The second poem says that even lowly beings, such as lightning, echoes, foxes, tigers, dragons and the like, are all, in their way, deities. As these poems say, the word kami has even been applied to wolves and tigers. All this goes to show that in antiquity the word kami did not involve a privileged position. But, as has been already mentioned, the word kami did not continue forever to be used in the same manner as the other related words; by the early Heian period, the word kami was still living and used as a suffix to the other related words; and it continues until today to occupy a special position.

The end of the period during which the term mikoto-no-kami became stereotyped can be assigned confidently to, at the latest, the early part of the tenth century, thanks to the Engi-shiki, the date of which is known with certainty. However, with regard to the beginning of the period, such a term undoubtedly existed already in the Nara period, since the Harima Fudoki (written during the Nara period) contains these examples:

阿速須伎高日吉尼命神 Ajsukita-hiko-ne-no-mikoto-kami.
豊徳命神 Toyo-ho-no-mikoto-kami.

As has been seen above, kami, one of the words used to express the idea “the divine,” was used identically with the related words mono, tama, hi, chi, etc., until a certain time, and by certain people until a much later time. And it is not possible to say that, at a certain time—we cannot say with certainty exactly when, but probably around the Taika era (645-649 AD)—the word kami came to supersede the other words and came to bear exclusively the meaning of a spiritual being in the positive sense? An example of this might be the words of the edict of the 4th month of the year 647 AD, recorded in the Nihon Shoki as follows:

惟神我子遺教故寄

This sentence is believed to mean that kami entrusted the rule of the Empire to the children of kami. That kami in this case refers to the Sun Goddess Ama-terasu-ō-mikami can naturally be supposed from the evidence in the Kojiki and Nihon Shoki. The fact that, in this quotation, the actual name of the Sun Goddess does not appear, but that instead the Sun Goddess is referred to simply by the word kami—this fact may prove that the word kami meant, for certain groups, not an abstract or vague “awesome being” (kashikoshi mono) but rather an authoritative, sacred being. If this is so, it is necessary to dwell at more length here on the exact meaning of what I call an authoritative, sacred being, a positive sacred being.

The idea of the sacred is common to all religions and is certainly not one peculiar only to Shinto. The Japanese word for “the sacred” was kashikoshi, or “awesome”. However, as mentioned before, when Norinaga pointed out the mistake in interpreting kashikoshi solely in an ethical, benevolent, intellectual, one might say rational manner, and when he wrote his two poems about the various types of lowly beings known to be deities: then one must say that his views were fully in accord with the learning of today. When R. Otto, in his Das Heilige, points out that there exist, among the properties of the divine, certain parts which cannot be fully understood by the rational mind and that
there is ample room for the play of Gefühl; and when he holds that
it is an error, an one-sided view to believe that the essence of divinity
das Wesen der Gottheit) can be penetrated by the use of rational predications—then he is very close to the ideas of Norinaga.

The “hashikoshi” is, in Norinaga’s words, the “out of the ordinary.” It is the out of the range of every-day experience, the exceptional, the rare. In ancient Japanese the nobles were called mare-hito, or “rare men”; not seldom is the concept of nobility associated with that of rarity. The idea of rarity gives rise to the consciousness of nobility, of awe. The awesome, the exceptional for the ancient Japanese meant not only the “divine”, as one would imagine from the word exceptional itself, but also included the idea of the “demonic”; it included the sacré pure as well as the sacré impure. Life and death, being beyond the ken of every-day experience, were both awesome, hashikoshi. When analyzed, life was the sacré pure, and death the sacré impure. In Shinto, both religious rituals and funeral ceremonies were exceptional occurrences and consequently awesome; in connection with both arose the necessity of purification and abstinence. In later eras, the religious rites came to be regarded as sacred in a desirable sense (sacré pure), while funeral rites were regarded as sacred in an undesirable sense (sacré impure).

It was, at the latest, in the early Heian period that this “desirable sacredness” came to be generally regarded as the meaning of what I call positive sacredness and that the word kami came to refer to such objects.

The kami revealing in purest form this “desirable sacredness” is the Sun Goddess Ama-terasu-ō-mikami; and for this reason She is worshipped as the highest, noblest of the deities. This sanctity is evident in Her being represented by the sun. Thus the concrete expression of her sanctity is Light or Brightness. Light is the hope of human life; and spiritually Brightness corresponds with the ethical virtues of honesty, truth, and sincerity. One can say that, as Buddhism lays great emphasis on compassion and Christianity on love, Shinto makes Brightness its most sacred value.

THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT*

BY
TETSUTARO ARIGA

For a scientific understanding of Christian thought, it is necessary first to ask, what is its basic structure? In a sense this inquiry is the resumption of the task taken up by the liberal theologians of half a century ago. For they wanted to get at the “essence” of Christianity. But the philosophico-historical method employed by them could not do full justice to the revelational character of the Christian Gospel. The dialectical theologians criticized this point of liberal theology and attempted to restore the theology of revelation. Their criticism is correct in so far as Christian faith can be Christian faith only where it is a faith in the revealed Word of God. We should not think, however, that the theology of revelation has made the inquiry of the old liberals entirely irrelevant. For according to the theology of revelation the Word of God was given to man through persons and events of history, above all through Jesus Christ. If this is the case, historical inquiry should help, rather than hinder, the understanding of the meaning of Christian revelation.

Christian revelation is thus a historical revelation and hence, to that extent, historically conditioned. But man’s understanding of the meaning of Christian revelation has also been historically conditioned.

It is for this reason that there is diversity rather than unity in the interpretation of the Christian Gospel. In the face of this diversity, then, we are justified to ask, what is the original and basic structure of Christian faith? We have to note, however, that the diversity in question has developed, to a considerable degree, owing to the diversity of the languages that have been used for expressing Christian faith and ideas. The history of Christian thought may thus be looked upon as a history of translation of terms from one language into another. As a
student of Christianity whose native language is Japanese, I am particularly conscious of the problem of translation. The Japanese translations of the Christian Bible have carefully avoided, as far as possible, terms which definitely savor of Shinto or Buddhism. But when the earliest translators sought an equivalent for "God", they had to choose between butsu (Buddha) and kami. It was the latter that has been adopted, so that the Japanese Christians call their God kami. The Roman Catholics also use kami, but they usually prefer the word tenshu, which literally means "Heavenly Lord". Today, however, the Christian use of kami is so well established that scarcely anybody raises an objection to the Christian application of the originally Shinto term. This case, then, may be compared to the adoption of thesos in Greek, deus in Latin, god in Anglo-Saxon, etc.

We cannot say, therefore, that Japanese Christianity, because of its adoption of the term kami, has acquired a Shintoistic coloring. But as early as the time of the Septuagint, we notice, together with the Greek language, the way of thinking began to be introduced into the Hebraic stream of thought. And the most crucial point is found in the translation of the divine name in Exodus 3:14. The Septuagint rendered it as Ego  eimi ho  dn. On the basis of this translation, Philo interpreted his God in terms of "being". This identify of God and "being" was later inherited by the early Christian fathers and through them has become a part of our Christian vocabulary. In English, too, God is often called the "Supreme Being." In our Japanese Bible the divine name is rendered by Ware wa arite aru mono nari, which is nearer to the Septuagint than to the Hebrew original.

In Hebrew the verb hayath means "to become," "to happen," "to act," "to be," the one word may signify all this. Moreover, its function is not primarily copulative. It is therefore extremely difficult to translate 'ehyeh 'asher 'ehyeh. It seems that 'ehyeh is represented more adequately by "I ACT" than by "I AM". But if the ultimate in Hebrew thought is the creative "I ACT" and if the Hebrew language does not have to use a copula for linking a subject and a predicate, there can be no occasion in Hebrew thought for the rise of ontology or a speculation about "being." And where there is no philosophical concept of "being", it is impossible for the problem of being and becoming or that of being and non-being to be taken up for discussion.

It is this characteristic that distinguishes the Hebrew way of thinking from the Greek way of thinking, which may be called ontological. If hayath, and not to on or to einai, is the basic concept of Hebrew thought, then it should be characterized as hayathological, rather than ontological.

The concept of to mē on likewise appears in Hebraic-Christian thought only where the influence of Greek ontology is felt. For instance, Philo who identifies God with "being" says that God brought ta mē onta into to einai. In De Mutatione Nominum he argues that the divine name "I am He that is" is equivalent to "My nature is to be (to einai), not to be spoken." In De Somniis I, he likewise interprets the divine name in the sense of monon eionai to on. And this God is also the Maker of the universe who brought ta mē onta into to einai (Vita Mosis II). In another connection Philo says that God "brought the universe out of non-existence" (ek mē ontos) (Legum allegoriae III).

In early Christian literature a clear statement of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is found in Mandate I of The Shepherd of Hermas, which teaches that one should first of all believe that God "made all things to be out of that which was not" (ek loun mē ontōs). The meaning of to mē on or ta mē onta is, however, by no means unequivocal. It may mean potential, as distinguished from actual, being. As a matter of fact, both The Wisdom of Solomon and Justin Martyr say that the world was made "out of formless matter" (ex amorphos hyle). It is only when we come down to Theophilus of Antioch and Irenaeus of Lyons, both of the latter part of the second century, that we find the doctrine of creation out of formless matter explicitly rejected. Tertullian in North Africa also fought against Hermogenes' doctrine of creatio de nihilo, which would make matter eternal, in favour of creatio de nihilo, which would safeguard the sole government of God.

It is therefore clear that the problem of non-being came up in Hebraic-Christian thought only in consequence of the introduction of Greek ontological thinking. The doctrine of creation out of nothing or ex ouk onta may thus be viewed as an outcome of the defense of the Hebrew creation-faith, which is hayathological, in terms of ontology. Hebrew thought itself was not aware of the contrast of being and non-being. The contrasts familiar to it were: life and death, power and impotence, truth and falsehood, righteousness and iniquity, good and evil, etc. In the Book of Deuteronomy we read: "I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse" (30:19). Idols are called "vain" (Ps. 31:6) or "false" (Jer. 10:14). As idols are lifeless and powerless, those who make them are all "vanity" (Isa. 44:9). In sharp contrast with those false gods, the creative power of Yahweh is strongly emphasized, notably in II Isaiah. According to Psalm 33, "the word of Yahweh" is upright and it was by this upright and faithful word of God that the work of creation was done (vv. 4 & 6).
According to the prologue of the Fourth Gospel, all things were made through the Word, in whom there was life. This “word” or “logos” is the working of a personal, living God, and as such it is itself personal. And the Christian faith accepts and responds to the working of the *dabhar-logos* in the actual person of Jesus: “And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth”. Here, we may note, “becoming” is not becoming as distinguished from “being”. The term *egeneto* should be understood on the basis of *hayathology* rather than on the basis of ontology. The thought of the Apostle Paul, likewise, moved along *hayathological* rather than ontological lines, although he employed the contrast of being and non-being in Romans 4:17b (also, 1 Cor. 1:28). In the Standard Revised Version we read: “in the presence of the God in whom he believed, who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist”. But what is the meaning of the clause *kalountos la mé onta hós onta?* The expression has its close parallel in Philo’s *De Specialibus Legibus*, where *la mé onta ekalesen eis to einai* is used of divine creative activity. In *De Joseph* however, Philo says of a dream: “of the mind which without any basis of reality produces pictures and images of things which are not, as though they were” (*la mé onta hós onta*). If we take this parallel, the Authorized Version with its “God, who... calleth those things which be not as though they were” would seem to be quite legitimate. Whichever interpretation we may accept, it seems to me quite clear that Paul’s emphasis lay on the contrast of life and death, not primarily on that of being and non-being.

It was inevitable that the use of the Greek language should have been accompanied by the intrusion of the Greek way of thinking. However, the identification of *’ehyeh* with *to onai* or *to on* did not necessarily mean the replacement of the former by the latter. Both in Philo and among the early Christian fathers we recognize the interesting fact that, on the one hand, the concept of being acquires the dimension of depth by being identified with *’ehyeh*, and, on the other hand, the Hebraic-Christian faith in a personal God of creation is freed by ontological reflection from crude anthropomorphism. As we have noticed above, Philo introduced the idea of creativity into the concept of being. Being, to him, is not simply a rational concept, for the being of God is utterly incomprehensible to human reason. All things that come after being itself (*meta to on* ) are indeed perceivable and comprehensible, but being itself is entirely beyond comprehension (*De Mutatione Nominum*, 2), 9). This incomprehensibility of the divine essence has its analogy in the incomprehensibility of the essence (*ousia*) of our own soul (*ibid.*, 10).

Thus the mystery of human personality corresponds to that of divine personality. To call God a personal being does not mean that He is an object of human knowledge. God is the absolute subject as a human person is likewise a subject. Such a God, then, cannot be conceived as existing in human form and occupying a portion of space. “For not even the whole world would be a place fit for God to make His abode, since God is His own place, and He is filled by Himself, and sufficient for Himself” (*Legum Allegoricae*, I, (14), 44). Likewise in Justin Martyr we find the following words: “you must not imagine that the unbegotten God Himself came down or went up from any place. For the ineffable Father and Lord of all neither has come to any place, nor walks, nor sleeps, nor rises up, but remains in His own place, wherever that is, quick to behold and quick to hear, having neither eyes nor ears, but being of indescribable might; and He sees all things, and knows all things, and none of us escapes His observation” (*Dial.* 127).

These words of Philo and Justin well indicate the general direction in which the Christian doctrine of God developed. In spite of all the ontological influences it has received, it has not been induced to conceive God as impersonal and abstract “being”. When God is called “being”, He is considered primarily as *ko on* or *qui est*. In other words, God is a “personal being” in the most profound sense of the term. This profundity of “being” may best be accounted for by regarding it as a result of the encounter between *hayathology* and ontology. If there is anything that can be called Christian ontology, it must be understood as a thought which has a double structure, a structure that may be characterized as *hayah-ontological*.

It cannot be denied, however, that the preponderance of ontology in the traditional Christian doctrine of God has made a full appreciation of the original Christian faith quite difficult. For, however personal a “being” may be considered, the concept tends to be static and self-sufficient. The principle of *hayah*, on the other hand, is dynamic, active, and relational. It can be recognized only where there are encounters and relations between persons, namely, in the world of history, while being as *to on* transcends time and history. The revelational character of the Christian faith, therefore, can only be fully understood on the basis of *hayathology*.

The above analysis has certain relevance to our situation in Japan. Because of its ontological tradition, Christianity is in this country often called a religion of “being” and, as such, is contrasted...
with Buddhism as a religion of “nothingness” (or, negation of being).
It seems to me that there is still a great deal to be done in order to
clarify the meaning of such terms as \( yu \) (or, \( u \)), \( mu \), \( aru \), \( nai \). But it
is also necessary to obtain a clear conception of “being” as applied to
Christianity. Our study, it is hoped, has made it sufficiently intel-
ligible that “being” in Christianity is not ontological but primarily
hayathological. And this finding may shed some light on any honest
attempt to compare Christianity with other religious or philosophic
systems.

A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE BURMESE BUDDHIST
SAMGHYA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE STATE AND THE LAITY

BY

AUNG THAN

Simultaneously with the introduction of Buddhism into Burma
proper in the eleventh century A.D. the Buddhist Samgha was also
established. In fact, it was one of the members of the Samgha who
brought Buddhism to Pagan, the ancient capital of Burma. At the
instigation of Reverend Arahan, who introduced Buddhism into Pagan,
many sets of the Pitakas were brought from the Mon kingdom of
Thaton. It was again the Buddhist monks of Pagan who evolved
the Burmese alphabets. Anawaratha (A.D. 1044–1077) and his suc-
cessors built many monasteries in which the Burmese monks carried
out their studies with the zeal of scholars who had newly discovered
a new literature. Before the introduction of the Pitakas, writing in
Burmese was at its infancy, and it was greatly enhanced by the study
of these Pali texts. The monks who had become proficient in the
Pitakas in turn taught the lay-folks in the art of reading, writing and
of composition. In this the monks and the lay students received
encouragement from the king as also from the laity who provided them
with their material needs.

Monks had their own Head of the Order whom they nominated
from among themselves, but whether such Heads of the Order received
official appointments from the kings or not, they were treated with
due respect and deference by the latter who often consulted them in
matters concerned with the government of the country and the people.
Shin Arahan was the first Primate and he was succeeded by Thera
Panthagū during the reign of King Alaungsithu (A.D. 1112–1167). On
the death of Alaungsithu, his son Narathu (A.D. 1167–1170) sought the
aid of the Primate to prevent his brother Min Shin Saw from marching
to the capital with the army on the promise that Narathu would agree
to Min Shin Saw being raised to the throne. Though according to his
promise Narathu put Min Shin Saw on the throne, but he poisoned
him to death on the same night. On hearing this Panthagū, burnt
of the kin-rs took was the conferment of titles on learned monks. The title was changed to Ratthaguru (the learned monks were officially appointed the heads of the Church. They were at first called Sarpghanatha (the chief of the Sarpgha), but later Precceptor of the Country). Besides this, one of the forms the patronage kings could wield a considerable amount of influence over the Sarpgha was that monks, and kings, ministers and high officials were educated in monasteries. And these people in return built magnificent monastic establishments and thus the successive capitals of Burma, namely, Ava, Amarapura and Mandalay, became full of these edifices. Learning into prominence. Education in monasteries became the chief occupation of the monks, and one schismatic monk sought contributions and grants of lands.

The kings continued to bestow their patronage on the monks and the laity in return endowed them with contributions and grants of lands. And these people in return built magnificent monastic establishments and thus the successive capitals of Burma, namely, Ava, Amarapura and Mandalay, became full of these edifices. Learning was imparted in these monasteries to all and the laity in return endowed them with contributions and grants of lands.

During the life time of the third Primate Chapata there were schisms among the monks and one schismatic monk sought contributions openly from the ministers, high officials and laity for the benefit of his disciples whose studies apparently suffered for lack of sufficient material support from the laity. This incident shows that the Sangha in general regarded the laity as their principle supporters for their material needs.

After the fall of Pagan to the Mongol hordes, the Burmese capital was shifted to Pinya, Sagaing and Ava successively; but Buddhism continued to flourish. The kings continued to bestow their patronage on the monks and the laity were no less behind in their generosity to the Sangha. It was through the members of the Sangha that the literary activity continued and Burmese literature as such came very much into prominence. Education in monasteries became the chief occupation of the monks, and kings, ministers and high officials were educated by the monks. And these people in return built magnificent monastic establishments and thus the successive capitals of Burma, namely, Ava, Amarapura and Mandalay, became full of these edifices. Learning was imparted in these monasteries to all and the laity in return endowed them with contributions and grants of lands.

From the Ava to the Mandalay period of Burmese history certain learned monks were officially appointed the heads of the Church. They were at first called Samghanātha (the chief of the Sangha), but later the title was changed to Rājuguru (the king’s preceptor). Now however in the Union of Burma the title has been changed to Raṭṭhaguru (the Preceptor of the Country). Besides this, one of the forms the patronage of the kings took was the conferment of titles on learned monks. The kings could wield a considerable amount of influence over the Sangha through the royal preceptor. But even then the preceptor must have the willing support of the majority of monks and no interference with the general administration of the Order was tolerated. Such was the strong and democratic spirit laid down by the Vinaya rules. King Bodawpaya (A.D. 1782–1819), a strong and despotic king, introduced certain reforms in organization of the Sangha. He appointed four learned monks as Sangharajās (the Heads of the Order) and above them a Mahāсанgharajā (the Head of the Church). In this way the king expected a wider support for any measures he might wish to take. But even a Mahāsansgharajā and his councils of Sangharajās were not in a position to give support to the monarch without consulting the majority of the monks. Thus when Bodawpaya made the preposterous claim that he was the Future Buddha, the Sangha successfully resisted his claim.

Once a controversy over the mode of wearing robes appeared among the monks and King Alaungpaya (A.D. 1752–1760) issued the decree that monks should follow the practice of the royal preceptor. A number of monks of stronger will resented and one such monk by the name of Munindaghosa openly defied the order. He was summoned to the royal presence and when asked the reason for disobeying the royal order, he boldly replied that he was following the rules laid down by his own Master. On being asked who his Master was, he said that his Master was none else but the Lord Buddha and that so long as he was alive he would follow no master other than his own. Despot as he was, the king dared not punish the monk but asked him to go and reside at a distant place away from the capital. There the monk, undaunted in spirit, succeeded in collecting a number of adherents to his own view and when the king heard about it he was sent for to the capital. The monk suspected that the king would kill him this time and disrobing himself appeared before the latter. When the king asked him why he had turned a layman, he replied that he did not wish the king to commit the murder of a monk.

A laungpaya acted in this incident in the way he did, because he undoubtedly considered himself to be the Head of the Church. But the Sangha considered that they had the religious authoritative sanction for their views and resisted the king’s order. Thus even a despotic king dared not exercise his despoticism to the full where the Sangha was concerned. The matter in controversy was really one which concerned the internal administration of the order, and as such the monks considered that it was out of the king’s jurisdiction.

At one time Bodawpaya, being jealous of the monks for the honour
and prestige in which they were held by the people, attempted to wrest the power from the Sangha by seizing some of the lands belonging to it but did not succeed. During the time of his successor Bagyidaw (A.D. 1819-1837), a law was laid down that after the lands had been granted to the Sangha they would always belong to the Order and they should be treated as religious lands over which the state will have no right. This law was continued to be recognized by the British during their reign. Therefore it has become a settled policy that the state has no control over the church property which had once been declared free.

In the Mon State in Lower Burma during the time of King Dhammaceti (A.D. 1460-1491) the Sangha became very much disorganized and was split up into a number of sects. Dhammaceti successfully unified the different sects into a single Order by introducing a uniform method of ordination. In this also it should be noted that the king did not issue any order to the Sangha but established a convention by respectful suggestion to the Order whereby all the senior monks agreed to take the uniform form of Upasampadā ordination. By introducing a new and uniform type of ordination King Dhammaceti indirectly effected the registration of monks.

During the time of Mindon (A.D. 1853-1878) the king, noticing the laxity in monastic discipline, tried to put an end to it by imposing a vow on the monks to behave strictly in accordance with the Vinaya rules. This also was done in consultation with an assembly of senior monks. The monks in their deliberation agreed to the suggestion made by the king because it was the duty of the novices and the ordained monks to take a vow to observe the precepts and the Vinaya rule. Thus the king’s wish was fulfilled with the aid of the Sangha.

During the time of King Thibaw (A.D. 1878-1885) lay officials were appointed to deal with ecclesiastical matters, but in practice they were just liaison officers between the king and the Primate. One of their duties was to bring to the notice of the Primate any case of general conduct among the monks who did not conform strictly to the rules of the Vinaya.

The monks who were appointed as officials of the Primate were empowered to bring to the notice of the king through the Primate any case of mis-governorship or abuse of power by the local officials. They had the power to ask the local authorities concerned to set the matter right by verbal warning and if the miscreant official persisted they were authorized to report the matter to the king. For this purpose these monks were supplied with palm-leaves stamped with royal seal to send their report in. Thus the monks had a certain say in the local affairs.

The disputes in the Sangha were settled by the Primate in council during the days of the Burmese kings. But during the British regime, owing to the complicated legal points being involved in the disputes among the monks, they were settled in the civil courts. The British Government continued to confer titles on the learned monks, but instead of the titles of King’s Preceptor it was changed to the “Most Learned”.

During the Burmese regime the conferment of titles usually carried with it some ecclesiastical office and both the king and the Sangha presumably considered that the king who was the supporter of the faith was also the head of the Church. The British Viceroy, however, was not considered to be the supporter of the religion or the head of the Church. Though Buddhism has not been declared as the State religion in independent Burma, yet as the Head of the Government and most of his officials as also ninety percent of the population are Buddhists, the Government and the Head of the State may just be considered as supporters of the Religion. There is again a Ministry of Religious Affairs which deals with purely Buddhist religious affairs.

With regard to the relation between the Sangha and the laity the former is considered as the field of merit for the laity, and of the Three Holiness it is the only living example with which the laity daily comes in contact. The laity considers that it is its duty to supply material needs of the Sangha for the spiritual benefit which the former receives in return the latter. During the Burmese regime and the earlier part of the British rule, monks were the only educators of the people. The king and the high officials of the states were products of the monastery. And many of them had been members of the Order too. Every Burmese boy, even up to the present time, has to spend a certain period in the monasteries and take upon himself the first step to ordination, and no man would be considered a Buddhist unless he has entered into the Buddhist noviceship.

All religious and social activities gravitates round the monasteries and pagodas. The great influence the Sangha exercises over the laity is hardly to be wondered at. Even the humblest and the poorest household makes its daily contribution of rice and curry to the monks. It is impossible to estimate in terms of money the amount of contribution made by the laity to the Sangha. These contributions are always voluntary and even under the Burmese kings no law had ever been enacted by which such contributions were to be made compulsory.

In most villages of Burma, people in groups of ten houses take turns to send daily food to the Village monastery.
The members of the Sangha are people who devote themselves to their self-enlightenment as well as to keep burning the torch of learning and instruct the laity in the path of Enlightenment. They were never expected to work for their own livelihood; it is by practice, as well as by example of their own holy life that they were to earn the respect and gratitude of the laity who would then make contributions voluntarily for the material support of the Sangha.

The general principles underlying the attitude to be adopted by the members of the Order towards the laity is that they must so act that their action must be “for the benefit of non-believers, for increase in the number of believers; it must not be to the detriment of non-believers as well as believers, and must not cause wavering in any of the believers.” One of the prescribed measures to be carried out against the monks who had given offence to a householder is that the guilty monk is enjoined to obtain the pardon of the householder he had offended.

The Sangha in Burma today shares the weals and woes with the laity, as it did in the past. The monks encourage the people to earn a livelihood and live a comfortable life, but it is the members of the Sangha again who prevent them from drifting to a wrong and foul mode of living. In times of happiness the monks share the pleasures with the laity. On occasions like a namegiving ceremony or a marriage the invited monks attend the function and while sharing joys with others they heartily shower their blessings on the new born babe or the newly wedlock couple. At times of sorrow too the members of the Sangha do not lag behind. They stand by the people sharing griefs with them. When a person is lying ill, monks come, attend to the sick, speak words of encouragement and pray for a quick recovery. A bereaved family is always visited by the preceptor monk who, while consoling the members of the household, offers prayers so that the departed soul may have a better and brighter future in the life to come. It is because of this kindly disposition of the monks that they are regarded by the people as their guides and well-wishers par excellence.

In affairs religious and spiritual, Burmese Buddhist monks are no doubt very strict, a characteristic which may apparently be cried down as conservative. But on emergent circumstances, the very same monks again show an extremely liberal and tolerant attitude. To cite an example, it may be said that although under ordinary circumstances lay people are not permitted to put on footwears within the precincts of the monastery, yet during the last great war the refugees were allowed to put on shoes within the monastic compound on grounds of health. During that period of horror, the Burmese Buddhist monks, disregarding their personal convenience and the minimum comforts they happened to enjoy, gave accommodation to the people who sought refuge with them; they protected them from all kinds of outward dangers and difficulties even at the risk of their own lives and looked after them with care and concern which in normal circumstances is to be expected in households alone.

Thus, in Burma the Sangha and the laity are mutually bound up by ties of goodwill and friendship, love and affection, regard and respect. The laity relies on the Sangha for the moral upliftment and spiritual welfare of the people, so also do the members of the monastic order depend on the laity for their material subsistence and personal comfort.
THE MYSTICISM OF SRI AUROBINDO

BY

ARABINDA BASU

The watchword of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy is harmony. It reconciles in one complete world-view the standpoints of the major but mutually exclusive philosophies. A spiritual philosophy, it not only does not deny the reality of matter but looks upon it as the medium of the ultimate Reality's uttermost expression in the world. An absolutism to the core of its teaching, it does not reject relativities but welcomes them as manifestations of the Infinite. Sri Aurobindo takes an evolutionary view of the world, yet he insists that what is evolving is an eternal reality which in itself is independent of its own evolutionary movement. At the same time, though transcendent in the sense of being free from the necessity of self-manifestation, the reality freely projects the world out of its own being and is the immanent moving spirit in it. And while he considers the individual spirit the pivot of the evolution, his quest is a transformed collective and international life of humanity.

The self-manifestation of the Divine is through a process of descent or involution. The Spirit involves itself through different levels of descent in matter. From the point of view of the Absolute, it is self-veiling and concealing of its absoluteness. But the process is not meaningless. For involution is followed by evolution. Evolution is the progressive manifestation of the Spirit involved in Matter. When the urge to manifest reaches a certain pitch of intensity, there is a descent of the Spirit from the next higher level of its own involution. In other words, after Matter, Life is manifested in the world on the basis of Matter. And the Spirit in living Matter aspires for a still higher expression of itself. The result is the emergence of Mind in living Matter. Man is the mental being par excellence. But he is not a pure mental being, for he is also endowed with life and has a material body. Also through his mind he aspires after the Spirit, which he truly is. For "man is rather than has a soul." This does not contradict our statement that man is the most excellent mental being. For what is meant by it is that his most well organized faculty of knowledge and action is the mind. Even his soul is a mental soul. This must be so, for man has emerged on the world scene in the evolutionary process and has a complex being and nature. His mind, life and matter—all three determine the character of his spiritual soul though the latter in itself is a spark of the Divine.

The practical counterpart of this philosophy of harmony is what Sri Aurobindo has called the Integral Yoga. He defines Yoga as, first, the science of the inner being and nature of man. It is in essence psychology, only its range is wider and deeper than what ordinary psychology covers. Secondly, it is also the art of organizing and utilizing the results of its study, experiments and discoveries for the purpose of liberating man from his normal personality and its functions. Thirdly, and following from the second, it is an attempt to bring to perfection the potentialities of man's being and nature. Usually Yoga is taken as a means of obtaining knowledge of the ultimate spiritual reality and consequent freedom from ignorance about the true nature of the self of man and its products, viz. misery and unhappiness. Sri Aurobindo accepts this view of Yoga. But he takes an evolutionary view of the world. In other words, he believes that Nature, which is really the Knowledge and Will of the Divine manifesting more and more of his being and force and delight in the world, is doing the Yoga of perfecting the world. From one point of view this is developing the potentialities of man to the utmost extent, from another it is manifesting the true reality in man. For the real man is nothing but God in the conditions of finitude and wearing a material vesture and limited in vital power and mental abilities.

Sri Aurobindo maintains that all Yogas, indeed all religions for that matter, are essentially other-worldly and individualistic in aim and certainly in achievement. Let us explain what he means by these two expressions. The term 'other-worldly' for Sri Aurobindo means that a religion does not consider spiritual fulfilment possible in this world. This is not to say that spiritual liberation, or salvation, or Nirvana, cannot be obtained by man while he is alive and embodied. No, but the implication is that in such realization of liberation the apparently non-spiritual parts of man, namely, his mind, vital force and body, do not participate. The power of the realization does not bring about any radical change in them or in their functions. They are not spiritualized. True, the mind does gain a tranquility and serenity and luminosity. But its basic structure remains the same and its power continues to be imperfectly potent. In some cases, the vital gains additional force
and increased felicity of action. But there again, fundamentally speaking, it is not brought under the guidance of the liberated spirit’s new knowledge and experience. And the body is designated to its instinctive and blind activities without even the idea of relating it with the spiritual realization.

Also the spiritual aim entertained by the different religions is individualistic. This is not to say that the lack in universalism or elements of cosmic compassion or love. But here again, Sri Aurobindo says that to preach to all and sundry the ideal of spiritual emancipation or salvation or Nirvana is not to work for a collective spiritual fulfilment in the world. For the nature of that ideal remains individualistic. In other words, the ideal of cosmic salvation or emancipation does not envisage a collective spiritual fulfilment of humanity itself. It only means that the way to spiritual freedom or salvation is shown to all individuals. “All religions have saved a number of souls”, says Sri Aurobindo, “but none has spiritualized mankind”. Also the nature of man’s salvation remains other-worldly and thus cannot have fulfilment in this material world. We must guard the reader against a possible misunderstanding. Sri Aurobindo does not mean that spiritual communes are unknown to history, nor that such communes have not sanctified the normal activities of life. Indeed we have got the teaching of the Gita about Karmayoga which has been successfully practised by a certain number of people. There is the ideal of Mahayana Buddhism of not running away from life but leading a life which in all outward appearances is ordinary and normal and is yet tuned perfectly to the inner spiritual state of freedom. And the Christian speaks of the Kingdom of God. But Sri Aurobindo remains us that the last call of Krishna to Arjuna in the Gita was: Having been born in this transitory and unhappy world, leave it and come unto Me. Mahayana Buddhism is not known to have envisaged a spiritualized society which will be the embodiment of a collective, communal Buddha. And the Kingdom of God was said to be within man a translation of which into a divinized human society was not declared in early Christianity, for the simple reason that Christ himself expected the world to come to an end very soon. Also it is an ethical ideal and not a spiritual goal. That is to say, there is no assured spiritual knowledge behind its idealism, nor any power with which to achieve it.

The Tantric philosophies and yogas in India evolved a very harmonious outlook. They not only added the idea of enjoyment of God’s delight in all kinds of experience to that of spiritual emancipation, not only combined spiritual power with spiritual knowledge, but they also dreamed of a society of perfected spiritual men. But they too in the end looked upon a disembodied state of freedom as the highest ideal and achievement.

The reason for this exclusiveness of the realizations as the bases of the different religions and yogas in this. Sri Aurobindo maintains that even experiences and realizations of the ultimate reality are obtained through a faculty which is essentially mental. Even intuition which seizes Truth directly, knows only one or a few of the many aspects of it and never grasps it integrally. The mind has various levels, the intuitive being one of them. True, the logical and dialectical mind cannot know the Reality. But the mind made silent and receptive reflects the Truth in itself and this is how spiritual knowledge is obtained by man. Psychologically speaking, all mystical systems are agreed on this point. Buddhah purified and sublized and concentrated is the means of spiritual intuitions in Hinduism and Buddhism, the passive intellect purified and made receptive in Christianity and Sufism.

The need according to Sri Aurobindo is the evolution of a new level of consciousness in man. He believes that the manifestation of this new level of consciousness is the goal of the evolution of Nature in man. After the mind, the Supermind. And “the Supermind”, says Sri Aurobindo, “is God’s own knowledge of himself and his own native power of acting”. What is evolving through Matter, Life and Mind is the Supermind. The being endowed with this complete and infallible Knowledge-Will is the superman. The supramental yogi and mystic will integrate in his comprehensive realization all the experiences of the different aspects of the Divine. He will know God as transcendent and immanent, as absolute, universal and individual spirit, combine his Knowledge with Will and Love and have intimate knowledge and control of that faculty of God through which he creates the world, or rather manifests himself as the world. The superman will know and have mastery of the process by which the sleeping and dormant, yet evolving and secretly self-assertive Spirit in Matter can be manifested fully and overtly. He will transform his mind, life and body.

The Integral Yogi will also be a member of a community of supermen who will each be an expression of the Soul of the community. And the collective God in humanity will make the superman the unit of a new and perfected system of human unity. The integral yoga is a yoga of realization and manifestation. It is pragmatic mysticism. Its two principles are ascent and descent – ascent to God and the descent of the Spirit in the different levels of God’s self-manifestation into the immediately lower levels. The supermined is the true cause of the
world. And the time has come when the supermined is to manifest itself in and through mind, life and matter. From the side of the evolving spirit, it is an ascent, from that of the eternally realized Reality, it is a descent. This joint process is the key to the emergence of the superman, the God-man who will "transplant Heaven on mortal soil" and "justify the light on Nature's face".

**RECENT OBSERVATION ON INSTITUTIONAL HINDUISM**

**BY**

**ALAN COATES BOUQUET**

I offer the following account of first-hand observations made during the last six months, because so much in India is at the moment in flux, that unless items are quickly recorded, they may disappear without notes of them being made. Sometimes I was given a complete and national account of what I saw, on other occasions educated Hindus were unable to explain the significance of the ceremony in question.

During the week after Christmas I had the privilege of staying with the Professor of Philosophy in Andhra University at his country home in Sangam – Jagalarmudy, some five miles from Tenali, a station on the main line between Calcutta and Madrass. The period actually covered a kind of New Year Festival. There were two temples in the village, one of Siva and one of Vishnu. Daily worship was held at both. Every morning an urn of holy water was carried through the village to the Siva temple, preceded by musicians playing an appealing little tune on wood-wind and two drums. In this way the village was roused to a consciousness of the divine Presence and was ceremonially lustrated. At the temple, the symbol of deity was ceremonially washed, and offerings were made, and these were repeated in the evening. I was allowed to be present at the evening oblation. As we approached at the courtyard, the priest's portion of consecrated food was being carried out, and musicians in the vestibule of the temple were serenading the deity with a melody similar to that heard in the morning. The food offering had already taken place, but we were present at the offering successively of incense, fire, waved peacocks' feathers and a waved lit candelabra. During the whole of the worship there was chanting. The Professor, who accompanied me, said that the words of the liturgy were in ancient Sanskrit and would not have been understood by the congregation, but that they included a mantra in which an ascription to Deity occurred: "Thou art He who is, Thou art the Beginning and the End." He added that the ritual forms were probably datable to about the 7th century A.D., but that the hymns
were older. The priest having made the offerings, a bell was rung and the congregation received the equivalent of communion, to wit, coconut chips, received in the right hand to be immediately consumed and then sacred leaves, immediately handed back to the priest, and finally ashes from the sacrifice to be dusted on the head and body of the worshipper. Then over the head of each worshipper in turn was held a golden helmet, surmounted by the representation of the feet of Siva. The worshipper bowed down in humble submission, and received a spoken benediction. More chanting, and the worship was at an end. The symbol or lingam was of silver so heavily draped and ornamented as to be unrecognisable. Signs of polytheism remained in the shape of images of a consort and son of Siva, but I did not see that any puja was offered to these. The temple itself might have been rebuilt a century or so earlier than our visit, but outside it and in its walls were a number of stone images from an older building, two of the female ones, standing in niches, actually looking Minoon with curious flounced skirts. Later in the week I was allowed to visit the Vishnu temple, a smaller 19th century building, and again was offered communion by its priest. I recognized that in both cases real worship was taking place. Nothing unseemly or irreverent could be seen, and the little week-day congregations behaved in a manner which betokened devotion. One wondered what kind of account an Indian might have given of similar week day worship in an Italian village church.

On the New Year festival I witnessed two processions. The first was a Krishna one, and from the Vaishnavite temple, and it held some 20 stations round the village, which was a sizable one. The car usual with the Krishna image was preceded by the band. At each station people dressed in their best clothes came out of their houses, bringing various kinds of food and offerings which were reverently laid on a platform at the foot of the car, apparently for consecration, and then taken back into the houses. By the time the car had made its full circle a very large amount of food must have been consecrated in this way, so that at the little domestic feast which no doubt followed the villagers must have been "Commensals" with the Lord Krishna. I might even have been one myself without knowing it...... "asking no questions for conscience sake." One naturally remembered Corinth in the days of St. Paul. Later in the day a similar small procession went round the village with torches and a car, this time in honour of Rama, so there must have been a small temple of Rama somewhere as well. But it was clear that at any rate in this village the Krishna avatar took preference over the Rama avatar. I noted a number of
bull, worthy bull”. That the object of this bull-driving as a ceremony was the same as that practised by the ancient Greeks I have no sort of a doubt.

The second ceremony took place a few days later, just at sundown, and was clearly a spring-ritual of Siva as the personification of the Life-Force. But I must place it on record that none of the members of the University Department of Philosophy could give any explanation of its significance, nor could the peons in the same Department. It was clear therefore that already there had been a considerable break in the tradition. The procession, which was wending its way to a small Siva temple on the outskirts of Waltair, was led by the usual band of wood-wind and drums. Then followed six young men wearing yellow robes, who danced slowly along in circles, holding garlands high above their heads. After them came a small congregation, then a large seven-branched candelabra, fully it, and carried by a man. Another man followed, bearing on the end of a pole a large casket decorated in red and blue, evidently containing some cult-object, and shaped with a gable top like a medieval reliquary. Finally then came a small pony-cart, surmounted by an image of Siva performing his celebrated dance, and surrounded by a representation of flames. Everyone looked in deadly earnest, and I for one was glad to see no sign of slovenliness. But I could not help noticing that the University don in the faculty Culb, who came out with me to witness the show, manifested no signs of piety, such as the kneeling when the Blessed Sacrament goes by, as one sees it in Catholic countries; and the Chinese Professor of Zoology at the University of Peking, who was standing beside me said “In my country we do not encourage such ceremonies, but if people like to continue the same, we do not prohibit them from doing so”.

About a fortnight before leaving Andhra University I was taken by some American friends to see another temple at Anukapalle. This was in honour of a goddess, said to be an avatar of Lakshmi (there are so many cult-goddess all over South India that one suspects them of being “Earth Mothers” who have been drawn into orthodox Hinduism by being made into avatars). The temple again was not an old one, though it contained some old (possibly pre-Hindu) images. The figure of the goddess was attired in a pink dress, and surrounded by an ellipse of electric bulbs, switched on for our benefit. 19th Century colour-prints of avatars surrounded the walls of the forecourt. But what interested me was to see two worshippers obviously going through the ancient ceremony of incubation so well known in Greek temples and especially that of Aesculapius. We unfortunately missed seeing the important ruins of a Buddhist monastery on the top of a hill outside Anukapalle. One Indian student to whom I remarked on the extinction of Buddhism in medieval India replied “you see it was rather a dry ethical religion, and lacked the colour and emotional appeal and perhaps the comparative moral laxity of Hinduism. Pancha Sheela made high ethical demands”.

I have only time and space to add one more item. Throughout my stay in South India I was continually confronted by chalk symbols drawn in front of peoples’ dwelling houses. These have been noticed and written about before: but I have never seen the suggestion made that they might be connected with the curious phrase in the well-known English folk-song “Green grow the Rushes O” i.e. the phrase “Five for the symbols at your door.” Professor Ebbinghaus remarked to me that he had seen symbols of the same type outside house-doors in Switzerland, but here he thought they were made for purely ornamental purposes. However that may be, it has been well-known for years that in India they are much more than that. At worst they are prophylactic symbols intended to keep the bad sacred away from houses. As such I saw them drawn outside the primitive huts of the fisher folk on the beach below the University. At best they are pious symbols of sacred beliefs. Thus my host at Sangam, - Jagalarmudy told me that some elaborate drawing in front of a collage opposite his house symbolized the gates of heaven, and that they were so drawn during the month of December because it was an auspicious month in which to die. If died you during it course, you went straight to felicity without any re-births. I ought to say how grateful I was to the Professor of Philosophy for enabling me to see so much of the institutional religious life of India. India is still a deeply religious country, but she is passing through a severe crisis.
One of my students asked me recently, "What is the mystic experience?" Who are mystics? If you aren't one, can you become one?" My answer to the last question was that it depends on how much time you are willing to spend with God and how much fun you have while you are with Him. There are those who think it is more fun to be with God than anything and who think the time spent consciously in His presence is time best spent. There are some people who have never had this experience and perhaps do not even know it is possible. They could be like the woman who was stopped by a man on the street in New York City one day. He asked her, "Sister, have you any clear views on religion?" "No," she answered, "but I've got some dandy shots of the Empire State Building."

As to the other questions, one definition, a Christian one, of a mystic experience could be that it is an experience of partial or full realization of what it means to be enveloped in the consciousness of our inevitable tie with God. To be a mystic means that you have your lens always in focus and very clean. Some mystics have some very clear views of God and can see Him wherever they look. To be a mystic means to have a tendency to look and want to see Him and long to see Him and to be willing to spend the necessary time. It is a step further than prayer. It is when you stop asking God for things or informing Him about the world situation, when you are content to just be in His presence. The goal of the mystic is the experience of union with God, the breaking of the barrier of human consciousness. It is perhaps the most precious experience a human being can have. Once you have had it, or even glimpsed the possibility of it, it becomes your most want-to-be-repeated experience. Mystics are God-hungry. Yes, if you are not a mystic, you can become one, if you will stop eating the world long enough to get really hungry for God. Not that the world and God are incompatible. Not at all. If all things were made by God, then so was the world, and He loves it. But the clear view you are seeking is not of the Empire State Building, but of God Himself.

A. BASIC CONCEPTS: The nature of the experience.

It seems nearly everyone describes it in somewhat the same terms. It is union with some Ultimate, whether called God, Divine Mother, Universal Presence, Mind of the Universe, or It. It is an experience of love - of light. Pascal called it FIRE.

To the Christian it is often an emotional ecstatic experience. To the Hindu it is a more normal experience, because to have it is part of his cultural heritage in conversation and in way of life. It is the custom to sit in quiet contemplation for long hours. It is not at all strange for a man to leave his home, when he has reached a certain age, and go off alone for months or years in search of the experience. In any case, it is not strange to rise early for meditation, or to leave the office for a short time. Nor is it strange to have a meditation room in one's own house. A Christian is more apt to think it necessary to enter a monastery or convent to develop mystical experience. Or at least he is apt to think it a "special" sort of thing for which some adaptation of life is necessary, rather than an everyday experience.

To a Zen Buddhist realization, or satori, is not so much an emotional experience as the final solving of a difficult riddle. Enlightenment does not come easily. In fact it may be suspect if it does come too quickly and easily. In the Zen temple where I was a student, it was not unusual for the embryo monks to take 7 or 8 years for their final satori. When it finally came, it was ecstasy to be sure, but often accompanied by laughter - of joy and of relief at the realization that it could be so simple. The experience of union is knowledge that all matter is one - it is more a feeling of unity with all things - nature, solid objects, flowers, Mind - than of union with a divine Being. The reaction is, "Why did it take so long - it is such a simple answer - so obvious - it was right there all along right under my nose?" And he laughs at the release of tension, the end of effort. There is no longer any duality, no he and you, no object and subject. There is never God and he - because to him there is no personal God - because all is now one. He cannot even talk about the experience because to talk about it makes him separate from it and he creates duality again.

He becomes the narrator of the experience and thus separates himself from the experience. If he holds up his finger and wordlessly indicates that it is a finger, he has created duality because there is the finger, separate and perceived, and he the perceiver. Once the Zen Buddhist
The daily life of a Zen monastery is well-calculated to induce the mystic experience. At the Japanese monastery where I was privileged to be a student of Zen for several years, meditation is practised for about 16 hours a day. Rising hour was 3 A.M. every day and retiring at 11 P.M. Of the 20 hours in between, 16 were for meditation, 2 hours were for taking meals, short conferences with the Abbott, the morning reading of the sutras, and occasional lectures by the Abbott, and 2 hours were for rest or walking. There was no chatting however, for there was silence. You may think this life was strenuous; and if one was struggling too hard for the "break-through to cosmic consciousness," it was. But there is much joy in Zen life, and we often smiled. It is a simple life because the complexities of existence have no attraction.

The aim of a Hindu is also enlightenment, but it is a much gentler

It is poor because the great riches of the interior life cannot be seen. It is non-discriminating because there is so little emotion and personal reaction to things. Everything is accepted as it happens. Chuang Tzu said that the perfect man employs his mind as a mirror, and that it grasps nothing, refuses nothing, and receives but does not keep. And my great teacher of Zen, Dr. Suzuki, often said to me that the best way to live is to accept everything as it comes—say thank you and smile—but don't talk much about it. Just accept life in general as it comes.

The Zen method is one of diving into deep water without knowing how to swim. No one will offer the student any water wings or any shallow water to wade in. I was encouraged, by the example of the monks, by the Abbott, and by my own inclination to dive in at once. One does not ask questions. I found that out the day I arrived at the monastery for my training. When the monk who was to supervise my training showed me the meditation hall and took me to the place in the hall where I was to sit for so many subsequent hours, I made the mistake of asking what to do. He only smiled and said, "You will know." I sat quietly for a few hours—all sorts of questions rising within me. But soon I decided not to think about meditation, but to go ahead and do it. As soon as I stopped reacting, I found I could dive into deep water. I did not even know it was deep. This is how one finds satori—the enlightenment experience. It is the goal and measure of Zen, for it is the measure of Buddhism itself, the most important single fact of which is the enlightenment the Buddha himself. But satori is not a calming or even a beautiful experience. It is violent. It tears one apart. All I had known in the past became mental sawdust and dribbled away. I was in the midst of a sort of mental disaster. All values ceased and I merely existed in a world of non-division, of totality. There was no me and my chair, no monk and Abbott, no bell or rice. All was tea and all was me and all was you.

In the Pali Canon of the Theravada or Southern School of Buddhism it is written, "Just as, Brethren, the mighty ocean deepens and slopes gradually down, not plunging by a steep precipice—even so, Brethren, in this Dhamma Discipline the training is gradual, it goes step by step; there is no sudden penetration to insight." And to many people it occurs like this. In fact there are often grades of satori. But even the first little one I described above is very shaking.

2. Meditation with an Indian Guru

The aim of a Hindu is also enlightenment, but it is a much gentler
experience. In India I have had the precious experience of being a guest in several Hindu homes and ashrams. The actual daily life in an ashram or in study with a guru is much the same as in a Zen monastery, but not so rigidly disciplined. We meditated early and late and the greater part of the day was silent. But there were short periods of talk with the teacher, and there were a few sweets to eat now and then along with the vegetarian diet.

Sri Ramakrishna used to say that when a plant is young and tender it is better for a fence to be placed around it so that it will not be blown away or eaten down by animals. But when it has grown to be a great tree, strong and gigantic, not only does it no longer require protection, but it gives protection to many. The animals can then come and dwell under its branches, shielded from the sun and the rain-storm. So it is with our characters.

When one is learning to draw out the inner forces, it is, as in Zen, an effort to penetrate one's own being and to find there a reflection of the basic pattern of life. Sometimes it is difficult. In the Bhagavad Gita the disciple exclaims in despair: "Oh Krishna, Oh Lord! All these beautiful teachings you have given me concerning Self-knowledge and the attainment of divine qualities, I realize that they are true, but I do not see how with this mind I can ever attain such consciousness or make it lasting if I do attain it. For my mind is restless, stubborn and unyielding; I consider it just as difficult to subdue as the wind. When a storm comes, who can control it?" Then the Blessed Lord said: "There is no doubt that the mind is unyielding, strong and stubborn, very difficult to subdue; yet through the practice of discrimination and dispassion it can be subdued."

When the truth is realized, however, it comes more like an addition to what one already has, rather than a subtraction or annihilation of all previous conception, as in Zen. It is almost like being able to keep the Empire State Building pictures while getting a clear view of the Ultimate.

I found there were 3 stages in the meditative process in my study in India. The purpose of meditation is to direct consciously the thought, to acquire control of thought and thus of environment, to uncover the perfection which is within and to express it in relationship to the world. Another way to say this last is to realize Beauty. The Sufi word for God is Beauty. But the source of the beautiful is Beauty itself—God. This is the final ultimate Beauty of which the world is a manifestation.

The first stage of meditation is the realization that God is one.
recurring remembrance. There is a continual frame of reference within the conscious mind to which every thought and deed is brought in terms like, "What do you think of this, dear? Do you agree? Would you too like or dislike this?" All thought of the future seems to be in terms of what can be done together. What cannot be done is easily given up. You don't really want to do anything that cannot include your beloved. There is no thought of sacrifice, of austerity, of denial. The desire is simply not there.

So it is with one who has "broken through." The thought of God or truth, or real Self becomes part of one's being. There is no consciousness apart from this complete and marvelous envelopment by the Beloved - God. Every conscious thought is referred to that Source. Every desire is a response to that constant Presence. One's very life is taken over by this ineffable experience. Thus, to live in accordance with the fact of this Presence involves non-indulgence in many activities which other people think indispensable. Non-indulgence, however, is not even remotely tinged with the thought of sacrifice - of "giving up" something. Oh no, it IS far easier to give up physical life itself than to stray from the all-pervading radiance of this Presence, for it possesses you. And you love it with all your heart, mind, and strength.

Unity, not separateness, is the summary of the search of the mystic, and the burden of his message. At first there is an awareness of both unity and separateness. But if one is conscious enough of unity, then the sense of separateness will gradually disappear. And after that, one realizes that this unity can be real only by the expression of love with no thought of self. This love within, says the Christian, is God, trying in and through the person to reach all the people of the world. Ultimate Reality is Love. This discovery has been made by many saints, poets, and sages of every country and period and religion. Many people also have seen this truth who have not had the spiritual muscles to fashion their lives according to the truth. Some people have honestly tried, and their dissatisfaction with their own efforts has been the inspiration for many who follow after them. They write of their failures. Often the experience is as dry as the rocks under a waterfall during a severe drought, when the winds rush across the rocks like the ghost of last year's water. Sometimes they find their goal, and come to live in that white, still, empty radiance which is the mystic's One.

Conclusion

We shall not understand the first thing about mystics unless we realize they are in love - with the Absolute - with the character of Divine Love. We must accept the statement of most mystics that union with what nearly all of them call the Beloved or Absolute yields ecstasies that the most perfect human love can never know. Ecstasy is a big word, but it is the best description. The writings of people describing this knowledge of one's unity with the universe is almost as wide as the world and as old as pen. Buddha, Christ, Paul, Plotinus, Mohammad, Dante, Boehme, Pascal, Blake - all speak or write of it, and nearly all who have tried to put the experience on paper have stated that the flash of knowledge is inseparable from a sense of brilliant light and ineffable bliss. Perhaps these flashes of cosmic consciousness are tentative visitations of the yet larger and clearer consciousness that all men will possess one day. Do you know the secret document that was found sewn into the clothes of Pascal after his death? Some overwhelming experience must have forced these unrestrained, underlined, excited jottings from Pascal which he desired always to carry about with him but no man ever to see. No modesty of utterance here. He was not minding what critics might say, but caring solely to name a memory in words before it escaped him. It said, "The year of grace, 1654, Monday 23 Nov... from about half past twelve midnight, FIRE... Assurance, joy, assurance, feeling joy, peace... The sublimity of the human soul... Joy, joy, joy, tears of joy... I do not separate myself from Thee..." (Quoted from In The Steps Of St. Francis, by Ernest Raymond).

St. Francis wrote down on parchment the exultation of his own experience at La Verna. You can see it today, in its silver reliquary, the priceless treasure of the brothers of the Sangro Convento in Assisi. "Thou art holy, Lord God... Thou art goodness, all goodness, the goodness, the greatest goodness...Thou art love, thou art wisdom, thou art humility, thou art joy, thou art justice...Thou art infinite goodness, great and admirable Lord God Almighty..."

The experience is great - whether the mystic adores or laughs. It is true and valid - and it can change our world.

Reverend Asahina, the Abbot of the Zen Temple where I was a student, wrote for me his own experience - a more restrained expression, but nevertheless powerfully moving. He wrote it on an exquisitely brocade-bordered kakemono to hang on my wall. It says, "to understand the great experience, I climb up on the highest hill and look down upon the world, and lo, the world is there!"
FAITH AND WORKS IN EAST AND WEST

BY

HENRI CLAVIER

INTRODUCTION

Is there any essential difference between East and West in their religious experiences and doctrines of Faith and Works? A careful study, as we shall see, reveals that the same types are to be found on both sides. Consequently, any fruitful comparison must bear on those types, and not on a somewhat mythical view of East and West as entities radically opposed.

A limited set of typical experiences and creeds must now be selected in some of the most representative religions in East and West. Without ignoring the fact that all such great religions originated in what we call the East, our choice, significant enough, will be drawn from Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity.

Whatever may be our personal convictions, we are used to restrain from value-judgments in the "templa serena" of science, and to confine ourselves to what Albrecht Ritschl called "existence judgments." As F.B. Jevons rightly put it in his well known handbook "An Introduction to the study of Comparative Religion" (London 1908), "The science of religion deals essentially with the one fact that religion has existed and does exist. . . . The science of religion is limited to the establishment of facts and is excluded from judging on the religious value of those facts." (pp. IX, 5) Such limitation does not prevent us from holding, and perhaps very strongly, our appreciations, and from expressing them in other circles. But this is neither the time nor the place for such estimations. Religious beliefs may be right or they may be wrong; religious practices may work good or evil, or a mixture of both; anyhow, they exist, they are facts. This is their grace for a scholar, and a grace sufficient for his specific task.

1 – FAITH AND WORKS IN HINDUISM

Hinduism is a complex where almost any religious motive may be found on the long way from the oldest Vedas to the Upanishads, and further on. The specification of such complexity appears to all scholars as a difficult task. However, a general survey on that wonderful jungle of spiritual products and others, will make it plain that three terms and notions have become very important for the understanding of the whole: Samsara, Karma, Moksha. The wandering of Samsara from existence to existence in an illusive world under the spell of Maya, is considered as a curse of Karma, the inevitable result of the action of one life, the general impulse which at the end of each stage of existenceanches the wanderer on the following one. Moksha is the longed for release from Samsara through the breaking of Karma.

Works, whatever they may be, hold a capital place in the whole system, inasmuch as shaping a karma, they all contribute not merely in launching the following life, but in directing it and making it more or less lucky or miserable. Various destinies in all sorts of shapes are conditioned by the merits, or de-merits of good or evil works in the preceding stages of existence.

Now, if we take the word "Veda" in its early historical meaning, it is very doubtful that anything of the sort may be found. The specific meaning of samsara, karma, moksha does not appear clearly before the Upanishads and it is not sure that hints at it are to be detected in the Brahmanas. There has been a change, the nature and origin of which is discussed amongst scholars specialized in Hinduism. Whatever may be, as Sten Rohde states it on a careful study of texts, in his interesting "Studies on the Vedic Ideas of Salvation" (Lund, 1946, p. 110), we find in all Vedic Scriptures the idea that man is reborn in his offspring or in another world. In both cases, works are determining. The famous funeral hymn in Rig Veda X, 14 speaks of a destiny after death which is conditioned by the merits of works in the present life.

In the later Vedas and in the Brahmanas, a special place is reserved to ascetic and sacrificial rites in the merits which a man may amass. Such meritorious accumulation may increase immensely the powers of man in the present time, and make it easier for him in the time to come, be it lived in another world or in this world. This lesson will not be lost when Karma and Samsara have taken shape in the Upanishads.

The importance of meritorious works is stressed especially for the first stages of the Brahman life: Disciplehood and Householding with the social duties involved. From such standpoint, it is always profitable to behave and act morally, in observing the general or special duties in each condition of life. But in the advanced stages, the so-called Forestdweller stage and the Wandering stage, the final aim and the way to Moksha are wholly discovered. Is it possible, as Sten Rohde
believed (p. 173), to trace a way backwards from a forest or wanderer yogin under Siva's rule to the three-faced meditative figure which has been excavated in Mohenjo-Daro? (ibid. p. 80, 134). It seems more prudent to wait for other plainer discoveries before assuming any definite position in such a case. But it remains that in the Upanishad of Vidyā, the delivering knowledge as the hermit meditates it in his forest or in his wandering, reveals to him the entire truth and the way of release. Salvation cannot be earned through merits and works, whatever they may be, for all of them, good or evil cooperate in winning up the cursed clock of Karma which has to be stopped in order to stop the perpetual motion of Samsara, with its trials without end. The wise man no more cares for meritorious or sinful deeds, but for deliverance from good and evil works, from birth and death, from all opposite pairs. As Kausitaki Upanishad, I, 4 puts it: "The wise man who reaches the world of Brahman shakes off his good and evil deeds. Then, just as one driving a chariot looks down upon the two chariot wheels, thus he looks down upon day and night, thus upon good deeds and evil deeds, and upon all pairs of opposites. This one, devoid of good deeds, devoid of evil deeds, a knower of Brahman, unto very Brahman goes on." The saving power of Vidyā, a salvation from works through knowledge, but a sort of knowledge which might confine to Faith, is affirmed strongly in this statement of Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, V, 14,8: "Even so one who knows this, although he commits very much evil, consumes it all and becomes clean and pure, ageless and free from death" (cf. Sten Rohde, op. cit. p. 168).

Besides, it is to be noted that the connection between Karma, Avidyā (ignorance) and Kāma (desire) had already been stated by the Upanishads when Sakyanuni started from there with another philosophy, opening a new way, which has been almost shut in India, but has found many followers elsewhere. It seems probable that before being expelled from it's native soil, Buddhism has had some influence on the notion of Samsara as it was held later on in Hinduism (cf. Rohde, ibid., p. 132).

Long afterwards, the old tree of Hinduism was to shoot a still more congenial ramification than Buddhism when Vidyā which had confined to faith became really Faith with it's more dynamic power against the curse of Works and Karma. This happened in the Bhakti which has been termed a pietistic religion of Faith in the form which it took with Ramanuja, it's main theologian. His protest is well known against the monism and acosmism of Shankara, where the world and the gods are fictions belonging to the great illusion and cheat of Maya and

Avidyā. Ishvara is a real god, the living God of salvation. By his grace, and not by knowledge or works are we released from the evils of our human life. The great problems of Grace and Faith, of Faith and Works are now in the foreground, as never before with Hinduism, and four centuries before they were debated in the West at the time of the Protestant Reformation.

Rudolf Otto has given in his remarkable essay "Die Gnadenreligion und das Christentum" (Gotha, 1930), a vivid comparative dyptique of the debate on both sides, with the same tendencies towards Synergism and Monergism. Starting from the mystical trend of the Bhagavad-gītā, Ramanuja had vindicated the reality of his fellowship with a real god, Ishvara, and the real grace of Ishvara answering his living faith, and saving not through works, but through faith. Some of his followers wondered whether Faith itself ought not to be considered as a work, as Work "par excellence", being the participation of man to his own salvation. Others denied it and preferred to Bhakti which means faith and love, another term: prapatti, self surrender to God in his all-sufficient and all-powerful grace. And thus, two schools arose, opposed and often embittered in their strife about synergism or monergism. A picturesque comparison characterized them as the ape and the cat school. For when the young monkey is in danger, it sticks to its mother which takes it away and saves it, provided that the small creature holds firmly to her; that is synergism. But when such thing happens for a kitten, the mother takes it by the neck and carries it away. The kitten has nothing to do; this is monergism. (R. Otto, op. cit., p. 39).

Whatever may be of those subtleties, the principle of Salvation by Faith has now permeated Bhakti Hinduism.

II—Faith and Works in Buddhism

Buddhism is grafted on Hinduism at the point where Karma and Kama collude. The general outlook and the goal are the same: Moksha as the deliverance from Samsara through the stopping or breaking of Karma. The means of release are different, not merely because the relation between existence and desire is more completely and minutely analysed in Buddhism than in Hinduism, but also and even more as a consequence of the psychological trend of the whole Buddhistic system. Metaphysically, Buddhism is at the antipode of Hinduism, as phenomenon to substantialism. The great revelation of the Upanishads is the common substance of ātman and brahman, expressed in the famous "Tat twam as" which enchanted Schopenhauer. In Buddhism, there is no substance at all, but mere phenomenon of the
same nature and under the same rule in the world and in man. Their aggregates and conglomerates, the skandhas are built similarly on both sides. The dharma, the law of their aggregation or disaggregation, is the same in man and in the universe. No "psychologism" is more consequent and radical than the Buddhist one.

Now, as in Hinduism, there are early stages when the Buddha is urged to live a normal social life in acquiring merits by his moral conduct. But at the end of the Eightfold Path, the merit-carrying saint, the arahat in Pali, the language of oldest Buddhism, has given up any activity, rejected any care and killed any desire of individual life and existence. He is ready for Nirvana.

As archbishop Nathan Söderblom finely and sympathetically puts it (Dieu Vivant dans l'Histoire, pp. 164-168, Paris 1937), this rather egoist way of seeking for a disintegration of the "ego" seems to have been repudiated by the Buddha himself through an inspired reaction of his benevolent and generous nature against the logical conclusion of his philosophy. According to some older sources, he was tempted by Mara, the evil one, who fearing his blessed influence on men, endeavored to persuade him that he ought to leave at once this world of misery and enjoy without delay the Nirvana which he had merited. The Buddha did not yield to the allurement of Mara and decided to remain on earth in order to go on preaching his doctrine of salvation and thus helping his fellow-men on the Path to Nirvana. One may consider with the great occumenical archbishop, who was at the same time a prominent scholar in comparative religion, that the fruitful notion of Bodhisattva, which has taken such an extent in the Mahayana, originates in that ancient tradition. Every Bodhisattva accumulates merits not only for himself, but for others. A transfer of merits is admitted in Mahayana Buddhism, not merely in the case of a Bodhisattva, but for the priesthood. This special prayer of the candidates is typical: "Let the merit which I have gained be shared by my lord; it is fitting to give me to share in the merit gained by my lord." (Upasampada Kammavaccha, or ritual for admission to the Buddhist priesthood. Cf. L.H. Gray: art. Merit, in Hastings E.R.E, VIII, p. 561)

A mystical movement similar to the Indian Bhakti, but combined with the notion of Bodhisattva, seems to have invaded China from the West as early as the 4th or 5th century, with the worship of Amitāyus or Amitābha, the Buddha of infinite Life and Light. Some, as J. Bukod (in Hist. Générale des Relig., IV, 496, Paris 1947) would suggest Iranian influences, or, later on, Christian-nestorian ones. T. H. Robinson (A short comparative Hist. of Relig. p. 80, London 1951) considers the mystical trend and doctrine of Amitābha in China and Amida in Japan as wholly alien to the spirit of Buddhism at its origins. A like opinion might be held when one considers some alien characters of the Bhakti in the frame of Hinduism. Whatever may be the influences which they have received or not, both Bhaktis did follow a similar process towards a doctrine of Salvation not through works, but through faith. However, the Chinese or Japanese one would retain a certain transfer of merits, those of the Amitāyus – Buddha in Amitābha or Amida, to the faithful worshipper. This would mark the persistent action of the notion of Bodhisattva.

I am sure that much will be taught to us in this country about Amida, the Japanese Bhakti, which is generally considered as the most developed and perfect one in Buddhism. We shall hear more than we know about its origins and history, with Hōnen Shōnin, the Japanese Reformer of Mahayana, who protested against the scholastic soteriological systems of Tendai or Shingon, and who opened the way to the complete release from Samsara, to salvation through faith in Amida Buddha, the way to the Pure Land of Bliss, the way of Jōdo-Shū. In his comments which have been published by the International Missionary Council in Report I of the Jerusalem Meeting in 1928, a priest of Jōdo who wrote about Hōnen, Ishizuka San states these points of doctrine which are related to Faith and works: "Having disappeared for several hundred years, the Buddha's power came again to the world about 110 B.C. in a new form of faith in the Buddha of boundless life and light (Skr. Amītāyus Buddha). He not only redeemed us from the bondage of sin, but also piled up merits to deserve one's birth into that Buddha land of perfect Bliss. The very indefectible virtues of these accumulated merits he concentrated in his own name, wishing all sentient beings to appropriate the same by calling upon his name, and promising that whenever any would from their hearts so call on him, he would grant them birth into his Pure Land of Nirvana. This birth is the so-called "new birth" or regeneration of Jōdo Buddhism." Concluding his remarks, Ishizuka San asserts that "you may easily see" salvation by faith "in Hōnen's Buddhology as in Pauline theology."

This is true, when one compares Hōnen's doctrine to the Zen with its remarkable philosophy of the will as it is presented in Prof. D. T. Suzuki's "Essais sur le Bouddhisme-Zen" (Paris 1955). Spiritual contention and drilling of the will, as it is practised in Zen, still belongs to the sphere of works from which Jōdo breaks for the "easy way" of Faith. But in Jōdo itself, the same debate which we have mentioned in Ramanuja's movement has appeared, with it's parallel in Church
III - FAITH AND WORKS IN CHRISTIANITY

The need for a return to the sources has marked Christianity many times, and still now. A bird's eye view on Faith and Works in Church History would often reveal that sort of nostalgic strain which it might be difficult to find where the progress has partly or mostly consisted in getting further and further from mythical or doubtful origins. Facing all the complications which appeared in the course of times, the scholar himself cannot do better than recur to the same sources, in his own way.

We might find in Church History several periods when the problem of Faith and Works came in the foreground of the theological debate. None would be more fit than the time when Augustinus polemised against Pelagius. But in relation with the parallels which have already been traced, we shall rather apply to the renewal of such polemics in the crucial period of the Reformation.

According to Roman Catholic Theology at the time and yet now, "good works are truly and properly meritorious, and that not merely of some particular reward, but of eternal life itself." (R. Bellarmine: de Justificatione, V, 1). There are requirements imposed on every one, and one may be content with observing them. But it is possible to do more than what God requires, and thus to accumulate merits for a higher call. The merits thus stored up will be used for others who are short of them. This is the principle of the Roman Catholic dogma of Supererogation and Reversibility of Merits. Works of Supererogation are works not absolutely required of each individual for his own redemption, but which may be added for the sake of greater perfection,

and of the Church who thus possesses a sort of pool in which she draws to eke out the deficient merits of others. In that way, the infinite satisfaction of our Lord's sacrifice, the superabundant virtues of the Virgin Mary and the superabundant merits of the Saints constitute a priceless fund administered by the Church. This is the starting point of the doctrine and practice of Indulgences, which has been maintained by the Council of Trent, and is still in honour, in spite of the well known excesses which decided Luther to take his decisive step.

Referring to St. Paul and to his basal creed of Justification by Faith, Luther asserts that the whole system of merit and good works as mean of salvation, however moderated by admitting a cooperation of divine grace (meritum de condigno), is entirely wrong and opposed to the pure Gospel. He thus rejects the scholastic method of classifying and calculating merits after the quantity or quality of works: the seven Works of Corporal Mercy: to feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, visit prisoners, visit the sick, harbour strangers, bury the dead; the seven Works of Spiritual Mercy: to convert sinners, instruct the ignorant, counsel the doubtful, console the afflicted, bear wrongs patiently, forgive injuries, pray for the living and the dead. — The value of works and the duty to perform them does not imply in the least any saving merit nor justifying efficiency. Redemption comes from God through Christ: sola gratia, sola fide.

If we now resort to the sources, which no Christian Church ever officially disowned, the following landmarks will become clear to us: Jesus rejects the legalism of the Scribes and of the Pharisees, with their doctrine of good works and of merit. The deeply spiritual interpretation of the commandments of the Law which he gave in the Sermon on the Mount as well as the reaction of the disciples when he speaks of riches are to be concluded by the same word: "With men this is impossible; but with God, all things are possible" (cf. Matth. 5: 21 ff; 19: 21-26). Let us observe here that the greek text does not say "syn", but "para Theo", which is neutral towards the problem of synergism or monergism.

Nevertheless, in his moral teaching, Jesus maintains the notions of reward and punishment, as it appears drastically in the description of the last judgment which has inspired so many artists: "For the Son of Man will come in the glory of his Father with his angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works" (Matth, 16: 27). True to say, in the lesson adopted by Nestle and which really seems the best, the term is not "kata ta erga", "but kata ten praxin", which has a different meaning and would rather suggest the practical
application of principles, the practical conformity to faith.

If there were any ambiguity in such statements, it would vanish away when Jesus compares the relation of God and men, as He does, to that of a master and his household servants (Matt. 25: 45 ff; 25: 14 ff; Luk. 17: 9, etc.). One must remember here that the "doulos" at the time of Jesus was in the hand of his master, almost as man is in the hand of God, so that with such comparison any idea of merit is repudiated. The most striking instance is in Luke 17: 7-10, where the servant has not even to be thanked because he did the things that were commanded him. "So likewise ye, when ye shall have done those things which are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which was our duty to do" (v. 10). The authorized version is once more inadequate when it translates "achreios" by unprofitable. Nor are most French versions better when they put "inutile". The exact meaning would be: without merit, in this context. Evidently, the dutiful servant is not useless nor even worthless, but without any merit to claim or vindicate in the face of God. This truth is stated most drastically in the similitude of the paid labourers (Matt. 20: 1-16), with the well-known conclusion: "So the last shall be first, and the first last" (v. 16). In the one case where Jesus might implicate merit with reward and payment, in works for God as in the work for men, he deliberately breaks the rule. God's gracious will transcends any human rule and is not bound by any bill of rights nor of labour.

The difficult problem which arises from such statements will find it's key in a comparison between merit and worth. A keen analysis of the notion of worth in the Gospel and in itself has been made by Dean Raoul Allier, who came to this country with my professor and often inspired Henri Bois, fifty years ago, and who prefaced the French version of Ouchiwomura Kanzo's biography: "La crise d'âme d'un Japonais." The "achreios" servant is not necessarily worthless. He may be unworthy and obnoxious when doing evil; he may be useless when passive, as the last servant in the parable of the talents (Matt. 25: 30, with the second instance of achreios which is used only twice in the N.T.). He may be worthy and he is, when he performs his duty towards God and men (cf. R. Allier: Études Theol. et Relig., 1927, and H. Clavier: Le Christianisme et le Travail, p. 116, 1944). Such prospect is opened by Jesus himself when he lays stress on the personal worth of him who works rather than on the performance of works. What makes works efficient, although meritless, is the personality thus manifested and revealed at work, "For the tree is known by his fruit" (Matt. 12: 33; cf. 7: 16-19). What is worthy, though meritless, in the eye of God himself is not works as such, ta erga, but H PRAXIS, as the actual and active manifestation of the person (cf. supra, Matt. 16: 27). And thus, it may happen that the labourer of the last hour, perhaps a converted heathen, reveals himself as worthier in quality of soul and personality than the one of the first hour with the whole bulk and quantity of his works — "God doeth the works" (John 14: 10) — On the same line, according to St. Paul, good works are not the condition, but the fruit of the Spirit (Gal. 5: 22 f), and the result of a saving faith (Eph. 2: 8-10). Justification starts from faith (ek pistóës, Rom. 5: 1), making of us the work of God through His grace and giving us power for the good works which He proposes to our effort. Paul's experience and doctrine of Justification from and through Faith which inspired Augustine, Luther and many others till now, springs from his incapacity of doing the good which he sees and consents. This harrowing contradiction in his nature, as he describes it pathetically in Romans 7, leads him to complete surrender through faith in God's only powerful grace. Such devotion which bears much resemblance with the Bhaktis, has become the classical Protestant standpoint. Kierkegaard goes so far as to bless such human impotence which constrains the sinner to humility and self-surrender to God alone, and, as Calvin proclaimed, Soli Deo Gloria. — Now, it remains doubtful that all this should mean a strict monergism, without any participation of man to his own destiny, and the debate goes on in Protestant Christianity as in the Bhaktis. In fact, Paul himself suggests literally synergism when he states in 1 Cor. 3: 9: "We are labourers with God (Thou gar esmen synergōs)." His ministry is one of cooperation with Christ (2 Cor. 6: 1), and one possible translation of his faith might be that God cooperates in all for good to them that love Him (Rom. 8: 28).

Whatever may be of our participation which could never imply any merit of works, but should always be considered as a requirement from God and a grace, Paul sees very clearly the danger of a quietism which would be ruinous of any christian life, of any Christianity (cf. Rom. 6: 1 f). Faith that justifies cannot but produce works. If not, it is no real Faith, as Paul, and after him Luther describe it in it's marvellous fullness and richness, but just that petty faith that James has meant when he declares: "Faith, if it has not works, is dead in itself" (James 2: 17, 20). Paul and James are not on the same level, and one may conclude with Albrecht Ritschl, that the rubric of good works does not express adequately the specific genius of Christian ethics. (Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, III, 627).
CONCLUSION

The specific genius of any creative religion is traceable in the doctrines, experiences, behaviours and practices which it has shaped. Specification is the main task of comparative religion. As F.B. Jevons rightly noted in his already quoted Introduction ..., (p. X), “It is sometimes supposed that to admit that all religions are comparable is to admit that all are identical; but, in truth, it is only because they differ that it is possible to compare them.” Many centuries ago, St. Augustine, had already given the principal without of course realizing its far-off range and bearing: “Ek tou paraλλελου to diaphoron.” From the parallel (to draw) the difference. For any methodical and fruitful comparison, both the differences and the resemblances must be assumed to exist.

There is no specification of East and West; but there is one for the great religions which we have compared, and applying Ephrem’s intuitive statement, we shall detect that specificity even in the striking resemblances which we have noted in their conceptions of Faith and Works.

The most extraordinary parallel is the common doctrine of Salvation through Faith in the Bhaktis and in Christianity. As long as Faith is taken in itself, absolutely, as in a Fideist system, one might fancy that it comes to the same on each picture of the triptyque. But it is plain that the nature, the quality and the efficiency of Faith, however deep, intimate, intrinsical it may be, are not without relation to it’s object. This object is conceived as divine on all parts; but the divine is conceived quite differently in the Bhaktis which are themselves not identical in spite of their near relation, and Christianity. The International Buddhist Congress of 1925 did very well see the incompatibility of the Biblical God with essential Mahayanim, and though slightly different, the incompatibility of the same God with essential Hinduism must be recognized as well, in spite of all moving similarities in piety, mystical expressions and apparent behaviours. If we venture to use such a disputed term as mystical, it will not be without specifying that it has various meanings, that there are two fundamentally different types of mysticism, and that a genuine Christian mysticism would be strongly personal. It does not appear to be the same, whether in Hinduism nor in Buddhism at their best (cf. H. Clavier: L’Expérience de la Vie Eternelle, Paris 1923). Ramanuja’s God and communion with him in faith are marked with a stamp of striking reality on the background of traditional Hinduism; nevertheless, they are ahead on the same line and if set on the background of Biblical and Christian

“personalism”, they suddenly look shadowy and evanescent. Isn’t it the same, and may be more when we pass from Ishvara to Amida?

In his articles on “Elevation of Personal character” (1927) a Buddhist scholar, Professor Takahasu says of Amittābha and Vairochana, the of the Dhyanibuddhas, that “they are nothing more or less than objective expressions of ideals possessed by the Buddha in his mind, in short idealized Buddhas.” Ishizuka San, the Jōdo priest whom we have already quoted, gives a drastic confirmation of such impersonality of God, and consequently of man: “We have,” writes he, “no external creator nor upholder. God, if any in Buddhism, is the Dharma. He exists in the sense of life or the power of the universe in itself. He is compared to the Christian God.... The anatman doctrine of Buddhism rejects every thought of ego or soul-entity.... There is no idea of remission of sins in Buddhism, as there is no God in the sense of the Ruler of all things in the universe” (op. cit. pp. 170, 175 f.).

Compared to the Christian God, says he; but the Biblical-Christian God is strongly personal with a predilection for persons, for personalities that He has created at His image and resemblance in the real world of which He is the Creator and Upholder. Men are apart from God in an ethical sense, because they are sinners, whilst God is holy, holy, but a Father loving and merciful who encounters the repentant prodigal son and forgives him. The first way to salvation is the way of return, of conversion (metanoia), with God’s remission of sins on the way. The Mediator of salvation is no ideal nor mythical figure, but an incarnate, real, historical person: Jesus-Christ. No other faith has so much to do with history, true history, as the Christian faith; we have already noted it’s constant yearning for the sources, historical sources. The real person, the real teaching (if possible, tpeissima verba), the real sacrifice of Jesus Christ, the objective reality of the whole are of capital importance for a Christian. With such marked peculiarities, coming to Christ cannot be the prolongation of other ways, but means a rupture, a break. In spite of his great and comprehensive sympathy for other faiths, and especially for the Hindu Bhakti, Rudolf Otto realized this perfectly well (op. cit. and Jerusalem Report, I, 383), as the Buddhist Congress, although differently.

Faith in Christ leads to God and saves in proportion of the radical change or regeneration which it starts and accomplishes in man through God’s grace. And this means Works, new works, works in a new spirit. Such Works are no condition, no preliminary step to Redemption through Christ, but the outflow of a redeeming faith, the result of essentials which are not to be found elsewhere.
Finally, as we have noted, works are secondary for different reasons, in all three religions at their best; but they are not neglectable, and in Christianity at least they are considered as the fruit without which the tree would be cursed (cf. Matt. 21:19). Now, at whatever stage works are to be considered, all three religions will agree that they ought to be good. And if there was a doubt on what is good or evil, St. Paul would advise us to appeal from the official codes to the Unwritten Law which is the same for all, for all human Conscience (Rom. 2:14, 15). Similarly, when in Athens, he had appealed from the Greek gods to the Unknown God “who is not far,” said he, “from every one of us” (Acts 17:23, 27).

HINDUISM AND THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ
— A FRESH APPROACH —

BY
RAMACHANDRA N. DANDEKAR

A proper appreciation of the essential distinction between Vedism (which is more popularly known as Brahmanism) on the one hand and Hinduism on the other would ensure the right perspective in the study of the ancient Indian religious thought. Broadly speaking, the Brahmanic thought, which was, in a sense, an exotic on the Indian soil, may be said to have developed—both in logical as well as chronological sequence—from the stage of the cosmic-heroic ideology of the Vedic Samhitas, through the stage of the mechanical sacerdotalism of the Brāhmaṇas, to the stage of the monistic idealism of the Upaniṣads. Paradoxically enough, this last stage, which, indeed, represented the very acme of Vedic speculations, also proved to be, from a certain point of view, the harbinger of the decline of Vedism as such. On account of some of their peculiar characteristics the Upaniṣadic teachings, which were the result of the thought of the few, could not possibly become translated into the way of life of the many. This state of things gave rise to three main tendencies, each tendency representing, in its own way, a significant turning point in the cultural history of ancient India. Firstly, systems of thought, like Buddhism and Jainism, which are generally regarded as heterodox because they do not accept the ultimate validity of the Veda but which can be actually traced back to an indigenous Indian origin in the form of a common pre-Vedic thought-complex, were quick in taking advantage of the atmosphere of free thinking created by the Upaniṣads and of the religious vacuum which had been engendered at that time. They carried their appeal to the masses with great vigour, and ultimately succeeded, to a large extent, in winning them over. This resulted in the rapid growth of those heterodox religions—particularly Buddhism—and the corresponding decline of Brahmanism. But Brahmanism, which had such a glorious past, could by no means be expected to become altogether extinct under the pressure—howsoever strong—of the non-Brahmanic movements. On the contrary, by way of a reaction against the growing
popularity of the non-Brahmanic thought, it made a last bid for retaining its lost prestige. This was the second tendency, which found its literary expression in the Sūtras and the ancillary Vedic literature called Vedāṅgas. The third tendency steered a course intermediate between the anti-Brahmanism of the heterodox religions on the one hand and the revivalism of the promoters of the Sūtra-Vedāṅga movement on the other.

Even from very early times, there had existed in India, side by side with the hieratic Vedic religion, several popular tribal religions. The gods and goddesses of these tribal people were different from the divinities of the official Vedic pantheon. Their religious practices also differed fundamentally from the religious practices of the Vedic Aryan. Indeed, these tribal religions were definitely non-Vedic in provenance and character. It is even possible to discover their beginnings in the ideology of the pre-Vedic indigenous population of India. From this point of view at least, they were more akin to the heterodox systems of thought referred to above. But there was one point of essential difference between these two. These popular tribal religions soon came under the spell of Vedism. And, though they did not actually adopt the ideology and practices of Vedism in any appreciable measure, they followed the very practical and realistic course of avowing allegiance to the Veda—however nominal and superficial that allegiance might have proved to be in actual practice. Naturally, enough, while Brahmanism had been in ascendancy, the sphere of influence of these popular religions was restricted to the respective tribes among whom they had originated. They could not have then emerged as quite the forces to reckon with. But the decline of Brahmanism afforded them an opportunity to assert themselves. It would, indeed, seem that the rear-guards of Brahmanism had themselves encouraged these popular religions to a certain extent. For, they must have soon realized that the challenge of the heterodox movements could not be effectively met by mere revivalist efforts. A common popular front was required to be presented against them. Consequently, most of the popular religions, with their variety of gods and religious practices, came to be organized into one single but multi-charactered whole, which was held together by means of the thin thread of their allegiance to the Veda. This is the genesis of Hinduism. Hinduism, in its origin, was verily a parliament of religions, over which the Veda formally presided, but whose normal functioning, like any other presiding authority in modern parliamentary systems, it does not seem to have noticeably influenced. It may be pointed out that the third tendency, mentioned above, manifested itself in the form of Hinduism, which, while effectively arresting the growth of anti-Brahmanic thought, successfully combated the insularity and exclusiveness of Brahmanism by bringing together under its ban large masses of people and, at the same time, kept the Vedic tradition alive.

One very significant constituent of this all-inclusive Hinduism was Kṛṣṇaism. This religion seems to have originated and spread among the tribes of Western and Central India, like the Vṛṣṇis, the Sātavatas, the Abhiras, and the Yādavas. Its principal teacher was Kṛṣṇa who is seen to have been associated with the above-mentioned tribes in one way or another. He was presumably the temporal head as well as the spiritual leader of those tribes, and was, in course of time, transformed into a tribal god. That this tribal god and the religious movement inspired by him were originally not countenanced by the hieratic Vedic religion is indicated by the episode of the Govardhana mountain (Harivamśa 72-73), which portrays the chief Vedic God Indra's antagonism to and subsequent subjugation by Kṛṣṇa. This is clearly symbolical of the popular tribal religion having prevailed over the hieratic Brahmanic religion. But the religion of Kṛṣṇa may generally be said to be typifying the paradoxical characteristic of Hinduism, mentioned above, namely, a fundamental departure from Brahmanism so far as its basic tenets are concerned coupled with a deliberate non-abjuration of loyalty to the Veda.

The Bhagavadgītā (BG), which is by far the most well-known religious-philosophical text in Sanskrit, may be looked upon as an authoritative manual of Kṛṣṇaite religion, philosophy, and ethics. When, in the course of the growth of the Mahābhārata (MBh), the bardic historical poem, Jaya, was being transformed into the primary epic, Bhārata, two principal processes had been in operation, namely, the bardic enlargement of the original ballad-cycle relating to the Kuru-Bharatas and the Kṛṣṇaite redaction of the bardic material. Presumably the BG served as the cornerstone-of this Kṛṣṇaite superstructure. It has, however, to be remembered that, though the BG originally epitomised the teachings of Kṛṣṇa, after it had been included into the epic, like the rest of the epic, it also was subjected to the final process of Brahmanic revision.

The religion of Kṛṣṇa differed from the Vedic ideology, firstly, in its teaching about the goal of human life. The Upaniṣads, which give the most consummate expression to the Vedic thought in this connection, have generally put forth the view that, since this phenomenal
world and the human existence, so far as it is governed by the body-mind-complex, are fundamentally unreal, man must renounce this worldly life and aim at realizing the essential identity of his soul with the Universal Self, which is the one and the only absolute reality. It will be thus seen that the Upaniṣadic attitude is essentially individualistic and, to a large extent, negative. The BG, on the other hand, teaches that man’s chief duty is the promotion of lokaśamgraha, that is to say, of the stability, solidarity, and progress of the society. The society can function properly only on the principle of ethical interdependence of its various constituents. Man, therefore, must see to it that as an essential constituent of society, he furthers the completion by men of their respective svadharma or specific social obligations. The svadharma or social obligations of different types of men, according to the BG, best embodied in the doctrine of ciiturvarṇya or the scheme of four social orders. Though the adoption of this doctrine by the BG may have been due, to a certain extent, to the Brahmanic influence, the way in which it has sponsored it is peculiar to its own. Unlike the Brahmanic texts, the BG never refers to the superiority of one social order to another. It consistently emphasizes only the socio-ethical significance of that scheme. All social orders are equal and essential from the socio-ethical point of view. It would, indeed, seem that the insistence of the BG was mainly on man’s active recognition of his svadharma or social obligations, the ciiturvarṇya being referred to – almost by way of an example – as a scheme, which, in the context of certain specific circumstances, best ensured the recognition by men of their respective svadharma.

The second fundamental point in which the BG differs from the Vedic thought follows logically from the first. As indicated above, the Upaniṣadic ideal of spiritual emancipation through self-realization presupposes the acceptance of the unreal character of the phenomenal world. Through his actions, man gets entangled, consciously or unconsciously, in the tantalizing affairs of this fictitious world and is thus removed farther and farther away from his goal. A complete abnegation of action, therefore, came to be regarded almost as a sine qua non of a true seeker’s spiritual quest. On the other hand, the ideal of lokaśamgraha through the fulfilment of svadharma, enjoined by the BG, necessarily implies an active way of life. The BG, indeed, often speaks in terms of yoga (from the root yuj—to apply oneself to) rather than of mokṣa (from the root mokṣ—to untie or to loose). The teacher of the BG has discussed, at great length, the why and the how of this karmayoga. Verily, that is the main theme of the poem. The activism which the BG seeks to inculcate is, however, not of the common type. It is certainly unique in that it is tinged – perhaps, under the influence of the Upaniṣadic thought – with some element of renunciation. The BG attempts to reconcile its ideal of lokaśamgraha or social solidarity and progress with the Upaniṣadic ideal of mokṣa or spiritual ascertainment of an individual. It argues that action, as such, does not prove detrimental to one’s attainment of his spiritual goal. It is his attachment to the fruits of his actions that keeps him eternally involved in the cycle of births and deaths. The BG, therefore, teaches its Yoga or skilful art of “how to act without being involved in the consequences of action”. It teaches the anāsaktiyoga, that is, renunciation in action and not of action.

But the activism (karmayoga) of the BG must by no means be confused with the way of work (karmahāňḍa) of the ritualistic texts. If the way of renunciation, taught by the Upaniṣads, was inconsistent with the ideal of the BG, the way of work taught by the Brāhmanes and the Sūtras, which was actually constituted of ritualistic practices and as a reaction against which the Upaniṣadic doctrine of renunciation had evolved, was more so. The elaborate and the highly complex system of sacrifice could never have become the religion of the people. Kṛṣṇa, therefore, sponsored a way of spiritual life in which everybody – irrespective of caste, creed and sex – could participate. It was the way of bhakti or devotion. The way of bhakti presupposes the recognition of a personal god – in the present context, of course, Kṛṣṇa himself – who is regarded as being responsible for the creation, preservation, and destruction of the universe. The devotee serves that God like a loyal servant, always craving for some kind of personal communion with Him. The criterion of true worship, according to the doctrine of bhakti, is not the richness or profuseness of the materials used for worship nor the number and variety of religious observances involved in it. It is rather the urge and the earnestness, the faith and the sense of complete surrender to the Divine on the part of the devotee. Such a bhakta – whatever his age, sex, learning, and social status –, indeed, compels God to become his friend, guide and philosopher. The way of bhakti is thus more simple, more direct, and more effective than any other religious practice. And the cultural history of India bears ample testimony to the fact that the cult of bhakti has proved to be the only force, which could unite large and heterogeneous masses of people into one truly democratic religious brotherhood. In his teaching of bhakti, however, Kṛṣṇa has made one significant addition. He has insisted
that a true karmayogin (that is, one who adopts the activism as taught by the BG) alone can become a true bhakta, for, by following his svadharma, the karmayogin is only promoting the will of God and is participating in the divine project.

It has already been pointed out that the BG could not altogether give up the Upanishadic ideal of mokṣa. It could not also altogether evade the ritualism of the Brāhmaṇas. While, therefore, coordinating it with its own thought-pattern, the BG stressed the spirit of the sacrificial ritual rather than its form. It seems to have been suggested that, just as lokasamgraha implies the ethical interdependence in the social sphere, sacrifice implies the ethical interdependence in the cosmic sphere.

Krṣṇaism cannot boast of any independent philosophical system of its own. As a shrewd leader of the people, Krṣṇa had realized that what the people wanted was not so much an abstract, metaphysical way of thought but a concrete, practical way of life. He, therefore, gave them a religion and a code of conduct. The different schools of philosophy, which were then prevailing, tended, on the one hand, to confound the people at large and, on the other, to encourage dogmatism among their respective followers. And dogmatism—whether religious or philosophical—often divides rather than unites. The BG therefore, instead of diluting upon the points of difference among the various systems of thought and practice, emphasised the points of agreement among them and thereby brought about a positive philosophical and religious synthesis. As a matter of fact synthesis is the very watchword of Hinduism.

It has been already suggested that, at one stage, like the other parts of the MBh, the BG also underwent a kind of Brahmanic reorientation—howsoever artificial and superficial that reorientation might have been. This is, indeed, true of Hinduism as a whole. One of the more significant results of this reorientation, so far as the personality of Krṣṇa was concerned, was that that tribal god, who was essentially non-Vedic in origin and whose character had already become syncretic, came to be regarded as an avatāra (incarnation) of the All-god and also as being identical with the Upaniṣadic brahman.

NATURAL MYSTICISM IN ZEN

BY

HEINRICH DUMOULIN

The early reports about Zen which reached Europe were not adequate to impart a vital knowledge of this most original form of Oriental mysticism. Thanks especially to the influence of the works of D.T. Suzuki the appreciation of Zen Buddhism in Europe and America underwent a complete change.

In order to make the psychological peculiarity of Zen comprehensible to the Western reader, Suzuki employed, especially in his early writings, the categories of the American school of the psychology of Religion. Taking as his point of departure the four well-known characteristics of the mystic state as formulated by William James (Ineffability, Noetic Quality, Transiency and Passivity), he set forth eight characteristics of the Zen enlightenment known as Satori, which he analyzed individually. These categories, however, are quite general, and apply equally to all types of mysticism. It is in their elucidation that Suzuki seeks by word and example taken from the Zen masters to set forth the traits peculiar to Zen. He attaches prime importance to the “Impersonal Tone” which is to be above all the distinguishing mark of Satori in contrast to Christian mysticism. Already Heiler, in his studies in Hinayāna, had emphasized the striking difference between the cool, impassive concentration of Buddhism and the ardent consciousness of God in Christian mysticism.

Suzuki is indebted to James’ celebrated “The Varieties of Religious Experience” for yet another suggestion in his psychological understanding of the Satori. James regards the hidden powers which break forth from the subconscious as a major source of religious energy. His formulations seemingly inspired Suzuki, when he termed Satori “an insight into the Unconscious” and designated the driving power which leads to enlightenment as “a certain desperate will”, which is “impelled by some irrational or unconscious power behind it.” It is worthy of note that many works of the Zen masters who seapk of “seeing into one’s nature” and of “the original countenance before birth” point in the
same direction.

We encounter here a remarkable complexity of relationships. The interest in the unconscious brought into the foreground of European thought through the science of depth psychology, has been recognized in Asia since antiquity. Not only did the Indian philosophers carefully observe dreams and unconscious states, but they built the unconscious into their metaphysical systems. Especially among the Buddhists, whose doctrine of the store-consciousness with its content of hidden seeds plays an important role, one finds striking parallels to the views of modern depth psychology. It is therefore no mere coincidence that the introduction of the concept of the unconscious to occidental thought during the nineteenth century by the romantic school, was preceded by a previous encounter with the spiritual world of Asia. It was the romanticists Schelling and especially C.G. Carus, who, out of a full awareness of the deep psychic layers of the human soul, first spoke of the significance of the subconscious. Eduard von Hartmann’s “Philosophy of the Unconscious” (1869) was influenced by Buddhism by way of Schopenhauer. He understands the unconscious, not psychologically, but metaphysically. The renewed encounter between the psychology of the unconscious and oriental thought in the interpretation of Zen by Suzuki and C.G. Jung can be viewed against this fascinating background.

On the basis of the material furnished by Suzuki, Jung declared the experience of Zen to be the breaking forth of the unconscious forces of the human psyche which exhibits the totality of the nature of the soul, both its conscious and its unconscious strata. According to Jung, the “great liberation” of Satori is nothing other than the salvation of the unconscious. For conscious psychic life is constantly limited and obstructed. On the other hand, “the unconscious... is a non-manifest totality of all subliminal psychic factors, a potentially total view.”

Jung’s interpretation of the Satori experience in terms of depth psychology sheds new light upon it, and provides us with the key to interpret many natural mystical phenomena. This interpretation makes clear the specific changes which occur in the states of consciousness, as well as in the psychic mechanisms they entail, but the mystical experience itself, which precisely in its mystical character points beyond the mere psychic realm, cannot be fully explained in this manner.

In similar fashion the French scholar, Benoît, regarded Satori as basically the integration or realization of man in his psychic totality. Modern psychologists expect from Zen an enrichment of their thera-...
natural cognitive power of man. As a supernatural manifestation it belongs to a higher order than natural mysticism, even though there may be a similarity in the psychological structure of the two experiences.

In mysticism we speak of magic phenomena wherever the extraordinary state is extorted by unnatural bodily or psychic methods. Among such forms of magic can be included hypnoses, suggestions, hallucinations, as well as ecstatic states induced by intoxication, sexual incitements, or other stimuli. Such means may, on occasion, heal the sick soul, but they are essentially unnatural and harmful.

The technique of non-thinking carried out in the sitting meditation known as Zazen and the violent mental effort used in the exercise of the Köan have given rise to the classification of Zen among magic or parapsychic phenomena. It must be admitted that in the collection of Satori and Köan writings one can point to much that is strange and distorted, indeed even morbid and unnatural. Not infrequently these materials border on magic. Nevertheless, Zen as a religious mystical phenomenon belongs, not to the realm of magic, but to that of natural mysticism.

Mager defines natural mysticism as "the psycho-spiritual perception of the natural activity of God in the soul." The possibility of this experience is not to be denied. "The soul by its very nature is spiritual, and has not first become so by revelation. Why then should it not be possible that the soul should rise to spiritual activity in a quite natural way? Such activity can be regarded as natural mysticism, and is to be distinguished from every sort of magic." Likewise August Brunner recognizes "the possibility of a natural mysticism in which one becomes aware in a new way of the depths of one's own subjective spiritual being." Gardet regards the self as the object of natural mysticism. Whereas in supernatural mysticism the soul reaches the depths of God, the termination of natural mysticism is "the secret of the substantial existence of the soul as spirit, pervaded with the activity of the Creator." This, as Gardet observes, is likewise an absolute goal.

Merton describes "a kind of natural ecstasy in which our own being recognizes in itself a transcendent kinship with every other being that exists and, as it were, flows out of itself to possess all being and returns to itself to find all being in itself." Mager names as apparent examples of natural mysticism Sufism (which perhaps could be regarded as supernatural mysticism), Buddhism, neo-Platonism and the neo-Indian phenomena of Ramakrishna and Vivekananda. These are all examples which display a kinship to Zen.

A copious and well-rounded knowledge of as much material as possible would be required to ascertain, whether the concept of natural mysticism as mentioned can be applied to the experience of Zen enlightenment. I tried in a study on the History and Essence of Zen to gather a rather large number of descriptions of the Satori experience with Bodhidharma, Hui-nêng and the original Zen masters of the T'ang and Sung periods up to the present time. The material reveals a great deal of uniformity and seems to fit fairly well into the category of Natural Mysticism. However it is to be noted that in almost all accounts of the mystics' description and interpretation merge. This is why the effect of the experience upon the individual mystic should be considered, if there is to be an evaluation of a certain kind of mysticism.

Just as the genuineness of supernatural mysticism is to be determined chiefly by its results, so too the worth of the natural must be tested by its fruits. Zen seems to pass this test. Admittedly it would be difficult to determine in each case the concrete role of mysticism in the formation of personality. But generally the religious men who matured in the practice of Zen are distinguished by prudence in conduct, by great resolution in difficult situations and by unfailing courage in constant action. The great Zen masters of which the Chinese chronicles speak are by and large energetic and intellectually developed personalities, robust at times perhaps to the point of crudity, but nonetheless in full possession of their spiritual faculties. In Japanese Zen we meet illustrious figures such as Dôgen and Hakuin whose religious genius was recognized by their contemporaries, and which continues its influence by way of their writings. Zen also exerted an admirable influence on Japanese art and culture.

The extravagant praise of some authors is toned down by the awareness of the moral decline in a great many Zen temples during certain periods of Japanese history. Zen shares in the responsibility for the general religious decay throughout the country. But this does not diminish the worth of Zen mysticism as such. For this degeneracy came about precisely because ascetical practice and enlightenment fell into neglect. The spiritual tradition survived the periods of decay. Today the Zen temple is still a dignified place where excellent intellectual life and natural mysticism can unfold.
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ROOTS OF NATURAL LAW THEORY

BY

NOAH EDWARD FEHL

In each language there are words which express seminal ideas and determine basic cultural perspectives. I propose in this paper to examine several such concepts relative to the notion of law in nature and human society. A comparative study of Dharma, Rta, Danda Nomos, Themis, and Moira would reveal, I believe, not only distinctive views of man and nature but also a common primitive insight into the magic circle of life relating man to what is ultimate in his environment.

I NATURE as Moira

The notion of Moira (fate) as fixed and unalterable order had its source in the force of custom in folk society. Tribal custom is the prephilosophic equivalent of nature. Without formal contract the strong patterned rights and obligations of the individual are unquestionably accepted as deriving from the nature of things. The pattern is sacred beyond criticism, even beyond question. In the ancestral way physis (nature) and nomos (law) are as yet undifferentiated, yet the germ of the concept of nature as "the way of things" has here its genesis. Moira was in myth the maker of custom—the weaver of the personal pattern of men. The verb preserves the clue: meirromai is "to receive one's portion." Originally it signified the giving of the "special divisions or portions of primitive tribes." Nomos as the articulated rule of custom was first associated with allotment: nomos is "pasture" and aisa (the fated decree) is the appropriate share. Themis who is older than Dike and came to be the guardian of law by consent was in earliest usage concerned with dooms and with personal lot. Themis and Nemesis were indeed hardly distinguishable in mythic characterization. "Nemesis is the thing set, fixed, settled. It begins in convention, the stress of public opinion. It ends in statutory judgment. It is the collective doom, public opinion, that, for man's common convenience, crystallizes into law." Similarly, Dharma was associated with Danda (coercion or sanction) as the bulwark against social chaos, against life according to masya-nyaya (the logic of the fish), i.e. the war of all against all. By Danda the order of the allotted portion (mamayya 'property') and of classes (varna) is safeguarded. The rights and duties of individuals and classes (srodharma) were in the Laws of Manu determined according to the varnasrama (status and stages of life).

In China Tao was first the efficacy or force energizing To the lot or specific genius or fortune of beings. The individual To was expressed appropriately by the ming (name) which also connoted investiture or mission and destiny. The relation of jati (birth) and varna (caste) to Dharma appears to have been comparable to that of To and Ming to Tao. A new stage is reached in the concept of natural law when the folk society creates in mythology the insight that nature too has her customs, and that these are also of necessity. Moira (fate) and Ananke (strong necessity) and Heimarmene (the fated allotment) are the inescapable order of that way which is nature. Such order both in Greek and Vedic mythology is an impersonal power above the gods. In the Vedas the gods also are bound to that Rta which is the cosmic law—the world course that stands eternally constant where the sun's charges are unharnessed. Tao, too, came to be the custom of nature, "the path which the universe follows." In Greece as in India the custom of nature was a harsh order. Apportioners of nature's way to man were the daughters of night. Heimarmene forms the evil circle of generation within which man, so far as he is a creature of nature, must remain. The lot of man as a part of nature is samsara. His only hope is for moksha—deliverance from the wheel of existence. Plato sets ananke over against nous. "Now our discourse must also set by the side of the creations of reason the effects of necessity, for the generation of this world came about from a combination of necessity and reason... This universe was compacted in the beginning by the victory of reasonable persuasion over necessity." But that victory was not unconditional and hence there can be for classical Greek thought no complete science, no complete philosophy, and particularly, no complete philosophy of history. Even more definite is the ultimate characterization of human experience as maya or lila. To accept nature's inexorable and dark workings is Dike. It is the counsel of piety, for there is a dark working within, the blight of Ate driving on to Hubris and Atalatha, and the inexorable working without, which conjoined, lead to Nemesis. Such is the pattern both of Greek tragedy and the sober judgement of the Upanishads and the Pali Suttas.
Its structure as there disclosed is not something artificial or devised — it is not imposed upon life, but is found in life.\textsuperscript{13} In the characteristic of the inevitable is found the concept of unalterable natural order. Nature as Moira, then, is the origin of the concept of Cosmos.

Nature as Moira may be conceived as reason as in Stoicism. Or reason may be elevated above nature and hence only dimly reflected or distorted in the phenomenal world (Plato and Ramanuja), or identified with what is of ultimate value in man over against nature (Plotinus and Shankara). Here then the conflict of positive and neutral law has its sharpest focus.

In contrast to classical views, modern theory in the West has found the source of natural law (or more properly natural right) not in reason but in the sentiments or the passions of men. Thus sociology and psychology rather than philosophy provide the source and shape of modern natural law theory.\textsuperscript{14}

II The Conflict of Nature and History

Since the latter part of the 19th century natural law theory has been attacked on the grounds that history rather than ontology is the appropriate discipline for the study of man. The force of this attack lies in the assertion of the relativity of philosophy itself. All knowledge is seen to be relative to its historic context and all attempts at validation must of necessity be simply a rehearsal of the perspective within which it emerged. Kant’s rejection of the objective validity of the theoretical concepts of God, the world, and the soul anticipated this emphasis in an ongoing converse with nature as history in concrete situations.

This leads directly to a second implication of nature viewed as history, namely the concept of the historical character of human thought. The idea of the “way of things” in the primitive and classical sense lives and moves and has its being against the horizon of the ‘character of importance’ that was the shape and color of Greek and Eastern life three millennia ago. When we speak of nature today we may have several concepts in mind but none of them will be the Greek notion of physis or logos nor the Vedic notion of Dharma and Rta, nor the Chinese Tao. We simply cannot, except for academic purposes, empty our minds of the influence of modern science which has formed our world of thought. The ancient insights are for us, for the most part, abstractions. The historical character of human thought explains the ambiguity we encounter in the term nature and in the concept of natural law. We must however raise the question of the value of absolute norms outside the context or the horizon against which they were formulated.

Natural law with the riches of insight preserved in the root words...
of our several cultures may be not only meaningful but essential as regulative principle. The enquiry concerning such principles must, however, be as widely inclusive as the area of our cultural interest. Nature as history makes evident the relevance of all disciplines to the discovery of moral value. The fact of the historic variety of natural law theories (custom, might, reason, passion) urges the cooperative regulative principle. The enquiry concerning such principles must— that is custom. Gradually even the inscrutable mystery of the universe becomes commonplace. . . . I want to stand on my own feet and live in this universe with a capacity to be surprised.”

Footnote


2) Burnet concludes that such is the line of development traceable in Greece; “In the early days the regularity of human life had been far more clearly apprehended than the even course of nature. Man lived in a charmed circle of law and custom but the world around him still seemed lawless. When the regular course of nature began to be observed, no better name could be found for it than Right or Justice (dike), a word which probably meant the unchanging custom that guided human life. Cf. Henry Maine, Village Community, pp. 110 ff. Ghurye, Castes and Race, Lewis Sydney Steward O’Malley, Indian Caste Customs, 1932, chs. v and vi.


5) Cf. Iliad xi 807. See J. Harrison, Themis, pp. 8, 515-519. In Aeschylus, Themis is another name of Gaea (V 211 ff.) The myth of Moira clearly fixes the primitive notion as the “necessity” of tribal custom. She is the mistress of the weavers, the moirae, who weave the swaddling bands of the yet unborn infant, the mark of his clan and the share to be accorded him. See R. Graves, The Greek Myths, vol. I 10 C : 60 : 2.

6) J. Harrison, Themis p. 485.


10) Finally the Rta of the gods and the soul of man (Atman) are seen as the veil or the delusion which is nature, to obscure the ultimate reality. Atman and Brahman are one: tat tvam asi.

11) Hesiod, Theog. 218, 904. The darkness of Fate’s decree is the burden of the Gnomic poets. “Neither prosperity nor stubborn war nor all destroying strife cometh to us of our choice but Aisa who giveth all things brings now the cloud upon one hand and now upon the other.” Bacchylides, frag. 20.

12) Politics, 268e-274.

13) Aetius, 1-27. Cf. Theognis 373-392, Simonides, frag. 4 D. Euripides Alcestis, 378, 416, 617. The answer is endurance. All may be lost save honor and teleomone. If you have these you have fulfilled your nature. This is the measure of the good man, the goodness of Oedipus. Jocasta who would “live at random” fails of the prize. Oedipus fulfills his destiny. It is the goodness too of Socrates in the Apology, and the righteous counsel of Edgar in King Lear (v. 2): “Men must endure their going hence even as their coming hither. Ripeness is all.” To live at random is to invite worse woe. It is to wither before fruition. Cf. Bacchylides, xvi 24-26.


15) Justice is the goal of that best regime wherein the compromise between primitive individualism and the institutions of civilized society is the least artificial, i.e. most in accord with nature. Law, particularly the law of the monarchical state, must give way to that democracy in which custom is allowed to develop in terms of natural inclinations free from the restraints of imposed and artificial conventions. In due course custom freely evolved in accordance with nature will mythologize its ideals and create a civil religion. In that golden age there will be no need for conventional law, civil religion as the ideal of custom will again be king. So we have come full circle around to custom from which all natural law theory had its origin. The new Moira will be transmuted, not to a concept of order as reason, but to a concept of inevitable progress.

PSYCHOLOGY OF ISLAMIC BELIEF IN GOD

BY

ABOUL WAHID J. HALEPOTA

From the study of the Qu’ran and the original sources on Islam, it becomes evident that Islam claims to represent that religion and that faith and those sets of beliefs and that conduct of life that are most natural to mankind and meet the specific needs of man. Anything that falls short of this criterion is not necessary part of Islam. It may be anything else but that.

Keeping this in view, in this paper an attempt has been made to co-relate the psychology of Islamic belief in God with some psychological processes. This has been made in the first part of the paper and in the third and last part of its a resume of the natural outcome of the Islamic belief in God on the attitude in life etc., has been given.

Beside the original sources, the main sources from which the material of this paper has been drawn, are the works of Shah Waliullah of Delhi (A.D. 1705-1762) who is one of the most universally accepted authorities in Islamic teachings in Muslim world. In the end I have also amply quoted from Iqbal the leading Muslim thinker and a great poet of Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent.

The following are the books from which the material has been mainly drawn:

Shah Waliullah of Delhi :
   i) Hujjatullah Al-Baligha
   ii) Al-Budur Al-Bazigha
   iii) Sata’t

Allama Iqbal :
   Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.

I THE NATURAL PROCESS

RUDIMENTS OF GOD CONSCIOUSNESS

According to most of Muslim thinkers the source and rudimentary...
Universe, about His Nature and His Essence and the diversity of opinions about the Essence of His Existence. The main cause of this diversity lies in the human mind’s incapability of comprehension not only of God’s Essence but even of the view of the whole Universe and the whole Universal scheme and the System that is working in it. Conceptions vary according to the levels and capacities of the minds to comprehend the phenomena and the Reality behind it.

Those individuals, who grew more self-consciousness and had an active intellect in them, and yet could not conceive the presence of the Universe or anything beyond what is visible, assigned the ultimate causation of the physical phenomena to Matter and to the properties of Matter and ruled out any possibility of existence of any higher being or anything belonging to the Universe beyond the physical. Those who could conceive of the presence of higher phenomena attributed it to some thing belonging to that category — either heavenly bodies, their movements or the souls of bygone sages and heroes or gods and so on. But those of the Sages and Prophets who were capable of a much more comprehensive knowledge of the Universe and found that none of these objects could be the ultimate cause or the Real Agent, that brings about the whole Universe into existence and the whole system of the Universal Scheme into being, and maintains its activity, their conception about God who is the cause and Creator and Ultimate Reality revolved round the idea that anything whether it is heavenly or phenomenal belonging to the system of the Universe and forms a part of the Universe or existing within the Universe can not be the Ultimate Agent that has created the Universe. In other words anything that exists in the Universe and is the part of the Universal scheme cannot be God. Because God must be a Being that transcends the whole Universal phenomena and is above all and beyond all the phenomena. Nothing in the Universe can have any likeness with Him. That is how the Sages and Prophets with evolved minds formulate their concepts about God.

God Consciousness in Ordinary Minds

This God consciousness, which is innate even in ordinary minds develops on the right lines if it is not mingled with anthropomorphic concepts and is kept free from determinations and limitations that could be conceived by the mind. In the ordinary mind, this takes the form of "pure consciousness, implicit awareness and mere attitude" regarding God without any further determined and definite conception of His nature. Ordinary minds possessed of only practical reasons...
within themselves and perpetual bewilderment at the time when their souls or psychic selves are liberated from physical life, specially in the case when a worshipful attitude is developed towards objects other than God. Such worshipful attitudes have a preventing effect upon their minds and harmful effect upon the development of their specific nature.

Those who are lost in the physical phenomena and rule out the possibility of the existence of a Being that is beyond what is physical cannot best submit in a worshipful attitude to other objects than God, because their innate tendency of worship must get a satisfaction in some form or the other. Such people cannot also conceive the fact that their life does not terminate with the physical death and that there are states of pleasure and pain that follow after one’s physical death. According to Shah Waliullah, such persons are materialists (DAHRI) in the true sense of the word, and this state of these persons is due to their lack of the sound specific nature (SALAMAT al-FITRA) in which God consciousness is an essential part of what is called MAHABBAT al-ZATIYAYA, the attraction of the essence of the “self”, and is innate like the instincts of hunger, thirst, etc. Just as physical pain is not felt due to the temporary effect of an anesthetic (KUKHADDIR) drug, so it may be that due to the predominance of the impediments of the physiobiological (BADANIYA) and psychic (NAFSANIYA) aspects, the soundness of the specific nature (FITRA) is affected and the consciousness of God is not felt as it ought to be. But as soon as the impediments are removed, either by the process of what he calls “the Voluntary Death” (MAUT al-IKHTIYAR) or by the physical death (i.e. MAUT al-IDHTIRARI) a partial consciousness comes into being.

Owing to the acquired states that are perverted and contradictory or remote from God consciousness, a state of great pain is suffered by the person in various modes and forms in accordance with the natural processes of psychological suffering. The details of this suffering belong to Eschatology.

In order to satisfy the urge of the innate God consciousness, the people take to natural modes of conforming behaviour, directed to express their inner feelings on consciousness, and of conforming mental attitude developed from or built upon the basis of God consciousness. This conforming behaviour and corresponding mental state becomes conducive to a further development of the consciousness, according to the principle of Interactionism and thus a way is open for the natural development of the disposition of the person and evolution of his psychic self and all that which constitutes his self (i.e., soul or nature) and to the ultimate and real happiness.

II ISLAMIC BELIEF IN GOD

STATEMENT

Islamic belief in God is based on the natural processes and the foundations described above. But from the time of advent of the Qur’an the standards set in the belief in God are based not only in the belief of existence of God, but in the belief of only One God who is Unique and the Ultimate Reality and the Source of all the Creation and the Universes. Not only that, He is the sole Agent who is directly wielding the control of all the management of the Universe. He is the supreme Being transcending all and everything. Such being the case He is the only object to be worshipped. To Him alone is appropriate to direct the minds worshipful attitude. Nothing is like unto Him. His Attributes are manifest in the Universe, but the nature of the Attributes cannot be comprehended by the human mind as they belong to the Essence of His Being which is beyond the ken of human mind. The human language is a defective instrument for describing anything about His Essence and about the nature of the Attributes. It is only in a limited and incomplete form that He can be described at the most in the negative terminology. On definite basis one can say what He is not, but so far as positive statements are concerned, the statements can be only approximate and superficial account of His boundless Being. For example; It can be said about Him that He is not body or a corporal being but the statement that He is Merciful is not so comprehensive in its implication, because no one can fully conceive the actual nature and the full significance of Mercy that is His Attribute.

TAUHID. (BELIEF IN ONE AND ONLY GOD)

TAUHID (belief in One and only God) is the most fundamental foundation of Islamic belief in God and Islamic way of life.

According to Shah Waliullah, the term TAUHID generally signifies one of the four following ideas and beliefs. (a) That the Essential Being is only one and the existence of the Universe ultimately depends upon that Single Essential Being i.e. God. (b) That the Creator of the whole of the Universe is One i.e. God. (c) That the management (TADBIIR) of all the affairs of the creation and working of the schemes of the Universe is done exclusively by God. (d) That no-one else other than God is worthy of the attitude of worship.

All these four conceptions of Tauhid are essential and necessary
and constituents of Islamic belief in God. Out of these four the two first concepts of unity of God are found in some of the other faiths and philosophical systems as well. So far as the last two concepts of Unity are concerned they are more or less specific marks of Islamic conception of unity in belief of God. If an analysis is made of these two concepts it appears that the out of these two, the third i.e. (c) is the basis of the fourth i.e. (d) which is the psychological outcome of (c). It is but natural that if there exists conviction and belief that the management of all the affairs of creation and working of the schemes of the Universe is exclusively God’s function and work, and no one else’s and when there is conviction that the bounties and beneficences that one enjoys in one’s life, nay even the life itself and the death and happiness are all exclusively in Gods’ hand, the natural outcome of this belief and conviction would be the production of the psychological state of mind which is known as the state of worship constituted by the sense of adoration, admiration, awe, supplication etc., in relation to what constitutes worship which according to him, comes, according to him, under the categories of natural feelings towards one’s fellow-beings and other objects in the world. The love, respect and humbleness felt for one’s parents, teachers or other human benefactors do not constitute the psychic state of worship in the mind. These feelings for worthy creatures are natural, as long as a perverted sense of consciousness of the supernatural does not intervene and no attributes of the Supernatural are assigned to the creatures.

MODES OR FORMS OF WORSHIP

Like any other psychic states, the genuine psychic state of worship has also concomitant modes of expression in the external behaviour of human beings. The following are some of the modes:  

The Gestural Modes: The state of humility is sometimes expressed by corresponding external gestures which indicate humility and the humbleness of the person who adopt them in order to pay homage to and express adoration for the object adored and worshipped. These gestural forms generally consist of bowing, bending, kneeling, prostration, touching the ground with the forehead, etc. These gestures are, therefore, included in ritual forms of worship of God.

The Verbal mode: Certain verbal expressions indicate the state of worshipping mind. Such expressions imply the ideas of the greatness of the object worshipped. His praises and holiness, and sometimes implore His forgiveness, help and kindness.

Physical suffering and Sacrifice: In order to show steadfastness in love and sincerity, people do not shrink from undergoing physical discomfort and loss of physical pleasure. This takes the form of fasting and at times of complete self-denial of physical pleasures, in various forms of asceticism and practices of penance.

Charity and Sacrifice of Wealth: In order to express an inner state of love, humbleness, etc., people sometimes make sacrifices of things from property that constitutes their wealth, and from other objects that they love dearly, in order to evoke the favours of the object worshipped.
Pilgrimage: To make pilgrimage to a place, or to an object known for a historic event relating to the object worshipped is also a form of giving expression to one's worshipful state of mind.

Vows, Pledges, Oaths, and Reading of Scriptures: These also are forms of worship which express one's fidelity, loyalty and reverence for the beloved object which is worshipped. The reading of the scriptures giving the account of the praiseworthy qualities and attributes of the Holy, and listening to these accounts, is a natural tendency of the worshipping mind.

These are some of the universal modes of worship that have invariably been adopted by humanity from time immemorial to give vent to inner states of the worshipful mind. These natural modes of worship are originally meant to express their concomitant psychic states. According to the principle of psychological interactionism, like the rest of the external forms of behaviour, they also eventually lead to the awakening, strengthening or developing of their corresponding psychic states (i.e., worship) in minds in which the same are dormant, weak or undeveloped. It should, however, be remembered that these modes not only have a strong relation with the psychic state of worship, but they also make considerable contributions to the fulfilment of social and other ethical ends and exert a tremendous influence over the culture and general outlook of people, as is clear from the study of the principle of normal and higher ethics of Waliiullah.

Islamic Codification on Modes of Worship

All these modes and forms of expression of worshipful state of the mind can actually constitute worship when they actually correspond and simultaneously represent the corresponding psychic states, without which they are empty gestures and meaningless action. However looking to their normal relationship with their corresponding psychic worshipful state, the law of Islamic Shariah has for the safety of common people put a ban on the adoptions of these modes in relation to any object other than God. It is therefore that according to Islamic law the practice of these modes for any object other than God is prohibited and is considered as a practice in conformity with polytheism which is diagonally opposed to the Islamic conception of Tauhid.

The significance of polytheistic state of mind and the varieties of form of polytheism codified in the law of Shariah needs an elaborate analysis and separate treatment. Though it is very important subject matter, the illucidations of which will give further probe into

Psychological analysis of conception of Tauhid-Islamic belief in God, yet owing to the short time and space at disposal, this part of the subject is unavoidably left untouched.

III ISLAMIC ATTITUDE TO LIFE

Freedom

However to give some analysis of Islamic attitude towards life and a few words about spiritual, ethical and social significance of Islamic belief in God may be given here. In addition to having an appropriate and proper relationship with God and virtue of humanity which is one of the cardinal virtues according to Muslim thinkers, this belief inculcate in human beings, the sense of trust in Allah and the dependence on Him alone and submission to his will, this in its turn produces a sense of freedom and independence from everything that is worldly.

Universal Unity

In addition to this, human being with such a belief in God becomes conscious of Universal unity, according to which Humanity (Insan al-Kabir) is a unity which is a part of a much bigger unity the whole Universe (Al Insan al-Akbar). The Life itself is a unity in which according to Islam there is no division in it of the Secular and the religious or the profane and Sacred. Iqbal one of the latest Muslim thinkers says:

"The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of 'Tauhid'. Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life loyalty to God virtually amounts to man's loyalty to his own ideal nature. The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life; for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change. But eternal principles when they are understood to exclude all possibilities of change which, according to the Qur'an, is one of the greatest 'signs' of God, tend to immobilize what is essentially mobile in its nature."
THE SPIRITUAL AND THE TEMPORAL

In Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains and the nature of an act, however secular in its import, is determined by the attitude of mind with which the agent does it. It is the invisible mental background of the act which ultimately determines its character. An act is temporal or profane if it is done in a spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of life behind it; it is spiritual if it is inspired by that complexity. In Islam it is the same reality which appears as Church looked at from one point of view and State from another. It is not true to say that Church and State are two sides or facets of the same thing. Islam is a single unanalyzable reality which is one or the other as your point of view varies. The point is extremely far-reaching and a full elucidation of it will involve us in a highly philosophical discussion. Suffice it to say that this ancient mistake arose out of the bifurcation of the unity of man into two distinct and separate realities which somehow have a point of contact, but which are in essence opposed to each other. The truth, however, is that matter is spirit in space-time reference. The unity called man is body when you look at it as acting in regard to what we call the external world; it is mind or soul when you look at it as acting in regard to the ultimate aim and ideal of such acting.

THE STATE

"The essence of 'Tauhid' as a working idea, is equality, solidarity, and freedom. The state, from the Islamic standopint, is an endeavour to transform these ideal principles into space time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human organization. It is in this sense alone that the state in Islam is a theocracy, not in the sense that it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always screen his despotic will behind his supposed infallibility. The critics of Islam have lost sight of this important consideration. The ultimate Reality according to the Qu'ran, is spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. All that is secular is therefore sacred in the roots of its being. The greatest service that modern thought has rendered to Islam, and as a matter of fact to all religion, consists in its criticism of what we call material or natural - a criticism which discloses that merely material has no substance until we discover it rooted in the spiritual. There is no such thing as a profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of spirit. All is holy ground. As the Prophet so beautifully puts it: The whole of this earth is a mosque. The state according to Islam is only an effort to realize the spiritual in a human organization. But in this sense all state, not based on, mere domination and aiming at the realization of ideal principles, is theocratic." (Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam-Iqbal, pp. 147-48, 154-155.)

UNITY OF THE PURPOSE

In the end there is unity of the purpose in the life of the believer in unity of God in accordance with the Islamic belief. His whole life, his actions, his works, deeds, his death all are dedicated to God and God alone who is the creator and maintainer of the life and the existence of all the Universes as it has also been clearly given in the following words of the Qu'ran: (VI, 162-163) (VI, 162-163) "Say : Truly, my prayer and my service of sacrifice, My life and my death, Are (all) for God, The maintainer of the Universes:
No partner hath He : This am I commanded, And I am the first of those who bow to His Will."
SYMBOL OF DEITY AND SOCIAL LIFE

BY

TOSHIAKI HARADA

The religious life of the agricultural village in Japan has its roots deep in the practical social life of the village. It is not individualistic but communal. Here the things that play a dominant role in the communal life or go to make its features are regarded as sacred by the village. When they are concrete things, they become the objects around which the religious activities of the village centre.

The treasure of the village is a case in point. It is not merely the treasure of the village, but to the villagers it is the embodiment of the village deity, which will in time become the object of worship. This deification as well as sanctification comes not so much from the qualities the treasure possesses as from the bearings it has on the life of the village.

Thus in the old days swords and mirrors were treasures. When consecrated, they became sacred treasures. As far back as A.D. 804, that is, the early part of the Heian era, we find mirrors deified. In many agricultural villages, however, the paraphernalia of the practical life were important, they were kept carefully, sanctified and regarded as the embodiment of the deity. Thus the annals, registers and ledgers of a village were as much sacred as they were important, and came to be reverently worshipped. With offerings made and altar-lights burning, they are encircled by a 'shimenawa' and regarded as identical with the village deity, and even as the embodiment of the deity. So are the costumes of the priests, governmental orders and proclamations, ceremonial keys and measures, and other ritual implements. From generation to generation, they have been traditionally handed down and reverently worshipped as if they were the deity of the village.

A tenth century document gives us a great number of names of shrines then consecrated in various parts of Japan. Generally speaking, many shrines were named after the names of the localities where they were situated. This seems to suggest that these deities were merely the deities of the localities and the clans there and had no individuality of their own yet. Some names certainly show that they were personal and individualized deities, while the component elements of others suggest that the objects of worship in these shrines were mountains and waters. But many instances are found where a wood, a grove or a giant tree was the very deity of the village.

How did they come to be deified and worshipped? Important things in the life of a village, especially its social corporate activities, are generally performed at the centre of the village. Such a public place generally comes to be considered sacred. To mark it, a certain symbol or sign of the place, such as a stone or a tree, will be chosen. It comes to be regarded as a symbol of the village deity. Surrounding a giant tree or gathering under dense trees, the village people will carry on their social activities. These trees are then, in the villagers' eyes, no more simple trees, but are the objects of religious worship, for they are identified either with the village deity or with its abode.

A certain marked development in the idea of the village deity was required before a sort of structure was erected which eventually took the shape of a shrine. The trees and a mound, originally the sign and symbol of the site, the dwelling of the village deity and were regarded as the embodiment of the deity of the village. Then these sign trees came to be symbolically represented by a 'gohei', that is, a branch of the evergreen tree and a pole adorned with wreaths of white paper. As will be seen the 'gohei', in its origin, was not an offering to the deity but an embodiment or symbol of the deity. If the small mound is covered with lawn or pebbles, encircled by evergreen trees, kept clean and sanctified, and a 'gohei' is set up there, it will mark the presence of the village deity. It goes without saying that this is an altar. The 'shinorogi' is evidently of this kind.

Even today several varieties may be found in many agricultural villages of Japan. The essential features are a branch of the evergreen tree and a pole with wreaths of white paper set up on a small mound which is surrounded by a row of evergreen trees. There are many variations. Some of them are called 'Odan'. The term 'Ohake' is also used throughout Japan, but its etymology, I am afraid, seems to have been forgotten. Then follow in order the 'Okariya' with its roof, the 'Otabisho' with its fixed place of access and stay, and at long last the shrine of the present day type.
THE BUDDHIST-WHITEHEADIAN VIEW OF THE SELF AND THE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

BY

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

One may view the self or soul in three ways. There is the conventional notion that each of us is, or has, an identical soul from birth to death, or even prior to birth and after death. There is the doctrine of Hindu monism, that plurality of selves is in some sense only appearance, since the primary reality is beyond numerical diversity: hence the saying, That art thou—each of us is Brahma. There is finally the Buddhistic view, or the somewhat similar, but much later doctrine of David Hume and William James, recently revised by Whitehead, according to which each of us is a numerically new actuality every moment. Although I recognize some validity in each of these theories, it is the Buddhist-Whiteheadian doctrine which seems to me most capable of expressing the truth in them all.

The pronoun "I" ("you" or "he") is a demonstrative, a context-dependent or "token-reflexive" term. With each case of its use, each new utterance or set of ink-marks (called by Peirce a "token" of the word), the meaning may change. If John says "I", that is one thing; if Suzuki says "I", that is another. This plurality of entities denoted by the uses of the pronoun is not turned into naught by calling it appearance or maya. Appearance to what or to whom? And does the plurality only appear to appear, or does it really appear, and if the former, do we not have a vicious regress? Monism may have its truth, but it does not clearly show the relation of this truth to truths it declares less real. Not only Hinduism, but much of the later Buddhism, which tended to relapse into monism, is guilty of this unclarity. Zen Buddhism indeed tries to make a merit of it. There may be profound and wise ways of being in a muddle (or, if you prefer, of employing dialectical logic); but I am deeply convinced that the wisest way is to be clear.

Let us now consider the conventional pluralistic notion, that each human being has an ever-identical self, wholly distinct from that of every other human being. The weakness of this view appears when it defends itself against monism. This it may do by asking, "If I and the other self are identically Brahma, why do we not have identical experiences?" But the more radical pluralist, Buddhist or Whiteheadian, may likewise inquire, "If I am identically myself at all times, why are my experiences not always the same?" Mere identity does not explain plurality, whether in space (myself here and you there) or in time (myself today and myself yesterday). And how can the same subject of belief, the same believer, accept childish fairy tales and also mature common sense and science? Moreover, if the difference in time removes the contradiction, why do not the differences in space and time remove the contradiction in attributing all experiences to Brahma?

The conventional pluralist may appeal to memory, as proof of self-identity. But then the extreme limitation and relativity of human memory is to be considered, including the possibility of aphasia. The most that human memory can prove is identity in a highly relative sense, or as a matter of degree. But numerical identity has a clear meaning only if it excludes degrees and is something absolute. Also, if identity of a person with himself through time varies in degree, then non-identity of one person with another in space may also be conceived as a matter of degree; and the door is thus opened to the monistic doctrine that in some ultimate or non-relative sense we are all one in Brahma. I conclude that the form of pluralism which has been standard in most Western thought for over two thousand years is a superficial, unclear doctrine. Here the Orient has had a definite superiority.

However, it is important to realize that, against the radical pluralism which takes the primary units of the plurality to be the momentary experiences or selves, the monistic argument does not have the same force. For within the present self or experience, there need be no contradiction of beliefs, and no chance for lapse of memory to break the continuity. Here we have a definite subject with definite experiences. Each new experience means a new total actuality, and the numerical novelty of this actuality is not a matter of degree. True, the successive experiences have much in common, but it is they, the successive actualities, which possess the common factor, not the common factor which possesses them. The persistent identity is abstract and a predicate; the concrete subjects are the momentary actualities.

The problem of memory is sometimes said to be: how can we, in the present, be aware of a past experience, which as past is no longer in existence? But this problem is not made easier by the assertion...
that both experiences belong to the same self existing at both times. For now we have to ask how an experience can drop out of existence, though the self to which it belonged is still intact and still able to have the no longer existent experience as its object in memory. If there is but one soul or spiritual whole throughout life, how can elements be added to this whole, and elements dropped from it, leaving the identical whole?

Of course, the new and the previous selves may be “the same” so far as their most important aspects or elements are concerned; but this is like saying that two otherwise empty houses are the same if a certain man is first in one house and then in the other; for surely a man is more important than building materials. Yet, strictly speaking, any unitary reality is, as a whole, numerically distinct from another if a single trivial constituent is different in the two cases. Failure to see this is the essential confusion in the doctrine of individual substances, absolutely self-identical through time, but non-identical in space.

Although the conventional pluralistic conception has no strict logic, it is perfectly sensible if taken, as common sense does take it, in a relative sense. We say, “He was not himself,” and this is no more paradoxical than the substance doctrine; rather it is less so. The context usually shows what one is talking about when one says “I,” whether it be something momentarily, as in, “I just had a new thought,” or a reality which for the purpose in hand may be considered the same for sixty years, as in, “I was born in Pennsylvania.”

The radical pluralist need not deny, and Whitehead asserts, that past and present experiences are embraced in a unity. But this unity is the present or new self or subject, which through memory includes its predecessor; the unity is retrospective, not prospective, much less, timeless. A weakness of the substance doctrine is that it seeks to explain succession by identity, which is a symmetrical or directionless relation. Only the principle of cumulative creation of new actualities, each intrinsically related to, and in so far containing, its predecessors can do justice to “time’s arrow.” Here I believe Buddhists can learn something from Henri Bergson, and even more from Whitehead, who alone has given this theory adequate systematic exposition.

Recognizing the relativity of self-identity need not destroy the notion of obligation, nor even make rewards and punishments inappropriate. For each momentary self takes an interest in, and feels responsibility toward, its successors in the same personal sequence. The doctrine does, however, limit the need for any strict proportion between one’s fortunes and one’s “deserts,” since the rewarded or punished self is, strictly speaking, never the original agent. We thereby escape from the more absurd extremes of heaven, hell, and Karma. Here I suspect that all religions have a good deal of “demythologizing” to accomplish.

The radical-pluralist view makes possible a unique perspective upon death, and the apparent impermanence of all things. If the momentary selves are the realities, then the permanence we should be concerned about is that of these selves. To provide for their preservation, the prolongation of the individual’s life after death is neither necessary nor sufficient. It would mean the creation of new momentary selves to be preserved, not the retention of those already created. For, although in memory the past is in a fashion conserved, human memory is but a pale suggestion of what adequate conservation of experience, in its full vividness and value, would be. Only an ideally perfect memory could constitute such conservation. We can, in the profoundest sense, “live forever” if, and only if, we are cherished by an imperishable and wholly clear and distinct retrospective awareness, which we may call the memory of God.

A Buddhism which accepted this theory would contain a monistic aspect, since there can be but one divine rememberer conserving the diversity of momentary selves in space and time. We sometimes read in Buddhist literature of the “store consciousness.” This might mean what I mean by divine memory, and what Whitehead means by “objective immortality” in the Consequent Nature of God. I rather fear that in fact Buddhists have had something different, perhaps less clear, in mind. The obscurities of which some complain in Whitehead seem to me almost crystal clear compared to the paradoxes of Zen Buddhism.

Christian doctrines of love become strengthened by the realization of the radical element of illusion involved in self-interest theories of motivation. These theories take as absolute or perfect an identity which is quite devoid of these characteristics.

It is interesting to reflect that both monism and radical pluralism seem to have received their earliest expressions in India. To produce the universal primitive idea of soul, special philosophic or religious genius was not required; but to make us aware of the limitations of this idea, genius was required, and it was India that first gave it to us. Western philosophy and religion, prior to Hume, and in large part since Hume, have failed to grasp these limitations.

On the other hand, the Western tradition, with its stress on the plurality of individuals, may help both Buddhism and Hinduism to
accept empirical plurality in a more positive and consistent way than they were able to do in the past. It is not enough to say, with Zen Buddhism, that the ultimate reality and the empirical particulars are "identical"; for, as it stands, this is not good sense. Plurality I hold is no mere appearance to our ignorant awareness, but is the imperishable content of the divine awareness, which cherishes forever each momentary actuality - momentary for our consciousness, but everlasting for that Awareness which alone measures all things. And this Awareness itself is cumulatively plural, a new total spiritual reality with each new creative pulsation. It is, as Whitehead says, "always one and always many, always with novel advance moving onward and never perishing."\(^1\)

In some such conceptions, as I believe, may radical pluralism and radical monism, Eastern and Western genius, and universal common sense, find their fruitful meeting ground.

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FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF PRESENT SHINTO

BY

NAOFUSA HIRAI

Although the problems faced by present Shrine Shinto are diverse and complicated, basically, many of these vital problems derive from the fact that today Shrine Shinto is standing at the crossroads confronted with the necessity of choosing between two different directions.

The first direction is the movement to restore State Shinto, abolished by the order of the Occupation Army, and to make the performance of state ceremonies an important activity of the shrines. The other direction does not necessarily contradict the first. It seeks to re-examine and re-evaluate the meaning of Shinto, under the new post-war conditions and to establish a new social order by the spontaneous will of those concerned; it means an attempt to grasp the true religious connotation indwelling in the basis of Shinto and to vivify it in a broader sense.

The various reforms carried out in post-war Japan were not the results of spontaneous movements from within but were rather forcibly imposed from without. It is only natural, therefore, that after Japan recovered her independence with the San Francisco Treaty, the correction of the excesses of Occupation policies should become the subject of widespread public discussions examining whether or not the new reforms were suited to the Japanese soil. In the case of Shinto, both movements mentioned above are founded on earnest thought regarding the essence and future of Shinto.

Some of the main points at issue between the proponents of the two tendencies are: (1) the theological conflict between nationalism and universalism, (2) the ethical question concerning the basis of moral values, and (3) the realization of the necessity of propagation and its methods.

The first point concerns the theological discussion whether in future the norm of Shinto should be considered exclusively for the Japanese people within the boundaries of the Japanese state or whether it should be considered on the basis of fundamental principles of human life.

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which are applicable to worshippers beyond the national boundary. Historically, the prosperity of the Japanese state flourished in the sacred books of Shinto. The pantheistic view of man which grew up since the medieval period, as well as folkways, which were considered to form the substructure of Shinto belief, were not regarded seriously enough. This trend, together with the so-called "Revival of Pure Shinto," was extremely strong in Shinto circles until the end of the war, and even today there is a movement which insists that Shinto is unthinkable without strong nationalism and Emperor worship.

But a different interpretation of this problem is proposed by young students. Shinto has existed in Japan without having any founder since the time the ancestors of the Japanese people began living in this land. According to this view, therefore, the core of Shinto belief is the communal religious experience accumulated in the actual lives of the Japanese for many centuries.

Shinto phenomena are indeed expressions of this religious experience, but the medium of these expressions was always the past history, culture, and society of Japan. Japanese life and society became highly urbanized after the Meiji Restoration and underwent great changes after the Second World War. Had our ancestors edited the classical works under the same conditions as today, no doubt Shinto mythology would show quite different nuances. The stage of the creation myths of the Kojiki and Nihon Shoki is not the universe, but Japan. Was this not because the idea that the world and the universe in which man lives is sacred was conditioned by the limited geographical information of the ancient Japanese? Another Shinto tenet considers man sacred if, in obedience to the divine will, he reveals a selfless life-attitude moving towards the realization of the Ideal. The divinity of the Emperor is a concept which ought to be interpreted also from such a view of man.

Inspired by such views a movement among young students, instead of making a Japan-centered political philosophy the absolute norm of Shinto, seeks for fundamental principles in more basic areas and regards view of life, view of man, world-view, and life-attitude as the main-springs of traditional Shinto thoughts and activities.

The second point, the ethical problem concerning the basis of moral values, is closely related with the first point. According to the above mentioned first trend, the highest ethical values are considered to be in the direction of loyalty to the nation and endeavour for a prosperous Japan. Certainly throughout its history, the life of Shintoists was deeply connected with the vicissitudes of the regional community. Their greatest concern was the prosperity of the groups to which they belonged. For the people in the past centuries, natural groups such as the village, town, and nation were the units of their daily lives, and at the same time were the places where the crisis of individual life were solved. These circumstances have not yet completely changed even at the present time. Loyalty to the nation and endeavour for a prosperous Japan would still be meaningful in a sense for the actual social and national lives of the Japanese people.

However, since the Meiji Restoration and particularly after World War II, the characteristics of Japanese society have changed rapidly. The solidarity of family and village life is breaking up, and the problems of life become much more severe through disintegrated human relations. In the past decades, Shinto was so narrowly confined within the Japanese nation that its religiousness used to be subordinated to Japanese nationalism. To be a religion of the new world, it must also provide salvation and solutions for human problems besides merely maintaining the function of Shinto shrines as the spiritual centres of group life.

Though pre-war Shinto ethics stressed makoto (sincerity) as the motive of moral principles, its practical observance was highly evaluated only when it pertained to the realm of Japanese nationalism. The real meaning of makoto, however, appears to be a sincere and modest life-attitude stemming from communion with the divine and containing a deep religiousness in the depth of one's experience. Obviously it does find expression in the realm of national life, but is it also meaningful if it is practised in fields beyond the national boundary. The ethics of the new Shinto society should be social ethics based upon the respect for individual personality and moral responsibility as a human being. It has to be a standard of moral conduct both in group and individual life. The basis of moral values in modern Shinto will be found in the last analysis along the lines of world peace and human security, by re-organizing our family, village, and nation under the new Shinto life-attitude. Such an opinion has begun to make its appearance among some Shintoists.

The third point is the degree to which the necessity of propagation and its methods are realized. Because of its nature as an indigenous and national religion, Shinto did not, except in a few cases, positively engage in missionary work. The traditional religious attitude and ritual practices
were transmitted generation after generation through life-orientation within the family or through initiation of age groups within the village. A conventionalized way of life accompanied by strong group solidarity and traditional, uncritical behaviour was the reliable background of this religion. In recent years, however, urbanized ways of thinking and behaviour have become common even among mountain villagers and isolated islanders through mass communication, and this makes a certain degree of reform inevitable in Shrine Shinto.

At the beginning of the Meiji Period, the so-called taikyō sempū movement, or the great promulgation of Shito teaching, was carried on under the sponsorship of the government. After the movement finally miscarried, the Japanese government undertook to promulgate the political philosophy and other teachings of Shinto through the national education system. Since 1882 to the end of World War II, preaching by Shinto priests in during ceremonies was prohibited by law. One view held that the government administrators wished to protect State Shinto from free competition between religions. Another reason was that they were afraid of liberal interpretations and criticisms of priests concerning the established theories of State Shinto. The delay in formulating a theology for contemporary Shrine Shinto is partly due to the 64 years of bureaucratic control of Shinto.

Now, the promulgation of Shinto ideals fully depends upon the efforts of Shintoists. In these circumstances various religious activities including social welfare works have been carried on and obtained a fair measure of success. Yet the weakest point in the enterprise is the remarkable shortage of priests. Recent statistics show that there are 80,000 Shinto shrines and 16,000 priests in Japan. This means one Shinto priest takes care of an average of 5 local shrines. Shrine Shinto developed on the basis of natural groups, and cases in which the head of the family or the elder of the village served also as priest were common. This tradition has remained until today, and the family head or village elder has often assisted in the work of the Shinto priest. With the help of this system, the priest has been scarcely able to maintain the shrines. There is no assurance, however, that this institution of sub-priest will survive in this age of social change. Some priests are still thinking that by a revival of the pre-war situation, i.e., a revival of State Shinto, Shinto will regain vitality among the people. The future of Shinto propagation depends upon making each priest fully aware of the importance of these problems and preparing a number of young well-trained priests at this important turning point of the century.

Buddhist Ethics, Buddhist Psychology and Buddhist Philosophy from Buddha-Desana

By

HPE Aung

The Middle Way. Buddha, as we know, shows us the Middle Way consisting of Eight folds. These eight folds can be divided into 3 levels of attainment, namely, Morality (Silà), Mind Development (Samādhi) and Wisdom (Paññā). As such, I like to treat the teachings of the Buddha in three branches of study, such as, (1) Buddhist Ethics, (2) Buddhist Psychology and (3) Buddhist Philosophy.

The Bodhis. In Buddhism there are different types of enlightenments called Bodhis. They are:

1. The Sammā Sambodhi – Universal Buddha-hood,
2. The Pacceka Bodhi – small Buddha-hood,

The Universal Buddha-hood can again be classified under 3 heads, namely:

1. the Paññādhika Buddha,
2. the Sattvadhika Buddha and
3. the Viriyadhika Buddha.

The Arahat-hood can also be divided into different types:

1. Sukkha-vipassaka
2. Samatha-yānika.

Both (1) and (2) can be brought under the class of Pakati Sāvaka
3. Ātadaggas,
4. The Mahāsāvakas and lastly,
5. Aṭāsāvakas.

Any body, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist, can aspire to any one of these Bodhis, as enumerated here.

The Ariya Stages. The lowest stage attainable is the Arahat-hood. When one has cut off the 10 Saññeyojanas (fetters) completely, to that one, there will be no more rebirth, and last is the life that he is living now.

A devotee while practising Vipassana (mindfulness), realize Nibbāna as an ārammaṇa for the first time, he becomes a Sotāpanna – the first
hearer of the Law – the enterer of the stream towards Nibbāna and only 7 more births are left for him before the final liberation.

When Nibbāna, as an ārammaṇa is realized for the second time, one will attain the stage of Sakadāgāmin – The once – returner.

When Nibbāna is realized as an ārammaṇa for the third time, the devotee will be an Anāgāmin – a never returner.

When Nibbāna is realized for the fourth time as an ārammaṇa, the disciple will become an Arahat – the Holy One, who has no more to strive for – Asekha. He enjoys the Nibbāna with residuum while alive, and the Nibbāna without residuum when dead.

The Fetters. The ten Sānyojanas are:

(1) Self-illusion (Sakkāya-diṭṭhi),
(2) Doubt (Viśeṣaṭṭhi),
(3) Attachment to rites and rituals (Silabbataparāśraya),
(4) Sensual lust (Kāma-rāga),
(5) Ill-will (Vyāpada),
(6) Craving for fine material existence (Rūpa-rāga),
(7) Craving for formless existence (Apāpa-rāga),
(8) Conceit (Māna),
(9) Restlessness (Uddhāccha) and
(10) Ignorance (Avijja)

Out of these 10 fetters, Sotāpanna cuts off the first three fetters completely; a Sakadāgāmin does not cut off any more fetters but refines another two fetters namely (4) and (5). When a disciple attains Anāgāmin stage, he cuts off another two more factors i.e. (4) and (5), and as such, he has only 5 fetters left to be cut off. All the entire 10 fetters will be removed by one, when one has attained the Arahat-hood.

Buddhist Ethics. When a person becomes an Arahat, there is no vinaya prescription for him. He is the vinaya rules themselves. But for an ordinary lay man, in order to enhance the realization of the Arahat-hood, Buddha has laid down rules of conduct for observance ranging from the level of an ordinary house-holder to that of the Holy One. They can be enumerated as:

(1) the five precepts,
(2) the eight precepts,
(3) the nine precepts,
(4) the ten precepts,
(5) the Patimokkha saṅvīra slīla,
(6) the Indriyasāṅvīra slīla,
(7) the Paccayasāṅvīra slīla,
(8) the Ājīvāpatīsuddhi slīla.

(Further reference is invited to the Teachings of the Buddha-Sutta and Vinaya).

The five precepts are meant for a layman to be observed constantly. The eight precepts can be observed occasionally. The Nine precepts will be observed by the benevolent rulers and the ten precepts and the other remaining silas are prescribed to be constantly observed by the monks who has given up all forms of worldly attachments with only one goal in life, i.e. the attainment of Nibbāna.

There are the different kinds of precepts that I like to present to you which are to be found in the Teachings of the Buddha. It will be of great value if we can compare the precepts given in other religions with what has been given in the Buddha’s Teachings.

Buddhist Psychology. Regarding Buddhist Psychology, the detailed treatment can be found in the Abhidhamma Pitaka. Here, I will treat only the attainment of the heights through the concentration of the mind. In Buddha’s Teachings there is no Superposition of the mental states, but there is only Juxtaposition of mental units, one entailing the other, having a continuum with a change within the series of the mental units.

The Mind Levels. The levels of the depth of mind can be distinguished as follows:

(1) The sleeping stage – the stage of bhavanga,
(2) The waking stage,
(3) The preliminary stage of concentration,
(4) The neighbourhood – stage of concentration,
(5) The ecstatic stage of concentration.

Sleep. In Buddha’s Teaching, there is no consciousness, without the object of consciousness and the consciousness itself. This consciousness and object of consciousness relation exist till the time of liberation. As such, in the sleep stage, the ārammaṇa (the object of consciousness) is any one of these three, namely, (1) the action, (2) the symbol of action and (3) the symbol of the abode that one is going to be reborn, as seen at the time of one’s previous death. Here the moments of the bhavanga are continuous. If the flow is interrupted by any other vithis, internal or external, dreams occur.

Waking Stage. In the ordinary waking stages, the course of cognition will comprise of the vithis coming from the different avenues of the senses with the bhavanga moments intervening between each vithi.

Preliminary Concentration. When a person prepares himself for concentration on a certain Kasina (object of concentration), there will be many vithis arising from the Kasina but there will also be many
other viññās arising from the six sense doors, with intervening bhāvangas between all these viññās.

Neighbourhood Concentration. When a person reaches the neighbourhood concentration, the intensity of concentration becomes so pronounced that the viññās will arise only from the Kāśīna and not from anything else; yet there will be intervening bhāvangas between the Kāśīna viññās.

The Jhānic Concentration. Now when one attains the stage of ecstatic concentration, the intervening bhāvangas moments will not rise between the Kāśīna viññās and all the viññās at a stretch will arise from the Kāśīna (at this time from the glistening after-image of the Kāśīna) alone.

Different Jhānas With Their Factors. These mental levels are not all as yet. There are still other nine levels, known as absorption or Jhāna ending in Nirodha samāpatti— the cessation of perception and sensation altogether. They can be shown as follows:

With reproduction, retention, joy, bliss and one-pointedness as factors, one can enter the first Jhāna through concentration on the paṭībhāga nimitta (the glistening after-image of the Kāśīna).

By removing one Jhānic factor after another a person can enter the 5th stage of Jhāna. So there are five stages of Jhānas, namely:

1st Jhāna, with reproduction, retention, piti, sukha and one-pointedness as factors.
2nd Jhāna, with retention, piti, sukha and one-pointedness as factors.
3rd Jhāna, with piti, sukha and one-pointedness as factors.
4th Jhāna, with sukha and one-pointedness as factors.
5th Jhāna, with upekkhā (substituting for sukha) and one-pointedness as factors.

The Formless Jhānas. These levels are not all as yet. There are still some higher level of mind attainment. They are:

(1) Jhāna on the infinity of Space.
(2) Jhāna on the Infinity of Consciousness.
(3) Jhāna on the realm of Nothingness and lastly,
(4) Jhāna on the realm of Neither perception nor non-perception.

Even before, or during the time of the Buddha, there are Sages and Seers, who were reported to have attained such a lofty height of mind.

But from the Buddhist point of view they are failures. The only way towards Nibbāna is through the practice of mindfulness (Vipassanā). If the devotee has gained the stages of the Anāgāmi and the Arahatta, after this stage, he can enter another samāpatti called Nirodhasamāpatti, which is the cessation of perception and sensation altogether. (In my research finding, I have never found any school of thought that treats this profound and intricate subject of mind development in great detail and with such a comprehensiveness, as is done in the Buddha’s Teachings).

(Farther reference is invited to the Buddha’s Teachings-Sutta and Abhidhamma).

The introduction of the state of Nirodhasamāpatti naturally leads us to another higher and more important subject of Buddhist Philosophy known as the practice of Mindfulness— Vipassanā.

Buddhist Philosophy. There are many definition in connection with the term “Philosophy”. In this context, I will confine the interpretation of this term to “search or quest after the Truth”.

Vipassanā or mindfulness is decidedly a method of the quest after the Truth. In the Vipassanā practice, 7 kinds of purities with 10 different forms of insights or realizations are mentioned. They are:

The 7 Purities:

(1) The purity in morality.
(2) The purity in mind.
(3) The purity in self-illusion.
(4) The purity in the removal of doubt regarding the past, the present and the future.
(5) The purity in distinguishing the right and the wrong path.
(6) The purity of vision as regards the method.
(7) The purity of insight.

The 10 Insights: The ten Nāṇas that arise in the course of Vipassanā practices are:

(1) The insight regarding the three characteristics.
(2) The insight regarding the beginning and the ending of things.
(3) The insight regarding the destruction of things.
(4) The insight that the world is dreadful.
(5) The insight that such a dreadful world is full of emptiness and vanity.
(6) The insight that such a world should be disgusted with.
(7) The insight that the world should be forsaken.
(8) The insight that liberation should be realized.
(9) The insight that equilibrium should be observed in spite
of the vicissitude of life.

(10) The insight that adaption has to be made for the realization of Nibbāna.

Sammasana Nāṇā. Out of these 10 Nāṇas - insights, Sammasana Nāṇā will arise between Kanbhāvitaṇa visuddhi and Maggāmaggānāṇadassana visuddhi. The other 9 Nāṇas will arise between the Maggāmaggā Nāṇadassana Visuddhi and the Paṭipādā Nāṇadassana visuddhi.

It is very interesting to study these different forms of Nāṇas and the different types of Visuddhis.

All the different types of Silas that have been mentioned before come under the purity of morality. The different levels of mental heights attainable up to the Jhāna on neither perception nor non-perception come under the purity of mind.

Soul-lness. Regarding the purity of view, it is said that the devotee with the purity in morality and the purity of mind will now see, as it were with a magnifying glass, that there is no permanent identity called “soul” and that there is only a continuity of the series of states, caused by the inter-action, inter-dependence, and interrelation of the mind forces as well as the material forces. There is no identity between the mind and the body and there is also no abiding ego in us. This awareness leads one to the realization of the chain of dependency called “Paticca-samuppāda” - dependent origination. Here the dependence of the present on the past and the determination of the present on the future become clear to the devotee. This will be the purity of doubt regarding the past, the present and the future.

When such purity is gained, there will arise as concomitant lightness, ease, equanimity and such like states, which have a tendency to make one think that he has already realized Nibbāna. This is a very critical moment. The person has lost sight of the right path and now thinks that these states themselves are the ultimate goal that he is so far seeking. At such a stage the guidance of a master who can give proper direction becomes very much necessary.

In those days of old, there were masters who could read the thoughts of others. The changes in the mental attitudes of the disciples are as transparent to them as a looking glass. They would then give proper instructions to their disciples and thus make them discern the right path from the wrong path.

The 9 Nāṇas. Between this Visuddhi and the visuddhi on the realization of the right method, there arise nine insights, that comprise the 6th visuddhi itself.

Real Desire For Liberation. Though one is practising vipassanā, up to the stage of the arising of the Paṭisankhāna, one is not at all serious about liberation. When Muccitu-kamayātā nāṇa arises, the devotee becomes fully aware that such a world should be forsaken. At this stage the devotee practise mindfulness on the three characteristics without as yet knowing which of these characteristics will be best fitted for him to be taken up to gain Nibbāna.

One Characteristic For Mindfulness. He continues with his practice, till he gains the purity of the realization of the right method. He now knows which characteristic, out of the three, he has to take up as the object of mindfulness. Seldom, I come to know, would-be Arahats pass through the Anatta door. Only Vipassanā Sambuddhas do so. As such, those systems that emphasize the Bodhisatta Ideals define Nibbāna in terms of Ānattā, which I think is not very much far wrong. There are three names for the same object Nibbāna - Ānattā, Animitta and Apanihita.

The 8 Mind Factors. In the study of psychic factors we are told of eight Maggānaga factors. But they are not simultaneously present at any time in any thought moment. At the time of the realization of Nibbāna, they all, eight in number, will be present simultaneously.

Another interesting feature regarding these Nāṇas is that a person who vows for Buddha can easily be tested. A Bodhisatta cannot go up higher than the Sankhāra upākāra Nāṇa. When one has gained Anuloma Nāṇa, one has no way of retreating.

The thought moments the Parikamma, the Upacāra, the Anuloma, the Gotrabhī and the Magga and the two moments of Phala occur in such a quick succession that the devotee is merely helpless to check them. This is Dhammanupassana - things happen as they are; there is no controller of them.

In the rounds of Samsāra, we have experienced these thought moments of the Parikamma, the Upacāra etc. in connection with the Jhānas but never with the Magga. If so, we would have gained Nibbāna long, long ago.

(Further reference is invited to the Buddha’s Teachings Sutta and Abhidhamma.)

The Ariya Stages. The person after gaining the first stage of sanctification can realize higher stages of Ariyahood, the last stage being the Arahats. Buddhists are optimistic because there are many bodhis to choose and though the world is full of sufferings, yet, to a Buddhist, there is a way out of it. We are the architects of our own fate and what we are is the result of what we have done. Ethically we
must be pure, psychically we must be developed and philosophically we must search for the Truth. If Buddhists can live strictly as Buddhist, they all can contribute tremendously to the welfare and the happiness of others; for happiness lies in the heart and no one can work for the welfare of others unless one works first of all, the welfare of oneself morally. Example lies not in the talk but in the deeds that one does. The real test lies with oneself. No Institutions by itself can survive unless the members of them are morally sound.

In my opinion, leaders of the world to-day can bring a happy state of affairs to the world if they only strive for the perfection in their own morality, before they do any good to the people at large. No wisdom can shine forth from immorality and no mind power should be developed on impurity. If we want to bring about world peace, instead of racking our brains in many other ways, we can simply observe the moral precepts as shown in the Buddha-Desanā. If any body walks in the Noble Elight Fold Path, there would be peace to the individual as well as peace to all in general.

The Buddhas—Way Farers. Buddhists are the way farers. The walking must be done by ourselves. The first step is perfection in morality. Morality by itself is not an end; it is but a mean towards Mind development, which in turn will lead one to the realization of Wisdom. As such, it will give us profound knowledge in studying the three branches of Buddha's Teachings, namely, (1) Buddhist Ethics, (2) Buddhist Psychology and (3) Buddhist Philosophy theoretically and there can be no harm if any one of us put these teachings to the most critical test and see with our own eyes what the Sakya-muni had delivered in the form of Sutta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma more than 2500 years ago.

SHINTO CEREMONIES CONNECTED WITH THE ENTRY OF FOREIGNERS

BY

TOKUICHI IWAMOTO

When one considers the peculiarities of Japan from the standpoint of its natural environment, one is bound to note that, unlike the countries on the continent, Japan's borders are made up by bodies of water rather than man-made boundary lines. The restrictions imposed by the sea have made communication and intercourse more difficult than on the mainland, and, because of such obstacles as seasonal winds and sea currents, have strengthened Japan's isolated character. Whereas cultural intercourse is constantly carried on between the continental countries across the artificially created borders, the intercourse of the isolated Japanese islands with foreign countries has been sporadic; and, because of the obstacles imposed by the sea, Japan has been able to be relatively uninfluenced by the conditions of its neighboring continental countries. Japan's history can even be considered one of passive reception of the influences of its continental neighbors.

The world of the ancient Japanese—although including natural obstacles—was the world as far as their eye-sight could reach, the region in which the community could move. Routes of commerce were discovered accidentally by experiences of being stranded at sea; but intercourse within the limits of the immediately visible world was far less taxing. Across the horizon was Toko-yo, the Eternal World, which was thought to be another world; that which was across the horizon was beyond the sphere of everyday life and was regarded as a different world.

Besides these geographical characteristics of the Japanese islands, the geographical environment within the islands themselves was a peculiar one. Mountain range succeeds mountain range, the rivers are all swift, and as a consequence the location of habitations and fields had to be scattered widely. The village was doomed by the restrictions of nature to be isolated, a sealed-off community.

The natural restrictions inevitably made the isolated village into a small world of its own. The village border was the entrance to the outside world, a world ruled by different gods and possessing a different
language, time system, and moral code. The many tales of visits to
different lands, beginning with the famous legend of Urashima Tarō,
are fundamentally tales about different worlds with different deities.

The village boundary was the door through which evil spirits
entered as well as the place where the village god confronted the gods
of the outer world. Consequently, the boundary was the site of religious
ceremonies and could not be easily crossed or penetrated. The gods of
the outer world were understood to be beings who would disturb the
peaceful life of the village. The Hitachi Fudoki relates: “First, the
mouth and hands must be washed; then one must face to the East and
worship the Great God of Kashima; only then can entrance be gained.”
As is evident from this account, the village boundary was regarded with
great interest, and prayers were offered to the god protecting the
boundary.

There were two attitudes towards the outer world. Welcome and
rejection of strangers are noticeable in many traditional stories, such as
the legend of Kōbō Shimizu and that of the Shimo-suhi no Daiishi-kō.
This is a concept of combined fear and hope towards the outer world.
The marocho-kami (guest god) and the toko-yo-gami (god of the
Eternal World) were gods who came from outside the boundaries to
bring happiness to the village; these gods were to be welcomed and
entertained. On the other hand, the vengeful gods, the pestilential
gods were gods who were to be rejected as beings who disturbed the
peace of the village.

Of course, with the development of culture, consciousness of the
isolated village based on kinship and regional ties began to give way to
national consciousness under the influence of the disappearance of
local antagonism, the reclamation of arable land, community migrations,
development of communications, and the accumulation of wealth;
gradually there was established consciousness of a unified State with
centralization of power.

The naturally-imposed village boundaries gradually disappeared, in
a sense, and became united into larger boundaries.

However, in the extremely peaceful atmosphere in which Japanese
society evolved, social reforms were never accomplished by revolution;
society developed with respect for history and tradition. Consequently,
conservative-minded respect for precedent and tradition has prevented
the problem of boundaries from ever disappearing completely. Even in
harai, the highly important purification rites of Shinto, it is
understood and believed that purity is finally introduced by expelling
ever and impurity outside of the sphere of everyday life, in other words,
outside the boundaries.

Furthermore, in the shrine, the concrete expression of Shinto faith,
the shrine deity was viewed as the deity protecting the region with which
it was geographically connected; and the regions under its protection
were regarded as the districts of its uji-ko, or parishioners. Even today
these uji-ko districts are preserved and make up the smallest divisible
units of shrine worship. The processions which are conducted as
part of shrine festivals are, in brief, derived from ancient ceremonies in
which the gods each year travelled around the community which they
ruled in order to bring it blessings — this fact is revealed with especial
clarity by the procession at Kirishima Jingū in which the deity Saruta-
hiko makes the rounds of all the borders of the area. By disregarding
the religious beliefs connected with boundaries, one loses sight of a
fundamental aspect of Shinto belief.

With regard to the entry of foreigners — the subject of our discus-
sion — one may say that it was commoner to think of foreigners more as
strangers, as travelers or visitors from the outside world, rather than as
aliens or foreigners in the modern sense. The traveler, the stranger was
somebody not originally dwelling in the village, but somebody who
passed through the village, somebody who was returning to his own
home. For religions as well as practical reasons, the setting of
strangers on the limited arable land of the village was feared and avoided.
However, unusual persons, persons with different gods, persons from a
different culture, were more often welcomed than rejected.

It is especially interesting to note that the various types of Shinto
rites connected with the entry of foreigners were influenced by the
common-sense experience that communication is accompanied by the
spread of new fashions and tastes. Because of the rather disorganized
state of the documentary evidence, I will base myself chiefly on the
Engi-shiki of the Heian period, which is a compilation of Shinto
ceremonies of that time. Since Shinto is, of course, not a religion which
sprang into being suddenly, one often discovers when dealing with a
particular religious phenomenon that its origins reach back to the
primeval forms of the remote past.

The alien culture which Japan first actively imported was that of
the Sui and T'ang dynasties of China. It is possible to obtain a glimpse
of the ceremonies attendant upon the entry of foreigners into Japan at
the time of this commerce with Sui and T'ang China. According to
the extant documents, it was prescribed that when foreign visitors
entered Japan, they were to be greeted first at the borders of the
Home Provinces, in which was located Kyōto, the capital of the time;
then religious ceremonies were to be carried out to drive away the gods which had protected them on their way to Japan; next, when the visitors were about to enter the capital, they were to be given linen cloth for exorcism, and were to be allowed to enter the capital only after having been exorcized and purified.

This was, let it be remembered, the era during which Japan imported the so-called ritsu-ryo culture of Sui and T’ang and carried out the Taika Reform in order to establish more firmly the authority of the imperial throne. It can readily be seen that, in their insistence on the performance of these native Shinto ceremonies upon natives of a culturally more advanced nation, the Japanese were strongly asserting their own independence.

Furthermore, according to the Gemban-ryō, which deals with the foreign relations of the time, it is clear that sacred rice shoots harvested from sacred fields belonging to famous shrines within the five home provinces were assembled at the Ikuta and Sumuji shrines (in the amounts of 240 and 200 bushels, respectively)—from these rice shoots was brewed a sacred wine, sent to the cape of Minume and the host of Naniwa to be given to the foreigners to drink for their purification. This fact also shows that, notwithstanding the extreme fastidiousness about diet and drink in the outer world, it was considered necessary first of all to purify by means of sacred wine these state guests—who, on the other hand, needed to be treated with the greatest respect. As is seen in the Saegusa-matsuri, in which golden-banded lilies are used to adorn casks of wine, in Shinto religious life wine is a deity, wine bears the mystery of the divine, and is highly regarded as a means of purifying people and bringing them to proximity with the divine. For this reason, every effort was made in the brewing of sacred wine, in which virgins participated, to obtain spotless purity and freedom from all pollution.

In brief, foreigners, at their entry into the country, were not rejected, but were greeted, then purified by native Shinto ceremonies and accepted after thus having been transformed into bringers of blessings and good fortune. One can glimpse the sources and many variations of this type of belief in such festivals as the Ya-chimata-sai, the Sakai-sai, the Shigu-eki-jin-sai, and the Sawaru-kami no matsuri.

In primitive religion, which had as its object the peace and well-being of the village, those coming from outside the village were unknown, awesome beings whose entry had to be preceded by Shinto ceremonies on the boundary. This point is one of special interest, since the concept of the boundary disappeared relatively early in other nations besides Japan; and the fact that the stranger was not rejected, but welcomed and transformed into a bringer of blessings reveals a possible new series of questions in the study of cultural assimilation. One can conceive of this very attitude as being the basis of the recurrent Japanese attitude of assimilating a new culture upon the basis provided by native rites and ceremonies.

The fact, too, that these ceremonies relating to the entry of foreigners took place out-of-doors, were roadside ceremonies, as well as the fact that, in comparison with the anthropomorphic deities who were the objects of in-door worship, the objects of these purification ceremonies, the defensive deities, were deities of imperfect development as spirits, is a noteworthy problem in the study of Shinto deities.
Next year, in 1959, the Protestant churches of Japan will celebrate the centenary of the Protestant mission in Japan. From this vantage point, looking back over a hundred years of missionary activities, it is undeniable that the transplanting of Christianity to Japan, a non-Christian land, offers several problems of interest from the viewpoint of theology and the history of religions.

In this paper I shall discuss only one of these problems: the problem of why the progress of Christianity in Japan has been so slow. This question has been asked both by Christians themselves, and by those who are outside the Christian Church as well. It is said that it took nearly two hundred years for Buddhism to spread throughout Japan. Therefore some people think that there is still another hundred years for Christianity to go. However, if we think of the great number of missionaries and the huge sums of money which have been spent in missionary work, the results of the Protestant mission have been rather disappointing. What, then, is the reason? There may be many reasons, but I shall discuss here only one reason, which is concerned with the problem of doctrine.

A man born in a non-Christian country inevitably receives any foreign religion through the medium of his own non-Christian thought. There is a very interesting episode which occurred when Roman Catholicism was first brought to Japan by Francis Xavier, before the days of the Protestant mission: the Japanese people at the time regarded him as representing a new kind of high-church Buddhist sect. This episode, though probably exaggerated, seems yet to suggest some truth. In other words, the Japanese people unconsciously accepted Christianity through the medium of traditional Japanese thought, which was strongly influenced by both Confucianism and Buddhism.

One good example of this may be found in the Japanese translation of the word “religion.” As you perhaps know, we Japanese write our language in a combination of Chinese characters and Japanese phonetic signs. The word “shūkyō,” written in Chinese characters, means the teaching (kyō) of any religious group (shū). I do not know how occidentals respond instinctively to the word “religion,” or what kind of “Wortgefühl” (as the Germans say) they receive from the word “religion.” It is often said that the word “religion” is derived from the Latin verb “religare” meaning “to bind.” I am not quite sure whether the average occidental is really aware of the original meaning of this Latin word when he hears or reads the word “religion.” But in the case of the Japanese, the word “kyō” definitely means “teaching.” And Christianity, translated as “Kirisuto-kyō,” literally means Christ’s teaching, just as Buddhism, translated as “Buk-kyō,” means Buddha’s teaching, and Confucianism, translated as “Kōshi-kyō,” or “Ju-kyō” means Confucius’ teaching. Since all these religions are equally called “teachings,” Christianity is also naturally regarded as a teaching.

“Teaching” here means a theory, a system of thought, Lebensanschauung, or what may be called a law. This is one of the reasons why there exists in Japan a group of people called “non-church Christians,” they study the Bible diligently, perhaps more intensively than other Christians, but they object to the sacraments. These Christians are found mostly among the intellectuals and students.

Now I do not necessarily object to calling Christianity the teaching of Christ. But we must make clear that the content of the teaching of Christ cannot be said to be of a kind similar to that of Buddha or of Confucius. This is to say that Christ is not teaching the truth about God. He is teaching about Himself. He is not pointing to the truth beyond Himself, but pointing to Himself as the truth. Therefore to follow the teaching of Christ does not mean to live and act according to what Christ teaches, but to live and act listening to what Christ, the living Christ, speaks to us now. We must recognize, then, the difference of the meaning of the word “teaching” when it is used to describe Christianity. The word is the same, but the meaning is different. I want to stress here that the words of the Bible must be translated into Japanese, but that when Biblical words are translated into Japanese they are apt to lose their original meanings. We must use Japanese words, but Japanese words as such are not competent to convey the original meanings of Biblical words. Herein lies the difficulty.

Let us look at some examples. The Biblical word “love” is translated as “ai” in Japanese, but “ai” as understood by the average non-Christian Japanese is not the same as the Biblical “agape.” For the Japanese people there is no other meaning in the word “love” (“ai”) except “eros.” The Japanese people have never heard of the dis
tinction between “agape” and “eros”. Not only that, but when the Bible says that “God is love” (1 John 4:8), the context of this passage makes it clear that the Bible is trying to teach that the love which it speaks of is not to be understood correctly apart from an understanding of the God whom Christ reveals to us. In this sense we may say that man cannot understand the love spoken of in the Bible by himself alone, no matter how hard he may try: it can only be revealed by God.

Another example is the word “resurrection.” The Japanese translation for it is “yomigaeri” or “fukkatsu.” Either word in Japanese means simply to come back to life again. Thus when a Japanese hears or reads of the resurrection of Christ, he immediately understands that He came back to His former life again. But if we read the Bible carefully, we are able to understand that the meaning of Christ’s resurrection according to the Bible is not that He came back to His former life again. It means an entirely new creation. Paul calls it a spiritual body, not a fleshly body.

We could go on with an enumeration of such examples as these. But the problem arises from the fact that preachers, whether foreign missionaries or natives, take for granted that the people who listen to them really understand the meaning of the Biblical words if they simply translate them into their corresponding Japanese words. When preachers and pastors follow such a procedure they must guard themselves against making serious mistakes. We must be aware of the fact that almost all the words we use in our daily life can be said to have some connotation of, or at least to stand in the context of, our own native religious thought. Therefore, when these words are employed to explain foreign religious thought, care should be taken to examine whether the words employed are really competent to convey the new content of the foreign religion. Here we must look for contributions from the study of comparative religion. But in the comparative study of religion in the Meiji Era emphasis was laid upon the similarities among religions rather than upon their differences. And doubtless this tendency among students of comparative religion of the time exercised some influence upon contemporary methods of preaching. I shall not deal with this subject now; suffice it to say that preachers and pastors were so eager to see as many Japanese as possible converted to Christianity, that they attempted only to make the Bible easily understandable to the Japanese. On the other hand, we must not overlook the fact that there was always pressure from the government upon Christianity in the Meiji Era. It was declared publicly that the Japanese people enjoyed freedom of religion, but in reality this was not so. On the subtle situation of Christianity in the Meiji Era I refer to my article, “The Imperial Rescript and the Christianity of the Meiji Era,” which I read at the 8th Congress for the History of Religions, 1955, in Rome (ATTI, Firenze, 1956, p. 200). Until the end of the last war Christian churches were not permitted to preach against the Imperial Rescript. When Christianity was preached, care had to be taken not to contradict the teaching of the Imperial Rescript. Preachers and pastors naturally tried to explain Christianity by using traditional Japanese thoughts and words. Such a procedure easily results in depriving Biblical words of their Biblical content, and placing it with traditional Japanese content. If such a procedure continues unrestricted, the specific content of Christian thought is gradually overlooked and finally forgotten entirely. Most attempts to Japanize Christianity, to make Christianity indigenous, ended this way. The fault with these attempts was that they deviated completely from the fundamental truth of Christianity. In the early period of the Protestant mission, however, there was a marked tendency to admire everything from abroad, i.e., from Western countries. The interest in Christianity on the part of a great many Japanese may be said to be an expression of this general admiration for things Western. It may be called a kind of exoticism. Since the Japanese way of thinking is essentially pantheistic, Japanese people think almost instinctively that all religions are ultimately one and the same. Then if there is any reason for choosing Christianity before the native religions, it is simply because Christianity is more up to date. Some people are said to have been impressed with the monotheism of Christianity, or with the strict doctrine of moral monogamy. But if Japanese people were converted to Christianity by such motives, they cannot be said to have been converted by the fundamental and central truth of Christianity. These motives are concerned rather with secondary and peripheral matters in the Christian truth. People who were converted by such motives were convinced only to secondary and peripheral motives could give up their faith without much difficulty. It is a well-known fact that in the middle of the Meiji Era a great many novelists and intellectuals joined Christian churches, but most of them lost their interest in Christianity sooner or later. If they had really been converted by the fundamental truth of Christianity I do not think that they could have so easily abandoned their faith. The fact that they did abandon it proves that their conversions were due to secondary and peripheral motives.

In conclusion, in the propagation of Christianity in Japan during the past hundred years efforts were made to explain Christianity in
such a way that Japanese could grasp it easily. But due to these very efforts, I fear, the truth of Christianity suffered distortion. I do not mean to say that the truth of Christianity was never transmitted to the Japanese people, because while being impressed superficially with the peripheral matters of Christianity they may have grasped the truth of Christianity unconsciously and intuitively while continuing faithfully in their church life. But we cannot overlook the fact that many Japanese who have once been converted are apt to abandon their faith in later years. To my mind, if they were really converted, or rather, grasped by the fundamental truth of Christianity, their way of thinking would have been changed, and it would not be so easy for them to abandon their faith. Therefore I fear very much that in the majority of cases in Japan, when Christianity was preached, the central truth of Christianity, i.e., the specific content of Biblical thought, was left out. Perhaps the best example of this is found in the doctrine of eschatology. In order to grasp the truth of Christian faith we must be able to understand the unique way of Biblical or Christian thinking. And this unique way of Biblical or Christian thinking is, in short, eschatological thinking. But it may not be too much to say that this fundamental and central truth of the Bible, has never been preached properly in Japanese churches. And this is the result of the efforts to make people understand Christianity by reducing its specific way of thinking to the traditional Japanese way of thinking. Here lies a very important problem of Christian communication in a non-Christian country.

ON THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY

BY KUMATARO KAWADA

I Introduction

According to some people, Pure Land Buddhism, especially Shin-Buddhism, and Christianity are very similar to each other. And they are right in their own way, because these two religions emphasize above all faith and salvation from without. But those who are content to say so or who will draw some conclusions therefrom are men who have had, to my regret, no opportunity and lack the competency to study these two religions from the original sources, because, if one does so, one will necessarily acknowledge the fundamental difference between the two. By original sources I mean here especially the New Testament and Augustine’s Writings on the one hand, Sukhāvatīvyūha-mahāyānasūtra and the writings of Shinran on the other.

II Fundamental Christianity

Faith (πίστις) is, according to Christianity, the gift of the Holy Spirit. It is by faith alone that men are justified. Why do men stand in need of justification? It is because they are sinners whom awaits nothing else but inevitable Death. And justification is the remission of sins and the eventual admittance into the City of God where there is eternal life. And the remission of sins does not result from the works of the sinner but comes from God who inspires faith into the sinner who is without merit. Justification, therefore, is entirely the grace of God. For this reason, faith (πίστις) is all and it originates from the power and wisdom of God (1 Cor. 1:24) who is clearly not a sinner and who is different from the sinners.

Now, what is God? He alone is the real and eternal Being. “I am the Alpha and the Omega, saith the Lord God, which is and which was and which is to come, the Almighty” (Rev. 1:8). All other beings besides himself are brought into existence out of nothing by (325)
knowledge and compassion, of Amitayurbuddha, which signifies time and without exception. Thus here, in the case of Shin-Buddhism also, faith is all, and it originates from the jnana-karui)yam, which consists in the re-uniting, religio, religion through the medium of Augustine. Hence Christianity has no intrinsic need of entering his Pure Land those who have faith and call his name in gratitude. And those who have acquired faith are received after death into the Pure Land, where no obstacle bars the inhabitants from attaining the nirvāṇa. This is the content of the 18th and 11th vows of Amitayurbuddha.

Shinran praises the Buddha with a hymn as follows: "Those who have acquired true faith by the friendliness of Amitayurbuddha are therewith numbered among the samyaktvaniyatarasi, and those who are established on the stage of non-retrogression are led necessarily to salvation from without because Amitayurbuddha is different from men and sentient beings who are in the bond of ignorance. This Amitayurbuddha, however, was not a buddha from the beginning, but originally a man, who raised the bodhicittam, thoughts towards the highest perfect knowledge, as the sūtra tells us, in the reign of Buddha Lokesvararāja, under whose guidance and through his own efforts he attained the highest perfect knowledge of the uncreated truth, realised all his 48 vows and became the dharma-sambhoga-kāya, i.e. a Buddha who himself feeds on and feeds the bodhisattvas with truth. And thus he became the matchless friend, who helps in every possible way those who have resolved, like him, to acquire the highest perfect knowledge of the uncreated truth. He is the embodiment of compassion, karunā, and friendship, maitrī. And the best help he offers consists in this: he causes, by the power of his 11th vow, those who have acquired faith by dint of the 18th vow, to enter the stage of non-retrogression of bodhisattvas, bodhisattvānām avairya-yabhūmi. The reason why this is the best help he offers is this: - Faith (prasannacittam) is, according to Shinran, nothing but the resolution to become a Buddha (佛心), that is, the raising of Bodhicittam (bodhicittotpada). The resolution must be realized: he who has made up his mind should become a Buddha. And to become a Buddha requires much time and effort according to the Mahāyāna Buddhism of Saints. And so one is always exposed to the danger of giving up the resolution or of relapsing to a lower stage of forsaking the Mahāyāna Buddhism of Saints. And so one is always exposed to the danger of giving up the resolution or of relapsing to a lower stage of forsaking the Mahāyāna Buddhism of Saints. And so one is always exposed to the danger of giving up the resolution or of relapsing to a lower stage of forsaking the Mahāyāna Buddhism of Saints. And so one is always exposed to the danger of giving up the resolution or of relapsing to a lower stage of forsaking the Mahāyāna Buddhism of Saints. And so one is always exposed to the danger of giving up the resolution or of relapsing to a lower stage of forsaking the Mahāyāna Buddhism of Saints. And so one is always exposed to the danger of giving up the resolution or of relapsing to a lower stage of forsaking the Mahāyāna Buddhism of Saints. And so one is always exposed to the danger of giving up the resolution or of relapsing to a lower stage of forsaking the Mahāyāna Buddhism of Saints.

The mediator between God and men is, therefore, God-Man and not Man-God. He is originally God, who became a man and not a man who became God. And it is not the Man-God, but the God-Man, that Christianity does profess, defend and teach. This Jesus Christ, the God-Man, is God from the beginning, who became a man in order to re-unite men, the apostates, with God. Fundamental Christianity, therefore, is the evangel (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) of God, the content of which consists in the re-uniting, religio, religion through the medium of Jesus the Christ. Hence Christianity has no intrinsic need of philosophy in the Greek sense of the word. The Christian philosophy of Augustine is just Christian theology and nothing else.

III Shin-Buddhism and Fundamental Buddhism

Now, according to Shin-Buddhism, faith (prasannacittam) originates from the 18th vow of Amitayurbuddha who has resolved to receive into his Pure Land those who have faith and call his name in gratitude. And those who have acquired faith are received after death into the Pure Land, where no obstacle bars the inhabitants from attaining the highest perfect knowledge. And so they are led to nirvāṇa in a short time and without exception. Thus here, in the case of Shin-Buddhism also, faith is all, and it originates from the jhāna-kāryayam, knowledge and compassion, of Amitayurbuddha, which signifies...
nirvāṇa.” The samyaktvaniyatarāśī is the group of men who are fixed in righteousness. Righteousness signifies nirvāṇa. And the stage of non-retrogression (avaivartyabhūmi) is a stage which, once entered, leads yogins necessarily to nirvāṇa.

Thus by faith alone, which depends upon the power of the friendly Amitāyurbuddha, even common people can easily attain nirvāṇa, the goal. And those who have attained nirvāṇa are in all respects equal to Amitāyurbuddha. This means that they have awakened to the uncreated truth and experience it, as people experience warmth and coolness when drinking water, and that they have become the buddha of dharma-sambhoga-kāya.

From the above we can safely infer that Pure Land Buddhism, especially Shin-Buddhism, is fundamental Buddhism adapted to meet the needs of the decadent period of Buddhadharma, the truth of the awakened One. And the adaptation has been performed by applying and utilizing on a large scale the concept of pariṇāma, i.e. transmission of one’s own merits to others. The pariṇāma has two phases, going thither from here and coming hither from there. The 11th and 18th vows are the components of the former phase.

Now the Buddhadharma is in no sense a Personal God, the Creator, a concept inherited from the Old Testament. It is the uncreated and impersonal truth, which has two phases of Paurāṇa-sthiti-dharmatā and Pratyātmadharmatā, that is, truth standing and reigning from time immemorial and truth realized by oneself. If the concept of a Creator would be felt indispensable, Buddhism, then, would point Creator on every man’s mind, cittam, which develops varieties of worlds. “The mind is,” as Buddhavatarpsaka put it, “like a skillful artist: it depicts different five agglomerations. There is nothing which has not been created by the mind” (Chapter XVI). The fundamental law of the mind is the uncreated truth of dependent origination, which is the middle way. Prajñā, founded upon śīla and samādhi, enables us to attain the truth by ourselves and to teach it to others (sayaṃ abhiṣā sacchi-katvā pavedeti: Brahmajāla, i. 2.15). Herein is found the essence of fundamental Buddhism. Accordingly, Buddhism is not reuniting, religio, religion, but the teaching, desanā of the finally attained truth, siddhānta. Incidentally, it may be said here that this is the original meaning of our expression “Shūkyō” (Shūkyō).

Buddhism, therefore, is darśanam in the strict sense of the word. Darśanam may be translated approximately but not adequately into the Greek ὑποστασις. Think of ὑποστασις combined inseparably and from the beginning with pietas, and you can approximate
SOME ASPECTS OF CONFUCIANISM IN ITS ADAPTATION TO THE MODERN WORLD

BY ROBERT P. KRAMERS

For the study of contemporary religious phenomena among the Chinese people we are so fortunate as to have an excellent guide in Dr. Chan Wing-tsit’s book: *Religious Trends in Modern China.* In this book Dr. Chan attempts, besides giving a careful description, also to evaluate what is living and what is dead in the various religious systems which used to be part and parcel of traditional Chinese society. He arrives at a number of interesting conclusions, the principal one being that, although most of the formal aspects are rapidly disappearing, this cannot be said of the content of the traditional Chinese way of life. While it is true that ever since the beginning of this century so many Western forms of life have been adopted by the Chinese people, a wealth of publications show that many intellectuals are earnestly seeking to reevaluate their own cultural tradition. It is not surprising that this process of re-thinking is especially going on in the sector of Confucianism, because the Confucian way of life has been so closely linked to traditional Chinese culture. Confucianism in particular was the object of vicious attacks by revolutionary intellectuals. “Down with the Confucian shop,” was the slogan. Yet, if we look more carefully, we can discern that these attacks were mainly directed against the old pattern of life which stood in the way of a free development of human relations and of society. A more thorough-going encounter, however, with the basic attitudes and beliefs underlying this pattern has hardly taken place yet.

It is, of course, far more easy to break with traditional forms than with basic attitudes towards life which underly them and which are the result of millennia of spiritual moulding. When Confucian morals still held undisputed sway over the social relationships of the Chinese people, one could at least obtain a fairly clear picture of this morality. But at a time when most Chinese intellectuals are clamouring for Western standards of life it is not so easy to discern how much of the old conceptions ring through even in the propagation of new ideas.

Yet the question poses itself with increasing insistence, ever since the communist revolution on the mainland of China. A highly interesting study by Professor David Nivison on *Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition* reveals some striking analogies, though the problem as yet is too hypothetical in nature as to permit more definite conclusions.

There is, however, ample evidence that Chinese intellectuals outside the mainland continue to be occupied with the problem of their Confucian heritage. There are, of course, many reasons for their concern for this heritage, the most obvious being the political circumstances of which they often are the victims. Yet their writing reveals far more than political concern only. The great problem behind it is that of the integration of the Chinese person with his rich spiritual background into the modern world, or, to express it in terms used by Professor J. R. Levenson, that of harmonising the tension between their emotional commitment to “history” and their intellectual commitment to “value.”

A very interesting and quite representative example of Confucian re-thinking is a “Manifesto to the World on behalf of Chinese Culture,” written and signed by four prominent intellectuals, and published this year in Hong Kong. It may truly be called a restatement of a Confucian “faith” and its implications for the present day. Its dominant tone is that of an “Auseinandersetzung” with the “West.” It begins by stating three reasons why the “West” has never understood the inner motivating forces of Chinese culture. The first reason is that part of the knowledge about China was transmitted by missionaries, who could not but be biased in their views, and therefore stressed the supposedly atheistic aspect of Neo-Confucianism. Moreover, the knowledge about China which the Jesuits imparted fell, so to say, in the wrong hands, for, while Neo-Confucianism was much closer in spirit to Kantian idealism, it was extolled by rationalist atheists in conformity with the trends of those times in Europe. The second reason is the following: during the last decades the study by Westerners of modern Chinese history has been greatly stimulated by the increasing international contact between China and the West, politically or otherwise. Yet, though here a more “participating” kind of study did develop, it was again biased mainly because it tried to explain China’s past from its present conditions. In short, all these avenues of approach were lacking in sympathetic

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understanding of the object of study for its own sake, so that the true inner significance of the outwardly observable facts and phenomena was seldom grasped. And this lack of sympathetic understanding is not merely ascribed to historical circumstances (though they are enumerated too), but basically to the inability to get rid of Western categories of judgment in evaluating Chinese culture.

In order to overcome these difficulties, the writers of the Manifesto set out to do two things. First, they analyse the nature of the Western categories of judgment according to their own historical origin. They notice the elements of tension, division and inner conflict within Western culture, and they ascribe this mainly to its diversity of cultural origins: religion can be traced back to Jewish culture, the rational analysis and logic underlying philosophy to Graeco-Roman culture, which also gave rise to the scientific attitude. The great deficiency due to this varied cultural origins was the break-up of the necessary unity between thought and action. This is also why Western thought can display such a wealth of form, and yet be so innerly divided and therefore ineffective.

The second thing they do is to paint against this picture of an innerly divided Western culture the picture of an innerly united Chinese culture. Though in the course of its history influenced by other cultures, yet Chinese culture is “single-rooted.” Thus, there could in China never emerge such a conflict between Church and State as in the West: the Emperor at the same time fulfilled his function as a high priest. The fact that religion is such an outstanding separate phenomenon in Western culture is simply because of its different cultural origin. But – and this is an interesting assertion – the fact that there was no independent religious tradition in Chinese culture does not mean that the Chinese people lacked a sense of the supernatural or a religious spirit. The faith in Shang-ti or in Heaven, as expressed in the ancientmost texts, and as it was later worked out in the doctrine of union between Heaven and man, should be sufficient indication of this religious spirit. Did not many courageous men in Chinese history go so far as to discard their lives for the sake of Justice, or Human Goodness, or the Way? And when this is called “wishing to abide in the true atmosphere of heaven and earth,” or “wishing to move to where their heart is at rest,” instead of “obeying God’s commandments,” would it therefore fail to express a faith of high quality?

Thus, the basic elements of this Confucian faith are described as a faith, a faith in the essential goodness of human nature which ultimately is in harmony with the order of heaven, the immanent and transcendent moments both being represented in this way. This method of describing Confucianism in its essence seems far more relevant than the often heard assertion that Confucianism is non-religious and rational (an assertion which perhaps also springs from the wish to make Confucianism relevant to modern life, but which does no justice to its distinctly mystic foundations). Having outlined the inner spirit of Chinese culture, the Manifesto in its second part tries to give an outline of the future development of this culture. In this part the writers cannot get away from the reality of two phenomena which especially symbolise the Western impact on the whole of Asia: the phenomena of science and democracy. But now, whereas the Confucian spirit was first asserted in its own right and freed from Western categories of judgment, the process seems to be somewhat reversed: science and democracy are made into universal human phenomena and freed from their exclusive association with Western culture. The writers’ main conclusion is that the Chinese people should accept science and democracy because the history of Chinese thought and culture clearly shows that their acceptance by the Chinese people is an inner historic necessity of this culture. Science and democracy should therefore not be regarded as modern forces which will overthrow and replace the traditional culture, but rather as a logical development of what was already inherent in that culture. There seems certainly to be a somewhat artificial flavour to these arguments, but for our purpose it is interesting to note how, throughout this Manifesto, as in much other literature on the subject, the underlying conviction of ultimate harmony shines through in them, together with an abhorrence of anything that resembles conflict and contrast. This seems also true for the view which is given of Western culture. The lack of integration in modern Western culture is by no means a subject on which Chinese intellectuals were the first to write. But to ascribe this lack solely to the diversity of cultural origin, and to ascribe the tension between the religions and the secular also to this cause alone, seems the best proof of the existence and great power of this Confucian conviction of ultimate harmony. Nevertheless, much of what the writers say is undoubtedly true and wholesome for a Western mind, and consequently such publications may play their important role in bringing Chinese and Western minds together in deepening the level of intercommunication. They certainly are a sign that the spiritual tradition of Confucianism continues to be expressed not only in traditional but also in new ways.
THE TRANSMISSION OF TAOISM TO JAPAN
—WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE SAN-SHIH—

BY

NORITADA KUBO

Although it is difficult to grasp the essential character of Chinese Taoism with its complicated structure, it is fundamentally a belief of animistic peoples of ancient China in which Taoist magic becomes the central theme. As a consequence, the aim of Taoism was directed towards the search for the Elixir of Life. Amongst the numerous methods of prolonging life advocated in the early stages of Taoism—medical potions, massaging, deep-breathing exercises, etc.—there was also included the theory of the San-shih (三尸) or 三虫 San-ch'ung : the “Three Noxious Insects”) which seems to have been propounded since the early half of the 3rd century. It is not restricted merely to Taoist Classics but appears also in essays, medical works and Buddhist literature. The most important element of the San-shih theory was the all-night vigil observed on the Keng-hsin (Jap. Koshin) day of the cyclical calendar — “the keeping of the Keng-hsin day” (守庚辰) : the observance of this vigil was supposed to prolong life by preventing the Three Noxious Insects residing within the body from ascending to Heaven and making their report on the individual’s misdeeds to the God of Life. Besides this, it was essential to develop unselfishness in the purification of both body and mind; in particular, on the Keng-hsin day, husbands and wives were not permitted to occupy the same room or bed, or partake of fresh meats and spices (五辛). In Tang and Sung times, methods of exterminating the Three Noxious Insects from outside the body wherein they resided, seem to have been propounded extensively; they were indeed very numerous—considerably more than three hundred have come to my notice.

Observances relating to the San-shih were not restricted in China to Taoists but were widely believed in by most people—they were conducted even until a couple of decades ago but with their elaborate details greatly curtailed. In Japan there were actually numerous places—even Tokyo—where the Koshinmachi was celebrated; Edo scholars opined that the festival originated in the era of Emperor Jimmu while
others sought to place its earliest origins in the time of Emperor Tenji, but since there is no evidence to support them, neither of these theories can be accepted. On the basis of a record dated 26th of the 11th month of the 8th year of the period Jōwa (838 A.D.) in Chisho-Daiishi’s Nittō-Guhō-Junrei-Koki, I wonder if the Kōshin-machi of Japan may possibly have originated in the 8th century. The term Kōshinmachi dates from the middle of the Muromachi period; before then the festive was referred to as “Kōshin-wo-mamoru” the same way as in China. Even after Muromachi times, the above three characters are commonly found written in diaries, calenders and stone-pagodas known as Kōshin-tō and even now-a-days, although it is uncommon, the place-name “Kōshin-wo-mamoru” are found. Thus it may be observed that although the later Japanese term now holds sway, there still remain instances where the Chinese expression which was anciently employed is retained. Not only the terminology but the significance and aim of the all-night vigil of the Kōshin day were anciently the same here as in China. In collections of poems and medical works dating from the Heian period we can see that the aristocracy of that time was well acquainted with the theory of the San-shih for the prolongation of life for which purpose they observed the all-night vigil on Kōshin days. This knowledge was not limited to the aristocracy; numerous essays, collections of songs, medical books, almanacs and popular Buddhist works contain simple introductions to the theory. —Yamazaki Ansai, who strongly propounds the opinion that the celebration of the Saruta-tō for which purpose they observed the all-night vigil on Kōshin day. He was acquainted with the theory of the San-shih for the prolongation of life that varies from the Chinese term.

NEW LIGHT ON THE MAHĀYĀNA-
ŚRADDHOTPĀDA ŚĀTRA

BY

WALTER LIEBENTHAL

The study of the Mahāyāna-śraddhoptāda Śāstra has a long history. French, Chinese and Japanese scholars have participated in the discussion, among others such great authorities in the field of Sino-Indian Studies as P. Demiéville, Ui Hakuju, Tokiwa Daijō, and Mochizuki Shinkō. In the last years Hayashi Kemmyō and finally Matsunami Seiren have again picked up the problem. The theories advanced by these scholars are very diversified. First Asvaghosa was accepted as author and Paramārtha as translator. This idea, however, was soon discarded as it was found that the phrasing in the Śāstra did not agree with that found in other translations of the same translator. Besides, the main doctrines taught there seemed to suggest a Chinese author rather than an Indian.

The Śraddhoptāda Śāstra teaches the doctrine of the cosmic mind which is one but has three aspects, cosmic like the mind itself. This cosmic mind is identified with the tathāgata or buddha and therefore has no relation of meaning to store-consciousness (ālaya-vijnāna) of the Vijnaptivāda school. For ālaya is a cosmic mind-stuff and never personal. In the three cosmic aspects we are confronted with a trinity of manifestations. The Indian pattern of svabhava and lakṣaṇa (substance and attributes) has become amalgamated with the Chinese neo-Taoist pattern of cosmic integration and disintegration 像用. It is not wholly built from Chinese material but Chinese influence is undeniable.

The present state of the question seems to be that the majority of investigators agree in the belief that the Śāstra was composed by a Daśabhūmika of North China, 达人. This allegation is already found in the Compendia of the Tang Dynasty and I am inclined to take it seriously, even in details. In the Sūtra-hsin-hsien-i 四論玄義, composed by Hui-chün 徽秦, the author of the Śāstra is called “a former Daśabhūmika” 达人。This implies that a distinction must be made between earlier and later Daśabhūmikas. Further study shows that

“earlier” here refers to the translators in Loyang and the first generation of their disciples, “later” to the second and third generations. To the “earlier” group belong Bodhiruci and Ratnamati, the fathers of the northern and southern “routes” or factions, Tao-ch'ung and Hui-kuang 誕光; to the “later” Fa-shang 江上 and all those who at the end of the Chou and the beginning of the Sui Dynasties fought with or against the propagators of the Mahāyāna-samgraha Śāstra, the most important of whom was T'an-ch'ien 捲震. The following is an abridged outline of the genealogy of the Daśabhūmikas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Northern Faction</th>
<th>Southern Faction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bodhiruci</td>
<td>Ratnamati</td>
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<tr>
<td>道厳 ( <code>( )</code>)</td>
<td>道方 僧寶 莹光</td>
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<td>+ 550 + 476-542</td>
<td>476-563 465-537</td>
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<tr>
<td>譯念</td>
<td>江上</td>
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<tr>
<td>535-608</td>
<td>495-580</td>
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<tr>
<td>僧保</td>
<td>莹道</td>
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<td>515-588 + 550 + 504 (?) - 588(?) 523-582</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>僧震</td>
<td>542-607</td>
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Mochizuki proposes T'an-tsun as author who, however, did not write the text himself but only handed down his ideas to his disciple T'an-ch'ien who took them down in writing. T'an-ch'ien was in possession of a copy before the breakdown of Kao Ch'i (577). He wrote a commentary on the Śāstra and lectured on it after 582 in Ch'ang-an. There was at least one other monk who probably possessed a copy, namely Hui-ssu 蕙思 (515-577) who might have got it from Hui-wen 蕙文. As he met Hui-wen before 553, this copy would have been about twenty years older than that of T'an-ch'ien.

A problem of main importance is to find out whether the author of the Śāstra belonged to the Southern or the Northern Faction of the Daśabhūmikas, 南北道。Generally, he is included in the Southern Faction but I think this is not correct. A passage found in the玄義 梵義 says, “the Southern Faction thought that Buddha-nature had created all the dharma, the Northern Faction that ālaya had created all the dharma.” Buddha-nature, as a term, does not occur in the śraddhoptāda Śāstra, while it is said in a prominent place early in the text that “ālaya-vijnāna has two functions: it contains all dharma and it creates all dharma.” This is exactly what the Hsin-i shi-
ch'ien ascribes to the Northern Faction. There is more evidence supporting the view that Hui-kuang and his school was influenced by Tao-sheng's teachings and the discussion of Buddha-nature which started in the South after the translation of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. His disciple Fa-shang wrote a paper on Buddha-nature.

If the Northern Faction has composed the Sūtra, there is virtually only one man who could have done it namely, Tao-ch'ung. Tao-ch'ung was a Confucian scholar of reputation and an extraordinary person. His biography says that he took the vows in a very small, obscure monastery in the course of some hours without any preparation and without submitting to a teacher. After the ceremony he left to study alone by himself. This means that he simply perused Buddhist books but never memorized any, as every cleric had to do. This would explain the strange way in which the author of the Sūtra quotes badly memorized material as "sūtra". Tao-ch'ung did not take part in translation, also probably because he did not belong to any sangha, but met Bodhiruci later and during three winters received private instruction in the Daśabhūmika Sūtra. This may be exaggerated as the biography obviously exaggerates in other cases, but we know that he was lecturing on this work in his old age (biogr. Chih-nien). Strange is also that at the end of his life he received a pension as a scholar who had brought fame to his family, — an impossibility for a monk who had no property of his own but was always supported by the sangha.

In the biography of Tao-ch'ung an interesting passage occurs which corroborates our view that he was the author we are looking for. After he had met three great literati of the Northern Ch'i, it is said, "In common they paid homage to the three cosmic (aspects) and (said that) they are completely contained in one mind." This can only refer to the three cosmic aspects śākya of the Sūtra.

Studying the allusions found in the Sraddhotpāda Sūtra, we found that the author knew the following texts:

2. Four or five translations of Bodhiruci.
3. Two translations of Mandrasena-Saṅghabara.
5. Some minor texts, translated early.

I believe that knowledge of the Mandrasena translations which were made in the Southern Capital came to Loyang with T'an-luan 藤原(476-542) who visited Liang Wu-ti in 527-9 and then returned to Loyang. He must have known Tao-ch'ung as both were disciples of Bodhiruci. This relation to T'an-luan may also explain the passages at the end of the Sūtra which show influence of the Pure Land School. Many passages in the Sūtra are evidently emendations. There are others which might have been written by the author but are not well fitted into the context. We may doubt whether Tao-ch'ung ever finished his work or whether he left only notes which were later collected and made into a book. But even this assumption would not explain influence from Paramārtha, especially from Paramārtha's translation of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha which Mochizuki and other investigators believe to have found. I think that to explain this fact we may make use of Mochizuki's hypothesis already mentioned before, and say that T'an-ch'ien or another member of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha school must have tampered with the text of the Sūtra. At the time when the dispute about the ninth vijñāna grew hot between the Daśabhūmikas and the followers of Paramārtha, especially after 881, when T'an-ch'ien brought a copy of the Saṃgraha to P'eng-ch'eng, both parties must have looked for support. Then the Northern Faction joined forces with the believers in the Saṃgraha doctrine of the mixed (pure-impure) ālaya-vijñāna and may be adapted the Sraddhotpāda Sūtra to the new doctrine. I also believe that T'an-ch'ien or somebody else of his school forged the Introduction.

There are other points which make me think like that. All members of the Southern Faction studied the Avatamsaka Sūtra; later they united with the Avataśaṅka School. But in the Sraddhotpāda Sūtra no allusions to that sūtra are found. Then the style of phrases is sometimes rather ancient; 了義 is found in the translations made by Fo-nien 了義; but not later, and his translations were at the end of the sixth century already obsolete.

If my hypothesis is accepted, it leads to interesting consequences. The Sraddhotpāda Sūtra is a scripture of that Chinese Buddhism to which the Chao-lun also belongs. But it does not continue the speculation of the latter work. In both cases we have Chinese thinking rising through contact with Buddhism but not strong enough to initiate an uninterrupted stream of thought. Both texts, though they had many readers, never stirred the imagination of the Chinese to an extent comparable for instance to the influence of the yin-yang theory or the Middle Path. As much as I can see, the Mahāyāna-sraddhotpāda Sūtra has no relation to Ch'an Buddhism which derived from a different tradition.
CASES OF "TRANSMISSIVE" PSYCHOSOMATIC COMPASSION
— AS STATED AMONG MOSLEMS (ACCORDING TO TURKISH, PERSIAN & JAVANESE DOCUMENTS), — AND "TRANS-MIGRATION OF SOULS", AS IN FAR EASTERN ASIA'S TRADITION —

BY

LOUIS MASSIGNON

SUMMARY: 1 Usual explanation of these ascertained facts by Psychoanalysts and Sociologists. 2 Deeper investigation by Parapsychologists of the "pledge of Honour" linking Workers' Comradeship among men and women. 3 How to "spot" experimentally the threshold of Sacralization, and foresee a kind of spiritual communion in an immortal life. 4 Kinship of "transmissive compassion" with traditional "transmigration of souls".

I

Everyone of us has been acquainted with queer cases of "transfer" of pain, even of moral evil: of suffering felt (not only of, but) from others' woes, or misdeeds. This transfer hurts often unconscious, innocent, or irresponsible beings, arousing physical and mental illnesses. Psychoanalysts, through the investigation of dreams, try to cure the mind of such "traumatisms", mere useless "remains" of old forgotten "shocks"; — in showing to the patient that they originated from inaccurately "intentionalized" and "personalized" former "misunderstandings". — No real good should be anticipated, they say, from others' illnesses, whatever homeopathic osmosis of compassion may be fancied. Nevertheless, Sociologists have to face cases where "dreams" of compassion led to interfere in the events of social life; when men, obviously convinced that they must, at all costs, "realize" such a compassion, do keep their "pledge" to others, to foreigners, styled as their adopted "guests of honour". — Sociologists, digging with Frazer the earth of mythical folklore, try to cure the ambient society of such foolish "potlatches", of such "extravagant" prodigality of "human wealth"; showing that it is plain madness to claim for an impossible "transfer" of a penalty, before any sound tribunal, human or divine; and that

the trespassers should be punished for this insolence towards the Laws. — Promethean rebels are to be scourged. Moral virtue is a "middle" between two excesses: and nothing else.

II

But we are induced to investigate more deeply the matter. Common sense makes "conscience objections" and observes: that "transmissive compassion" has been historically ascertained, in heroic lives; that "Heroes' worship" is the positive basis of History; which recent thinkers have wrongly reduced to unconscious and impersonal conflicts between mere abstractions, laws, (rational), or archetypes (irrational), or mere slogans. The impact of "heroic compassion" on most of our human, traditional and legendary records (and legend is an immediate projection of the event in the world of symbols), shows that there is the secret of History; and that this secret is disclosed only to an elite, tested only by men of sorrow and compassion; born to assume the blind anguish of living multitudes, and to understand and announce its transcendent glory.

Among the myriads of anonymous sufferers, helplessly crushed and so quickly forgotten, apparently unavenged, — it is enough, for Justice offended, to rely on the faithful hope: that, intermittingly, a Hero of Compassion may appear, from the midst of wars and plagues, as the Herald of a Doomsday for all, as unexceptionable as unavoidable. 1)

But how begins this vocation for Heroic Compassion? By an "epoche", by a sudden stop of time, by a sudden abolition of space, by a shock, psycho-somatic, viz. in the heart of some one passing by, on the common Road. Who suddenly perceives, on the side of his Path, a beggar standing, or a wounded, or a dying wretch, a single case of blind despair. Who has an instant of mindedness, better than thousand years of nursing administratively, mechanically and undeceivedly, as do Benevolent Societies. It is a sparkle from some Unknown Personal Being, badly veiled under the wretches' poverty, flashing out the holes of this pierced frock of disabled humanity. A Fire, quickening the careless heart with an everlasting Need. Gotama on his royal youth's road, the Good Samaritan going down on his tradesway. The psychosomatic shock they endured was deeper than human love; it was Absolute Desire defying the lack of Justice in the whole World, a kind of revolt against the Laws of Nature, in the Name of their hidden Lawgiver; "in the Name of the Compassionate" as says the beginning of the Muslim prayer.

That kind of temptation has begun in humanity, after the
ambivalent shock of the first sexual appeal: with the awful woe of the children when spoiled of their Father by Death; looking on the corpses not only with suspicious fear of an uncleanliness, as Frazer (and Graham Greene) sums it; but with cryptical hope of a purifying sacralization. They had not choose them.

Such is the paradoxical way for the “phenomenal appearance”, in this world, of the spiritual Absolute of Religion, as postulated by Prof. Y. Moroi. Not only for men, through men. But also for all living beings, from men, through humanity; wherever she is shining with the virginally feminine smile of Pity, as a Mirror; in whatever Universe. And it is an experimental discovery, not an “a priori” invented synthetical axiomatic.

To be genuine, in itself, this absolute psychosomatic shock must create a permanent link between us and the object of our Compassion, and cooperate to the building of Mankind’s Unity.

Statistical parapsychology shows, in thousand cases of telepathy and precognition, how this link is “constellated” and built; how everyone of us, without having the slightest propension to heroism, is “mobilized” by suffering, for others’ sake. And that it holds on, for true progress of true welfare. The history of humanity is “overstreaming” (specially in Japan) with positive and fruitful experiments of “transmissive compassion”. And for something else than material aims, if through material means, in family, motherland, mankind, friendship.

If these cases have been underrated and neglected during centuries by scientific research, it is because their parapsychological genuineness had not been discriminated from the administrative tricks of too many priesthods, who indulged in torturing self-denying souls, as surgeons do with “Guinea-pigs”. And also because most of these silent bearers of the wounds of “transmissive compassion” being women, did not attempt to complain and speak, keeping in their hearts the divine secret. But now rises on the world the star of the Promotion of the Immaculate Woman, foreseen by Gandhi in Sita and Savitri; and not in Asia only; of Fatimat-al Batul, in Islam3, as of Mary, in Christianity.

III

Here below, some documents on premonitorial dreams linked to their objective “answers”. (NB: the first shock, being unconnected with ordinary life, looks as a dream, as long as the objective fulfilling “awakes” not the witness; see Peter, in Acts, XI, 6-11).

The premonitorial dream gives the picture of usual things as a symbol for spiritual realities; and the answer makes the witness grasp at the spiritual reality: in recovering the material presence of the usual things alluded to.

1. About the shroud. Muslim dreams of a shroud normally mean friendly prayers comforting the soul of the deceased, wrapping her under this mantle:
   a. The desire for a shroud (Istanbul, Aug. 1945). I was coming back from my friend Omar Fevzi Mardin (in Scutari) when a young Turkish physician who had recently lost a friend, told me; “I had felt summoned” to go, and remain alone at the side of the corpse; I was seized by a silent awe, on which I kept secret. Later on, my wife told me she has dreamed of another of my friends who had also died of a premature death, and said to her in her dream: “do tell your husband to wrap me with the same white shroud he used with his first deceased friend.” – From where did this dream come to her?
   b. The removal of the shroud (Qarafa, Cairo, May 9th, 1937). A very pure muslim shadhili nun, Nabihâ Wafa’iya (d. 1934) said in a dream to a friend, the night before the removal of her corpse (to a new tomb) “don’t remain troubled about me; you shall find my body incorrupt, because I never did anything implying dissolution.” And the body was found incorrupt and flexible, naked, without her shroud of 1934.

2. About the sweat (by Fear of God) (Qarafa, Cairo, circa 1041). In this cemetery, from the tomb of the “Bride of the Desert” (‘Arus al-Sahrâ), sweat, as a balm, used to ooze, curing pilgrims of their soul and body diseases. It was the “sweat of agony” which had seized a young girl, the daughter of the Muhaddith Abulkhasan IbnGhalibân, at the eve of her nuptial night, when going to be unveiled by her betrothed, she had prayed “O God, prevent any creature from seeing my
witnessing for Husayn remains, while Mukhtar’s awful revenge taken on
of against Husayn, had asked his forgiveness, and turned back
the tomb the cupola which I visited twice, 1908, 1953
the forehead, and Shah Ismail, struck with remorse, ordered
the corpse, and, before destroying it, attempted
to build on the tomb the cupula which I visited twice, 1908, 1953.

One may find at length the wide belief, in Muslim countries (Turk,
Persian, Javanese): concerning the witnessing of Husayn Mansur Hallaj’s blood (crucified Baghdad 922), in the study given by Rawan
Farhadi (Revue des Etudes Islamiques, Paris, 1955, p. 69–91); and of
his ashes, swallowed, either by virgins or by the doves of the minaret
from where they were spread in the air, still I was told in 1908 that
these doves were saying “Haqq, Truth”, in remembrance of the martyr
(see the Encyclopédie de la Musique Fasquelle, Paris, I, 1958, p. 77–82).

The same witnessing of the blood is to be found in Christianity with
the link between the “thrust of the Lance” at Calvary, and the
stigmatization of S. Francis, and others. And, without bloodshed in
the visions of Muslim mystics concerning the “opening of the breast”
(sharh al-sadr) of the Prophet Muhammad.

I must now add two evidences, not only personal, but direct: on
“transmissive compassion”:

a. Fasting for Peace in Justice. Coming back from Washington,
where I had thought about Lincoln’s last fasting for the sake of the
black slaves, and from Mehrauli (South of Delhi, where I had
meditated about the last fasting of Gandhi, – I had realized in France,
in summer 1953: that some evil deeds performed on Muslims by some
countrymen, most of them christians, were staining the spiritual purity
of our common spiritual body, of our dear Motherland, Joan of Arc’s
Motherland. Accordingly, I joined with some friends in atoning for our
brethren going astray, acting as “substituted” these illtreated Muslims.
Fasting periodically, specially during Ramadan the Lunar month of
Muslim “Lent”. Several Muslims, touched, joined us by prayer. One
of them openly struggled with me to make joint muslim-christian
pilgrimages visit such common places of worship as the Seven Sleepers
of Ephesus (Ahl al-Kahf) in Vieux Marché (France), and Guidjel (near
Sétif, Algeria). And one day, this friend, Prof. Hajj Lounis Mahfoud
wrote to me, it was on April 25th 1957, that on the next night, 27th of
Ramadan, the most solemn “Night of Destiny”, when we were to pray
specially for Muslims’ sake, he would also “communicate” with us by
compassion, praying for our common spiritual goal at the Cemetery of
the Seven Sleepers in Guidjel (“alone, not compromising anybody”); on
June 5th next, he was killed; as a sacralized victim; I was myself
exposed twice to murderous attacks, showing the reality of our spiritual
compassion, for Peace’s sake, as Gandhi’s, and Lincoln’s deaths.

b. Atoning for a lack of filial duty. On Aug. 30th, 1956, it was
granted to me to come and bow, in dutiful recollection, before a
Japanese Friend’s grave (R. Adm. Y. Sh. d. Feb. 28th, 1942), together
with his Son, at Aoyama Bochi, Tokyō. In fulfilment of an ancient
“covenant of friendship”. He had made me confident of a deep secret
sorrow (Paris, June 9th, 1921) endured since that day of 1917, when
he had heard in Hong-Kong of the death of his Father. He suffered
not only because he had not been able to attend the funerals in Tokyo;
but because he had religiously “renounced” to perform the normal duty
of a Japanese son towards his ancestors; and he had left me an atoning
“ex-voto” to be exposed, in a definite place of worship, in Paris, for all
the Japanese forefathers and their descendants. Six months later, I
had most unexpectedly to endure the same suffering at my Father’s
death3 (Jan. 18th, 1922: two hours after I had made, owing to the father
of a friend in spiritual need, the same filial “renunciation” that R. Adm.
Y. Sh.). The last, and perhaps strangest “parapsychological encounter”
ocurred for me last June, when, at last, my Japanese Friend’s ex-voto
was, after 37 years negotiations, officially and safely exposed at the
very place he desired. And it coincided with a letter from the Japanese
Organizing Committee of the Congress in Tokyō, telling me, on June
6th, 1958, that “after careful consideration”, he had “decided to accept
my application to read a paper at the forthcoming Congress for the
History of Religions”. – And this was done; on Aug. 28th, at 16h. 30.

From the above documentation may be inferred how to “spot”
the threshold of sacralization (pavitra, punya) in an “overstretched”
trial of painful love, – in an “hyperextension” of Self for mental
identification with the other’s need; when one can’t help him, except
by sharing, mentally, so poorly, his pain. By tears, if one can’t afford
blood, – by burning of his hunger, if one’s breast can’t give him the
milk of human kindness? Tears and blood, milk and fire are the means
of the housekeeping, of the immemorial Rite of Hospitality and Right
of Asylum (Atithi Dharma, Caranya Dharma). But they are undiscoverable and unworkable if one has not “recovered his mother’s womb”
in pilgrimage, bound straight in his own Hospitality for others, by the
pledge of Honour which alone may render “lawful” the bread put in
common with his comrades, working at the same work, – and may
render “apportionable” in common the Truth (Satya), sought on the
same Path.

Here lies the ford, the wade (Tirtha), for crossing: from
parapsychological research to the invisible Realm. Here we get on
from the “orderly” material world, through a distortion (einsteinian)
of Space and Time, to an “overorderly”, chronogrammatically
personalized “constellation” of human events: no longer causalized, but
as says Jung, “synchronized” by their intelligible meaning; which appears
apotropaean, i.e. transmissible; not genealogically, but as a chain of
spiritual rings.

There, in apotropaean sacralization, through transmissive com-
passion, do we meet the metaphysical problem of what may be the
link; between these rings in this chain? Externally, it looks as Karma,
as a mere transmigration of souls, moved by the Wheel of Destiny.
But, from inside, in the personal begetting of one’s own Vow (vrata),
it is felt as an Escape, thanks to a hook, an anchor; sent to save our
hearts, as from a star, from above.

I shall be very short on the kinship between these experimental
data on “transmissive compassion” from soul to soul, – and the theory
of the “transmigration of souls”. I have studied it only among
Muslims of the extreme Shi‘it tendency; for them, every man has only
one single soul,– and it can be easily suggested that “transmigration”
among Muslim Shi‘a is akin to the transhistoric inspiration of the Spirit
which is transmitted from the founder of a religious Order to his suc-
cessors, generation after generation, just as from Elias as far as John
the Baptist. While in Indonesia, the Spirit which “inspires”, the
“Sumangat,” doesn’t transmigrate, – and the transmigration is reserved
to the 7 or 9 minor souls which constitute the personality of the
“individual soul” for every man or woman. This dislocation of the
polyvalent soul in the Far East looks as a punishment her Karma; because
all the spiritual progress under the inspiration of the Spirit of Holiness
is towards unification of the individual soul through asectical training,
sacrifice, and compassion.

1) see my communication on substitution (in arabic: badaliya) through
compassion, at the Alexandria meeting of the “Continuing Committee
for Muslim-Chrisitian Cooperation” (Feb. 9th, 1955; translated in French in “L’Âme
populaire”, Paris, juin, 1955, No. 321; cf. Anne Fremantle, ap. “the Common-
2) researches of Prof. Gotthard Booth (Columbia Univ.), and of Prof.
Rhine (Duke Univ., N. Carolina).
5) see Mamughni, tanbih al-majdil, Tehran, 1952, p. 290.
6) my Father’s “modelled” prints and “gilded eglomisations” had been
strongly influenced by Japanese Art; see my “impressions on Isé” (“Misc."
Aug. 1959, p. 26) for the deep impress of the masters of the Ukiyo-e on my
Father “Pierre Roche” (recognized by the late Koisuke Niwa, his Japanese
Friend).
THE STANDPOINT OF DÖGEN IN ZEN
BUDDHISM

BY

REIHO MASUNAGA

Dōgen (1200–1253) founded the Sōtō sect—the largest of the three Zen sects in Japan. While still a young man, he crossed to China to settle the Great Doubt that arose during his studies at Mt. Hiei. In China he studied under Jūtsing (1163–1238) and returned to Japan when he was 28 years old. In the 26 years following his return, he wrote the Shobogenzo and other works. He also taught the essence of Buddhism to many priests and laymen and propagated his unique thought and belief among the general populace.

The Zen known in the West is mostly that of the Rinzai school. The Sōtō Zen of Dōgen is relatively unfamiliar there. Western students who wish to understand Zen must also know the Sōtō system, otherwise, their information will be one-sided.

Dōgen has several qualities that appeal to the modern mind. Among them are these three:

1. Dōgen’s thought and belief—as explained in his masterwork Shobogenzo—are closely related to some modern philosophical ideas. His depth of thought is well illustrated by his ideas on time in the Uji essay. Dōgen undoubtedly ranks as a pioneer in Japanese philosophy, and his insights may have significance for the modern West.

2. Thoroughness is another outstanding characteristic of Dōgen. He emphasized the importance of thorough practice in Eiheidaishingi and other writings. To Dōgen religion was not a dreamy concept. It was something to be experienced with the entire body and mind. He pointed out the need for being thorough in every word and action, no matter how slight. Even enlightenment has no meaning unless it can find expression in daily life. So for Dōgen the kōan did not mean an artificial problem to be solved; it was instead a problem of life to be solved by daily activities.

3. Dōgen’s lofty personality also draws respect. Shunning fame and profit, he kept away from authority. He lived humbly, secluding himself in the mountains of Echizen and concentrating his efforts on teaching gifted disciples. In any religion the personality of the founder is of great importance. The integrity of his words and actions deeply influence his followers. In this respect Dōgen was a truth-seeker who actually lived Buddhism. Many thinkers outside of Zen have acknowledged Dōgen’s greatness. They have said, among other things: “We cannot accurately grasp the essence of Japanese culture without knowing this great religious leader. The fact that the history of Japanese thought contains such profound insights gives us encouragement and confidence.”

What then is the standpoint of Dōgen in Zen Buddhism?

1) Zen, of course, aims at a practical experience of Buddhism. Dōgen’s thought, therefore, is not an intellectual means for recognizing reality. Dōgen, while denying man and society, also makes them come alive and affirms them. By denying both relativities, he underscores the fact that absolute denial is itself absolute affirmation. For Dōgen, “to be able to say” and “not to be able to say” are the same, and “to indicate” and “not to be able to indicate” are one. So logic and faith and philosophy and religion are inseparable.

For this reason Dōgen spurned such catch phrases as “No dependence on the words and letters of the scriptures” and “A special tradition outside the classified teachings.” Lin-chi said, “The Three Vehicles and the Twelve Teachings are nothing but paper for wiping dirt.” But Dōgen took a broader and higher view transcending the dualism of Zen and other teachings. He said: “The Three Vehicles and the Twelve Teachings are the eyes of the Buddhas and the patriarchs.” Thus he emphasized an attitude of vitalizing the sūtras instead of being enslaved by them. This falls in line with Hui-nêng’s saying: “I have transmitted the Buddha Mind seal. How does this differ from the Buddhist scriptures?” The Zen masters did not slavishly follow the lifeless sūtras. They did not have to depend on the sūtras; instead they made up their own sūtras. Lin-chi dismissed the sūtras as paper for wiping dirt. But in Dōgen’s teaching of true Buddhism, the sūtras were made to come alive as the eyes of the Buddhas and the patriarchs.

2) Dōgen’s basic aim was to transmit a unified Buddhism. Dōgen felt that if Zen established its own system conflicting with the other teachings, it would inevitably become one-sided. Dōgen said: “Those who call the great way of the Buddhas and patriarchs the ‘Zen sect’ have not even dreamed of Buddhism.” He avoided putting the name “Zen sect” in opposition to the other teachings. Dōgen con-
considered the division of Zen into five schools as an aberration of Buddhism as a whole. "Since the declining age," Dōgen says, "the names of the five schools have come into being for no purpose." Dōgen refused to set a sect stressing Buddha’s Mind against a sect relying on Buddha’s Word, the meditative schools against the sūtra-based schools, and the Sōtō sect against the other four Zen sects.

3) Founders of Buddhist sects usually picked out a certain sūtra on which to center their teachings. They made their selections on the basis of time and place. So inevitably Buddhism took on the coloring of the times. But Dōgen fought against this tendency to water down Buddhism; he argued that uncompromising training was necessary especially in a declining age. A Buddhism attuned to the times may, of course, be easier to propagate, but it does not express the true spirit of Buddha. Dividing Buddhism into the three periods of shō, zō, and matsu is nothing but a provisional means. Those who want to live in the Mind of Buddha and grasp the source of Buddhism directly must cast off the chains of the times and study Buddhism with the utmost effort. Dōgen found deep meaning in man’s effort to realize his true self with his entire personality. We see here Dōgen’s strong resistance to the fatalistic view of mappō (declining age). Anyone who truly seeks the way can see the Buddhas and patriarchs working as the true law. For the three periods refer not to time but to man.

4) In Buddhism the basic form of training is zazen. But it is not a zazen that separates body and mind. The sitting body itself is the enlightened mind. But if you set them apart by the discriminating intellect, you will never comprehend Buddhism no matter how long you try. So Dōgen emphasized that true enlightenment must be gained with the body. Zazen is Buddha’s conduct involving our body; it is vital activity itself. Zazen is commonly understood to be the means for realizing the ideal of enlightenment. In Bendōwa, Dōgen said: "It is heretical to think that training and enlightenment are not one. In Buddhism training and enlightenment are one. Since zazen is training that enfolds enlightenment, the training even of a beginner is in itself the whole original enlightenment." He thus rejected the dualism of training and enlightenment. Zazen based on faith in our inherent Buddhahood is the whole original enlightenment. Religion dwells in an absolute world free from the categories of object and means. It has the character of the object itself. Today is not for tomorrow, but is absolute in itself. Dōgen’s zazen was not a means for seeking enlightenment of becoming the Buddha; in this respect it differed from the Zen of the Sung dynasty. Enlightenment resides abundantly in training, and training occurs unimpeded in enlightenment. Because sitting cross-legged is the self-joyous meditation of the Buddhas, it does not involve austerities. But it is natural conduct based on Buddha’s will. Training is simultaneous with great enlightenment. Because it is wondrous training enfolding original enlightenment, this training is endless. Training goes on even after enlightenment. The effort does not weaken even after attaining Buddhahood. A zazen free from the dualism of body and mind is the living form of the Buddhas and patriarchs working as the true law.

5) As Buddhist thought developed, the Trikāya doctrine emerged. It set up three categories of Buddhas—Dharmakāya, Sambhogakāya, and Nirmānakāya. These were concepts developed from the teaching of the historical Buddha. When a Buddhist sect makes them the object of worship, it tends to close itself to other teachings. Dōgen opposed this tendency. He respected the historical Buddha anteceding the division into the three categories. Specifically, Dōgen honored Sakyamuni Buddha, who attained right enlightenment under the Bodhi tree and sat in self-joyous meditation. Dōgen made this clear in the fifth of the 19 questions and answers contained in the edition of Bendōwa discovered at Shōbōji in Iwate prefecture. Elsewhere in the Shōbōgengō, Dōgen declared that the various so-called Buddhas are Śakyamuni Buddha. So the object of worship in the Sōtō sect is an historical figure who was born, sought the way, trained for many years, and became enlightened through zazen.

6) Buddhism does not consider God as the "absolute other". Instead it emphasizes the inherent Buddhahood within ourselves. Buddhahood is man’s religious nature and his sincerity. The basic prerequisite for the zazen of original enlightenment and wondrous training is faith in our inherent Buddhahood. In most Buddhist teachings, Buddhahood is viewed as a possibility, and efforts are focused on bringing it gradually into being. But Zen adapts itself immediately to Buddhahood and expresses it as a whole. The essence of Zen must be this enlightenment-training based on original Buddhahood. Dōgen’s view of Buddhahood was unique; it differed from the views of Buddhism in general and of other Zen masters.

Dōgen gave his own reading to this passage in the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra: "All living beings have inherent Buddhahood." He says, "All existences are Buddhahood." In this way he made Buddhahood
the ground of existence and the source of all values. In Busshō, Dōgen said: "All existences are Buddhahood. Living beings constitute only a part of existences. Buddhahood exists both inside and outside of living beings." The sea of Buddhahood permeates all existences. We tend to think of Buddhahood as something deep and remote, but Dōgen says that it is immediately before our eyes-like a donkey's jowl and a horse's mouth. All existences are the self-manifestations of Buddhahood. All things are self-expressions of Buddhahood. From this basic standpoint Dōgen discussed with complete freedom the Buddhahoods of existence, of non-existence, of śūnyatā, of expression, of impermanence, of time, and of training.

7) When Dōgen met Jü-tsing in China and became enlightened, he understood the importance of direct tradition. Correctly transmitted Buddhism means that the spirit of Buddha lives in the personality of the successive patriarchs. It gets a firm base from face-to-face interviews between masters and disciples. In face-to-face interviews two personalities confront each other directly and synthesize into one. One life flows into another and continues eternally. Although this life flows on over long periods, it resembles a trunk and its branches and the life itself undergoes no basic changes. But if it remains rigidly fixed, the body and mind of the Buddhas would become frozen and eventually deteriorate. Therefore, to keep Buddhism active, the disciple must excel the master. The spirit of Buddha works in history and develops in accordance with time and place. It goes forward by returning to the source. Living traditions are continuously developing. This idea was expressed by Keizan, the founder of Sōjōji, in these words: "The body of Sakyamuni is still warm; the smile of Mahākāśyapa is still fresh."

8) Dōgen took the Buddhist idea of impermanence and deepened it into his concept of time. He stressed the self-identity of time and existence; he did not look on time as an a priori experience in the manner of Kant. In Kūge, for example, Dōgen said: "Time has such colors as blue, yellow, red, and white. Spring draws in flowers, and flowers draw in spring." Dōgen touched on the same idea in Uji: "Time is existence, and existence is time. You must see all things in this world as time." In this world each thing is a time unit. Flowers establish spring, and spring emerges in flowers. This falls in line with the Buddhist doctrine that time has no independent existence but is dependent on things.

Dōgen used the term "Uji" to describe his time concept. Uji has several meanings. It means, among other things, the specific time in each moment. Here it is discontinuous time—time cut off from past and future. Uji also implies basic time (ursprüngliche Zeit). In this sense it is the source behind such expressions of time itself as mountain, sea, earth, and sky. It is time and also time beyond time. Also, in relation to oneself, Uji has the quality of continuity. Dōgen used the term "keireki" to express this principle of continuity of time. It refers to the time process—the relation of before and after. Time continues endlessly. The past is gone and yet not gone. The future still has not arrived but is here. In this there is continuity of time.

So from one angle, time is discontinuous; from another, continuous. In Dōgen's view, "Time continues from today to today." Continuity of discontinuity and movement of non-movement take place in this one moment. This is the moment of Uji—the eternal now. At this point specific time and continuity become unified. In Dōgen this unity—the eternal now expressed is action.* To express this is to live truly—this is the essence of Dōgen's religious thought.

By emphasizing these ideas, Dōgen opened up a new vista in Zen Buddhism. Many of his ideas are relevant to the modern world. A detailed study of them may offer clues to breaking the current philosophic impasse and pave the way for a creative synthesis of Eastern and Western thought.

* In Cyōji, Dōgen said: "When action is expressed, it is called now."
ON THE MIDDLE WAY

BY

SHOSON MIYAMOTO

It is necessary at the outset to discuss the relationship between the concepts of the Middle Kingdom (Madhya-deśa) and the Middle way (Madhyamā-pratipad). The Middle Kingdom is a name attached to a racial and cultural entity displaying the maintenance of freedom of one's rule and livelihood but this entity was first created by the victorious in politics or in military adventure.

The Aryans, as we all know, first crossed the Indus River and occupied the Punjab district; then they pushed forward to the more open and wider district of Kuru-pañcika, colonizing it and thus entering an era of peace and quiet. This latter district of Aryan rule and cultural life was named the Middle Kingdom. It became the headquarters for further colonization and adventure but, at the same time, it was the great center of rest for the conquering and colonizing forces. Befitting its pretentious name of Middle Kingdom, it has left us some of the greatest cultural achievements such as the Vedas, Brahmanas, and Upanishads, all of which express the aims of Aryan Nationalism. As reflected in the castes system imposed by it, it was, after all, a closed society stressing the supremacy of the Aryan race. The principle of life based on man's activities was not the primary aim of this society and so it neither respected the dignity nor the freedom of the individual.

The Aryans fought against the darker skinned races but utilized them within their livelihood and economy after subjugating them and, as their conquests spread into Central India, they had to be compromising and even to inter marry. In contrast to this situation, the Chinese always regarded themselves as the most favored group in a centrally located position both as a race and as a national polity, and treated all neighboring peoples and races as inferior and detestable.

In this fashion, the Middle Kingdom of the past reflects the achievements of racial colonization and the pioneering spirit and indicates a racial pivotal position; however, such a racial society must change in due time. The Aryans had to modify their concept of racial supremacy as they entered Central India. They were confronted with the problem of numerical inferiority in extending their rule in the face of the great natural surroundings (Himalayas, the Ganges) and by the envelopment of a mass of alien races. They had to learn the art of harmonization and utilization in order to expand and grow afresh. It was a method of seeking the truth in the complicity of things, of seeking a truly common ground by discussing and compromising with both friend and foe alike. They forced the ruling brahmans to recede from their rigid concept of racial supremacy and caused the rise of thinkers from among the royal families who were realists and active in political, economic and military matters. King Janaka of Videha, Gotama Buddha and Mahāvīra are representative of the royalty who heralded a new age and mission.

With the establishment of new trade and intercourse, the international outlook broadened and the standard of living of the general populace rose. In consequence not only did the actions of individuals become respected but the focus was placed on a new arena of co-existence based on mutual trust and recognition. The individualism of an historical society evolved. Buddhism picked up the voices and yearnings of this early age. However, it must be clearly defined that instead of the nationalistic tendency manifested in the Madhyadeśa of the Aryans, Buddhism served notice that the conduct and morality of the individual were supreme. The Middle Way was a guiding principle for the conduct of individual lives and its original form was that of avoiding the two extremes of pain and pleasure. It was the seizure of the universal element in the individuals' lives. Instead of what we presently know as human rights of the individual, it was the knowledge of one's self, the enlightened free individual. Herein lies the true historical meaning of Buddha's message.

We must next examine the Middle Way which avoids both extremes of pain and pleasure. It is based on the concept of the middle, which theoretically can be extended to ideological critique. Buddha, however, first enunciated it based on the daily experiences of individuals. The practice of austerities was quite prevalent during his time and it was regarded as the mysticism of a religious group who left there homes in search of liberation from the normally wasteful and degenerated life. But this practice had its short comings in that the physical austerities reflected on the mental and spiritual well-being of the individual. The individual never questioned the aims nor the effects of such practices, being earnestly concerned about disciplinary action itself. This was popular during the Brahmanic period and...
even Buddha subjected himself to it for six years. But he realized its meaninglessness and self-destructiveness and soon took another position which affirmed and respected the process of common, everyday living. The practice of pleasure, on the other hand, was regarded as a kind of epicureanism or sensualism and considered the life led only by misguided souls. Buddhist literature reminds us that Buddha himself was subject to condemnation by his five fellow practitioners of austerity when he attempted to regain his health by taking chyle. He was called a bhikkhūdī or āvatto bhikkhūdī, i.e., one who has degenerated into the life of luxury. Yet his act can hardly be compared with the luxurious princely life of the court he led before. The point is that the life of austerity and the life of pleasure-seeking are both one-sided extremes and Gotama Buddha had experienced both. Thus it was he who first taught the Middle Way approach toward life and which subsequently became the guiding principle of conduct and practice followed by a mass of races. It is best expressed concretely in the Noble Eight-fold Path which touches upon the common and universalistic elements in man. It must indeed be considered a great contribution of the Aryan culture.

Insofar as the individual is concerned, it does not matter much what method or approach he takes regarding life. However, it is important to examine the aims and the results covered by such an approach. The Buddha realized the need for a large and flexible sphere of action in order to exact the what and how of right practical living. This sphere of free latitude of action is characteristic of the Middle Way where new and old elements converge and become related, and where common grounds of discourse are sought in the interaction. It is also where we learn that love and hate interplay and transcend themselves into a world of tolerance. In expounding it the Buddha avoided both the mysticism of the ascetics and the realism of the pleasure-seekers, and united the secular and the clerical, the mundane and the supermundane and taught what is common or universal in the lives of individuals.

We must next take up the question of the sphere of the Middle Way (Majjhima pāṭipāda) and the theory of Majjhena. The Aryan pioneering and colonizing period was characterized by moving or transitory conquests, but the second period was that of a stabilized polity. Yet both were Aryan nationalistic phenomena where the Brahmins who administered the folk festivals and celebrations controlled both the political rule and ideological guidance. In the third period where the boundaries had extended to the Himalayas and the Ganges, it became apparent that the Brahmanic nationalism could not withstand the envelopment by the huge mass of diverse races and the imposing natural surroundings. The new age required a new administration and an adaptable ideology; and here arose the benevolent thinkers from among the royalty. Characterized by a novel pioneering genius it knew that the basis of creativeness lay not in man's fateful birth (jāti) or lineage (gottaj), but in his conduct (cāraṇa) and action (kamma). It became manifestly clear that in building a new society removed from the numerous oppositions, suppressions and obstacles of the old. And this kind of new society of free and open individuals required an earnest and sincere will to seek the good and harmony of man, society and nature. The Middle Way was a principle of action arising from the balance of the three and the search of the good within the balance. Although the Buddha discovered the Middle Way by way of his personal experiences, he expressed it concretely in terms of the Noble Eight-fold Path (i.e., right understanding, right purpose, right speech, right conduct, right vocation, right effort, right alertness, right concentration) understandable to all and regarded as the universal principle of man's true actions. Thus what had enlightened the historical Buddha became accessible to all and therein lies the universality running through the Middle Way and enlightenment. Racially speaking, the Aryan culture transcended the Aryan nationalism to bring forth an Aryan universalism. The Middle Way was not limited to pleasure and pain but applied to all the facets of life and also to all situations of the state of things. Moreover, the forms depending on the Middle Way began to be inferred doctrinally. This is manifestly clear in the various types of expression found in the sūtras of the Āgamas, i.e., the various opposing concepts which were treated, such as being and non-being, identity and difference, one and many, self and non-self, permanent happiness and vainness, and free creativeness and fate. All of these have utilized the expression, "the dharma expounded by way of the middle (majjhena)" and thus the Buddhist standpoint became clear by Way of this doctrinal treatment. Consequently, the forms of the Middle Way have been treated variously with respect to the opposite positions. When the applications of the various Middle Way forms are classified, we find that there are those which are related to the way of enlightenment and those related to perception. Of the former there is the following form.

Ete te bhikkhave ubho aste anupaṇṭam
majjhima pāṭipada tathāgatena abhisambuddha.
Oh Bhikkus, release yourselves from these two extremes!
The Middle Way was grasped by the Tathāgata.

The term tathāgatenā is in the instrumental case and majjhima pāti-pādā in the nominative, but the whole sentence implies that the Tathāgata was enlightened on the Middle Way. The Middle Way is always used in the case of being enlightened but not in the form of "by means of the middle." (majjhena). The latter form is used when treating the antithetical notions of ideological doctrines, such as being and non-being or identity and difference. It is often quoted: "Release yourself from the two extremes. The Tathāgata teaches the dharma by means of the middle." A new stipulation is made in the phrase, "by means of the middle" which omits the word "way" and places emphasis on the doctrinal inquiry of the Middle Way. Since the phrase is in the instrumental case, it is a methodological approach. Originally, in the phrase "to be enlightened on the Middle Way," the "way" clearly signified the steps toward a designated spot while the "middle way" meant the path of emancipation, of nirvāṇa, and pointed at a methodology. But we must be careful in distinguishing between a method which gradually helps to realize a goal and a goal which is always realizable by means of a method. These two take on the Mahayanaistic form of "method is at once goal". Thus the above phrase expresses the original form of enlightenment by the historical Buddha in which the goal and method, essential nature and method, can be looked upon as having a very intimate bond.

The Middle Way is usually taken as identical with such absolute concepts as Nirvāṇa or Buddha-nature, i.e., the rise of such expressions as "Buddha-nature Middle Way" or "Nirvāṇa Middle Way", and as such, instead of a methodology of the Middle Way, it becomes a form in the nature of a teleology of the Middle Way. In true Mahāyāna Buddhism, however, the Middle Way is taken in a larger context from a non-dualistic standpoint without siding for either the real or ideal, the method or the goal. Thus we are familiar with such expressions as "kleśa is at once bodhi" or "life-death is at once Nirvāṇa,". In consequence of the above discussion we are aware that the Middle Way cannot be treated in any dualistic manner but rather that its true position permits the acceptance of both a methodology and at teleology at the same time. Hence the Buddhist standpoint can be said to consist of both non-dualism and the Middle Way; however, non-dualism is a logical expression based on negation while the Middle Way is a humanistic, moral, and living expression supported by common sense. The former, as a negative concept, expresses what lies in the background while the latter that of the positive contents of our daily common sense living. In this way the Middle Way was the opening for Buddha’s enlightenment and thenceforth it has become the gateway to the understanding of Buddhism proper.

Let us finally take up the Middle Way as a conception in the new age. The two extremes of pleasure-seeking and ascetic life are both said to be "not Aryan" (an-ariya) or unrighteous while the Middle Way is said to awaken one to the truths of Buddhism, cause the rise of wisdom and progress toward the state of tranquility, supreme wisdom, enlightenment and Nirvāṇa. It is worthwhile noting that the term "not Aryan" is parallel to the word "unprofitable," i.e.: an-attha-saṅghita or not-profit or welfare-bound up. The one sidedness of the two extremes tends to be particular, for removed from the center and abstract in character. Thus the two extremes are decidedly not an Aryan way of life. Aryanism actually implies a new concept of expanding frontiers, namely, the birth of Aryan nationalism coupled with Aryan universalism. In contrast to this, the Middle Way in Buddhism connotes a fruition of all the good which man has experienced from the remote past to the present, i.e., there are elements in it which even today we are unable to pin down but which have been nourished by the long history of man’s yearnings for the awakening of wisdom, for the attainment of a mystical world, for the enlightenment of a world of rest removed from all afflictions, and for the peaceful Great Nirvāṇa inclusive of everything. In other words, it expresses a peaceful harmonious society of free enlightened individuals, something to which we today aspire.
THE TEACHINGS OF THE BUDDHA

BY

NAGA THERA

In the name of Vietnam Theravada Sangha Order, I congratulate all Brothers and Sisters coming from any continent of the world to attend this useful Symposium.

I have the honour and opportunity to speak a few words in this solemn Symposium which is very interesting to all Nations.

Whether all Religions in the world are different forms but the aims are almost similar.

The Islam has the thought of ‘Peace’ and they adore the St. Josaphat which name is derived from buddhist Bodhisatta.

The Hinduism has the aim of ‘Ahiṃsā-Harmlessness’ then they consider Buddha as their Vishnu avatāra-incarnation of Vishnu.

The Protestant has the ideal of ‘Neighbourliness’.

Rationalism considers Buddha as a Greatest Thinker. The Confucius taught: The viser has to make like a non-intelligent one, the powerful man considers himself as a weak one, the richman does not forget when he was poor.

As for Buddhism is ‘Mettā-loving kindness’.

Therefore all Religions have the similar aims e.g. friendliness, harmlessness, neighbourliness, helpfulness and loving kindness. In Pali, the language of Buddhist scriptures, Mettā is known under the name of ‘Brahma vihāra’, this term may be rendered by: excellent lofty or sublime state of mind, or alternatively, by Brahma-like or divine Abode.

It is said to be excellent or sublime, because it is the right, or ideal, way of conduct towards all living beings. This attitude of mind provides in fact the answer to all situations arising from social contact. It is the great remover of tension, the great peace-maker in social conflict, the great healer of wounds suffered in the struggle of existence, leveller of social barriers, builder of harmonious communities, awakener of slumbering magnanimity long forgotten, reviver of joy and hope long abandoned, promoter of human brotherhood against the forces of egotism.

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making the effort, and to lose one's independence.

Buddha is not a name, but an appellation, meaning Enlightened One. Former Buddhas have existed in the past ages, and other Buddhas are expected in the future, the present Buddha is Gautama or Sakyamuni. All Buddhas teach the same Doctrine.

Among us whether we are Buddhists or not, we should learn and practise the 'Science of life' that is we must control ourselves the deed, speech and thought, do not let them discard the wholesome volition or the other words we should follow the 'Noble Eightfold Path which embodies eight principles or rules of conduct, then one can improve the happiness in this very life as well as in the future's.

The Lord Buddha had foresighted that, in the future, His disciples would mistake Him as a Redeemer of the world or a Powerful God, then they engage only in the ritual ceremony of worshiping, and they do not set forth to practising the Dhamma, in order to escape all sufferings. So He recommended to His disciples as the following Pali stanza: Tumhehi kiccam atappaṃ-akkhātara Tathāgata
Patipanno pamokkhanti – Jhayino mara bandhanā.
That is, you have to practise diligently the Dhamma, all Buddhas are only showing the way, if you follow the Path that I had shown, then you will escape the ties of the Mara or dilements, so you safely reach the stage of Salvation.

All these arguments testify that Buddhism is absolute and rationalist Doctrine which is not grasping on Atheism, Heresy or others Power in order to get Deliverance.

I am sure that, if the modern world tries to understand the usefulness of Buddhism which teaches the mankind to be non-violent but compassionate, then the whole world would be peaceful.

Finally, I hope that this significant Symposium will bring happiness and cordiality to all nations.

THE MISSIONARY SPIRIT OF THE FOUNDERESS OF TENRIKYŌ MANIFESTED IN THE BOOK OF OFUDESAKI

BY

SHÔZEN NAKAYAMA

The Ofudesaki is the holy writ of the will of God the Parent which was dictated by the Foundress. It contains in 17 volumes, 1,711 poems in the form of Japanese waka. The word “Ofudesaki” literally means the tip of a fude or Japanese writing brush, and is here used for instructions to the people about the Divine Truth. The Ofudesaki is considered the most important and fundamental of all the books of Tenrikyō doctrine.

Now, writing in this way, the Foundress conveyed to us the will of God the Parent. She taught that things revealed through the writings of the Foundress are the exact directions given by God the Parent, and that the Foundress stood on the same footing as God the Parent, Her position was the Tsukihino-Yashiro or the Living Temple of God the Parent. This can be known by the fact that She always used the first person in revealing the will of God the Parent through Her own writings. And, on the other hand, She sometimes placed Herself on the same footing with people as their real parent on earth so that they could understand and follow the teachings of God the Parent, thus guiding people through Her daily life of Divine Pattern. In this case She may justly be called the Hinagata-no-Oya or the “Exemplary Parent.”

As you saw just now, while, on the one hand, She preached the wishes of God the Parent as “the Living Temple of God the Parent”, She, on the other hand, guided people intimately as “the Exemplary Parent.” From the former point of view, She preached the will of God the Parent with authority, as a spokesman of God the Parent, but from the latter point of view, that is, when She spoke as the parent of people on earth, She taught them with painstaking care and guided them by doing His teachings in Her own life. But from whichever standpoint She preached, at all times She did so in the same mental attitude. And this attitude was Her profound parental affection for Her children in giving them to
understand the will of God the Parent. And this parental affection in giving people to understand the will of God the Parent was manifested in various ways.

(A) First of all, one of the most prominent features is, that the contents of Ofudesaki from Vol. 1 to Vol. 17 were so arranged that people could understand step by step in good order everything about the teaching of God the Parent. The teaching has for its fundamental purpose the realization of the world of Yobigurashi or joyous life on earth, and the Foundress preached His teaching in due order at length to realize that purpose. So the whole thread of His teachings runs along the line toward the realization of that purpose. We are taught that we shall be given the protection of God the Parent by governing our mind in order to realize the world of joyous life. But the Foundress does not order us to lead a joyous life. Instead, She teaches us that it is proper that we should be joyous; she teaches us how to become joyous. Therein lies the main point of Her suggestions written in the Ofudesaki.

As the way to joyous life, the Foundress teaches the significance of service or Tsutome as it is usually called in Tenrikyo, and then explains in detail how to accomplish the performance of service. First She explains the truth about the place where service is to be performed, the time when service is to be performed, the persons who participate in the performance of service, the instruments with which service is to be performed, and the truth about the Kanrodai, a sacred stand with a vessel on it for receiving kanro or heavenly dew. Then She reveals the truth about the creation of mankind in order to explain to people why they can re-born into a joyous life. For that purpose She told them Moto-no-Ri, or the truth about the creation of man, from which She went on revealing the deeper truth in good order so that they could understand Her. In the meantime, we find, as a significant instance, the change of the speaker's name itself. That is, from the first to the middle of the sixth volume of the Ofudesaki, She speaks in the name of Kami or God, thence to the end of the thirteenth volume, She speaks in the name of Tsuki-Hi, Moon and Sun in one, and after that She speaks in the name of Oya or Parent. This change of names is quite significant for us, because we feel more intimate with Tsuki-Hi than with Kami, and with Oya than with Tsuki-Hi. It is true that the word Kami has been used in a wide sense, but we are apt to associate it with something awful or something which deals out punishment to offenders. The word Tsuki-Hi does not call up such an association with awe, as can be seen from our daily use of the words, but we do not feel so intimate as with Oya, our Parent. We may often adore the sun and the moon in their beauty in the sky, but we are never attached to them so much as to our parents. Oya is the very name, the very being for which we can have an intense affection. At any rate, herein also we can find an instance of Her scrupulous care for revealing the will of God the Parent.

(B) Furthermore we can follow the trace of Her thoughtful consideration in persuading people of the truth of the teachings repeating the same theme over and over again. It is notable that She taught us about many matters of deliverance by urging Tsutome or service again and again in every volume. We can point out that in the first volume of the Ofudesaki She tells us how impatient She is for the performance of service by teaching the word Kagura or Holy dance with masks and music, and teodori or Holy dance with music. In the second volume, She speaks about the invitation of Tsutome-ninju, persons chosen for the performance of the Kagura service, and about the truth of the Kanrodai. In the third volume, urging the preparation of the Kanrodai and the preparation for the performance of the service by duly chosen members of the service group, She intends to show the almighty protection of God the Parent. In the fourth volume, urging people to perform the service, She says that peace will then reign over the world and that all sickness and trouble will then be eradicated. In the fifth volume, urging people to sweep their dusty minds, She says that She will teach them Tehuri, gesture service, after having ascertained their sincerity of mind. In the sixth volume, She tells that the world of entirely joyous and blissful life will be realized on earth through the performance of service by dint of Tsutome by following the pattern of the creation of mankind. In the seventh volume, She teaches the gestures of the service and tells that through the performance of service with these gestures, thoroughly protected joyous life will be granted. In the eighth volume She speaks of Tsutome-sawo, the service for saving mankind. In the ninth volume, She tells about the truth of the Kanrodai and about the divine gifts. In the tenth volume, She speaks about the service performed around the Kanrodai, and, commanding that the persons who are to perform the service shall be assembled and shall then practise the service, She promises the almighty protection of God the Parent. In the fourteenth volume, She speaks of the world which is to be governed peacefully through the performance of service, and in the fifteenth and sixteenth volumes, She strongly urges people to perform the service.

In this connection, She has given an explanation why and how the world and mankind were created by God the Parent, and has repeated
this in various forms, so that all people may easily understand this idea in accordance with the growth of their minds. She began to explain the truth of the creation of mankind in the third volume of the Ofudesaki. From the fourth to the sixth volume of the book, She explains it more and more fully and in the eleventh volume, She explains how the way of saving mankind was begun on the basis of this truth. In the twelfth volume, She teaches the truth about the persons who are to perform the service, and in the fourteenth volume, She explains the fundamental truth about the joyous life. In the sixteenth volume She explains the truth about God the Parent, and in the seventeenth volume, She explains the truth about Jība and the Kanro-dai, the cradle of mankind and its symbol. In this way She taught people the fundamental truths of our faith, repeating the same thing over and over again.

(C) Furthermore we find many metaphorical expressions in the Ofudesaki. The terms michi or road, and mizu or water are most often used. And there are also such terms as dōgu or instrument, yōboku or timber, fushin or construction, sōji or sweeping, kohori or dust, and so on.

Some of those expressions received some special figurative significance as doctrinal terms peculiar to Tenrikyō. They are kohori or dust, that is to say, the evil use of the mind, dōgu or instrument, meaning instrumentality, yōboku or timber, meaning missionary, fushin or construction, meaning construction of the joyous world, and so on. In short, these metaphors were all used with parental care to make the children of God the Parent clearly understand His teachings.

(D) Moreover, mention is also made in the Ofudesaki of such things as shōho or evidence, and tameshi or test. And one of those instances of evidence was that the Foundress granted people the gift of easy childbirth. She gave many miraculous salvations as evidence, and taught people to take personal misfortunes and natural disasters as Divine warnings. These deliverances were also expressed in the words “God the Parent will work.” And what really happened in accordance with Her words drove people to accept the teachings more readily. Indeed those who believe in the absoluteness of God the Parent may have no need of evidence, but those who are dull-headed or slow in their growth of mind have to be given these warnings by means of facts instead of words. Herein lies also Her scrupulous care for His children.

(E) Still further, it is a noteworthy fact that She never preaches about the idea of sin or punishment. We find no trace of such an idea in the Ofudesaki. We may indeed find words of rigorous training sometimes uttered in the Ofudesaki. The “wrath of God the Parent” is one of them, but it is far from a punishment or a threat. They are a revelation of Her profound parental affection for His children. Instead of holding forth on sin or punishment, She earnestly urges people to reform themselves through the warnings given by God the Parent and thus to meet the will of their parental God. In short, we find no hint of punishment, threat, or vengeance in it, but a kind-hearted encouragement with which She consistently guides people on the right path; though strict in manner, She is always telling them, “Not too late to mend”. Her missionary spirit manifested here lies not only in promulgating the teachings of God the Parent but also in guiding people intimately with Her most parental affection.
THE THEORY THAT MIND IS THE INHERENTLY-PURE-MIND (PRAKRTHI CITTASYA PRABHÅŚVARÄ) IN BUDDHISM

BY

GIYU NISHI

I The Inherently Pure-Mind.

In the Indian thought of the Pre-Buddhist period, it was postulated that man should release (vimokṣa), himself from all sufferings of Samsāra (transmigration), and the practice of the yoga was stressed as a necessary method of deliverance. In compliance with this requirement, Śākyamuni realized the vimokṣa, obtained an actual state of nirvāṇa, become the Buddha and instructed his pupils so that the Buddhahood could be realized by all men as well as the Buddha.¹

Śākyamuni explained the innermost state of his mind (Buddhasya Gocara) as the citta-prabhāśvara (the inherently-pure-mind), and it was for the first time in India and in the other regions of the world that the cause of and nirvāṇa was grasped and called the inherently-pure-mind.

Further, it is remarkable that the inherently-pure-mind is recognized not only in the Buddha, but also in every ordinary man. Then, why do we ordinary men go astray and suffer always, while the Buddha has delivered himself from sufferings and realized nirvāṇa?

The Buddha said in the Agama Suttas that we do so because we are ignorant (avijjā, avidya) of the inherently-pure-mind. With this avijjā, we think, act, and speak, and as a result all perplexities and sufferings come to us. Avijjā is part of the inherently-pure-mind’s action while panna (prajñā-intuition) is the whole of its action. By our judgment with avijjā, the subject is distinguished from the object, the self of one from that of another, etc. Such a judgment always accompanies subjective and egoistic emotions or sectarian feelings, which may be collectively called impurities. These actions within ourselves are called duṣṇa (the very weak prajñā-intuition) and false discernments (vikatpa or parikatpa, vikalpa, parikalpa). So “all these discernments of ordinary men are essenceless or void” (Sabba (370)

II Various Names Given to the Inherently-Pure-Mind.

The relation between the inherently-pure-mind and its various names is likened to the relation between a mountain and its photographs. Although one can indicate every side of the mountain by many-sided photographs of it, a collection of photographs is not the mountain itself. In the same manner, we can point out every character of this mind by the many names of this mind, but we can not comprehend or grasp this mind without practicing Zen.

One of the names of the mind is vimulti-citta or cetovimulti (the liberated mind) in the Agama Suttas. It means to be free from all impurities (kilesa) and restrictions, to be independent, or to obtain freedom, of all sufferings. The second name is bhūta (ultimate reality), or the true state of all dhamma (dharma). The Buddha who realizes this mind is called “the one who has become the Dhamma (Dhamma-bhūta, Digha Nikāya vol. III, p. 84)” and “the one who has had a normal body (Dhamma-kāya. ibid. p. 84).” The third name is nibbāna-citta. He who realizes this mind can have an eternally truthful and peaceful mind dispelling uneasiness and agitation caused by contradictions

¹ dhamma sunna, sarvadharmaśaṅkya), but we are in the habit of misunderstanding these discernments depending on avijjā as true and real. There arise many perplexities and sufferings. The paññā-intuition and these false discernments are the actions of the inherently-pure-mind. So the triple world is created by this one mind.

We can say, therefore, that this mind corresponds to Brahman, the creator of the world in Brahmanism.

When this mind is called the creator of the triple world as mentioned above, men are liable to think that Buddhism is idealism. Buddhism is not idealism, because the inherently-pure-mind is not mind as contrasted with matter, but the mind which transcends the distinction between mind and matter, or between the soul and the body.

In the trace-back contemplation (pātīloma) on “the twelfofold chain of causation (paṭiccasamupādā)”, one reaches from nāma (spirit)-rūpa (body and matter), viññāna (mental faculty in regard to cognition) saṅkhāra (the essentials of anything) and avijjā, etc. to paññā-intuition and attains the state of the inherently-pure-mind i.e. vijjā or the anuttarasamānā sambodhi (the highest enlightenment). So this mind is called the state of “an undifferentiating penetration of the Subject and the Object,” or the state of “a person whose parents were not yet born.” It is called the mind of mindlessness (loc citam yac cittam acittam) in the early Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra.
between life and death, value and valuelessness or being and non-being. The fourth name is buddhatā. He who realizes this mind, will obtain Buddhahood. According to this view, it is said that all beings have buddhatā in the Mahāyāna-parinirvāṇa-Sūtra etc.

III The Relation Between the Inherently-pure-mind and our Phenomenal Consciousness.

We find many parables or allegorical expressions on the relation between the inherently-pure-mind and our phenomenal consciousness. I will point out several famous expressions.

1) In early Buddhism, the Buddha said "Thy Bhikkhave, this mind is very pure, but it is often defiled by visions (pabhassaram idarp, bhikkhave, cittarp tan ea kho agantukehi upakkiliṭṭhanti)," (Anguttara Nikāya vol. I p. 10). This short sentence is generally recognized as the first mention of the inherently-pure-mind (prakṛti). cittasya prabhasvara). It does not have the literal word for "inherently (prakṛti)," but the meaning of Prakṛti is implied when the pure mind is made the master who always lives in ourselves, and the impurities, i.e., the ordinary man's consciousness, are made visitors who accidentally come and go. Then, when did this prakṛti cittasya prabhasvara come into use as a technical term in the Buddhist history? We do not know when, because the Sārasvatī originals of the older Buddhist schools have been lost. But we find a phrase "sems ran-bṣin-gyis lod-gsal-bal o" i.e. prakṛti cittasya prabhasvara, a doctrine of the Mahāsāṃghika-school, in the "Gshin-lugs-kyi bye-brag bod-pal i. l.khor-lo" (skt. Samay-abheda vyāhacakra) of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons and we find also the same expression in the Abhidharmamahavibhāṣa-sūtra (A.D. 2nd C.) and the Sariputra-abhidharma-sūtra (about B.C. 2nd C.) in Chinese translation. Therefore, I think, this technical term was generally used around the beginning of the Christian era by the Buddhist school, and also in the early Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra.

2) In early Buddhism, we find a parable in which this inherently-pure-mind is recognized in every ordinary being just as gold is found in a golden (being Samyutta vol. V p. 29), and (3) also in some verses (Gāthā), the relation between the inherently-pure-mind and an ordinary man's consciousness is likened to the relation between a painter and his pictures of men, women, trees, mountains, etc., drawn on a pure white canvas (ibid. S. vol. III p. 152). In this simile a painter denotes some actions of the inherently-pure-mind and the pure white canvas, this mind. Generally speaking, this simile means that the contents of every ordinary man's consciousness are but pictures drawn by this mind. This is quoted in the Buddha-avatamsaka-nāma-mahāvaiḍūya-sūtra in Chinese (Taisho vol. IX, p. 465, c. vol. X p. 102 a.), and gives ground to the theory that the triple world is made by the mind only.

4) In the fourth chapter of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, there is a parable of a poor son whose father is a rich and virtuous man. Though the son lived a poor life in a remote land for a long time, he finally came back to his father and reaffirmed himself as the successor of his father's riches through his father's love. In this parable, the father denotes the Buddha i.e. the inherently-pure-mind in every man, and the son, is every ordinary man who is to be the successor to the riches i.e. he will realize the same mind.

5) Another parable in the eighth chapter of Saddharmapuṇḍarīka tells of a man, who has a valuable gem (manīratna) in the clothes given him by a good friend. In this parable, the valuable gem denotes the Buddha, i.e., the inherently-pure-mind; the poor man, every ordinary man; and the good friend, Buddha Sākyamuni. This parable teaches that as soon as every man enlightens himself by recognizing the pure-mind, he will be able to attain Buddhahood.

6) In the Zen sect of Chinese Buddhism (in the 11th and 12th centuries), we find some masters who made use of an ox in order to explain the inherently-pure-mind in pictures. They attempted to illustrate the stage of Zen discipline by six or ten pictures of an ox. In the pictures by P'u-Ming (Fumyo), who belonged to the Sōtō Zen school, the gradual development of his Zen life is indicated by a gradual whitening of the ox, but in the pictures of Kū-an Shih-yuan (Kakuan), who belonged to the Rinzai Zen school, there is no whitening. The difference of these two masters' expressions in these pictures is said to indicate the character of the Sōtō Zen sect and the Rinzai Zen sect respectively. On the detail, I hope you'll see the Jōgyūzu (the ten ox pictures) by Zenkai Shibayama (Kyoto 1941).

IV The Theory That the Inherently-pure-mind Originates the greatest Mercy of the Tathāgata

Buddha Sākyamuni called himself the Tathāgata which means one who has come from tathātā and also gone to tathātā, when he realized the inherently-pure-mind. Owning to the opinion that Buddha i.e. tathāgata exists inherently in every ordinary man, this inherently-pure-mind is also called the Tathāgatagarbha. Another meaning of the Tathāgatagarbha (the Matrix of the tathāgatahood) is that all the world, being created by this mind as mentioned above, is enveloped by Tathāgata.
This inherently-pure-mind in every ordinary man has the nature of returning to its perfect action (praṇā-intuition; paññā-intuition) from its weak action (durpraṇā; duppaññā). So it makes us reflect continually on many conflicts and the bitterness caused by the conflicts. The Buddha who has realized the inherently-pure-mind shows us the way to enlightenment from outside by his teachings, and the Tathāgata-garbha makes us awaken to the Bodhicitta from inside by its nature. This is the theory that the inherently-pure-mind originates the greatest mercy of Tathāgata, that is, the Tathāgata-mahākarunā.

1) See "Vipāsyanā Samatha and Jiñāna." by Giiyu Nishi (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies. No. V. 2.)
2) "The Study of Paññā in the Early Buddhism" edited by Giiyu Nishi 2nd chapter.
3) ibid. pp. 276-280
4) See the "Essays in Zen Buddhism" (p. 347-366) and the "Manual of Zen Buddhism" (p. 150-171) by D.T. Suzuki.

Music and the dance occupy an important position in Japanese religious ceremonies, particularly in the rites of Shinto. Music and dance are indispensable parts of religious ceremonies; they are intended to pacify, soothe, and console the deity, as well as to round out the external forms of the ceremonies and heighten the religious atmosphere. Gagaku, the form of music most frequently performed at Shinto ceremonies, is a refined, aristocratic music and dance of long tradition; based on the music and dance of various Asiatic peoples which were imported around the beginning of the 7th century, it became fully absorbed and "naturalized" by the 10th century. However, it was not specifically Shinto music from the very beginning.

The basic law of 701 AD, called Taihō-ryō established a Gagaku-ryō, or Department of Music charged with the preservation of ceremonial music and correct dances, as well as various other types of foreign music, such as Tōgaku (T’ang music), Koma-gaku (Koryo music), Kudara-gaku (Paek-che music), Shiragi-gaku (Silla music), Gīgaku, etc. The Department was a government office employing as teachers professional musicians of continental descent and comprising several hundred students. This music was performed as the ceremonial music of the Court and also used in religious ceremonies.

One receives the impression, for example from the documentary accounts of mourning and funeral ceremonies, that music and dancing accompanied by primitive instruments was performed also before the importation of this foreign music. But the foreign music possessed, first of all, many types of advanced musical instruments: beautiful melodies were played with high technical skill and on a precise scale; besides, the foreign music was accompanied by a religious musical theory as well. Examples of large-scale musical performances connected with religious ceremonies are recorded; for instance, when Emperor Shōmu went to worship there when the Great Buddha of Tōdai-ji Temple was completed in Nara, 5,000 priests were invited to
chant scriptures, then Chinese music and Japanese dances (Go-sechi, Ta-mai Kume-mai) were performed before the image of the Buddha. It is significant to note that here native Japanese music and dance—Go-sechi, Ta-mai, and Kume-mai—were performed on an equal footing with foreign music. It is possible that native Japanese music has been greatly influenced by foreign music.

The ancient Japanese songs, many of which are identified by their musical names, no doubt included many songs dating from times antecedent to the period of foreign music; but today it is difficult to restore the music of these ancient songs. Although one speaks of native Japanese music, it is nevertheless undeniable that there was foreign influence on musical instruments and melodies. Music and dance performed today under the names of ancient pieces such as Kume-mai or Hayato-mai are in reality recent imitations and are not necessarily the same as those handed down in the ancient Gagaku-ryō.

Inside the Gagaku-ryō section called the Uta-mai dokoro (O-uta-dokoro) dealt with native Japanese vocal music (such as Go-sechi, Kagura, Saibara, and Fuwoku). In the middle Heian period (first half of the 9th century) there appeared many brilliant musicians who brought about the "Golden Age of Gagaku" and who brought about the complete "naturalization" of Gagaku. During this period foreign music such as Bugaku was performed in ceremonial music recitals, and folk songs were arranged to Gagaku melodies; thus the Saibara vocal music came to great popularity. Consequently, Gagaku was not restricted to religious ceremonies, but was performed as orchestral music for dancing at large-scale court ceremonies. May we remark, in passing that the basic form of the Japanese religious ceremony, or matsuri, is to welcome a deity, to feast together with him, and to entertain him at a banquet.

The musical instruments known to have antedated the introduction of foreign music consisted of not much more than the koto and the flute (fue). There were two types of koto: that of foreign origin and one called the wagon, a 6-string instrument of ancient origin. The wagon was used exclusively in religious music. In ancient religious rites, the koto was used to summon was no longer the "sacred music giving the Emperor the spiritual power, or mana, to rule the local regions. This magical element in music has long been forgotten; but tama-furi or chin kon (magic causing vital powers to inhabit the body) is considered to be an important element in all ancient dances. The dance-like motions of the goddess Uzume before the Heavenly Cave in Japanese mythology were performed in a trance and can hardly be called dancing; but no doubt in such practices there was living a traditional knowledge of methods of awakening spirits and causing them to dwell within the bodies of gods and human beings. The most ancient tradition in the Imperial Court is that of the festival Chinkon-sai; but in the Nara period the concept of chin kon had already come to mean a secondary chin kon: rather than imparting of mana or vital force, chin kon was now considered to mean preventing the spirit from leaving the body. The Chinkon-sai ceremonies are still performed today as part of the mystical Court religious ceremonies. There are several dances handed down today which were originally chin kon dances later arranged in the Gagaku manner: for example Mi-kagura, Azuma-asobi, Yamato-mai, etc. Mi- kagura is also a type of chin kon dance, which became established as court music around the 10th century. It is derived from an older form of sacred performance (kami-asobi) in which a group of religionists appeared and imparted blessings by sacred music and other performances. The Azuma-asobi or religious performance of the Eastern regions (Azuma) which was introduced into the Court from these regions. However, whatever one may say about the words of the songs, at least the music and style of dancing have been thoroughly re-arranged in the Gagaku manner and are rather far removed from the original style. Yamato-mai was a type of dance in which each participant in a ceremonial banquet would arise and dance in turn; like other religious dances, it inclined to elements praising and revering the virtues of a deity.1) However, the words accompanying the dances are not necessarily of a religious nature. Anciently, many love

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1) There is also a dance called Yamato-mai among the so-called miko dances performed at the present day by priestesses in the Grand Shrine of Ise and in local shrines of various locations. Most of these are of more recent origin and usually are descended from the kagura dance of obeisance or the oga-tama-de; or else they are rooted in the rites of purification.
songs were used. The use of non-religious songs in religious ceremonies brings up a problem connected with the essence of religious faith. Besides these, there are the nembutsu and wasan, which developed together with the spread of medieval Buddhism. These were performances praising the deities and Buddhas and emphasizing the basking in their blessings. There are still many problems connected with the various types of religious music handed down as local folk arts using mainly the shō gongs and the drums which were the instruments of the nembutsu performances.

In connection with this, let us give a brief outline of the religious drama. It is thought that ancient ritual worship was carried out in the form of a dramatic antagonism between the gods and devils or spirits. However, these were not dramas for the purpose of entertainment, but were themselves religious rituals. In them, the spirit or devil seeking to interfere with human happiness and cause harm is subdued by the potency of a powerful deity. The evil spirit is ferocious in his defiance of the deity, but is finally brought to submission. By the periodic repetition of such performances, the spirits or demons are prevented from committing harmful actions. Thus, through a covenant with the deities, the safety of human beings is ensured from the fear of spirits and devils; and the blessings of these powerful deities are expected and believed in.

The simplest form of this performance is that of sumō wrestling. This can be seen in the quarrel of Take-mikazuchi and Take-minakata in the myths concerning the ceding of the land of Izumo (Izumo no kuni-yuzuri); and many such elements have been handed down through the ages as contests accompanied by divination held in connection with religious ceremonies. Japanese mythology also record an account of the origin of the Hayato-mai, a mimical performance representing the actions of drowning in the water; this is also a dramatic religious rite signifying the submission of a spirit and is recorded in the mythological story of the Luck of the Sea and Luck of the Mountains (Umi no Sachi, Yama no Sachi) dealing with magic power over the waters. This myth is also connected, together with sumō, with the production of the rice paddies. Among the religious performances is one called ta-asobi, still performed today in all localities, which is designed to pray for an abundant rice harvest and to act out in advance the work of the entire year in rice cultivation. It is not recorded as such in the ancient classics, but it can no doubt be called a religious drama handed down the most ancient and simple dramatic elements. Of course, it is possible to it a mere magical technique rather than a religious drama.

These performances connected with rice cultivation were early united with the imported Gagaku-type performances to make up what is called Dengaku, a colorful type of dancing which developed in the middle ages. Dengaku was mostly a performance somewhat like the modern review, in which performers in gorgeous costumes, striking drums worn around their waists, danced around in various patterns to the accompaniment of sasara and flutes. Besides this main form of Dengaku, there was also the Dengaku no Nō, in which stories were acted out, and which later developed into the Sarugaku no Nō; this was the origin of the stage drama in Japan.

The performers of Dengaku and Sarugaku lived in village commons called za which belonged to large shrines or temples. This is the ultimate origin of the custom of calling theaters, such as the Kabuki-za, by this word za.

The materials of the stories performed in the Nō drama are largely religious. The Nō drama is a classical drama in which the origins of a shrine or temple are recounted, in which a god appears and imparts blessings, or in which, on the other hand, a ghost or evil demon is subdued or brought to Buddhahood—in other words it is a classical drama endowed with the nature of a religious drama. The play called Ohina is the most sacred part of the repertoire, and even today is performed as a religious ceremony. In this play, the Nō actor belonging to the head of a school of the Nō drama appears on the stage and dons the sacred mask of the old man with reverent gestures, then dances while singing a formula wishing for the abundance of crops and the prosperity of descendants; this is the first half. In the second half, the Kyōgen actor, wearing a black mask of the old man, dances again in a more lively and comprehensible way the same dance performed by the former old man. This type of performance is called modoki. Modoki is thought to have two meanings; first, defiance; and second, imitation, or explanatory performance; the modoki character can be considered as a sort of buffoon who stands on the side of the spirits, as opposed to the deity. His performance is more lively, amusing, and complex; it is in the process of being transformed into drama.

The word Kabuki original meant making coarse, erotic movements dressed in a conspicuous, flamboyant costume. It is said that its founder, a miko of Izumo called O-Kuni, sang a song with the words; 'Iza ya kabuku', the final word of which, is, of course, derived from the verb kabuku, defined above. The Kabuki dance was based on the Nembutsu dance. It combined dances with stories of the kō-waka-mai.
and took on a dramatic form; since the onna-kabuki (Kabuki with women actresses), popular in the early 17th century, it has developed as a form of drama. Both Sarugaku no Nō and Kabuki were originally types of religious activities performed by low-ranking religious people.

The heroes of stories and dramas are most often young men who died under pitiable circumstances. In other words, the stories of their lives were recounted or acted out in order to obtain salvation for their souls. These stories have a very ancient origin: in the medieval sekkyo-joruri, stories of the experiences of a god or fantastic tales were told while manipulating dolls or unrolling picture-scrolls; first, the biwa was used to accompany such tales, later the samisen. But there is an even earlier origin, reaching as far back as stories of the exiles of a noble hero which were spread by the traveling bards of antiquity. In Japanese drama, the tragedy no doubt originated in stories of unhappy love; there were also stories designed to bring salvation to the spirits of the dead heroes and to purify the hearts of the hearers. However, it is sure that the religious drama did not originate as a passion play. It is true that, later on, there were dramas of the order of passion plays dealing with the trials of the saint Nichiren.

At any rate, the origin of Japanese drama is in religion; the No plays, especially the Wabi-Nō dramas, are largely drawn from Shinto or Buddhist themes. Besides these, there are, of course, in Nō and Kabuki many plays (such as Tsubosaka Reigen-ki) which deal with the miraculous benefits obtained from Buddhas or deities; but it is not proper to distinguish these as specifically religious dramas.

Kagura is a type of Court music of the Heian period; but there is another type of popular religious performance also known by the name Kagura. The latter developed in connection with Dengaku and Nembutsu performances. In its there are many types, such as the Sato-kagura of the Tokyo region, which have the nature of religious dramas. They are pantomimes in which myths are acted out as dramas. However, their masks, costumes, and dramatic methods are imitations of the Nō drama, and they are not older than 100 and some decades of years. In Kyoto there is the Mibu Kyōgen, a pantomime based on the Nō Kyōgen, as is evident from its name of Dai-nembutsu; it is danced to the accompaniment of flutes, drums, and a large shō gong. It is also religious in content.

There are also the “Buddha Dances” of Hanazono village in Wakayama prefecture, in which the participants dance wearing mask of Bodhisattvas; dramas about the attainment of Buddhahood of the female dragon said to be recorded in the Hokke-kyō scripture; and dramas about Hell such as the Oni Raigo of Mushiu in Chiba prefecture, which depicts the dead being punished by the devils in Hell and finally saved from their fate. This is similar to the “resurrection rites” in Kagura, by which a person goes into retreat and practices strict abstinence and thus is “reborn”. These practices supported by religious beliefs that the person praying for some benefit can be saved by himself assuming the costume and appearance of what he desires and carrying out a representative performance. The so-called Nerikuyo of Taima Temple in Yamato is, of course, not a drama. The parade of the 25 Bodhisattvas of the same order as the above – in Kuhon-butsu in Meguro, Tokyo, is another type of pageant in which the believers parade disguised as the various Bodhisattvas for the purpose of praying for benefits; the believers experience religious ecstasy at parading around as Bodhisattvas.

The above is merely a hurried, brief glance at the types of religious music and religious drama existing in Japan. In receiving the honor of making a report to this epoch-making international conference I should no doubt have reporting upon some more specific and concrete question. However, thinking that the foreign delegates would not doubt meet with some examples of religious music during their research tours, I decided to present here one aspect of this question in order to serve as an introduction for their benefit.
FOUNDERS AND ORGANIZER OF RELIGIOUS GROUP  
— A PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY IN JAPAN —  

BY  

IICHI OGUCHI

Regarding the general nature of religious authority, Max Weber examined this matter from the sociological point of view and later, Joachim Wach from the typological point of view. Wach arranged the researches of his predecessor's and approved the thesis that religious leaders have an extraordinary power called Charisma and tried to categorize religious authority upon an examination of the existence and quantity of Charisma. However, I venture to say that their standpoints are correct, as far as the examination of irrational existence of the authority is concerned, but it is insufficient for an examination of the structure of religious groups as social organizations. We should pay more attention to the function of the leaders and examine this problem in connection with the historical and social aspects of religious groups.

For instance, J. Wach noted that only the founder become the object of the cult when he divided the religious leaders into founders, reformers, prophets and heads of schools. But I cannot agree with his view, because, at least, in Japanese religion most of the heads of schools were deified and become the objects of the cults. It is one of the characteristics of Japanese religion and society.

The core of Japanese religious belief is the belief in a man-god, namely: man is deified. This is seen in the worship of the Emperor and of the founders of new religions. These are fundamental facts in Japanese religion and have been explained from the point of view that the Japanese concept of god is quite different from that in Christianity.

The character of religious authority in Japan should be examined in the above stated frame of reference of traditional religious belief. It may be noticed that there are many shamanistic elements in the personality of religious founders in Japan. It is generally accepted that in the shaman there is a charismatic element, but the shaman is a kind of magician in a wide sense of the term as his functions are oracle, divination, healing and others. According to general conception the magician is quite different from the founder in character, but in Japanese religion many religious groups have been established around the magicians, who became the founders of the groups. On this problem we should never forget the function of the organizer in a religious group who places the magician in the position of the founder. Even if the founder is abnormal, his religious group has become to be recognized as a normal one by the efforts of the organizer.

In the development of a newly established religious group, the founder is gradually deified and his charisma is transmitted to his own descendants through an hereditary system, while the power and function of the organizer are temporary. In the examination of religious sociology, we must never forget the existence of the organizer who contributed to establish the religious group.
A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF
BUDDHISM IN BURMA

BY

ON PE

On an occasion like this, it is but right that one should speak on a subject which has brought us here from all parts of the world. With a very short notice served on the delegates from Burma, we found ourselves not quite prepared to produce papers which would be acceptable as fully meeting the requirements of the subject to be dealt with. Yet one should contribute something which should stimulate a further study of the "History of Buddhism", as what I am going to speak has made recent history of Buddhism, at least in Burma, even though it will but form a small chapter in the history of Buddhism in Burma.

It is assumed that many of the delegates will already know the fundamental teachings of Buddhism, so that I need not dwell on them. I shall confine myself to only those circumstances in the field of Buddhism in Burma which make history and the resultant effect on the people of Burma in the social, moral and ethical spheres of life.

I may begin with how Buddhism came into Burma. It is said that it came to Lower Burma in about 300 A.D. Although according to tradition Buddhism reached Burma by land at a much earlier date. Theravāda Buddhism, however, was brought to Lower Burma from Ceylon at a later period, and it was in 1057 A.D. that King Anawrahta of Pagan conquered Thaton, Lower Burma and brought Theravāda Buddhism to Upper Burma.

What is Theravāda Buddhism? The Arahats who had been taught directly by the Omniscient Buddha held the First Great Council soon after the passing away of the Buddha. This first Great Council canonized the actual words of the Buddha and this teaching is known as Theravāda Buddhism. There have been, previous to the Sixth Council held in 1954 in Burma, which will be my main theme today, five Councils which were held with the object of preserving the Buddha's Teaching in all its pristine purity, against materialist threats from within or without.

They are as follows:

The first Great Buddhist Council was held in 544 B.C. at Rājagriha. At that Council held shortly after the Buddha's passing away, His Teaching was codified and canonized, and groups of Bhikshus or reciting monks, who in the days when the Buddha preached, undertook to learn by heart and to recite the Great Teaching, did their portion of recital.

The second Council took place in the year 444 B.C under the patronage of King Kalasoka.

The third Buddhist Council was held under the Royal patronage of King Asoka in 309 B.C. in what is now modern Patna.

The fourth Great Buddhist Council took place in 94 B.C. in Ceylon under the patronage of King Vuttagamani. The whole collection, about two times as big as the Mahābhārata was committed to writing for the first time.

Says the Mahāvamsa, "Then the most wise bhikkhus who had passed down the Tipitakas and the commentaries thereon orally in former times, since they saw the people were less righteous, assembled, and in order that the true Doctrine may endure, wrote them down in books."

In 1871 the fifth Buddhist Synod was held in Burma under the patronage of King Mindon.

Theravāda Buddhism in Burma, since its introduction has maintained its ground, in spite of internecine wars and alien influences which came in, in the wake of foreign rule over a century. Until lately, that is about a decade ago, many Buddhist countries including Burma, were under foreign rule which brought in its wake, its own form of religion. Thus we find other religions springing up in some Buddhist countries, particularly Christianity which made some headway in some of those countries. Independence granted to Burma can be said to have ushered in an era of renaissance of Buddhism in the country.

To begin with, this renaissance may be attributed to causes, one of which is the freedom which the people of the country have enjoyed after Independence. With the newly won freedom, the Government headed by Premier U Nu as well as the people, became suddenly infused with the spirit of religious fervour to promote Buddhism in many fields which were not thought possible for many reasons in the colonial days. The new legislature has enacted legislation in ecclesiastical matters and huge sums have been provided in the Government budget for maintenance of the Clergy, for endowment of scholarships for higher study by monks, for building and repairs of pagodas and religious edifices, and for
SECTION III

propagating Buddhism abroad. Examinations on country-wide scale are conducted on religious subjects amongst children and adults - measures which are intended to raise the standard of Buddhist morality in the country. Religious centres have been opened all over the country for the practice of mental concentration. The spontaneity in the emergence of this religious fervour, may perhaps be accounted for by the new nationalism which has swept all the newly independent countries. The association between nationalism and religious fervour is easily accountable in Burma. The life of a Burmese Buddhist is intertwined with religion. The clergy always occupied an important role in the life of the nation, which is true today, as it had ever been in the days of the Burmese kings. The new nationalism, ushered in by independence, found its expression in freedom of action in religious fields. Burma will always be remembered for the Great Synod which was held in 1954 by the Government and people of the Union of Burma as in the manner done on the five previous occasions, each of which is marked out in the history of Buddhism, as landmarks in the twenty-five centuries which have passed away. Since the World law the Light of the Dhamma. By a strange coincidence the Sixth Synod terminated on the 2500th. Buddhist Jayanti Day - a day celebrated with great rejoicings all over the Buddhist world. Twenty-five centuries have passed since the Buddha taught His doctrines and those doctrines have been preserved in all their pristine purity down these centuries. At the Sixth Burma Synod this pristine purity has again been authenticated, at a council of two thousand five hundred monks from all Theravāda Buddhist countries. The Synod was a joint effort of the Buddhist countries, with the collaboration and co-operation of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Ceylon and Burma, beginning from the 17th. of May, 1954 and ending in the month of May, 1956. The occasion was marked by the presence of Royalty and Heads of States of Buddhist countries. It took months and money was spent lavishly, making the ceremony unprecedented in the annals of similar Synods in its representative character and in its magnitude, symbolized by the great man-made cave in Rangoon in the shape of its prototype in Rajagriha, where the first Synod was held. This great cave of Rangoon will forever remain a landmark of Burma, and will be a perpetual testimony to the efforts of the Buddhists of the decade following the independence of the country — efforts which will form a chapter of the history of Buddhism in Burma, recording the uplift of the Buddhists of Burma in the social, moral and ethical spheres of life in Burma.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO JAPAN OF SHRINE SHINTO

BY

SOKYO ONO

I

One of the necessary tasks of Shinto studies is to consider the question: what are the contributions which Shrine Shinto has made to Japan, and what are its potentialities for making future contributions?

However, this type of question is extremely complex and involves a wide variety of points which must be considered. Furthermore, since evaluations must be made based on subjective points of view, it is not possible to obtain conclusions acceptable to all.

In this paper I should like to take up the questions of saisei-itchi (unity of government and religion) in Shinto and of communal worship centering around the uji-gami, and seek for a point of departure in dealing with this question by putting forward a few simple considerations, which will no doubt be vulnerable to criticism as being one-sided.

II

The idea of saisei-itchi is one possessing a long tradition in Shinto; it was this concept which created so-called State Shinto. The 1945 SCAP Directive on Shinto broke this tradition and dissolved the ties between the State and Shinto.

As a problem of administrative organization, this dissolution succeeded quite simply; and there is every indication that the situation will continue in the future as it is now. Recently the question of the expenditure of public funds for the Yasukuni Shrine came to the fore, but we regard this as a special problem and not one concerning Shrine Shinto as a whole. There is also the question of the return of the Grand Shrine of Ise to the Imperial House, but today when the rites of the Imperial House are considered, not as State rites, but as religious observances of the Imperial family restricted to the so-called "inner court," this is not to be regarded as an attempt to revive the connections between the State and the shrines. There is also the
problem of the revision of the law on religious corporations; in connection with this issue, Shinto circles are insisting on the shrines being designated as public institutions. However, this does not mean that the shrines are seeking any kind of special protection from the State, but is merely an attempt to preserve an equitable administration of Shrine properties.

Accordingly, there is no question at the present of the movement for the restoration of State Shinto becoming an immediate issue. Being no prophet, I can give no assurance that in the future there will not arise somewhere a demand for the revival of State Shinto. But at the present time, there is nothing at all evident which would tend to swerve from the present course of complete abolition of State Shinto.

Nevertheless in a reform, such as the Shinto Directive, accomplished by external pressure and without due study, it is only natural that numerous problems should be left unsolved. There are no doubt other problems besides those mentioned above. However, in my opinion, the importance of the problem of saisei-itchi is not in the restoration of State Shinto as a system, but rather in the realm of spiritual questions, such as the manner in which the Shinto tradition is to be carried on.

The fact that State Shinto, or saisei-itchi should survive in spirit the abolition of the system of State Shinto may be difficult to comprehend from the standpoint of other religions; but this truth is thought to be of great significance in Shinto.

III

Many questions are asked about what kinds of changes Shrine Shinto underwent since the Shinto Directive of 1945. One of the most frequently occurring questions is this; has any potentiality been for Shinto developing from a national religion to a world religion?

I hold the opinion that whether a religion is a national religion or a world religion has no relation whatsoever to that religion’s value as a religion. I think that the religious principles of Shrine Shinto have validity for the entire human race and that, in this sense, there is a potentiality for its growth as a world religion. But I think that for this to materialize, a new religious leader would need to appear and give a new organization to the religion, and some particular stimulus would be necessary. Therefore, I answer that, at present, there is no movement towards making it into a world religion, and that it continues to be, as before, a national religion.

The Meiji Shrine enshrines the spirit of Emperor Meiji, the builder of modern Japan; the Grand Shrine of Izumo enshrines Ô-kuni-mushi no mikoto, the spirit of the land of Japan. It would be meaningless to attempt to propagate the worship of these shrines among other nations. As can be understood from these two examples, most of the Japanese shrines are connected specially with worship pertinent to the Japanese people alone.

Those who ask about the potential transformation of Shinto from a national to a world religion often tend to think of Shinto nationalism as an exclusive, ethnocentric nationalism and that this nationalism inevitably leads to an ultra-nationalistic State absolutism.

It is true that most of the deities enshrined in Shinto shrines are deities specially connected with Japanese people, deities to whom the Japanese people are obliged to pay worship. Nevertheless, even now prayers are being offered in these shrines for the welfare of the human race as a whole and for world peace. In this point, a much clearer and more thoroughgoing attitude has been assumed than was the case in the pre-war era, and one can say that a world-wide, humanity-wide viewpoint has been greatly strengthened in Shrine Shinto since the war.

However, this is not a qualitative change in Shrine Shinto, but can be considered only as a clarification of an essential feature already existing in this religion. Its means neither a lessening of nationalism nor that any necessity is felt for its removal. It is correct to say that in this case, the central content of nationalism is the preservation of the tradition of national culture, the consciousness of a communal group destiny, and the establishment of an independent spirit.

Such a nationalism does not differ in any real sense from the efforts of the individual to safeguard his life, property, and honor and to preserve the independence of his own personality. Consequently, Shrine Shinto admits of no necessity of doing away with such nationalism; and, as long as Shinto continues to be Japanese Shinto, there will probably be no need for any such change.

IV

Of course, the indissoluble connection of Shrine Shinto with nationalism was undeniably the reason why it came to be distorted and used as the spiritual backing for the transformation of Japan into an imperialistic state after the Russo-Japanese war. Nor is there lacking a quiet, self-critical reflection on this point. However, this is not believed to be derived from the essence of Shinto; on the other hand, there is a gradual, but steadily growing movement striving for the restoration of the original, essential Shinto.
In exactly the same sense, the question of saisei-itchi is also gradually being raised once more. However, consideration of the problem has not yet reached the stage of distinctly embracing the cause of avoiding the revival of State Shinto as a system and confining itself to the spiritual question of the meaning of tradition.

In a non-dogmatic religion like Shinto, a long time is needed for thought to take a decisive direction, and the process by which changes take place is rather inconspicuous. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that much consideration is being given to the fact that the Japanese Emperors have come down in a single, unbroken line from remote antiquity and that they have more than once been instrumental in saving the nation from destruction; it is also undeniable that recently the longing for the tradition of saisei-itchi has grown in strength.

If this is so, it is important to know exactly what the content is of the belief in saisei-itchi. I believe that, broadly speaking, three main points can be discerned.

First, there is the recognition of the significance of Shinto rituals being performed by the State. This does not mean that the State engages in missionary activities among the people, nor that it seeks to impose certain religious beliefs by force. It is rather the act of praying, in the name of the State, for peace and prosperity, which are the common desires of the people; it is the performance, on a larger scale, of what communal Shinto worship does centering around the local uji-gami. In State Shinto, the State was in a position of synthesizing the communal worship of all smaller social units.

Secondly, by placing ultimate responsibility on its celebrants, State worship, which had the Emperor as its highest celebrant, placed restrictions of the purest kind on the consciences of government leaders and rulers. This sense of moral responsibility on the part of the ruler is best illustrated by the pious actions of the tenth emperor, Emperor Seiun, and by Emperor Meiji, who wrote a poem imploring the gods of heaven to punish him for any sins of his people and to avert their wrath from the people, who were his children.

Thirdly, the concept of saisei-itchi has its ultimate basis, not in political considerations, but in the life of each individual. Matsuri, or Shinto worship, was not a merely religious ritual, but life with the Divine, activity based on the protection and the spirit of the Divine. Government is something derived from it. The word matsuri-goto, meaning "government," is derived from the word matsuri, which means "worship." In matsuri-goto was contained the meaning that each individual should serve the gods and his fellow men through his own individual work in life. This fact is revealed in the use of the two characters and to write the word matsuri-goto: meaning "government," and meaning "professional responsibility." The meaning of these ancient words is not widely understood, but this spirit is still alive in Shinto.

I think that this spirit has been given a concrete organized form in the system of State Shinto; and I also think it understandable that, if this longing for State Shinto as a system be disappointed, there should be a demand for its revival in spirit. When this demand becomes sufficiently strong, is it not probable that Shinto will assume an ever more distinct form as a faith which, by means of the hearts and actions of the individual believers, supports a state system which is distinguished by its beauty and justice?

Local communal worship, centering around the uji-gami, is traditionally not different from the system of saisei-itchi in the State; both are essentially of equal significance.

The uji-gami was the object of common worship of the kinship group called the uji under the ancient social kinship system. Later, the uji-gami changed into the object of communal worship of a local, regional community.

The strongest religious consciousness in Shrine Shinto is found in the organizations of uji-ko, or parishes of the local uji-gami. Modern society, however, breaks down the unitive ties of kinship and regional communities, making each member of the group a distinct individual, and continually unites and divides individuals through rationalistic enlightenment and by the incentives of personal advantage. As a result, the uji-ko organizations are also beginning to lose their stability.

Membership in the ancient uji-ko organizations was determined by heredity or by strict examination. Consequently, not only was the religious organization extremely tightly knit, but individual moral character was regarded as a highly important condition.

Secondly, in connection with the above, the spiritual harmony of the community was the highest moral value, and the solution of quarrels and disagreements was sought before the gods based on religion. A hint of this fact is provided by the old proverb to the effect that "the peacemaker is the uji-gami of the time."

Although one receives the impression that, in recent times, the power of tradition has become weakened in this point, this is one of the
main characteristics of Shinto life derived from uji-gami worship.

Thirdly, the religious atmosphere accompanying these communal rites contains a spiritual stimulus not easily obtainable in individual religious life. In the restoration of the Japanese cities destroyed after the great Kantō earthquake and the Second World War, a conspicuous role was played by the lively festivals of the Shinto shrines.

One cannot overlook how the festival observances - many of which seem at first sight to be nothing but frivolous recreation - and the festival markets with their many old-fashioned vendors of toys and foods, were instrumental to a remarkable degree in stimulating the hearts of the people to search for a new life full of brightness, to put forth the courage needed in reconstruction, and to long for a peaceful world.

The tradition of communal worship of the local uji-gami is thus imbued with an indefinable spirit which gives support to the spiritual and material life. How this indefinable spirit of common worship will accommodate itself to the changing social life of today and tomorrow - this is a question which we cannot yet answer clearly.

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SUR UN PRÉTENDU MONOTHEISME JAPONAIS

BY

RAFFAELE PETTAZZONI

1

Au cours de mes recherches sur le monothéisme et problèmes connexes dans le cadre de l'histoire générale des religions, il m'est arrivé souvent de rencontrer une tendance assez répandue à employer le terme monothéisme pour désigner des choses assez différentes.

Cette tendance trahit une insuffisance de précision conceptuelle. C'est faute d'avoir une notion exacte de ce qu'est le monothéisme en histoire des religions que ce mot a pu être généralisé au point qu'on a fini par trouver le monothéisme un peu partout, là même où l'on s'attendait le moins à le rencontrer.

C'est le cas, entre autres, pour l'ancienne religion nationale du Japon, le shintôisme. Shintô est un mot d'origine chinoise signifiant littéralement "la voie (tō) des dieux (shen)," en japonais "la voie des kami" (kami-no-michi). Le shintôisme est donc, par son nom même, une religion nettement polythéiste. Il s'agit d'un polythéisme en pleine règle, bien défini, bien caractérisé. Cela n'empêche qu'on a voulu trouver dans le shintôisme des traces du monothéisme.

Peu le professeur d'histoire des religions à Université Impériale de Tokyo, G. Kato, dans un livre A Study of Shinto, the Religion of the Japanese Nation (Tokyo 1926), a écrit ce qui suit (pag. 63) : "We have good reasons to believe from the standpoint of a comparative study of religion that Ame-no-Minakanushi-no-Kami is really the Deity of Japanese primitive monotheism." 1

Malheureusement le dieu Ame-no-Minakanushi ne parait que dans le prologue du Kojiki - une espèce de prélude à la cosmogonie shintôiste - et il n'est mentionné qu'une fois dans le Nihongi. (G. Kato, Study of Shinto, p. 63) D'autre part il ne reçoit pas de culte, à ce

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qu’il paraît, étant donné que “there is anciently no authentic shrine dedicated to Ame-no-Minakanushi-non-Kami: not a single shrine erected to him is mentioned in the Engishiki. Those shrines that are said to have been erected to this Deity are all of later origin.” (Kato, ibid., p. 64-65)

Ce grand dieu unique et suprême serait donc complètement étranger, soit à la mythologie, soit à la religion ancienne du Japon; il appartient plutôt, à ce qu’il paraît, à la spéculation théologique. Il se peut, comme on l’a suggéré en dépit de l’avis de M. Kato, que c’est à la pensée et à la littérature chinoise qu’il faut rattacher la notion d’Ame-no-Minakanushi, “le Seigneur du centre du ciel,” une notion si différente par, son évanescence, des grandes figures divines de la mythologie shintoïste proprement dite.

Si M. Kato prétend, au contraire, que c’est l’évanescence même, l’indétermination des traits, le manque de données mythiques bien arrêtées, qui permettent de voir dans Ame-no-Minakanushi le représentant de l’idée monothéiste, c’est uniquement parce qu’il a été influencé, de son propre aveu, par les idées d’Andrew Lang. C’est Andrew Lang qui a attiré l’attention du monde savant sur la croyance en des ‘Supreme Beings’ chez les peuples non-civilisés. Et c’est cette découverte qui, à travers l’élaboration systématique du P.W. Schmidt, a donné lieu à la théorie de l’‘Urmonotheismus’.


II

Une autre thèse monothéisante a été avancée de nos jours au sujet du shintô, non pas – cette fois – par rapport à la phase la plus ancienne (prêshintô) de la religion japonaise, mais à un développement tout-à-fait récent du shintô.

Il s’agit du shinto populaire (shikhô shintô) avec ses différentes “églises” (kyôshû) qui se sont formées et développées au cours du XIXème et du XXème siècle en dehors et en marge du shinto officiel et de ses sanctuaires (jinja). Fondées en général par des simples prêtres du peuple, elles ont eu pour but de répandre au fond de l’âme populaire en faisant appel à des valeurs religieuses élémentaires, telles que la sincérité, la pureté, la confiance, l’amour du prochain, la sérénité de l’esprit, dans un effort de réforme et de renouvellement de l’ancienne religion nationale, dans un élan de vie religieuse individuelle que le shinto traditionnel dans ses formes établies et hiérarchisées n’était pas, parait-il, en état de réaliser. Autonomes au point de vue institutionnel et administratif (surtout en étant enregistrées officiellement), les différentes religions du shinto populaire sont aussi bien indépendantes par leurs croyances. Les croyances diffèrent de l’une à l’autre d’après la doctrine respectivement enseignée jadis par leurs fondateurs et transmise ensuite aux adeptes.

n'est pas tant l'unité du divin que l'unicité du divin. Les philosophes grecs ont atteint pour leur compte l'idée du Dieu un, au delà et au dessus des dieux multiples de l'Olympe ; mais la religion grecque est demeurée polythéiste jusqu'au moment où elle a été remplacée par le Christianisme.

Le propre du monothéisme est la croyance en un seul Dieu, intégrée par la négation supplémentaire de tous les autres. C'est ce qui manque au Konkô-kyô. L'on trouve dans le Konkô-kyô une opposition aux différentes formes de la superstition populaire : pratiques divinatoires, exorcismes, amulettes, répétitions mécaniques de formules, etc. Mais les différentes divinités naturistes du shinto traditionnel ne sont pas nées ni repoussées d'une façon explicite ; elles sont plutôt incorporées dans le Principe universel.

C'est ce qui se vérifie d'ailleurs, à mon avis, dans d'autres religions du shinto populaire, p. ex. dans le Tenri-kyô, ou “doctrine de la Raison céleste,” fondée en 1838 par une simple paysanne, Miki Nakayama, dont le chef actuel le Rev. Shōzen Nakayama est le descendant. Là aussi, dans le Tenri-kyô, l'on trouve la notion monothéiste d'un Etre suprême, Tenri-Ô-no-Mikoto, le “Grand Parent”, le Principe Créateur opérant dans l'univers, dont la Fondatrice se considérait en quelque sorte comme la manifestation et le porte-voix sur la terre. Le Tenri-kyô s'abstient de toute adoration à base de pratiques extérieures, formules, prosternations, etc., telles qu'elles sont employées dans le culte des divinités traditionnelles. D'autre part, le Principe universel est censé se manifester dans les différents Domaines de la nature, en particulier dans le ciel, dans la lune et dans le soleil, de même que dans les deux principes, masculin et féminin, régisseurs de la vie entière, qui sont autant le divinités principales de la mythologie et de la religion shintoïste traditionnelle. (Cp. Rev. D.C. GREENE, Tenri-kyô or the Teaching of the Heavenly Reason, “Trans. As. Soc. of Japan” 23, 1895, pp. 24-74).

Il se peut que dans la formation de la doctrine du Konkô-kyô, et particulièrement dans la notion du Principe suprême universel, ont joué des influences extra-shintoïstes.1) Le problème se pose également pour le Tenri-kyô et les autres religions du shinto populaire. Il est vrai que ces religions se sont plus ou moins affranchies de l'esprit strictement national du shinto orthodoxe. Le fait est, cependant, que le Konkô-kyô et les autres religions populaires semblables n'ont jamais rompu ouvertement et explicitement avec l'ancien shintôisme polythéiste, naturiste et nationaliste, et, quels qu'aient été leurs rapports avec les autorités officielles, elles n'ont jamais dénoncé leur attachement à la tradition.

Ce qui manque au Konkô-kyô (et l'on peut en dire autant des autres religions du shinto populaire) pour être réellement une religion monothéiste c'est, en somme, ni plus ni moins que la conscience et la volonté d'être telle. Il lui manque cette négation explicite et totale du polythéisme qui est un trait constant chez les grandes religions monothéistes. Ce trait est commun au Jahvisme, au Christianisme, à l'Islamisme, au Zoroastrisme, les religions historiques dont le monothéisme ne saurait être mis en question, parce qu'il est inhérent à la formation même de ces religions.

Holtom n'est pas le seul à avoir fait fausse route en matière de monothéisme à cause d'avoir négligé les données historiques concrètes pour s'en tenir à une donnée idéologique, telle que la notion abstraite du Principe suprême. C'est bien là également le tort de la théorie de l'‘Urmonotheismus’ que d'avoir envisagé comme monothéisme — par un rapprochement purement formel — ce qui est simplement la notion d'un Etre suprême chez les non-civilisés.

Au fond mes réserves, soit au sujet de la thèse de Holtom sur le monothéisme du Konkô-kyô, soit au sujet de la théorie de Kato sur l'existence d'un ‘Urmonotheismus’ japonais, rentrent dans une théorie générale qui consiste à envisager le monothéisme d'un point de vue rigoureusement historique. Vis-à-vis de la notion abstraite, spéculative, théologique, à priori, du monothéisme, je suis d'avis qu'il faut s'en tenir à la seule notion concrète qui est suggérée par l'histoire.

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1) Soit bouddhistes, soit confucéennes, ou taoïstes. Les influences chrétiennes ne sauraient éventuellement être prises en consideration que pour des phases postérieures de développement, les religions du shinto populaire étant pour la plupart antérieures, par la date de leur fondation à l'établissement des premières missions au XIXème siècle.
SANTIDEVA, A MYSTIC OF BUDDHISM

BY

AMALIA PEZZALI

Santideva was born in India about the VIIIth Century A.D. and became one of the greatest mystics of the Buddhist Religion. The historians of Buddhism inform us that he was of aristocratic birth—the son of the king Kalyāṇavarmā of Saurāṣṭra—but following the example of Buddha Śākyamuni and in harmony with the suggestions of Mahāyāna, he entered the monastery of Nālanda and dedicated himself to the ascetic life. Legend naturally enriched the history of his passage on earth but it remains that he was a giant figure, a fervent devotee and a profound philosopher, and his popularity reached beyond the frontiers of India.

His authenticated works, the Bodhicaryavatāra and the Śikṣāsamuccaya, give us a complete picture of his mind and soul. He was a very erudite and at the same time very fervent monk and he confounded his fellow-monks with his knowledge and the beauty of his expositions. Each of his books is different in character, but the matter treated is the same and both reveal his religious anxiety to show to others the Path and to support his assertions with exegetical and philosophical demonstrations as well as with many quotations from the Scriptures.

As a protagonist of Mahāyāna, Santideva magnifies the sanctity of the Bodhisattva calling him the most generous of creatures because he endeavours to save others from every kind of suffering, and this of his own volition, without being asked. Thus his merits are immeasurable (B.C. I, 26; Ś.S. I, p. 5). Even to think badly of the Bodhisattva—which in itself is a sin deserving of Hell—can become, in the end, a means of acquiring merit both for the sinner and the saint, since such a thought provokes the compassion of the Bodhisattva, raising him to greater heights and thus blessing in turn the evil-doer who was the instrument of this grace.

It is the Thought of the Bodhi, which transforms an ordinary man into a Bodhisattva (B.C. I, 9–10). The theory of the Bodhicitta is fully developed by Santideva in both the Bodhicaryavatāra and the Śikṣāsamuccaya. The Bodhicitta is the force with which to conquer the Passions; it is the means to overcome the saṃsāra (Ś.S. I, p. 6). It is a seed of joy, a remedy to all suffering (B.C. I, 26). It arises in him who has a concrete resolve to acquire it. And this resolve can occur in him in whom there “is the spring of great mercy (mahā-karuṇā)”. In fact, the Thought of the Bodhi has two main aspects, immanent and transcendent. Compassion (karuṇā) is the immanent aspect of it. The Bodhicitta arises indeed in a person who is never guilty of neglect towards any living being. The transcendent aspect is the void (śūnyatā) and can be likened to the potential state whereas the immanent aspect is the tangible state, the manifestation and the operative moment (Abhisamayālankārāloka of Haribhadra p. 29).

The Bodhicitta has four causes: family descent (gotra), the hearing of the glory of the Bodhi, compassion for all creatures and the consideration of the perfection of the state of Tathāgata (Ś.S. I, p. 8). The Thought of the Bodhi is of two types, the resolution (pranidhī) and the realization (prasthāna). Resolution is producer of many worldly fruits whereas the undertaking of the Way is a perennial flowing of merits (B.C. I, 17). When the Bodhicitta “is born with the embryo of resolution, the embryo of holiness and prudence will develop and it will be manifested as the embryo of knowledge,” says the Śikṣāsamuccaya (V, p. 103).

The theory of the Pāramitās is another point described in detail by Santideva. The Bodhisattva is compelled, by the great fount of compassion arisen within him to undertake the complete practice of discipline high morality, high meditation and high wisdom. The perfections to be achieved have as their aim to lead the Bodhisattva to Nirvāṇa and he must progress in the practice of these virtues without stopping, and preach the dharma by the example of his own behaviour (B.C. V, 109).

The perfection of gift (dāna) produces in him detachment from himself and from wealth; and gives him respect for his elders and devotion to them. It incites him to worship and allows him to spread the dharma.

The perfection of conduct (sīla) controls his actions, and regulates his life and, as the first mentioned virtue, continues the work of detachment freeing him from himself, his instincts, his habits.

The perfection of forbearance (ksānti) is particularly recommended, because all living creatures are fields of merits as well as the Buddhas (B.C. VI, 112–13). The Bodhisattva can acquire such merits only by
enduring many difficulties. By forbearance he pleases others, helps them, disciplines himself, overcoming his failures.

The perfection of energy (virya) is “the courage of persevering in Goodness” against sluggishness, attachment to evil, discouragement and self-contempt (B.C. VII, 2; S.S.X). By sluggishness and attachment to evil one can lose the strength to break Passions and discouragement and self-contempt can prevent one from daring to start along the Path to the Bodhi or from advancing along it. There are four weapons to fight these vices, aspiration, pride, joy and renunciation. Aspiring to Goodness from the beginning the Bodhisattva has to develop pride in acting singly (B.C. VII, 49) in fighting the Passions and becoming strong. Joy accompanies his action and when he feels tired he must practice renunciation by desisting provisionally from action. Strength has to guide him always.

Having acquired the perfection of energy the Bodhisattva practices the perfection of contemplation (samādhi). He cannot progress spiritually if his mind is distracted. The awareness of the thought is its stability, its oneness, its immobility, its being fixed by quietude (samatha). If the attention (smṛti) is absent, the hearing of the Scriptures (sruti), the reflection on them (cintana) and the spiritual exercises (bhāvanā) do not produce wisdom (B.C. V, 28). The Bodhisattva goes from contemplation to contemplation, purifying himself, his mind, his thoughts and endeavouring to penetrate the Reality of things.

The perfection of wisdom (prajñā) is the aim and the goal of all other Pāramitās. It gives light to others.

Sāntideva’s conception of wisdom involves another theory which qualifies him as a philosopher of the Mādhyamika system. Wisdom cannot be attained, he says, without knowing and cultivating śūnyatā, because otherwise thought is shackled. The shackles keep man bound in samsāra; but śūnyatā, whose other aspect is karuṇa, allows him to stay longer in samsāra for the welfare of other creatures. The Bodhisattva possesses wisdom when he becomes free from the hindrances of Passions (kleśavāraṇa) and from the hindrances of Ignorance (jñeyavāraṇa). He knows then that everything—the Self and the Dharmas—is void, that only Ignorance induces man to believe in them and thus he triumphs over Ignorance. With the prasàngika method Sāntideva criticizes all other systems or schools of thought: Hinayāna, Vijnānavāda, Cārvāka, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the rest, reducing their affirmations to the absurd. No one can have a particular view, as Nāgārjuna first maintained, because every extreme is to be rejected and both of the alternative views transcended.

In describing the spiritual discipline of the Bodhisattva and the Ethical standpoint of Buddhism, Sāntideva insists that he does not introduce anything that is new. He wants to be in the pure line of the Buddhist Dharma and he says explicitly that the Bodhisattva has to choose the Thought of the Bodhi, to establish himself within its discipline and to practise virtues and perfections precisely in the same dispositions as that of the preceeding Bodhisattvas (B.C. III, 22–23). He always supports his assertions with passages of famous sūtras and śāstras so that the Śiksāsāmuccaya particularly has the form almost of an anthology of Buddhist Scriptures.

Famous scholars like Minayeff, De La Vallée Poussin, Finot, Barnett, Snidt, Tucci, Murti and others have dedicated themselves to the study of this important personage, Sāntideva, editing and translating his works or portions of them, or delineating with care the figure of Sāntideva from among those of other Buddhist philosophers.

What we desire to show here in a particular light is precisely the mystical traits of Sāntideva. In the first Chapter of the Bodhicaryavatārā he declares that he is writing the work in order to purify his soul and particularly for his own benefit, but it can be that other people, with the same temperament would profit by reading it (B.C. I, 3). Thus it is clear that he was himself following exactly this method of purification in order to reach Nirvāṇa. He recommends the monastic life and solitude as the best means of accomplishing this spiritual work. “I shall live in solitude, the body at ease and the mind quiet (B.C. VIII, 14)” “Taking only what is useful to spiritual merit, as a bee which takes only the essence of the flowers, I shall pass everywhere, as free from the trammels of other humans as the new moon (B.C. VIII, 16)” He manifests the importance of the confession of sins (pratimokṣa) committed in all the lives before the undertaking of the Path; he emphasizes the importance of the worship of Buddhas, realized mentally, but nevertheless with a complicated ritual, as in the Indian tradition. Devotion (ādāra) is indeed the greatest soul of quietude (samatha mahānayam). Sāntideva thus starts the description itself with the homage to Buddhas, Bodhisattvas and Dharmā, the three jewels. He offers everything in the Universe and himself in the service of the Buddhas. His ardent mind and perfect charity make him associate himself with all fellow-beings who aspire to goodness or who are already on the way to becoming Buddhas and he expresses this in joyous felicitations. He suplicates the Buddhas to manifest the Dharma and he implores them to remain in the world.
Finally, he offers all his merits (paripāma) and he makes the gift of himself to suffering people. Once admitted as a member of the family of the Buddhas, he adjures himself not to stain the purity of such a family. His greatest wish is that everyone should become a Buddha. Perseverance is important in order to maintain one's high resolve and to overcome Passions, those mortal enemies of the soul. The observance of monastic rule is the sure guide, but in order to observe such a rule one has to control the mind and to possess attention (B.C. V, 1–3). This is most likely to occur in those who frequent the company of teachers and who reflect often on the presence of Buddhas, acquiring prudence, good behaviour and charity. The sage is serene, he sees far and goes straight to his goal. He always thinks that there is nothing that is not realizable and, armed with forbearance, he carries on regardless of setbacks or successes. The thought of the welfare of others enlightens his asceticism, no ascetic can perfect himself without forgetting his Self.

We think that, like some other mystics of the West, his spiritual character surpasses the limits of his tradition and religion and attains a universal expression of devotion and love, making him a lofty human personality full of pure charity. "One is invariably reminded of 'The Imitation of Christ' in reading the Bodhicaryāvatāra, which is the stranger in appeal as it is born of deep philosophical insight"; thus does a modern critic express himself about the poetical work of Sāntideva (cfr. T.R.V. Murti: "The Central Philosophy of Buddhism," London 1955, pag. 101). Indeed the matter in the Bodhicaryāvatāra is arranged rationally, according to a plan, but nonetheless the song of the devotee flows passionately and he dwells lovingly on the description of the way to the mental adoration of the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas while giving rein freely to the imagination in rich and beautiful verbal fantasy. In both the Bodhicaryāvatāra and the Śīkṣāsamuccaya he manifests himself as a spiritual doctor. He reminds us of his Spanish counterpart St. John of the Cross, when in his detailed exposition of the Buddhist spiritual discipline he exposes all the pitfalls on the road to Nirvāṇa. He speaks about the night of the senses and the night of the spirit of the necessity to divest oneself of every attachment in order to become united to the Absolute, to be really all for others.
place among the living languages of the world. Tamil is not only one of the oldest and purest, but is also one of the most copious and cultured languages with a perfect grammar and rich in literature. The very word ‘Tamil’ means sweetness. The elaborate manner in which phonetics, semantics, morphology, prosody and poetics are dealt with in Tholkappiyam, the oldest Tamil work available today, is proof positive of the highly advanced stage of this language at least two thousand years ago. The Tamils are proud of their language like the French. Their passionate love for it can be gauged from the fact that said that i?

Like the Indo-Aryans and the Chinese, the Tamils believed that their script and scriptures were revealed by God. That God is Sivam. In all languages, God and Good are synonymous. The word ‘Sivam’ means goodness, purity, greatness, love and auspiciousness. Many of the Indian scholars claim this word to be pure Tamil, and Sir Grierson’s conclusions support this theory. The view expressed by certain Western and Indian scholars associating Siva with the Vedic god, Rudra, has already been proved to be erroneous. According to the great research scholar, J.H.F. Hatton, “Vishnu, Shiva and Kali, the great gods of Hinduism, are not Rig-Vedic gods at all.”

In the same way as the Sumerian cities had a separate god for each one of them, the ancient Tamils too had their regional deities assigned to the natural divisions of their land, from the hill country to the sea coast, ranging though jungle, pastoral land, and fields. Four such deities are mentioned by Tholkappiyanar. Of these, Mayon, the dark-coloured, (Vishnu) and Seyon, the red-coloured, (Siva) belonged to the indigenous spiritual culture of the ancient Tamils, while the other two, Indra and Varuna, are, without doubt, the Vedic gods of the Aryans. In his monumental work, Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilization, Sir John Marshall says: “Among the many revelations that Mohenjo Daro and Harappa had in store for us, none perhaps is more remarkable than the discovery that Saivaisms has a history going back to the chalcolithic age or perhaps even further still, and it thus takes its place as the most ancient living faith in the world.”

In describing his pilgrimage to the famous Siva shrine of Amarnath in Himalayas, Dr. Joshua Duke says: “It is the trip to make. I shall never forget it. One felt in the presence of the Maker of the Universe.” This is exactly how the ancient Tamils, at the dawn of civilization, felt when they stood before the majesty of snow-capped mountain peaks, which naturally became their first objects of worship. Of the sixty four manifestations of God Siva described in the scriptures, Lingam and Lingotpavam come first in order, and this is associated with Arunachala (Red Hill) which is one of the oldest and most sacred of all India’s holy places, and which became world-famous in the 20th century after Sri Ramana Maharishi made it his residence for 54 years (1896 to 1950), shedding spiritual lustre of a unique kind by his teachings. According to Arunachala Purana, once Brahma and Vishnu fell to disputing which of them was greater, and Siva, who wanted to bring humility and wisdom to their hearts, appeared before them as a huge column of Light, and directed them to trace its base and summit. When both of them failed in their attempt, Siva transformed himself into Arunachala in the form of a Siva-lingam to be worshipped by them. In this legend, Brahma stands for our mentality, Vishnu represents our ego, while Siva is Atma or the Spirit. This hoary antiquity of Arunachala (Thiruvannamalai) is accepted today by the geologists as well.

In this connection, it is very interesting to note that it was once a universal practice of the ancients to worship their greatest deity on the highest mountains available. Peaks and pinnacles of mountains were thus associated with all that was holy and sacred. They have always carried a purer atmosphere than the plains. Exactly like the Saivaites, the early Persians lit their sacred flames on the highest peaks of hills in their land, and kept the flames perpetually burning as a symbol of the eternal nature of deity. Similarly the Druids of ancient Britain regarded their hills as consecrated abodes of divinity. The holiest rites of the Mexican priests were always done on selected lofty peaks. Belief in the mystic spirit of Mount Fuji in Japan is one of the tenets of the Fusio Sect of Shintoism, and the worship of Mount Mitake as a Sacred hill forms an important feature in the Mitake Sect. Besides, most of the great prophets of humanity are also associated with mountains before their spiritual enlightenment, Vyas with Bhadri, Elijah with Mount Horeb, Minoa with Mount Diota, Moses with Mount Sinai, Jesus with Mount Carmel and Mohamed with Mount Hira.

According to a Sanskrit work, Thedjanakailasa Manniyam, when Siva worship was universal, there were 1008 Sivan temples in the region north of Himalayas, 1008 temples between Himalayas and Cape Comorin, and a third group of 1008 temples in old Lanka, of which the present Ceylon is only a small portion. That this is not a poetic exaggeration but a historical fact is proved by the discovery, in recent times, of the sites of two ancient and famous Sivan temples in Ceylon.
Ketheeswaram and Koneshwaram which are reputed to have been in existence during Ravana’s reign in old Lanka. It must be mentioned here that not only Ravana, but his conqueror, Rama, and Krishna, the Avatar who followed him, were both Siva worshippers. The present huge temple of Rameshwaram, in South India, still shelters the Siva-Lingam established by Rama and Sita on their return to India after crowning Bibhishana as the king of Lanka on the death of his brother. In South Ceylon, there is also a pre-historic temple, Kataragama, dedicated to Lord Murukan, where the Hindus and Buddhists join in worship.

The worship of God as Mother was also one of the ancient cults of the Tamils. Kadu-Kilal is the Tamil name by which she was known. She was a deity of prowess and success, and it must have taken more than one millennium for that divinity of frightfulness to be transformed into a Sweet Mother, the Consort of Siva, with such attributes as beauty, love, bliss, grace, wealth and wisdom. The Pillaiyar or Ganeshha worship, which is today quite common among the Tamil people is said to have been introduced to South India only about 1300 years ago.

The worship of Sun was another ancient cult of the Tamils, which still prevails as an all-India practice. As you are well aware, the religion of Egypt was one of Sun worship, but it was in a crude form at the start, this god being conceived either as a falcon or a man with the head of a falcon. An ancient Theban hymn says:

“Amun-Ra, the falcon deity, with his scintillating feathers,
spanning the heaven with one flap of his wings.”

This practice was transformed into a cult of the real Sun in 1370 B.C. at the instance of the Egyptian pharaoh, Amenophis IV, known as the “world’s first idealist.” This refined worship is the cult that was followed by the ancient Tamils. The comparison of the eye and sun dates back as far as mankind. Sun and Moon are considered as the right and left eye of Siva, while Agni (Fire or Mars) represents his all-seeing third eye in the centre between the eye-brows. A comparative study of the mystical meanings of the Sculptural image of the all-seeing eye on pediment of the Lyceum Church, Town of Pushkin, and the Epigraph unearthed in Mohenjo Daro with the inscription: “Van ter or rein kan val,” which means: Let the one having fish eyes, on reaching the sky, be happy—, would lead one to the conclusion that the source of both these cults is one.

During the early Christian era, Brahminic, Buddhist and Jainism were a one

his ideas not only from the older Tamil poets, but also from Jaina Sutras, Buddhist Dhammapada, Brahminic Gita, Manusmriti, &c, and marked them with the stamp of his own unique personality. Out of the five epics (Pancha Kavyas) of the Tamil literature, three were Jaina works and the other two Buddhist.

In the realm of religion, all that was best in Brahminism, Buddhism and Jainism was absorbed and assimilated by the indigenous religions, Saivism and Vaishnavism, and it is no exaggeration to say that it was the harmonious synthesis thus achieved which gave birth, in due course, to modern Hinduism as it gradually evolved in South India. “It is my deliberate opinion,” writes Mahatma Gandhi, “that the essential point of the teachings of the Buddha now forms an integral part of Hinduism. It is impossible for Hindu India now to retract her steps and go behind the great reformation that Gautama effected in Hinduism. By his immense sacrifice, by his great renunciation and by the immaculate purity of his life, he left an indelible impress upon Hinduism.”

In this connection, it should be noted that the Tamils were at one time ardent Buddhists who took a large share in the dissemination of Buddhist culture in Burma, China and other countries of South-East Asia. To quote a few illustrious examples, Ven. Dharmapala, the Head of the Nalanda University in the 6th century A.D., the other famous Buddhist scholar by the same name who came to Ceylon and wrote the commentaries, and Bodhisattva Bodhidharma, the 28th Patriarch of the Shao-Lin monastery of China, who transmitted the Mind-Dharma and the Lankavatara sutra to the monk Shen-Kuang, who became the Wise-competent (Hui-K’o) and the 29th Patriarch, were all Tamilians from Kanchi, the seat of Buddhist culture in the early centuries of the Christian era. In his parting message to his disciple, Bodhidharma says: “I left South India to come to this land because I saw that China possessed the Mahayana outlook. This is why I crossed seas and deserts in search of men to inherit the Dharma.”

By the fifth century A.D., the harmony and understanding that existed for centuries among the different religious groups was ruffled by the logicians, who, in their pride and thirst for victory over the rivals, created an atmosphere of acrimony. Challenges and controversies became the order of the day. The common people felt the need for a religion which appealed to the heart rather than to head. This urge found a ready source of inspiration in the lives and teachings of the Saiva and Vaishnava Saints.

The first three Alwars led the Bhakthi (devotional) cult among the Vaishnavites, and a lady-saint, Karukkal Ammaiyar, followed their
example so far as the Saivaites were concerned. With the advent of Appar, Sambandhar, Sunderar and Manickavasagar (Saiva Saamaya Acharyas) and Nammalvar, Thirumangai, Tirumulasai, Kulasekhar, Andal and other Aiyars, with the authentic flame burning upon their brow, millions of souls awoke to the path of Love. In short, a wave of Bhakthi cult swept the whole of South India. It found its peak in the devotional poems of these Acharyas and Aiyars. In no other language of the world can one find such a wealth of soul-stirring hymns and lyrics, which, in Western phraseology, can be called the "Prayers, Praises and Psalms" of the Tamil land. The idea of Love plays a dominant part in these poems. Their authors held the view that the eternal marvel of the Infinite's manifestation in the finite can be easily understood only in terms of Love. So, they taught, "In love contraries are dissolved. In it unity and duality are not at variance. It must have one and two at the same time."

About three centuries after this Renaissance, South India witnessed the rise of the Chola Kings, whose glorious reign served as beacon light to the Tamils of later generations, particularly during periods of depression caused by political subjugation. Even today, it works as a balm to several Saiva Saints, was composed by Sekkilar during the closing part of this glorious period. Poet Kamban of Tamil Ramayana fame, who belongs to the same period.

Saiva Siddhanta is believed to be the quintessence of all the Vedas, and the right path to realize Siva. In other words, it is a philosophy of synthesis which leads the human soul to realize the Supreme Divine. Vedas and Agamas are the two (eternal) sources of this system, which is noted for its Advaitic interpretation of God, Soul and the Universe. The outstanding contribution is Meikanda Thevar's Siva Gnana Bodham, which consists of twelve aphorisms of universal appeal. His foremost disciple, Arulnandi Sivacharya, wrote an elaborate commentary on it, which is known as Siva Gnana Siddhiyar. This commentary discusses all systems of thought, from atheism to theism and from the most rank materialism to absolute monism. In this universality of outlook, it accepts all systems as stages in the path of the evolution of the soul.

Sankaracharya is well known to the intellectuals of the world as the founder of Advaita Vedanta, but it must be remembered that he was also a great synthesist and harmonizer of the different cults described by me earlier. He was a South Indian by birth, but by using Sanskrit as the medium of his writings, he became an all-India figure and today enjoys a world-wide reputation. The forms of God as Siva, Sakthi, Vishnu, &c, described in his works, are not distinct and different. It is the ONE that became the many. The forms may be different, the names may be different, but the ultimate Truth, that is Divinity, is ONE. This unique feature of our religion is well put in a nutshell by the late Bernard Shaw when he wrote in 1944: -

"The apparent multiplication of gods is bewildering at the first glance, but you soon discover that they are all the same God. There is always one uttermost God, who defies personification. This makes Hinduism the most tolerant religion in the world, because its one transcendent God includes all possible gods."

By the tenth century, South India gave refuge to the Jews who were driven out of their native place, and the Hindu kings encouraged them to build their synagogues. Christians and Muslims were also accommodated and encouraged to practice their own religions in similar manner. As a result, the cultures of Christianity and Islam mingled with the different Hindu cultures in mutual trust and respect. There are two notable epics in Tamil, composed in classical style, one by Umarupulavar dealing with Islam and its Founder, and the other by Rev. Beschi of Portugal dealing with the life and teachings of Jesus Christ.

Among those who carried the Message of Saivism to North India, special mention must be made of Saint Kumaraguruparar of the 17th century. To him belongs the credit of having restored Benares to its former glory as a centre of Hindu culture. He is reported to have performed several miracles to win the sympathy and support of the Sultan of Delhi for the success of his mission in North India. He was not only an inspired poet in Tamil, but also a master of Hindustani language in which he delivered his discourses on Saivism in the North.

During the 18th century, we had Saint Thayumanavar, who was a bridge builder between the Vedanta and Siddhanta systems of thought. Some of his poems indicate the soullessness of the medieval scholasticism, with its hair-splitting logic, and its frozen array of bloodless categories, which, in his days, had become an imposing monument of mental gymnastics, unrelated to facts of life. Thayumanavar's poems are both metaphysical and devotional, drawing the devotee to clearer thinking and purer worship.

The noble work of harmony initiated by Thayumanavar was continued in the 19th century by Ramalinga Swami, who was a Yogi,
Siddha, Poet and Prophet. He had not only anticipated the modern ideas of Universal Brotherhood and Federation of Man, by founding the Sanmarga Sangam (Pure Life Society) as long ago as 1867, but even foretold the appearance of organizations like the Theosophical Society, Ramakrishna Mission, Bahai Movement, Self-Realization Fellowship of Yogananda Paramhansa, Divine Life Society of Swami Sivananda, &c, to spread the same ideals all over the world. Long before Gandhi, Aurobindo and Ramana were born, Ramalingar had spoken of their advent. He was a contemporary of Ramakrishna with almost the same mission in life, but the Tamil land was, perhaps, not spiritually equipped to take heed and profit by his teachings or to produce a Vivekananda to carry his Message of Universal Love and Peace beyond the limits of South India. Even today, the Tamil community is not lacking in scholars of orthodoxy who persist in condemning the life and teachings of this great lover of humanity.

Ramalingar defined God as Light and Love, and the ‘Temple of Humanity’ built by him at Vadalur in South India, is the first of its kind in the world. It is a unique place where peoples of all Faiths can congregate for common worship. His poems have a universal appeal. To hear them with earnestness and understanding is to get drunk with heavenly bliss. In short, he is one of the modern Mahatmas who have paved the way for Universal religious understanding and harmony, which is the aim of Congresses like this. The nucleus of the future civilization is not the individual or even the nation, but the human race as whole. The present world conflict will never be resolved until the religious problem is solved. I would, therefore, close this address with an earnest appeal to all those, who are thinking in world terms, to realize the importance of world’s need of religious unity.

1. INTRODUCTION.

One of the strongest foreign influences in China is the Doctrine of the Enlightened, Fu Chiao, which was introduced into that country at the beginning of the Christian era.

It not only deeply affected the culture of the Chinese, but also that of the neighbouring countries, as it later on spread from China to these areas.

The extent of the impact can be somewhat imagined if through the number of Buddhist translations into Chinese which, according to Bunyiu Nanjo’s Catalogue is more than 1600 volumes.

The statistics compiled by the Chinese Buddhist Society in 1930 show that at that time there were 267000 temples, 738000 monks and nuns, and 3890000 lay devotees in China. (Quoted after Zenryu Tsukamoto in The Path of Buddha, N.Y. 1956, p. 224.)

These figures have been considerably reduced today, but in spite of the great political and ideological changes, Buddhism still goes on as a spiritual force to be reckoned with both on the Mainland and elsewhere.

2. INTERNAL PROBLEMS.

This is quite remarkable in view of the present internal weakness and severe handicaps of Chinese Buddhism.

Violent persecutions from time to time have contributed to the break down of the vigour and power of the sangha, and the process of adaption to Chinese customs going on all the time, did not only enrich Buddhism in many ways, but became more and more a source of dissolution and internal weakness.

The core of resistance to Buddhism was most of the time the Chinese scholars and Confucian “Literati” who were the spiritual leaders of the ruling class. This caused Buddhism more and more to turn to popular religion and superstitious practices, where no distinction is made...
between the gods, shen and the Buddhist images, pu shia. (J.A. Elliott in his book Chinese Spirit-Medium Cult, Lond. 1955, p. 26, introduces the word shenism to characterize this most common form of Chinese religion.)

At the same time the monasteries never became the centres of learning and industry as in western monasticism. True, the Buddhist sutras and other canonical scriptures are taken well care of in the many monastic libraries, and it is considered a meritorious act to take the books down for dusting and the turning of the pages, fan ching, but that is about all! (K.L. Reichelt: Truth and Tradition, p. 47.) This deplorable attitude is partly due to a reverse effect of the Zen School, which otherwise marked the halcyon days of Buddhism in China. But the negative view this school had of studies and learning had a detrimental effect on the standard of discipline and education among the monks generally.

To this have come the political changes with revolution, civil wars and a prolonged external conflict, making it extremely difficult for the monasteries to carry on. Often the buildings were taken over by the military. There were no more funds for repair and upkeep, and temples destroyed by war could not be rebuilt. Many wondered if Buddhism in China was not coming to an end.

3. ATTEMPTS AT REFORM.

But behind this dismal picture of general decay, the spirit of reform has not been altogether lacking, and especially after the revolution in 1911 the reform movement got a very able leader in the Buddhist Master Tai Hsu who succeeded in establishing Buddhist academies in Wuchang and other places where Buddhist learning was combined with more modern forms of education.

However, with things going from bad to worse in politics, the new centres of Buddhist learning had to close down. Still the ideal of reform lived on, and in one way Tai Hsu's endeavours met with some more lasting success, namely in regard to Buddhist laymen and -women, chu shih, who were organized into local associations, and established laymen centres in the form of temples, lecture halls, book shops libraries, and private homes. These laymen's centres or chu shih shih, can be found in all the main cities were there are Chinese in South East Asia. While Tai Hsu was the one who organized the lay movement, he had forrunners of prominent laymen, who through their publications and other activities laid the foundation for the revived Buddhist learning of the Republic. Notable among them are Yang Jen-shang who established the Chin-ling Scriptural Press, and his disciple Ou-yang Chien who in 1918 founded The China Institute of Internal Buddhist Studies in Nanking. (Z. Tsukamoto, The Path of the Buddha, P. 232.)

Another striking feature in present day lay Buddhism are the so-called vegetarian halls, chai t'ang formed with the object of providing board and lodging for unattached women for who for a longer or shorter period practice abstinence and observe the five precepts, k'ai ho, chu shou wu chieh. As this institution has met with a great social and religious need these halls are very much in evidence in Hong Kong Singapore and other places. (Mrs. M. Topley: Chinese Women's Vegetarian Houses in Singapore, Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XXVII, Part I, May 1954.)

With all these activities on the part of the laity, one might be justified in stating that the leadership in Buddhism has gone over to the laity.

This however is strongly denied by the monks and the nuns, which is only natural. (See i.e. an article in the monthly magazine Buddhism Today, Taiwan, No. 2 p. 12 this year about the Fourth Jewel, i.e. the laity.) But what is really surprising to the outsider is that the lay devotees generally seem to submit to this claim. Thus lay Buddhists as a rule have an ordained monk or nun as their spiritual master, and call themselves disciples or adepts, k'o i ti izu. The president of a Buddhist association is furthermore nearly always an old monk, while the vice president and the other lay officials are the ones who plan and organize the activities of the group.

The core of Buddhist life has always been the sangha, and even now it seems difficult for Buddhism to assert itself as long as the reform movement has not been able to penetrate the rank and file of the bikhuss and the bikhunis.

Here great obstacles must be overcome, as there is no central organization that can speak for all the temples who operate quite independently, and there is much mutual distrust and envy.

A growing impatience and tension on the part of the laymen may well lead to a full breach if the gap widens too much.

Even so some form of monasticism, necessary for the discipline of obtaining enlightenment, will be maintained. Even now laymen may stay for a shorter or longer period in a laymen's temple, and the women have the chai t'ang.

4. THE POSITION ON THE MAINLAND.

The initial hardships in connection with the great political
changes seriously affected Buddhism together with other religious bodies in China. Perhaps the most stunning blow was the land reform, which deprived the monasteries of their main source of income. Many leading abbots ran into grave difficulties being classed as "landlords". Several hundred monks escaped to Hong Kong, while others were taken as soldiers or put to forced labour.

However, as things became more settled, Chinese Buddhism again proved its ability to adapt itself. The freedom of religion clause in the new Constitution protected against direct prosecution, and in 1953 a Buddhist Association was formed in Peking with the approval of the Government, who seems to have become increasingly aware of the importance of Buddhism as a means of friendly contacts with neighbouring countries. (The Friendship of Buddhism, Peking 1957).

According to Professor Freytag, who visited China early last year, a Buddhist Academy was operating in Peking, and Professor Freytag was favourably impressed with the standard of learning and discipline.

Recent publications by the Buddhist Association of Buddhist Art etc. are quite remarkable, and the study and preservation of Buddhist culture is encouraged. (See the magazine Modern Buddhism, the article The Slab-inscriptions of Fang-shan, No 3, 1958.)

5. IN HONG KONG AND OVERSEAS.

Only some five years ago a large number of monks from China crowded the monasteries in Hong Kong. Now most of these refugees have gone to Taiwan, leaving the monasteries as desolate and stagnant as before. The lay Buddhists, however, have a very active association. The same is more or less the case with Singapore and other places in the South.

The main centre today is Taiwan, where a number of Buddhist periodicals and other literature is published, schools and other charitable institutions erected by both laymen and monks.

Due to the limited area where also the Christian Church is at work as never before, there are signs of increasing tension between the two religions.

The attitude of the Buddhists is even here one of adaption and learning of more modern means of propaganda and education, but at the same time also of antagonism.

To pave the way for a better mutual understanding is one of the great tasks in our time.

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ON THE "ATTAINMENT OF BUDDHAGHOOD BY TREES AND PLANT"

BY

YUKIO SAKAMOTO

The view that even mindless things such as trees and plants can attain Buddhahood was held by Japanese Buddhists already at the beginning of the ninth century. Since then many attempts have been made to give reasons for this view. This view originated in China earlier than in Japan. Mandra translated the Ratnakilta-sutra at the beginning of the sixth century, in which mindless trees and plants were made Buddhas to preach the Law through the wonderful powers (ādhishānabala) of Bodhisattvas. This fostered the view that Buddhahood can be attained by trees and plants. Chitsang (549-623) says in his Ta-ch'eng-hsuan-lun that the Buddha-nature resides in trees and plants as well as in sentient beings, because sentient beings are one with non-sentient beings in essence. He says that, theoretically speaking, trees and plants can attain Buddhahood like sentient beings, because all beings are equal in their essence. Since there is no difference between sentient beings and non-sentient beings in the ultimate Reality (Bhūtātatvatattā), there is no difference in their possibility to attain Buddhahood theoretically. But he rejects to recognize this possibility for trees and plants from the standpoint of experience, because trees and plants have no mind with which they can attain Buddhahood, while sentient beings can, because they have a mind, although they are apt to have illusions for the same reason that they have a mind.

The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra of Mahāyāna Buddhism says that all beings have the Buddha-nature, except mindless trees and plants. It says, "Those which have not the Buddha-nature are fences, walls, tiles, stones, and other non-sentient beings." Hui-yuan (523-592) speaks of two kinds of Buddha-nature: the knowing and the known, and admits the possession of the known Buddha-nature for all beings, sentient or non-sentient. The Buddha-nature which pervades all beings is called the theoretical Buddha-nature, and the knowing Buddha-nature, which is proper to those who have a mind to aspire for enlightenment.
and train themselves with, is called the practical Buddha-nature. This classification of Buddha-nature gave rise to a new theory concerning the Buddha-nature in later times. Fa-tsang (643–712) criticized Hui-yuan, Chi-tsang and others, saying that their theories were imperfect. He advocated the teaching of the Avalamsaka-sūtra and said that the perfect teaching of the Buddha is the truth that all things are interdependent with one another. He held from this viewpoint that the Buddha-nature and the phenomena caused by the Buddha-nature are common to all beings, sentient or non-sentient, and went on to say that even land itself can attain Buddhahood.

Chih-i (538–597) spoke of three kinds of Buddha-nature. They are Truth itself, Wisdom to see the Truth, and Practice to cause Wisdom to see the Truth. According to him, these three Buddha-natures are interdependent, involving one another. Therefore, Truth itself involves Wisdom and Practice. It means that all beings have the three Buddha-natures. Chan-jan (711–782) developed this theory in his Chin-hang-pei-lun. In this book he held that non-sentient beings have the Buddha-nature. The truths that “Even a color or a smell is not outside of the Middle Way” and that sentient and non-sentient beings are one and that all beings are the mind itself gave rise to his theory.

In Japan, the first to hold the view that trees and plants can attain Buddhahood was probably Kūkai (774–835). He said in his Unjigi, “Even trees and plants can attain Buddhahood. Needless to say, sentient beings can.” He proved this truth by the theory that the universe consists of the mutually interdependent six elements. According to him, the phenomenal world is caused by six elements: earth, water, fire, wind (vāyu), space (akasa), and mind (vijñāna). All phenomena involve these six elements. Therefore, trees and plants have a mind. Therefore, they can aspire to enlightenment, train themselves, and finally attain Buddhahood. The world of sentient beings is called the Great Mandala; the world of non-sentient beings, the Samayamandala; the world of meanings, such as voices, words, and letters, the Dharma-mandala; the world of the activities of these beings, the Karma-mandala. These four mandalas are interdependent and constitute the Dharma-kāya of Vairocana Tathāgata. This theory of Kūkai later developed through the efforts of Kairi, Gōhō, Yūkai, In-yu and others, who lived in the 14th and 15th centuries.

Scholars of the Tendai Sect also advocated this theory. Enchin (814–891) adopted the Shingon doctrine and said in the Kūkii-chimon-shū that everything can attain Buddhahood, because all beings, sentient or non-sentient, come from Vairocana Tathāgata. When one is united with the Tathāgata, he will attain Buddhahood. Annen (841–884) also adopted the Shingon doctrine in his Bodaishingi. He pointed out four theories about the possibility of attaining Buddhahood on the part of non-sentient beings. The first theory is found in the Saddharma-pundarikā-sūtra. According to this sūtra, one can attain Buddhahood by the mind of others. When one attains Buddhahood, all others can attain it also. When sentient beings attain Buddhahood, so do non-sentient beings. The third theory is found in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra. According to this sūtra, one can attain Buddhahood by the influence (vāsanā) of their pure mind and the power of the Buddhas. The fourth theory is found in the Mahāvairocana-bhūsisambodhi-sūtra. According to this sūtra, one can attain Buddhahood by the Buddha-nature. The Buddha-nature is common to all beings, sentient or non-sentient. Therefore, trees and plants can attain Buddhahood. Annen says that the last theory is the most excellent one.

Ryōgen (912–985) said in the Sōmoku-hoshin-shugyo-jōbutsu-ron, “Assurance of Buddhahood to trees and plants is the aim of the Saddharma-pundarikā. The word that the phenomenal world is permanent is the expression of what the Tathāgata sees as it is (yathābhūtā-darśana) that is why trees and plants can attain Buddhahood.” The four stages of the life of a plant: budding, growing, fruiting, and dying, correspond to the four stages of enlightenment: aspiration, training, enlightenment, and nirvāṇa. From this point of view, he said that trees and plants should be treated as sentient beings. When trees and plants train themselves, sentient beings also train themselves. When sentient beings train themselves, trees and plants also train themselves. “The truth that non-sentient beings have the Buddha-nature is the fundamental teaching of the Saddharma-pundarikā. Assurance of Buddhahood to trees and plants is the implicit aim of the discourse of the Original Buddha revealed in the Saddharma-pundarikā.” Here he emphasized the importance of the discourse of the Original Buddha in the sūtra.

Chūjin (1065–1138) points out seven theories about the Buddhahood of trees and plants in his Kankō-rujū. They are:
1. Trees and plants are Buddhas when seen by the Buddha. They are not Buddhas by themselves.

2. Trees and plants have the dharmā or the nature of the Law. The nature of the Law shows that everything is enlightened by nature. The nature of the Law residing in trees and plants is called the Buddha. Trees and plants are not Buddhas by themselves.

3. Sentient and non-sentient beings are one in essence. Buddha Śākyamuni, a sentient being, attained Buddhahood. Therefore, trees and plants can attain Buddhahood.

4. All things are eternal and undefiled in their nature. Their state of being eternal and undefiled is called the Buddha. That trees and plants can attain Buddhahood does not mean that they can become Buddhas with thirty-two bodily marks, but that their present state of having roots, stems, branches, and flowers, expresses the state of their having attained Buddhahood.

5. Like sentient beings, trees and plants have three bodhis: the Dharma-kāya or the Body of the Law, the Sambhoga-kāya or the Body of the Reward, and the Nirmāna-kāya or the Body of Manifestation. Therefore, trees and plants can attain Buddhahood, as sentient beings can.

6. The nature of trees and plants transcends the relativity between noumena and phenomena. This state of being beyond description is called the state of attaining Buddhahood.

7. Mind is all beings. All beings are mind. Therefore, the mind of sentient beings is non-sentient beings, that is, trees and plants. That is why they can become Buddhas. Trees and plants contain the three thousand realms of being. The quiescent side of the dharmā is called one mind, and the illuminating side of the dharmā is called the three thousand realms of being. Assurance of Buddhahood to trees and plants is proved by the two sides of the dharmā or the nature of the Law.

Shōshin (1189-1204), in his Shikan-shiki, denied the possibility of attaining Buddhahood on the part of trees and plants, pointing out the following six reasons:

1. No sūtra or śāstra says that trees and plants can aspire to and attain Buddhahood.

2. The existence of trees and plants is caused by the karmas of sentient beings; therefore, trees and plants cannot be transformed into sentient beings, or transmigrate into other worlds. Therefore, they have no chance of attaining Buddhahood.

3. Trees and plants cannot train themselves, because they have no mind. Therefore, they cannot attain Buddhahood. If they had a mind, we would be unable to differentiate them from sentient beings.

4. It is admissible that trees and plants have the Truth itself as one of the three Buddha-natures, but they have not the other two, which are necessary for attaining Buddhahood. Therefore, they cannot attain Buddhahood.

5. The Truth or tathā in trees and plants may influence the development of the inner Buddha-nature just as a perfume gives a lingering effect to neighboring things, but trees and plants do not possess the external conditions necessary for attaining Buddhahood. Therefore, they cannot attain Buddhahood.

6. Trees and plants cannot receive the wonderful power of the Buddha, because they have no mind to receive them with.

In short, Shōshin separates non-sentient beings clearly from sentient beings. This view was criticized by many Tendai scholars as inconsistent with the Tendai doctrine.

The purpose of the teaching that trees and plants can attain Buddhahood is to lead men from illusions to the truth that all beings have the Buddha-nature. The expression "trees and plants" is used to give concrete examples; and the expression "attaining Buddhahood", to show a concrete idea of enlightenment. In the "perfect teaching" or fully developed Mahāyāna Buddhism, sentient and non-sentient beings are interdependent; there are no trees nor plants outside of the world of sentient beings. Men under the sway of illusions think that trees and plants exist independently; therefore, they cannot recognize that trees and plants can become Buddhas. According to the Tendai doctrine, "Even a colour or a smell is not outside of the Middle Way and the Middle Way is the Buddha-nature." The Saddharma-ganapartha explains the "real state of all beings." The Mahāparinirvāṇa says, "The essence of the Buddha-nature pervades all." These words are regarded as the canonical sources of the tree-plant-Buddhahood theory.

Nichiren (1222-1282) explained in his Kanjōhōhon-zō that non-sentient beings, such as trees, plants, and land, have a mind, because everything in the universe has the three thousand realms of being in itself. The three thousand realms of being consist of three mutually dependent items of being. The three items of being are the ten worlds of being, the ten phases of being, and the three realms of existence.
The ten worlds of being are: hell, the world of hungry spirits, the world of animals, the world of asuras, the world of men, heaven, the world of pratyekabuddhas, the world of Bodhisattvas, and the world of Buddhas. The ten phases of being are: appearance, nature, substance, power, activity, primary cause, environmental cause, effect, reward and retribution, and the totality of these nine phases. The three realms of existence are sentient beings, non-sentient beings, and the five aggregates consisting of all beings. The ten phases of being particularly deal with mind and matter and the teaching that everything has the ten phases clearly shows that trees and plants have a mind. Nichiren proved by this theory that wood or other non-sentient materials can be used to make an object of worship. Thus the making of a wooden image or a picture of the Buddha as an object of worship is justified. He says in the "Renge Kyo, "Because matter and mind are one in essence, the mind of the Buddha can be revealed in the letters of the Saddharma-pundarika. The letters can be restored to the mind of the Buddha. When a wooden image or a picture of the Buddha, which has only thirty-one bodily marks of the Buddha, is impressed with the sūtra of the Saddharma-pundarika, the wooden image or the picture becomes the living Buddha, because the sūtra represents the mind of the Buddha. Here we see that trees and plants can attain Buddhahood. Tendai says, ‘Even a colour or a smell is not outside of the Middle Way.’ He says in the Somoku-jubutsu-hakkei, ‘Myohō (the first two letters of the Japanese title of the Saddharma-pundarika) or the Excellent Law represents the attainment of Buddhahood on the part of sentient beings. Renge (the second two letters of the Japanese title of the sūtra) or the Lotus Flower represents the attainment of Buddhahood on the part of non-sentient beings. Buddhahood of sentient beings is concerned with life; that of non-sentient beings, with death. When someone dies, his kith and kin erect a stūpa for him. The stūpa is consecrated and offered with oblations. The stūpa, concerned with death, is made of non-sentient materials and yet deserves worship, because trees and plants have the possibility of attaining Buddhahood.”

Nichiren’s purpose in advocating the tree-plant-Buddhahood theory was to justify the use of non-sentient materials in making a scroll of the Mañḍala, a wooden image or a picture of the Buddha to be worshipped as the living Buddha.

Nichiren’s Mañḍala has in the center seven letters, Namu Myohō Renge Kyō, representing the enlightenment of the Buddha. On either side of this central writing are written the names of the representatives of the ten worlds, including Buddha Śākyamuni and Buddha Prabhutattva. It can be said that this Mañḍala expresses the truth that non-sentient beings can attain Buddhahood, because paper and ink used are made of trees and plants and other non-sentient materials. The non-sentient materials used for this Mañḍala unitedly reveal the living body of the Buddha. We cannot see the living Buddha outside of this Mañḍala, which is made of non-sentient materials. This fact eloquently tells us the truth of tree-plant-Buddhahood.

The Tendai doctrine tells of the truth of tree-plant-Buddhahood in regard to trees and plants in the field. Their budding is interpreted as their aspiration to the truth; their blooming, as their training; their fruiting, as their attaining Buddhahood. But Nichiren sees the truth in their religiously arranged form, that is, in the Mañḍala. In the Mañḍala, trees and plants as materials are made collectively the true object of worship, that is, the Buddha. In the Mañḍala, non-sentient beings represented by trees and plants used as materials are identical with the Buddha, because they make the true object of worship. In other words, the truth that all beings, sentient or non-sentient, can attain Buddhahood is expressed in the Mañḍala and nowhere else. Here the letters in the Mañḍala, which are visible to us through the medium of non-sentient materials, are the Truth itself. This corresponds to the word of the Vimalakirti-nirdeśa that “The letters (aksara) are emancipation (vimukta).”

It is not a perfect Mahāyāna Buddhist view to say that the letters in the Mañḍala reveal the Truth, because this view retains a relativity between the revealer and what is revealed. From the standpoint of perfect Mahāyāna Buddhism, the letters must be said to be Buddhas themselves. The paper of the Mañḍala and the letters written on it are nothing but the Truth or Bhūtataṭhātā. When trees and plants are transformed into paper and ink, they begin to aspire to enlightenment: when they are used as the materials of the Mañḍala, they begin to train themselves for enlightenment; and when they show the state of the ten worlds in the Mañḍala, they attain Buddhahood. This Mañḍala, which is the true object of worship, preaches the Law to those who aspire to Buddhahood. The Ryaku-hokekyō says, “Each letter is a true Buddha.” The letters of the Saddharma-pundarika, which are visible to us through the medium of non-sentient materials such as paper and ink, are Buddhas by themselves, who preach the Law and save all beings. Consecration of wooden images or pictures of the Buddha requires the reading of the Saddharma-pundarika for this reason. By
the same reason, consecration of, and offerings to, a stūpa for the
repose of the dead is explicable. To Japanese Buddhists, worship of
the Mandala or an image of the Buddha is not idolatry, because it
aims to worship the Buddha himself.

Nichiren said that the Mandala was his invention. According
to him, Chih-i conceived the Mandala in his mind, but did not make
it public, because he thought that his times were not ripe for that.
Nichiren said that he started to propagate this Mandala, because his
times ushered in the Age of Degeneration. There is little doubt that
Nichiren laid great emphasis on the truth of tree-plant-Buddhahood be-
cause he wished to establish the true object of worship for all the people
in the Age of Degeneration.

KÖSHIN; AN EXAMPLE OF TAOIST IDEAS
IN JAPAN

BY

EOS DALE SAUNDERS

In many ways Japan is a kind of storehouse. In the domain of
the arts, the Shōsōin at Nara contains objects from various parts of the
continent, representing the cosmopolitan character of VIII century
aristocratic taste. In the field of religion as well, Japanese beliefs bear
the imprint of foreign influences, conserving sometimes concepts which
have long since disappeared in the country of their origin. Such is the
case of the belief connected with the kōshin, or monkey day, the sub-
ject of this paper. The present aim, therefore, is to set forth, first, a
résumé of the underlying kōshin concept as it appeared in Chinese
Taoist thought and, second, its transference to Japan and its evolution
in that country from an historical and cultural standpoint.

The Chinese idea which seems to be the basis of the kōshin
practice is this. There exist in man’s body three Worms, called the
san chu (or san shī). The first, known as the old Blue (Ch. ch’ung-ho),
lives in the head and causes blindness, deafness, baldness, loss of teeth,
 stuffy nose and bad breath. The second, the white Maid (Ch. po-lo),
lives in the breast and is the cause of heart palpitations, asthma,
and melancholy. Last of all, the bloody Corpse (Ch. hiue-shih?),
dwells in the loins and causes intestinal cramps, drying of the bones,
fading of the skin, rheumatism in the legs, aching of the wrists,
weakening of the mind and will. Because of him, one is hungry but
cannot eat, lacks vitality and is confused. One text adds that this
worm is especially addicted to sexual intercourse.

These three parasitical worms are vindictive creatures, disposed to
spy on the men in whose bodies they dwell, but which they look upon
as a prison. They may gain their freedom only at the death of their
host. On the kōshin day, which occurs six times each year, they
report to Heaven concerning the transgressions of their man, and his
life is accordingly shortened by the director of destiny – 300 days for
the greater transgressions, three for the lesser. Moreover, it was
specifically believed that on the kōshin night, the Worms took

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advantage of man’s slumber to make good their escape to Heaven and it
was hence thought undesirable indeed to sleep either during the
dōshin day or on that night.

Interestingly enough these basic ideas present in Japan a con-
tamination with a variety of concepts. Already in China, Buddhism
had adopted to a certain extent kōshin celebrations, and two non-
Taoist deities were associated with the observance of the monkey
day. These are Taishaku-ten (Indra), head of the Thirty-three heavens,
and Shōmen Kongō (Vajrakumara). There was evidently an easily
established equivalence between Taishaku-ten and Shang-ti, while
Shōmen Kongō, Taishaku’s messenger, could easily be identified with
the reporting role the three Worms had played in the Taoist system.
Moreover, Shōmen Kongō, in Buddhism, supposedly had powers to
cure diseases, which would by transference give him empire over the
ailments caused by the three Worms. In consequence, although
originally Taishaku-ten and Shōmen Kongō had nothing to do with
the kōshin day, they have been, and are still today, closely associated
with it. Witness, for example, the kōshin celebration which took
place this year on 11 August at the Daikyoji (Shibamata, Tokyo)
dedicated to Taishaku-ten.

There is a further association between the kōshin god in Japan
and the Shintō divinity Sarutahiko no kami. Sarutahiko is known as
the god of the crossways, and for this reason kōshin stones (kōshin-
no) are often found today by the wayside and are there worshipped
as a protective divinity of travellers. This identification between
kōshin and Sarutahiko is difficult to explain conclusively. Perhaps
it was due to the homophonous kōshin, meaning both “monkey day”
and “god of happiness,” this latter denomination being synonymous
with Sarutahiko. Or perhaps the existence of “saru,” meaning monkey,
as a part of the god’s name was sufficient to establish a connexion.
Actually the kōshin image is often shown accompanied by three
monkeys covering their eyes, ears and mouth. These three acts are
symbolic of the Japanese words not seeing, not hearing, not speaking
in which the homonym saru occurs meaning monkey and at
the same time being a negative verbal suffix. The use of these monkeys
as images would seem to come from the fact that monkey (shin) is one
of the elements of the kōshin compound. Some texts maintain that
the symbol of the monkey is taken from Tendai teachings, the three
great sections of which (void, temporariness and middle path) are
represented by not seeing, not hearing and not speaking. Actually, the
connexion seems to be through the mountain god (san-news), a Taoist
divinity, originally connected with the T’ien-t’ai mountain in China.

A third association may be seen by the relation of the kōshin
divinity with the bodhisattva Myōken. Myōken controls longevity
and karma and supposedly reports to the powers of the lower world.
Moreover, Myōken is a name for the pole star, and it is known that
Chinese Buddhist monks were conversant with active Taoist beliefs
in this heavenly body. Doubtless this belief, in part at least, was
brought to Japan via Buddhism. As a result of these associations,
please, at least as it exists in Japan, may best be thought of as an
example of what Professor Kubo in his study “Chikoku no sanshi
shink6 to nihon no kōshin shinkō” (The Taoist Origin of the Japanese
Celebration of the Cyclic Day of Metal and the Monkey) calls “acculturation arising from the introduction of Taoism into Japan.”

The early introduction of Taoist concepts like the kōshin—and
the practice of kata-lagae (directional taboos) is doubtless to be
laid to the count of the masters of Yin and Yang (ommyō-ji). In
the Heian period, the study of the Way of Yin and Yang (ommyō-dō)
assumed considerable importance. There was even a government
bureau called the ommyō-ryō, which was one of the departments
of state. Ommyo-ji were appointed in the capital as well as in the
provincial centers and they became, in fact, official soothsayers.
It is probably largely through them that Taoist concepts were intro-
duced to Japan.

Although tradition has it that the kōshin was early celebrated
under Mommu at the Shitennoji (701), there is some doubt that such
was really the case. However, it is certain that the kōshin was celebrated
by the beginning of the IX century at least. Ennin, in his diary under
838 (11 month, 26 day) refers indirectly to this observance when he
says of the Chinese practice: “In the evening the people do not
sleep—just like the kōshin of the first month in Japan.” In 834 and
836 the Shoku-Nihongi mentions that banquets were held on the
kōshin day, but no note is made of the sleepless night that was later
to become so characteristic of this day. It may consequently be
assumed that kōshin practices of some kind existed by the end of the
VIII century, and by the beginning of the ninth there were doubtless
people who observed the kōshin day by staying up all night. Just
who these people were is not known, but very probably they were
mostly nobles and priests, for kōshin observances during the Heian
period appear to have been essentially aristocratic. Kōshin celebra-
tions at this time, it is known, took place in the palace where attendants
arranged special mats and screens for the occasion. Cakes and wine
were served and poems were composed during the night. As dawn approached it was the custom for the Emperor to give presents to the participating nobles, who in turn offered their best wishes to him. Sometimes koto and biwa were played for entertainment; games like dice and go were the order of the day. It appears that the time for the beginning of these past times was not set; perhaps they commenced around ten-thirty in the evening and continued until near dawn. 33

Certainly poetry was one of the more popular forms of divertissement for the kôshin. Murasaki notes in the Tale of Genji, that "the lavish scale on which his establishment was run had, despite its disadvantages, drawn into his service quite a number of fairly presentable ladies, whom dressed in the most impossible fashion he would compel to organize poetry competitions, write novels, sit up on Monkey-nights, and in general attempt to convince the world that the house belonged to a man of taste and culture." 34 And Sei Shônagon in her Pillow Book echoes much the same attitude when she writes: "Now the minister of the center was making at that time great preparations for the kôshin night. As the evening advanced, he told the ladies to write poems on the subjects he would suggest." 35 Actually, one poem from the XI century Shûtsuba-hagi 36 contains a reference to the kôshin night: "Wait a moment kanoe-departing saru bark, I have a question I would ask of you before the waves get high." 37

The celebration of the kôshin throughout the Heian and Kamakura periods remained an aristocratic cult and, like Buddhism, it was not until the end of the Muromachi period that it became a popular practice. Of this important period, there are few detailed texts, and it is actually the Edo period which not only furnishes abundant documentation on the subject of kôshin but which forms as well the immediate basis of the modern cult. 38

It was from the beginning of the Edo period (actually, end of the Muromachi) that the expression kôshin machi (kôshin vigil) first came into use. In the Heian, expressions like asobi, on-asobi, kôshin suru wo mamoru or san-shi wo mamoru/sakuru were most often employed while in the Kamakura period kôshin wo mamoru was most common. 39 But it is the expression kôshin machi that was commonly used in the Edo period and which is most popular today. In a consideration of the kôshin from the Edo period to the present, it is necessary to note that although certain generalities may be drawn, kôshin practices show widely differing aspects according to geographical location. Since it is not within the scope of this paper to present a detailed analysis of different types of kôshin usages it will be sufficient to refer the interested student to Kubo Noritada's exhaustive study Kôshin shinkô (Kôshin Belief), published in 1956. It is to be remembered that the following remarks are meant to be of a general nature.

Unlike the aristocratic pursuits of the Heian nobles, modern kôshin (i.e., from the end of the Muromachi period on) is characterized by much more simple patterns. In villages, gatherings were held, commonly in the home of the village head: at this time a purificatory bath 40 was taken, offerings made to the gods, and sometimes sūtras were recited. After a banquet stories were told to pass the hours until dawn, 41 although the length of time spent in these past times differs from place to place. 42

This gathering of people (kô) 43 is one of the characteristics of modern kôshin. The kô may be organized on the basis of people from the same land or of the same family, or even of a mixture of the two. 44 Moreover, they may be composed of men, of women, of men and women, or even of children. The celebration of this kô is often largely Buddhist in nature in view of the above mentioned relation with such divinities as Taishaku-ten and Shômen Kongô. But from the Edo period on there may be noticed a kind of Shintô kôshin in association with Sarutahiko no kami. Here, instead of the recitation of sūtras, norito are read and a meal of fish is prepared. Of course, in the Buddhist kôshin (Shômen Kongô) no animal food is eaten. Food varies from place to place and includes beans, mochi, cakes and meatless dishes. There are "seven color cakes" (七色栗子) and in Fukuoka-ken (Hommachi) the kôshin divinity is called "the god who returns seven times": he has seven families, seven mochi are offered him, and in some places the seventh of January is his birthday. 45

Actually the kôshin divinity is thought of in a variety of ways. He is the protector of the harvest, children, horses, roads, he is a long life divinity, and many others. 47 Even in a same locality people may think of the kôshin deity differently. Of course, in agricultural areas he is largely a god of the harvest. In such communities there is a saying "the more one eats the better the harvest" 48 and as a consequence abundant banquets are given on that day. In this connection, Kôshin-san is also thought of as the "busy" god and, particularly in the form of the many-armed Shômen Kongô, he can help with the harvest. 49

Curiously enough in the Edo period, the belief sprang up that children born (sometimes conceived) 50 on the kôshin night were predestined to become thieves. This is traditionally explained by the fact that the famous thief Ishikawa Goemon 51 was thought to have been
Kōshin is treated more or less in detail by a number of works. By far the best and most exhaustive is the one by Kubo Noritada Kōshin shinkō (The Kōshin Belief), Tokyo: Yanagawa, 1956—henceforth abbreviated to KS. Kubo has written various articles as well (cf. “Chūgoku no sanshin shinkō” [The Taoist origin of the Japanese celebration of the cyclic day of metal and the monkey], Tōkyōkagakuronshō No. 3, Sept. 1955, pp. 1–54) by the above volume seems to contain the essence of his thoughts on this subject. Among reference works treating the subject, Mochizuki’s Bukkyō daijiten, Tokyo: Sekai shobō, 1955, Vol. II, 1051–1052—henceforth abbreviated to BD; Nishikawa, H. History of Phallicism in Japan, Tokyo: Miyō, 1956, pp. 185–191—henceforth abbreviated to HPJ; Kōjiro, Tokyo: Kōjiro, Kankoku, 1931, pp. 143–157—henceforth abbreviated to K.; and Nishitani Seiki Nenjūjū yōgen, Tokyo: Ohashi, 1988, have been particularly useful in preparing this paper.

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To summarize. The kōshin celebration present from the Heian period until the present day is celebrated six times a year on the day of birth of the Monkey type. Moreover, the monkey figure used to represent the kōshin would seem to show sexual overtones. The divinity is often shown in conjunction with a pair of monkeys, one holding a gohei while the other holds a peach which, in Japan as in China, is a feminine sexual symbol. The pair of monkeys on the Taishaku-ten altar (Shibamata) are of this type.

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SECTION III

1. The Three Noxious Insects (san shū sanjū sanjūrokkasen su) or san shū sanjū sanjūrokkasen three noxious insects (three noxious insects) are in a position to furnish them with numerous pertinent details concerning kōshin, and certainly many members of this conference are in a position to furnish them with considerably more authority than the present speaker. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that some light has been shed, however insufficiently, on one aspect in the evolution of religious ideas between China and Japan.

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12) Acc. to the Nenjū kōji yūgen (VII), the divinity in question (shangtō) is called Tenmō 天曾 who dwells in the three stars (which guard the purple palace constellation) – quoted in K., p. 149.

13) Acc. to Taoist thought, man's life was augmented or decreased by the good or evil deeds he performed in this world.

14) Unlike the Worms, the spirits in man want him to live and they combat the Worms as well as they can. After death the worms are dispersed and wander about as ghosts. Sacrifices are made so that they may eat and drink. (cf. Maspero, op. cit., p. 99) There are ways of killing the Worms by dietetic practices, controlling the breath, etc. – cf. Maspero, op. cit., p. 98.

15) These spirits have no special form. In one text at least (K., p. 149 – quoted from Nenjū kōji yūgen (VII)), it is said that if the kōshin is observed seven times the Three Corpses are destroyed; when it is observed three times they are subdued.

16) In the Edo period, however, there grew up the belief that certain formulas could be used instead of observing a vigil on this night. For example, to be said before going to sleep: “Upper corpse... is blue, middle corpse is white and lower corpse... is red. All... enter hell and leave my body.” – quoted by Chiribuhuru (1) in K., p. 148. There are others of the same nature.


20) There would seem to be a relationship with the three Confucian admonishments (B.D., p. 1052/a). There is also an explanation involving seven monkeys (leap year).

21) Acc. to the Sanyō saki (4) 三関蛇, quoted in K., p. 157: “The image of the monkey must originally have come from the three truths set forth in the three great sections of Tendai Daishi's Chishōkai 中道教 (read: void, temporariness and the middle path, represented by not seeing, not hearing and not speaking).” Certainly by the Edo period the monkey appeared as a deity for kōshin and there are stone statues of a male and female monkey, the latter holding a peach, a female sexual symbol, and the former a gohei (as in the Daikōji – Shibamata and the Sankōji 三光寺 – Aiichi).

22) Acc. to Shōjirī 秀知 (9) quoted in K., p. 145. Based on the Myōkengiki 般提經集.


24) Acc. to Shōjirī (K., p. 145) Myōken is the pole star (kōshin 北極)．

25) KS., p. 266.


29) Chishō Daishi is sometimes thought to be responsible for the introduction of Köshin machi along with the Shōmen kōshi-e.

30) KS., p. 124.

31) KS., p. 125.

32) Acc. to Nyōyō gabi junrai gyōki (KS., p. 124).

33) KS., p. 127.


35) Makura Zōhi (V) – given in KS., p. 129. In Beinard's translation (Les Notes de chevet de Sëi Shinkon, Paris : Maisonneuve, 1934, p. 128) this passage is in section 49. For other early mentions of the kōshin celebration, cf. Elga Monogatari II (Jan. 982) quoted in K., p. 154 : Minamoto Shigau Shin (winter, 976) quoted in K., p. 152-153 : Utsudo Monogatari (XI) and Köshin-zōshihiki (953) – quoted in HPJ., p. 186. I have not been able to consult the above texts except when they were quoted in the books at my disposal.

36) The Shitsukakushiki is the 3rd of the 3 anthologies called the Sandaisō. The name means “Collection of Gleanings,” 20 scrolls, 1351 poems, completed ca. 1005-1008, compiled by Fujiwara Kintō (966-1041) or by Kazan (reigned 985-986, died 1008).

37) Kano / saru fune / mate shibashi koto towan oki ne shiranami mada taisanu ma ni.

38) KS., p. 258. Kubo notes that the difference between present day kōshin and Heian kōshin is that the former is largely a Japanese practice, the later essentially Chinese.

39) KS., p. 259. The characters 甲子未 often replace 黄牛 in popular usage, meaning protecting or guarding the Kōshin. Machi may derive from mamoro meaning “to protect,” less probably from matsuru “to celebrate” (B.D., p. 1052/b). There is a type of beggar who carries with him an image of Shōmen Kōshin and who seeks alms. He is called Köshin-dai machi 黄牛代町.

40) In some places the bath is de rigueur, in others simply a symbolic washing of the hands is sufficient. Cf. KS., p. 59.

41) KS., p. 60. Kubo includes: Hannya shingyō 転法心経, Kōshin magical formulas; norito, Kannongyō ．

42) KS., p. 12.


44) Assemblies for offerings on the Kōshin night are called by the Buddhist term Köshin-e – Soothill and Hodous (op. cit., p. 257/a).
subdues the spirits of disease.

48) KS., p. 74.
49) KS., p. 75.
50) This is perhaps the older belief – KS., p. 83.
51) Ishikawa Goemon 石川五右衛門: attached to the Miyoshi. At 16 he robbed his master and in resisting arrest he killed 3 men. He then took up a life of professional brigandage. In 1595 Hideyoshi had him captured and executed by being thrown into a cauldron of boiling oil. Cf. Papinot, E., History and Geography of Japan, pp. 212-213.
53) Cf. HPJ, p. 188.
54) Cf. HPJ, pp. 189 and seq.

THE MAIN FORCES THREATENING
THE MODERN MAN, WORLD AND CIVILIZATION

BY

SAMUEL SHAHOON SHIN

I The Task for the Present Article:

Just only three weeks ago I received an invitation from the congress. In the midst of the very busy schedule of mine I selected the present theme with the following twofold reason: (1) Its importance for the present world situations, and (2) my having laboured for it through the book, written by me last November, using more than 60 German and 70 English books with the title: “Criticisms on Heresies and Modern Age and Our Living Road”, and through the several articles contributed by me to the various academic magazines, university and ordinary News Papers in Seoul. Under the present theme I will, first of all, try to point out, within the limit of the time given to me, some of the characteristics of the Last Days, the Modern Man and World. Then, after briefly mentioning some important criticisms on Materialism, Communism, Atheism, Sceptism, Nihilism and Secularism, I will deal with the weak points of the some important religions directly associated with the Far East, so as to point out some principles of the qualifications for being the religions beneficial for mankind, telling how to be reconciled between God and Man, between man and his neighbour, and, if possible, between religion and other religion.

II Some Characteristics of both the Last Days and the Modern Man:

One of the most important biblical passages which classically express some characteristics of both the Last Days and the Modern Man is to be found in 2 Timothy 3, 1-5: “This know also, that in the last days perilous times shall come. For men shall be lovers of their own selves, covetous, . . . , lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God; Having a form of godliness, but denying the power thereof: from such turn away.” (quoted form the King James’ Version). The original Greek Text is both rhythmical and forceful, as well as meaningful, as quoted in the following:

τοῦτο δὲ γνώσει, ὅτι ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις ἐνοχθοῦνται

(433)
SECTION III

subdues the spirits of disease.

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up a life of professional brigandage. In 1595 Hideyoshi had him captured
and executed by being thrown into a cauldron of boiling oil. Cf. Papinot,
E., History and Geography of Japan, pp. 212–213.
52) From Mokuami kyahukon shû (1920), Vol. III, 418–419. Five
scenes, 10 acts. Second scene Inageya tsuji ban no ba 稲毛屋止番の場 quoted
in HPJ, p. 187–188. Also consult Sanmin kichi kuruwa no hatogai 三人吉
HPJ, pp. 188–189.
53) Cf. HPJ, p. 188.
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(433)
kairos Χαλεποί: ἱστορικά... φιλαυτοί, φιλαργυροί... φιλόδονοι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόθεους, εἴσεξονείς μόρφωσιν εὐφοβεῖς τῷ, δὲ ὑπὸν εὐθήνειαν ὑποτέσσαροι... ἀποτέρασσαν. 

How sweet, significant and vital word are these! Many Korean Christians put them not only in their memories, but also in their hearts. The phrase "in last days" (ἐν ἐσχάλταις ἡμέραις) denotes the time immediately previous to "die Zeit der Parusie Christi",21 the crucial time in which "die Macht des Bösen" will be shown in its whole power (Gewalt);22 cf. 2 Pet. 3, 3, etc.). The omission of the article in the phrase, referred to, "perhaps emphasizes the quality of those days" "in days which are last and therefore worst."41 It is also a present reality,42 as many commentators point it out clearly.43 The phrase "perilous times", translated in the Vulgate as "tempora periculosa"44 and by Luther as "gemeine Zeiten"45, that is, "frightful or dreadful times", is rather a mistranslation. A correct one for it would be "opportunities, moments or occasions hard or trying."46 (cf. Moffatt: "hard times").47 The term χάλεπος (hard) occurs only twice in the N.T. (here and Mt 8, 28),11 καιρός expresses, indeed, not simply the time, but "den Zustand in der Zeit","12 the whole context for the phrase meaning thus the hard or trying opportunities, moments or seasons, hard for teachers, for the servants of the Lord to keep the spirit of 2 Tim 2, 24-26, and difficult to discover his duty (Eph 5, 16). It is even so for these days.

What are then the signs or characteristics of the Last Days? The primary one is φιλαυτοί, self-loving or selfish, which would constitute "the first root of evil"48, characterized by ἵπτεν τά εαυτόν, μή τά τοῦ ἔτερον (I Cor 10, 24).49 The individual, corporate, social, racial, national and international selfishness and self-centeredness create various sins, sufferings and death. For the very sake of Ego vast and enormous sacrifices have been enforced again and again to other Ego. This is a real picture in the present world. Hence, what kind of culture, religion or nationality we may belong to and be proud of, the first duty of ours would be to get by all means rid of this root of sin. Otherwise, only our ungrounded and purely subjective pride would be increased, the pride which Augustine pointed out as the root of sin. Of course, the opposite to this φιλαυτος is ἀγάπη, that is, the Divine Love, "παραδόντος ἐαυτόν", that is, "giving self up" or self-giving (Gal 2, 20), which has been so uniquely expressed in the very Cross of Christ, and which οὐ ἵπτει τά εαυτής (which does not seek its own things), namely not self-seeking, 1 Cor 13, 5.

The ultimate reason for man's self-centeredness is, in its final analysis, due to his "self-dependence and thereby likeness to God."13 The locus classicus for this truth is, of course, found in Gen. 3,5, which runs in Hebrew as follows.14

(And you will be like Elohim, knowing good and evil). Thus, "die Urglücke" (the primary sin) is "Sein Wie Gott" (To be like God) and "Wissen von Gut und Böse" (To know of good and evil). The Modern Man, eager desirous of power and fame, is nothing else than a result of this ultimate sin against God. To eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden, "contrary to the command of God, was self-emancipation from the restraint of law, self-elevation to antitheistic autonomy, self-completion by deciding against God, in one word self-apotheosis, not by direct rebellion against God, but through subjection to the power of sense,......"15 N.B. Self-apotheosis is man's trying to be God, being thus "Menschgott" and not "Gottmensch". The modern man, who had desired to be free, self-exalted, autonomous, self-completing against God, has become a slave to material, having thus gone down below the level lower than that of beasts, and having thus become satanic. Both Adam and his wife were found naked. "Die individuelle Nacktheit ist der seelische Ausdruck des Schuldbewusstseins, "16 And man has become "schuldig (guilty)". Man stands from the beginning "under obedience" (unter dem Gehorsam). "Der Mensch ist gegenüber Gott verantwortlich (responsible). Kann er sich nicht verantworten (answer), so ist er ein Sünden. Denn die Sünde ist der Ungehorsam."17 Adam said to God: "I heard thy voice in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself." (Gen 3, 10) יִלְּכַּת יָדָה (The voice of God) alone makes man understand his own real state. The true recognition of both his sin and his Existenz is only possible in presence of God, יִנְּסַת יִנְּסַת. Man's answer conceals, however, the sin itself behind what was, significantly enough, only its consequence, disobedience behind the feeling of shame. Herein, emerges a characteristic of the modern man: The man of apology for his sinning.

The concrete expression for self-love is φιλάργυροι, money-loving, which is the second root of evil, or the root of all evil. (I Tim 6, 10) Not to mentioning the time of the Korean War in 1950, even now several countries try to make money, trading with those which are eager to invade others, and sacrificing those who are eager to be freed. If we, as men of religion and as the scholars of it, can not denounce such an unforgivable vice as this, the reason dètre for our being and for our religions would be entirely meaningless, or even harmful. φιλήδονοι (lovers of pleasures) corresponds at the end to
ished as "ein melanesischer Name für das Unendliche." Hence, we are from the outset aware of the important fact that one of the primary concerns for every kind of religion is a sort of „Macht”. However this may be, strangely enough, „Sittlichen Wert hat die Macht nicht.”

Accordingly, herein emerges a distinction between true and false religions. The one has an inseparable unity between religion and morality. The other has it not. „Nun ist die vollkommene Vereinigung von Religion und Sittlichkeit, die im Evangelium als Aufgabe gestellt ist, der Grundgedanke der christliche Religion.” In a good sense the idea of die Macht is associated with that of "awe" or "holy”, and it is not ubiquitarily but aussergewöhnlich (extraordinary) or andersartig. One of the essential qualifications for being a genuinely true religion is its possession of such a religio-moral dynamic power, which would be, in its final anlysis, near to that of "the Spirit of God” (2 Cor 3:17) or “the Holy Spirit” (Heb 1:9). Moreover, it is very important for us to notice that in his dealing with „Die Aussagung über das göttliche Sein” under the section „Das Wesen des Bundegottes” Eichrodt begins with neither „Die Geistigkeit der Gottesvorstellung” nor „Jahves Einzigeit” but „Der Personcharakter der Gottheit”, because the livingness of God is most characteristic in the conception of God both in Judaism and Christianity, whereas the other two may be found even in other religions, however different contents the others may have.

Now, the modern homo religiosus, not to mentioning the ordinary secular man, has refused the δύναμις of godliness. Therefore, in order to be able to recapture that burning fire of the original δύναμις we have to go back to that original fountain. Otherwise, it would be not only meaningless but also fruitless for us either to study or to discuss our cultures, religions, mutual understandings, academic theses, world-peace and so forth. Only those of the regenerated man, society and nation would be able to contribute something useful and vital to our mankind. Hence, God, religion and theology have the final key-points for the solution for the ultimate world issues at present, whereas only the genuine God has the ultimate answer for us. In spite of this both God and Religion have been mostly disregarded by the modern man. This is the ultimate reason why the modern age is in its unprecedented chaos.

Formerly, older churches, missionaries or such countries had dominated the other. Now, recently a new tendency has emerged, that is the reaction to it, expressed in racialism, nationalism, and so forth. Viewed from the stand-point of the genuine Gospel, both are mistaken. Just as Beyerhaus aptly pointed out in his book: Die
Selbständigkeit der Jungen Kirchen als Missionarischer Problem, the mission-relation between older and younger churches is not that of “education” toward maturity but of “proclamation” under the Word of God. The Christonomy in the primitive church has to be realized in any age or under any circumstance, in cultural, social or political environments or even in the problems of church unity. Not human Christian activity but Christ himself working has to be operated. As Luther aptly says, „Gott bedarf unserer Güter nicht. Er schenkt uns, nicht wir ihm.“ We accept the realities already existing, that is, Christ’s sovereign act. It is true that „Die Selbständigkeit einer jungen Kirche ist ihre Kraft, Bereitschaft und Freiheit, in ihrem Lebensraum (environment) ihren göttlichen Auftrag zu erfüllen.“ However this may be, Ecclesia is the place where the Word of God is heard and where the sacraments are ministered (Luther). And since only Christ makes the Ecclesia constituted (Jn 15, 16), no “autonomy” or “independence” of the church, not racialism or nationalism, not „Selbständigkeit“ but „Christusseligkeit“ or „Christonomie“ is only possible for the church, being thus a Christonomous church, neither more nor less. Such a fundamental principle, or rather a fact, may offer us the solution for our desires and attempts either to minimize one of the Oriental and the Occidental cultures, or to equate one with the other. The same thing may be said even in connection with the comparison of religions. Not the superficial phenomenal similarities but both vital contents of religions and true benefits for mankind through them should be considered as the primary category for judging the genuineness of those religions.

The δουμας of godliness or God can be obtained by us only through the real Gemeinschaft between God and us, the fact and principle of which is uniquely expressed in the idea of Atonement, which etymologically means At-one-ment, God making thus all things reconciled unto Him. Prayer is the most spontaneous and necessary outcome for that Gemeinschaft. No wonder that in his book entitled Das Gebet Heiler points out that the history of religion is that of prayer. „Die Macht über die Geister“ is expressed as the result of „Gebet und Fasten“ (Mk 9, 29, etc.), and as those associated with „fromme Mittel.“ The same concept occurs even in rabbinical views. One of the main reasons why the church in Korea has been spiritually rich is due to the fact that it has been a church of praying as well as that of the Bible.

In concluding this section we can briefly point out the following: As the characteristics of the Last Days the modern secular man and even the modern homo religious have become self-loving, moony-loving, ... lovers of pleasures rather than lovers of God, having only the form of godliness and yet refusing its δουμας. Hence, Materialism, Communism, Atheism, Scepticism, Nihilism, Secularism and Various Religious Corruptions, not to mentioning Humanism and Heresy, have gained their strongholds. Though the modern man claims his autonomy against the true God, he has been subjected to the lower level of materials, having thus become the tools of Satan. The vast and various individual, corporate, social, racial, national and international injustices are nothing else than the modern man’s Sein wie Gott and Wissen von Gut und Böse, ultimately resulted from the departure from the real God. Unless we return to Him, everything in the world would be hopeless. Even Tiele concludes the second volume of his book: Elements of the Science with the following words: “There is no rest for them unless they arise and go to their Father.”

III. Criticism on Materialism, Atheism, Scepticism, Nihilism and Secularism:

Owing to the lack of the time to read the present paper, I am obliged to omit the dealing with these items, except pointing out the following: (a) I contributed to College Review Vol. 6 No. 2, July 24, 1958, published by College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Seoul National University, the College which was formerly called Keijo Imperial University the article: Atheism and Criticisms on it and to the University News a few week ago the article. Christian Weltanschauung, both of which were dealt very academically. Hence, I have to refer to them. (b) Recently such many atheistic books as those of Sartre, Heidegger, and so forth, have been published, charming and misleading many young people. Hence, we, as men of religions and especially as scholars of them, should criticize and evaluate their thoughts as soon as the appearances of their publications. Such books, as dealt with materialism, Scepticism, Nihilism and Secularism, should be also done like this. This kind of task should be undertaken especially by the scholars of religions, whose nationalities have published such ones. Moreover, since the present educational systems, either home or abroad, have been mostly based upon both materialistic and impersonalistic concepts rather than upon spiritual ones, they should be drastically reformed. Our education at present has mostly been handled by irreligious or even antireligious men. As its consequences the modern chaotic world has been brought. To be sure, usually Orientals are trying to imitate Occidentals superficially. This is especially
so, in case of bad things. Hence, the responsibilities of the latter for the
former would be beyond their imaginations.

IV Criticisms on Communism:

Again owing to the shortage of the time to read the present paper I
have to omit the dealing with this item, except pointing out the follow-
ing: (A) I contributed the article: Criticisms on Marxism to the
University News, August 26 of this year, that is, immediately before
my coming to Japan, and (B) Since I could not escape from Seoul when
it was besieged by communist armies at the Korean War in 1950, I have
thoroughly experienced the communist activities, though their theories
had been well known by me because of my having read many books of
them. Hence, I will briefly point out to you only some of what you
have perhaps never experienced nor known. They are as follows:

(1) As soon as they suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea, they
proclaimed that within the three days they would also invade
Japan.

(2) When they were forced to get out of it because of the U.N.
Forces in September of that year, they declared that they would return
to the south of Korea within 6 months, that is, February 1951. It
turned out as true because of the invasion of Chinese red armies with
them at the time referred to. They act, therefore, according to their
blue-prints, as in cases of every totalitarian regimes.

(3) Their activities usually start between 12 o'clock to 3 A.M.,
the time during which most of the people are heavily sleepy and during
which thieves use to break houses. They are those who say: "Mine
is mine, of course. Yours is also mine."

(4) Once invaded or dominated by them, no internal rebellion
against them is possible just because their organizations are so tightly
formed by various spies and terrors, that it is a purely wishful thinking
for us to expect to have an internal rebellion against them, unless
democratic armies enter their lands to free the subjugated people. In
the latter case democracy would surely win the cause because 8 out of
10 in communist countries are against communism. In this sense the
famous words of Jesus, who says: For whosoever will save his life
shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the
Gospel's, the same shall save it, are literally true.

(5) No freedom exists, as all of us know it well, in communism.
For example, if any one hears the radio broadcast from democratic
countries, and if he is found to do so, he is killed at once. They
threaten him with the so-called "immediate punishment", that is,
killing. Hence, whereas they claim they are for farmers and the poor,
even a farmer told me directly that if that regime is going to be success-
ful, he would commit suicide. Even a communist told me that if all
the people become communists, all of them would be killed by each
other, because all of them have to become spies, the son being a spy
against his father. Hence, all of them keep silence. The communist
country is the land of silence as well as of fear and terror, or spy and
traitor.

(6) An associate professor Y. Isaka mentioned: "Now Japanese
Christians are beginning to learn from the Chinese example the possibility
of co-operation with communists to establish social justice." This is
a fantastic idea. The cooperation with communists means nothing else
than their dominations and dictatorships over us. Before the Korean
War the communist leaders in the North Korea invited some of the
Southern Korea, proposing the congress of the so-called South-North
Negotiation. The latter, full of joy and expectation, went to the
capital of the red, only to find out that the brute-printed schedules,
formerly planned by the red, were being carried out and announced
as if they were the results of the peaceful and mutual agreements,
reached between the two parties in the congress. Hence, the deceived
one had to come back to South in vain and with an utmost despair.
The red propaganda to solve social injustice. In spite of this they
have done, and are doing, the most cruel one without selecting their
means for their obtaining the objects. Hence, the cooperation with
them means nothing else than to plus evil forces to them and thus to
make their evils extend so much longer.

(7) The same associate Prof. said: "Christians base toleration
upon Christ's love." However, this is a very dangerous assumption if
it is, as in his case, going to associate it with the red, because by doing
so, only their unprecedented injustice is to be continued. We should
never apply Jesus' ethics, spoken only to an individual, and especially
to a regenerated one, to a sinful and collective mechanism of communism.
The same associate Prof. said: "But only Christians will know that
Christ died even for communists." This is theoretically or logically
true, but practically or realistically untrue, indeed. If Christ died
even for communists, they should honour, obey and live for Him. (2
Cor. 5, 15 etc.) Otherwise, they have no such faith as in Christ. Then,
there is no salvation to them. The same writer must be, theologically
speaking, an universalist. We sincerely hope some Japanese Christian
scholars should write good books in connection with criticisms on
communism thoroughly and realistically, as well as biblically and
theologically. Having read such an article, I had deeply and honestly thought of this necessity for Japanese, in order to illuminate such formal and utopian theorists.

(8) The attempt to trade with communist countries would mean, as partly referred to, only to make the unrighteous regimes extend their injustice, and thus the harm would be eventually turned back to the trader. The so-called co-existence of Democracy and Communism is a sheer nonsense. To be sure, even communists themselves would laugh at this idea in the depth of their hearts.

V. Criticisms on Weak Points and Religious Corruptions:

Because of the lack of the time to read the present paper I will omit the present items to be dealt with the criticisms on Confucianism, Buddhism, Shintoism, and Christianity.

VI. A Conclusion:

A second reformation of religion is now imperative. Luther undertook only that of the individual soul. We need now a double Reformation: inside and outside, individual and social. The Christian Gospel has, from the beginning, had such a twofold side: individual and cosmical eschatologies, Gospel and Law, the church and the Kingdom of God, love and righteousness, immanence and transcendence, Gare and Aufgabe, and so forth. Hence, we should rediscover that original power of the Gospel, which makes us, indeed, fulfill such a twofold side of the truth, in order to overcome the Main Forces Threatening the Modern Man, World and Civilization. In order to carry on this solemn duty of ours we should create a world-wide religious organization which should not be humanistic, sectarian, racial, national, political, cultural, and so forth, but religio-moral, spiritual and dynamic, thereby the truth may be not only spoken but above all be realized. Thus, we should, as much as possible, endeavor to eliminate such main forces as mentioned above. To be sure, the real and permanent solution for it should consist, of course, in our becoming a new being. Frazer wrote: ‘‘... shrewd ecclesiastics, who clearly perceived that if Christianity was to conquer the world it could do so only relaxing the too rigid principles of its Founder, by widening a little the narrow gate which lead to salvation.’’

Though I am very sorry to point out, this is a false and fundamentally wrong assumption because of the following reasons and truths: As already pointed out, neither Oriental nor Occidental cultures, nor the superior concept of one of them, nor mutual understanding, and so forth, would not be able to create, maintain and enhance the world-peace.

Only the regenerated individual, society, race and nation can for the first time bear such an enormous task. Hence, each religion should concentrate on only this one point. Then, the solution for it, including others, would be obtained very easily.

One of the essential elements in Christianity is its emphasis on the regeneration of man through his abiding in Christ. The term ‘new’ in ‘a new creature’ (καινὴ κτίσις) (2 Cor 5, 17) has not a quantitative (νέος) but qualitative meaning. ‘The man in Christ’ is a qualitatively new being. It is worthy for us to recall the fact that according to rabbinical literature ‘the man forgiven by God’ is ‘a new creature’. Only such men and such religions can contribute something useful to our mankind. The ultimate solution for our ultimate problems hinge on this cardinal truth.

N.B.: Notes are omitted.
SOME ASPECTS OF JAPANESE-CHRISTIAN ACCULTURATION

BY

KOYA TAGITA

Many believe that Christianity did not take root in Japanese culture during the ninety years of Catholic missionary activity in the 16th and 17th centuries. However, if the Christian history of Japan is studied in its totality over its span of four centuries, including the three centuries’ existence of the Secret Kirishitan, some roots may be found in the possible unity of Christian and Japanese ethos. Kirishitan is a corruption of a Portuguese word meaning Christian, Christianity or Christian tradition in Japan.

When this new religion was introduced, Japanese political leaders considered using it for their political and economic interests. But Christianity did not prove to be a willing servant like other religions. In 1587, only thirty-eight years after St. Francis Xavier had founded the first Catholic mission in Japan, Hideyoshi, ruler for the Emperor, issued the first edict of proscription. Persecution was cruel and relentless for nearly three centuries until 1873.

Japanese samurai had been well trained in loyalty to their superiors. In their loyalty they were determined to annihilate the newly imported religion. It was the Christian alone who possessed a strong conviction of a higher object of loyalty more powerful than the feudal lords…. God, the Creator and the Absolute. For the non-Christian Japanese, disloyalty to the feudal lords or to the Emperor was as great a wrong as disloyalty to the national Shinto gods; Shinto had penetrated Japanese minds through thousands of years of daily practice and yearly festivals. The more stubborn the Christians became, the more cruel and cunning were the methods of torture, and the more determined the persecutors. The whole persecution hinged on the question of loyalty.

The Tokugawa Shogunate closed Japan even at the sacrifice of the nation’s economic interests in order to abolish Christianity and annihilate its leaders. As a result Japanese minds had no choice but to confine themselves, as it were, in a cultural prison, isolated from foreign countries and influences. The study of domestic literature developed, and resulted ultimately in the rejection not only of the Catholic but of all continental Asiatic influence on Japanese culture. Buddhism and Confucianism were attacked. During the Meiji Reformation in the nineteenth century, special Shinto rituals were developed and practised. Politicians tried to introduce Shintoism into the structure of the new government. It was then that the secret Kirishitans were discovered. The embers of a long buried faith were stirred and flared into apostolic fire.

The Japanese government, greatly surprised by the unexpected existence of Christians, deported thirty-five hundred from the region of Nagasaki, sending them to twenty-one places of exile. Some twenty-five percent of the exiles died of hunger in prison. The survivors were eventually allowed to return to their deserted homes in 1873, a move dictated largely by the interest of Japanese diplomacy. Otherwise, American and European nations might have rejected even the opening of international negotiations.

Within several years, about half of the descendants of the early Christians in Kyushu were won back to full membership in the Church. However, the other half, marked by the tenacity of the early faith which characterized their ancestors, refused the invitation of missionaries and still continue to carry on their secret rites.

It was my privilege to rediscover and to appreciate their ethnological position in the twentieth century. Suffering weighs heavily upon them in spirit and body: social ostracism, poor economic conditions and a persecution complex. These have cut deeply into their personalities. Customs, religious beliefs and practices are secrets which they will not betray. To secure their friendship and confidence required twenty-five years of sympathetic and tactful association. After a lengthy trial I was personally allowed to visit their homes, take part in their conversations, share their meals and record on tape their simple, impressive liturgy.

Here again, strong feelings of loyalty are involved. The success of rebuilding the Church in Japan has meant that loyalty to a supernatil God is permitted. Japanese Christians and foreign missionaries rejoiced. However, the case was different with the remaining secret Kirishitans. They have lost the Christian idea of the Supreme Being and observe a syncretistic ritual of Christianity and ancestor worship. They could see no fault in this practice, for Christianity recommends reverence for ancestral martyrs, and ancestor worship is the most common element of the Japanese religions. In the religious and
ethical milieu of Japan, it is difficult to make such a clear distinction between worship and reverence as Christianity defines. It is more through their reverence and loyalty to the ancestral martyrs than anything else that the Secret Kirishitans have adhered to this persecuted religion. Accordingly, when Christianity was restored in our country, they did not share in the Christian rejoicing, but rather despised those who returned to the Church for their disloyalty to the ancestral Kirishitan traditions. Their ancestors had become masters at covering their lives with trappings of Buddhism and Shinto. This was an absolute necessity. The Kirishitans, in their worship, art and daily lives, made a determined effort to blend in with those about them in order to avoid detection.

There are shrines of martyrs and relics in each of the Secret Kirishitan villages. Among the shrines which I have studied, eleven are of stone construction like this (the first slide), five have wooden oratory buildings like this (the second slide), seven have torii like this (the third slide), twelve are hidden in thick forests like this (the fourth slide), ten have or had until just recently, trees three hundred years old like this (the fifth slide).

An oratory, a torii and a forest of aged trees are common elements of a Shinto shrine called jinsha (the sixth slide). Nine of the shrines mentioned above have all these elements, and three of the nine have been inscribed with the Japanese characters for jinsha. Places of martyrdom have thus become places for offering prayers to ask the enshrined spirit for a rich harvest, good fishing, easy delivery of a child, safety in battle, etc. The names of five of these places are San Juwan (from St. John), Basutayan (from St. Sebastian), Anto (from St. Antonio), San Pablo (from St. Paul), and another San Juwan.

Reverence for relics is another characteristic of the Secret Kirishitans who are loyal to the martyred ancestors. One kind of relic is a small scroll bearing an image of Christ or the saints like this (the seventh slide). This is called Nandogami in Japanese which means the secretly-kept-god. Other relics are "disciplinas" which are bundles of hempen ropes, originally used by the faithful to scourge themselves on Fridays and during Lent, and are called C-tempensha (a corruption of the Portuguese word meaning "penitence") (the eighth slide), and sets of small wooden pieces of rosary. The present Secret Kirishitans attribute divine character to all the relics. When they are not in use they usually hide them in store rooms among the furniture. The "disciplina" has become so important a tool to cure the sick that they call it "O-dogu"; "dogu" means tool. The use of this tool is always combined with holy water and a small stick to sprinkle it (the ninth slide). The holy water is believed to be taken miraculously from Naka-e-no-shima, a small island of martyrdom (the tenth slide). The name of the stick, the sprinkler, has its origin in the Bible; it is called "Izuppo" from "Hyssop". When they use these tools, they always recite Psalm 50 in corrupt Latin. (tape record)

Observance of the Festival. Some Secret Kirishitans worship the Nandogami three times a year: at Christmas, Easter and the New Year. They take the relics from their hiding place and hang the scroll against a curtain above altar which is temporarily constructed in the store room (the eleventh slide). The meeting is held in the front room (the twelfth slide). Dishes and sake are indispensable elements of the ceremony which originated in the necessity of camouflage in the prayer meeting by simulating a meeting for business or recreation.

The Secret Kirishitans have naturally great difficulty in deciding the date of the movable feasts. Some of them have a special Kirishitan calendar. Though it has passed through yearly revisions since 1634 and has lost its original orthodoxy, they still call it the "original book" (Motochō in Japanese). A divine character has been attributed even to copies of this "original" calendar and also to the authority of revising it. The keepers of these calendars and their houses are the centers of Secret Kirishitans except the Nandogami group.

Both the calendar group and the Nandogami group of the Secret Kirishitans recite many kinds of prayers from memory; most commonly the Ave Maria, Confiteor and Pater Noster. Psalm 50 is also recited very often in corrupt Latin and is believed to have the magical power of exercising or curing.

The organization of the Nandogami group is related to the rosary confraternity which was started in the beginning of the seventeenth century under the name of "kumi" which means group. At present they call this confraternity "Kompan-ya" or "ko-gumi", the latter meaning small group. The head of this small group is called "mideshi" (disciple). He keeps a rosary which consists of sixteen small wooden tablets. The fifteen mysteries are written on them, but in many cases the space of each tablet is too small to write the whole mystery on it. I estimate there are more than one hundred sets of tablets which are playing an important role in the religious needs of these innocent Kirishitans.

The "Mideshi" (The disciple) represents the faithful of his group at certain meetings and in the election of the higher officials "gobanyaku" (the keeper of the Nandogami) and "sazuke-yaku" (the baptizing
THE MOTIVES OF THE SYNERGETISM OF
SHINTO AND BUDDHISM

BY
KENRYO TAKEZONO

Nowadays in Japan most Shinto shrines preserve some edifice of more or less Buddhist style; particularly the Tōshōgū Shrine at Nikko which you will see on research tour has so many Buddhist edifices like a five storied pagoda, a gong edifice and others that you will wonder whether it is a Shinto shrine or a Buddhist temple. Also in the beliefs of common people you can find many syncretic ideas joining native gods to Buddha as Kami and Hotoke. These phenomena show that the syncretism of Shinto and Buddhism, which has continued for more than twelve centuries, constitutes a unique characteristic of Japanese religious history. This paper deals with the motives of the syncretism of both religions. We can sum them up as follows.

1. In Shinto organized into a national religion the Emperor served as high priest, yet he as well as his nobles believed so earnestly in Buddhism that he needed not choose one religion and reject the other.

2. Buddhism in China flourished as a religion of ritual praying for worldly benefits and performing commemorative services to the dead of importance to the state.

3. Such Buddhism fitted perfectly with the prayers and ancestral rituals found in Japan’s native religion.

4. Deva, the Indian native gods, were thought by the Japanese to correspond to their native gods, Kami.

5. Buddhism was not a monotheism excluding any other religion.

First at the time when Buddhism was introduced into Japan, its native religion was gradually organized into a national religion together with the growth of national unity by the ruling family. That is to say the Great-goddess, the ruling family’s goddess, was identified as the Great Shining god or Sun-god whose descendants were explained to be the successive Emperors, the theogony was systematized to unify many local and tutelar gods, myths were recorded according to some national policy, and observances, dates and places of ceremonies were decided by the court. Those processes were recorded in the “Book
of Emperor Sujin (reigned in about the fifth century) in the "Chronicle of Japan". The national religion was called Shinto toward the end of the sixth century in order to distinguish it from Buddhism, being fundamentally not so much a doctrinal system as the mere natural religion of the ancient Japanese. In this connection we must particularly notice the Emperor becoming high priest to pray for national prosperity. Yet, as state below, the Emperor believed in Buddhism at the same time, and nobles like Fujiwara no Kamatari also, while being worshippers of their tutelar deities, believed in it as well. Hence there was no necessity for them to choose one religion and reject the other. This attitude was one of "believing in Buddhism and honouring Shinto" as written in the "Book of Emperor Yomei (reigned A.D. 586-7)" in the "Chronicle of Japan", and was the motive of the syncretism of both religions.

Secondly we must notice that Buddhism in China had undergone wide-reaching changes during the sixth and seventh centuries when Japan had intercourse with that country. In the early sangha of India, worship, repentance and meditation were necessary to be enlightened, and in Mahayana Buddhism six ways were practiced to ascend to Bodhisattva. When Mahayana Buddhism, attaching much weight to meditation and intelligence, was introduced to China, it flourished as a religion of ritual owing to the Chinese utilitarian trait in opposition to the Indian meditative. At first the Chinese wondered at the magical actions of the Buddhist monks bringing over many scriptures from India. In the early times some Buddhist scriptures were translated into Chinese because they promised worldly benefits. Above all Konkomyō-kyō translated by Dharmaraksha in about 425 gave the assurance that one who chanted this sutra would be saved from disease, early death, poverty, anger, fear and sorrow, given immeasurable pleasure by Buddha, and still more by the four devas, the Indian native gods. Ninno-kyō translated by Kumarajiva in 401 taught that when the country was disturbed, destroyed or assaulted by the enemy, it would soon overcome these dangers if the king invited a hundred monks to light a hundred lights, burn a hundred kinds of incense, offer a hundred kinds of flowers and chant this sutra twice a day. It told many tales of pious kings being preserved from ruin through chanting the sutra or repeating its incantation, and related various desires being answered through it. Both sutras emphasized so greatly the mystical power of sutra-chanting that the Buddhist monks' chanting was thought to have a magical power for securing worldly benefits. Besides, erecting temples, making statues of Buddha, copying the scriptures and forsaking the world were taught in some sutras to be holy deeds. Even chanting the title of a sutra was enough. Though these holy deeds were contrary to the first principle of Buddhism which taught enlightenment by practice, sutra-chanting was gradually organized into a ritual owing to the utilitarian trait of the Chinese desiring so many worldly benefits. Many Emperors so greatly rejoiced over the promises of both sutras predicting that country and nation would be protected that they held rituals on a large scale, erected many temples in the capital and many other provinces, and made innumerable statues of Buddha at state expense. Hence Buddhism came to be very closely connected with the state. In the fifth century, for instance, numberless statues of Buddha were chiseled in the caves of mountains, the inscriptions of which contain the letters of "state, king, queen, emperor, empress, prince etc." besides those of "teacher, ancestor, father, mother, wife, son, brother, all creatures etc." These letters meant that the statues of Buddha made by the state asked for national prosperity. So in the sixth century state Buddhism culminated in introducing Buddhist arts and rituals even into the palace. At that time Konkyomyo-kyō and Ninno-kyō including Hokke-kyō, called the trio of patron sutras of the land, were chanted, lectured about and copied all the time. In the Sui Dynasty the Emperor established the fundamental policy to support Buddhism and became such a pious believer as to name himself lay Emperor together with holy Emperor. In the Tang Dynasty, alike, the government made use of Buddhist rituals for national prosperity in spite of new schools of Buddhist philosophy arising. On the birthday of the Emperor and the Empress, moreover, rituals were celebrated in every temple for their welfare and on their anniversaries for the rest of their souls. At the end of the seventh century even a cloister was established in the palace in which many monks and nuns chanted sutras in so loud a voice as to be heard on the street.

Another purpose of Buddhist rituals in China was to hold memorial services for the dead based on the idea of transmigration of souls. Even though the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism taught deliverance from the bonds of transmigration by awakening, with the popular concept of the survival of the soul, inculcated that the soul travelling through the inferior resorts of transmigration would be helped along its way towards a better place and finally to Buddhahood if living relatives had anniversary rites performed the soul. Buddhist ceremonies combined so intimately with ancestor worship in China repeating the memorial service for the ancestor every year that they
used to be repeated periodically every three or four years. It fused, still more, so closely with the morality of filial piety as to hold them particularly for the deceased parents. Thus they were typically held as Ullambana on July the fifteenth based on the teaching of Urabon-kyō and at so early a date as 538 they were held as a time-honoured custom. In short, it was owing not to the original meaning of Buddhism but to the utilitarianism of the Chinese that Buddhism became to be state religion in the Sui and Tang Dynasties. By that time, Buddhism in China had undergone wide-reaching changes.

Thirdly influenced by the Tang civilization, Japan was to receive Buddhism as the ritual of ritual which it was in China. When Buddhism was first introduced from Korea, the Japanese, having no statue of their own native gods, wondered at the brilliant statue of Buddha to which they referred as “foreign gods” or “Chinese gods” and prayed for the cure from diseases just as they has done to their native gods. As soon as the true meaning of Buddhism came to be understood by Prince Shōtoku’s personal study of it and his application of the truth of the Three Treasures to every phase of national and individual life, his policy gradually dealt with it as a state concern. Prince Shōtoku and the Emperors Temmu and Shōmu, the most distinguished rulers in the dawn of Japan’s enlightenment believed so earnestly in Buddhism as to endeavour to establish a centralized government according to Buddhist ideals of peace, harmony, benevolence, equality and confidence. On the other hand, they thought that saving the nation from many disasters could be attained by prayer to Buddha after the Chinese rituals of Buddhism just as they had done to their native gods. Therefore they observed ritual, functions, built many large temples, made fine statues of Buddha and copied numerous scriptures to pray for good harvest, moderate rain, cure from disease and stamping out of epidemics. Besides, the Buddhist ritual was welcomed by the Japanese for the sake of the dead. In their native thought they the other world where the dead went and often came home from was an unclean land. In Buddhism, on the contrary it was a pure land where the soul, would go through transmigration owing to the commemorative services held by the living relatives. The ideas both of pure land and of transmigration were never dreamt of before by the Japanese. The Buddhist thought of spiritual communion was rejoiced in by them because it enabled them to solace the dead and embrace the souls of their ancestors. For this purpose, memorial rites, above all, Ullambana, for the dead, particularly for the ancestors, were most commendable holy deeds. We dare say that this was an accommodation of Buddhism to the animistic religion of the Japanese. As early as 606 A.D., sixty eight years after Ullambana in China, it was held in our country on a large scale by the court. In consequence the nobility witnessing these rituals was charmed by the solemn Buddhist ritual performed before a brilliant statue with splendid ornaments in a magnificent temple where many monks wearing gold brocade surplices chanted sutras in a procession around the statue. Accordingly in the Hakuhō era ruled by Emperor Temmu, the end of the seventh century, Buddhist rituals came to be held most frequently for the above mentioned purposes in every temple of the capital and in the other provinces and even in the palace as a state concern. Considering these facts we can see that although Shinto and Buddhism were religions of quite different characters, they were adhered to among the nobility as parallel religions at the same time. This happy coincidence accelerated the syncretism of the two religions.

Fourthly we must point out the most important motive. As the splendid rites of Buddhism both of prayer for worldly benefits and for the well-being of the dead were often observed on a large scale, they overshadowed the simple, naive ritual of Shinto. Yet the teaching of some sutras in which, as we have said above, the four devas were said to guard Buddhism, the pious king and his nation was regarded as of such great importance that the devas were interpreted to correspond to Japanese native gods. Then, in addition to the Shinto ritual, sutra chanting before the gods was thought to increase more and more the gods’ protection. By this interpretation in the end of Nara era Buddhist rituals were performed before the Great Shining god at Ise when disasters had happened, and for this motive, the Jingū temple belonging to the Ise Shrine was built which meant the origin of syncretism. Such an interpretation of correspondence was the leading motive of syncretism of both religions.

Finally but fundamentally we must remember that Buddhism was not monotheism as Judaism and Christianity excluding other religions of which we need not write any more.
THE PURSUIT OF THE ABSOLUTE IN MODERN INDIA

BY

KOSHIRO TAMAKI

The religious and philosophical thoughts of modern India follow the traditions of ancient India, especially the Upanishad, Vedânta and Sâmkhya. The influence of Bhagavad-Gîtâ is particularly prominent.

We can discern the pursuit of the Absolute in a great variety of approaches from various standpoints, for example, the religious standpoint of Râmkrishna, the ethical and religious one of Vivekânanda, the practical one of Gandhi, the philosophical one of Aurobindo and the poetical one of R. Tagore.

(A) Râmkrishna is considered to be one of the great mystics of modern India. He entered in ecstasy under various circumstances, for example, at the time when he kneeled in prayer before the statue of God, when he conversed with a visitor about spiritual problems and when he was sunk in meditation in his room toward evening. At these times on a sudden he fell into ecstasy.

This mystical experience is a characteristic and a centre of his religion, and he wishes to catch religion itself beyond any dogma. In spite of being a believer of the Goddess Kāli, he also accepted Mahommedanism and Christianity, and it is related that when he came into contact with Christianity, the Hinduistic marks on his body disappeared and he was captured by the God of Christianity. His confession of mystical experiences is very simple and he has no system about the religion. He intends to experience the Absolute freely and despises any entrenched line of thought.

I suppose that it doesn’t make any difference to him whether he is a Hindu or a Christian or Mahommedan, because he thinks that the essence of these religions does not exist in these thoughts, but in the background of them. And so the important thing is to experience the Absolute transcending any shape of religion.

(B) Vivekâkanda, one of the most excellent disciples of Râmkrishna, likewise emphasizes the essence of religion beyond the various dogma. What method does he select in order to arrive at the essence of religion?

In Bhagavad-Gîtâ three yogas are explained, that is to say, jñânâ-yoga, bhakti-yoga and karma-yoga. He esteems, of course, all of them, but he particularly emphasizes karma-yoga. Karma means deed, and he uses karma in its widest meaning. He says: “We are always doing karma: I am speaking to you, it is karma, you are listening to me, it is karma, we are breathing, it is karma, we are walking, it is karma, therefore everything we do, physical or mental, is karma and moreover our karma leaves its marks on us.” This mark is called sâṃskâra, the potential energy or latent force. According to his opinion each body is a centre of karma, and karma produces the human character and the human character produces the human will and the human will produces human civilization.

Thus it is a permanent rule that every affair in the human world is regulated by karma. What should we do in such a state of karma in order to accomplish our ideal? He holds that it is an important thing to do our duties, monk and layman, husband and wife, parent and child should each do his or her duty, and moreover do it without any intention. The ideal of karma-yoga is to work only for work without any selfish motive, and so a karma-yogi, ascetic of karma-yoga need not believe in any doctrine, not even in God and any metaphysical speculations. The goal of karma-yoga is an absolute unselfishness, unattachment and freedom, and thus the discharge of one’s own duty is the only way to enlightenment.

(C) The spirit of satyâgira (grasping of the truth) permeates Gandhi’s practical action. Satyâgira contains the Truth, Ahimsâ, Brahma-carya and Non-possession.

(I) The Truth means truth in thought, speech and action. One who has realized this Truth, need not to know any more, because all knowledge is necessarily contained in it. There can be no inward peace without true knowledge. This Truth is the base of his lifephilosophy.

(II) Ahimsâ or non-violence. It is impossible to pursue the Truth without Ahimsâ. Truth is connected with Ahimsâ and so the two can not be separated, but Ahimsâ is a means, Truth is the end. Ahimsâ is apparently negative and passive, but really it is positive and active. He explains the fundamental difference between passive resistance and satyâgira as follows:

1. Passive resistance can’t have the vision to develop in to love, but satyâgira has the universal love.

2. Passive resistance may change to the armed force at the proper time, but it is prohibited for satyâgira at any time.
(3) Passive resistance has always the idea to attack the other party, but satyagraha has no idea to harm the opponent, it rather anticipates at times the victory of the opponent.

(III) Brahmacharya or chastity. It is called also self-control or self-purification. Brahmacharya is considered popularly to be sex control, but this is incomplete and incorrect. The meaning of the word Brahmacharya is conduct adapted to the search of Truth and so it means control of all senses and moreover it expands to the control of all movements in our thoughts, words and deeds. He says: "The complete observance of Brahmacharya means the realization of Brahman, I do not learn it from a book, but by experience." Thus by the control of all senses Brahmacharya is gradually realized and at the same time a certain vitality is fostered in our bodies. Thought is the origin of speech and deed, and so the completely controlled thought is the highest latent force and the highest self-vitality.

(IV) Non-possession. Possession means provision for the future. A seeker after truth, a follower of the law of love need not store anything for to-morrow, and it is the business of God to provide the daily bread. Considered from the view of pure truth, the body is also a possession, and so it is the realization of the ideal of Non-possession to forsaake all desires for the body. Then we are free from the vicious cycle of births and deaths and our souls are omnipresent. But as long as we have our bodies, we must use them for the purposes of service.

This is a synopsis of Gandhi’s satyagraha, and his practical philosophy. He does not practise yoga in particular, but the actual world is for him a field for the pursuit of the Absolute and so politics is indeed his religion or ethics.

(D) Aurobindo is considered to be a deep yogi and an excellent philosopher. He meditates on the background of the phenomenal world, while he practises yoga. He calls the Absolute Saccidānanda, that is to say, Existence-Consciousness-Bliss. According to his opinion these three spheres are not the three Beings of the Absolute, but Existence is Consciousness, Consciousness is Bliss and Bliss is Existence. It is only One Being of the Absolute.

But when he pursues the Absolute, his philosophical eye is directed to Existence-Consciousness. After the hard application he gives to it the name Supermind. Aurobindo’s Existence-Consciousness seems to resemble Descartes’s cogito ergo sum. But in Descartes’s 'cogito' is 'sum', that is to say, 'je pense' is 'je suis', and so it is self-being as self-consciousness; in Aurobindo it may be a jīvātmā, individual self or a mind which proceeds from Consciousness. Therefore his Con-

sciousness is more fundamental and wider than cogito, and so his Existence is not 'je suis', but the universe.

He defines the Supermind as 'a vastness beyond the ordinary firmaments of our consciousness', and he says: "The Absolute is in the Universe, the Universe is in the Absolute, vice versa, and moreover the Universe itself is the Absolute." This is the Comprehensive Supermind, and so it is the Indivisible One.

When he sees the Indivisible One from the view of Consciousness, he calls it Force. It is said to be the fundamental movement or act of existence. This idea seems to resemble Leibnitz’s monade which is spiritual and conscious and at the same time vis or une force primitive or entéléchie, but the former is a maximum and the latter a minimum. According to him universal force is universal consciousness, in other words divine knowledge is divine will.

His pursuit of the Absolute is, of course, based on his yoga. But he does not only experience the deep yoga in his meditation-life, but he brings the experience also down into the actual world without confining it only to meditation, and treats of the real problems, for example, the awakening of the Indian people, the peace of the world and the future of the human race, etc. This is the reason why he names his own yoga the integral or pūrna (perfect) yoga, as compared with the previous concepts of yoga.

(E) Rabindranath Tagore is a great poet and has a philosophical view of life and the world. He also pursues the Absolute infinitely deep in the phenomenal world like the other thinkers. He believes deeply that the whole universe is one body. Human beings, animals and plants can be nothing else but appearances of the Absolute Brahman, and so they are one and the same life. The idea of the one body of the universe is deeply rooted in his thought. He absorbs Christianity and Buddhism, to say nothing of Hinduism in his grand view of the world.

I think it must be emphasized that Tagore reveals a scientific view of the world. While he devotes himself to poetical imaginations, on the one hand, on the other, he ponders on the future of science and predicts that the scope of science will come to embrace the entire universe. He says: "Through the help of science, as we come to know more of the laws of nature, we gain in power; we tend to attain a universal body. Our organ of sight, our organ of locomotion, our physical strength becomes world-wide; steam and electricity become our nerve and muscle."

According to him the whole world will become our extended body,
and thus Brahmanism will be realized ultimately through science.

We may summarize the common tendencies found in the philosophies of these thinkers as follows:

(1) The Absolute which those thinkers have pursued is to be proved in their personal experiences, and so in its meaning it is positive and real.

(2) The Absolute is bottomless, and so it must be pursued infinitely, in other words, the pursuit of the Absolute has no end.

(3) Those experiences of the Absolute are free from any thought or dogma, and on the contrary the true development of religion, ethics, art, life-action and so on must be based on them.

(4) The most noteworthy tendency in modern Indian philosophy is the emphasis placed on the importance of realizing our ideals in the actual world in which we live instead of confining ourselves to the realm of meditation and poetry. That is to say: While Vivekânanda practises jhāna-yoga deeply, he also emphasizes karma-yoga and ethical duty. Aurobindo is one of the deepest yogis and philosophers, and on the other hand he ponders on the peace of the world, the awakening of the Indian People and etc. Tagore thinks of the realization of his ideal through science, in spite of being a poet and a romantic philosopher. Gandhi is, of course, a practical man of action.

Although these are the most prominent tendencies today, modern Indian thought also concerns itself with various other problems. These problems are, for instance, social, scientific, religious, philosophical and so on. But of them I shall present only one problem. It is the confrontation of Indian thought with modern existentialism. Modern existentialism is considered to express the deepest spiritual sufferings of modern human beings. From ancient times Indian philosophy is fundamentally optimism. I originally believe in the ultimate optimism in human thought of the future, but it should be baptized with the spiritual sufferings of modern times which is revealed in existentialism. Otherwise it would be reduced to simple and easy optimism. Indian philosophy has assuredly infinite potential spiritual energy. When the Indian thinkers ponder on the actual world, their philosophy is confronted with existentialism which is the actual problem of modern times, it could give to the problem a certain solution and develop its life in a new sphere.

— THE LOGIC OF CRISIS

THE MAPPO THEORY IN INDIA, CHINA AND JAPAN —

BY

RYUJÔ YAMADA

This paper is an attempt to show how the Mappô theory originated in Buddhism and how it was received by Buddhists of the medieval age in the Orient. Emphasis must be placed on the point that the theory was one of the products of a social and spiritual crisis which Buddhists in the past had experienced. “Mappô 未法” is said to be the third stage in the history of Buddhist Dharma. It was believed among Buddhists that, after Buddha’s death, the time of decay would come sooner or later and Buddha’s teaching would be wiped out of existence. The destruction is to come gradually in three stages. The first stage is called the “Shobô 正法 (True Law) Period,” while the second is the “Zôbô 像法 (Imitation Law) Period.” After the elapse of these two stages there comes the “Mappô (the Latter Day’s Law) Period.”

There were, however, many different and contradictory views about the time and duration of the three periods. Some held the view that the True Law would continue for one thousand years after the death of Buddha, and the Imitation Law would prevail over the world for the next one thousand years. But others said that one thousand and five hundred years later after his demise the Mappô period would come and continue for ten thousand years. A very real problem for Buddhists was when the Mappô period would begin and when the True Teaching of Buddha would perish from the earth.

It is interesting that the advent of Mappô was not felt simultaneously all through the Buddhist world, but felt at regular intervals of some centuries. The conception of religious crisis was first cherished among the Buddhists in India in the sixth century, and was introduced next into China. In Japan it was felt in the eleventh century and the first year of the Mappô period was to be 1052 A.D.

It is natural that, from a psychological point of view, the followers
should be anxious of the transmission of their master's teachings in future. The conception of the decline of the Buddhist order became prevalent among them just after Buddha's death. They attributed it to the fact that the order had received women (bhikṣunis) as members of the order. They thought that, due to this fact, the True Law of Buddha (Saddharmasamādhyamakārikā) would be kept for only five hundred years instead of continuing for one thousand years. They believed that the period of the True Law would be replaced thereafter by the period of the Imitation Law. So we can see the conception of two stages in the earlier history of Buddhism. However, the word 'the Latter Day's Law' is not found in early Buddhist literature. Although the word 'Mappō' is found in the Chinese translation of the Saddharmapuṣṭapāda-sūtra (Taishō, Vol. 9, p. 37, p. 38b), which was translated by Kumārajīva in 406 A.D., the Sanskrit original 'paścime kāle paścime samaye' (Kern, p. 282)' has not the meaning which it was given later by the theory of the three periods.

The sūtra where the three periods, each covering five hundred years, were first mentioned, was probably the Daijō-dōshō-kyō 大乗同性経 (Taishō, Vol. 16, p. 64of). This sūtra was translated by Jhāna-yaśas, an immigrant translator from Central India; therefore it may be said that the conception of 'the Latter Day's Law' was prevalent in and after the middle of the sixth century.

The origin of such a conception was due to the fact that the Ephtalites invaded north-west India around 500 A.D. and destroyed Buddhist monasteries and temples in Kshatri and Gandhara. Mihilavāla (502–542), an Ephtalite king, whose tyranny was vividly described in some Indian and Chinese books, was remembered by Buddhists as the destroyer of Dharma. The persecuted Buddhists went so far as to fabricate a birth-story of Rengemen (Rengemen-gyō 蓮華年経). Mihilavāla was no other than the hero of this sūtra, who was described as an incarnation of the destrucive devil and a persecutor of Buddhism. The Rengemen-gyō does not use the word 'Mappō,' but describes what the word means. This sūtra was translated by Narendrayaśas in 584 A.D. He is also known as the translator of Nichō-bun 日藏分 and Gatsuzō-bun 月藏分 of the Daijōkyō 大乗経, where we find the word and description of 'the Mappō period' caused by the 'invasion of the foreign nation.' This description reflected the actual state of affairs in India in those days.

The theory of the three stages was introduced into China in the sixth century by those refugees from north-west India who took refuge in this Buddhist country. It was not, however, an age of peace in the history of China, but an age of civil wars. At the end of this century the Sui dynasty succeeded in bringing the country under one sway, when Eshō 仏は worthy countrmen of the advent of "the Mappō period." In 581 A.D. Shōingō 修行 (540–594) founded a new school of Buddhism called "Sankai-kyō 三階教," literally meaning "Three Stages School." Though his school vanished under the persecution of the Tang empire, he is said to have been the first priest who advocated the Mappō view of history in China.

As regards the date and duration of these periods, there were various views among Chinese Buddhists. But they were deeply impressed with the idea that the Buddhist Millennium was coming to an end. Generally speaking, no schools after this period in Chinese Buddhism could escape the influence of this pessimistic view. It is an undeniable fact that this idea paved the way to Jōdoism or Amida-faith in China.

In Japan the theory of the three stages was introduced in or around the seventh century. Saichō 智顕 (787–823) and Kūkai 金戒 (774–835), who are famous as the founders of Tendai and Shingon Sects respectively, mentioned the theory in their writings. Nevertheless, the advent of the Mappō period was not felt so keenly by the Japanese, until Genshin 源信 (942–1017) wrote a book entitled "Ojō-kyōshō 往生要集" in which he warned of the coming of the latter day. Quoting passages from the Daijōkyō more than thirty times, he declared that the Mappō period was coming near. According to him, the way to escape the coming catastrophe was solely by placing faith in Amida-Buddha. He excited great alarm in the minds of people in those days. The unsettled political and social situation increased such feelings of crisis. The aristocracy of ancient times, typified by the political monopoly of the Fujiwara family, was coming to an end and was being replaced by the warrior class. The critical situation in the political world led to the conception of religious crisis.

As a result of speculation, the first year of "Mappō" was sought to be calculated by Japanese scholars. They decided that the very year of 1052 A.D. (the seventh year of Eshō 永承) was exactly two thousand years after Buddha's death. They were convinced of its accuracy by many wars and natural calamities occurring after that year. There are many evidences in the diaries written by nobles and priests in those days which show how firmly they believed that they were entering the most degenerated age of world history.

Jiyou 智円 (1155–1225), archbishop of Mt. Hiroy, wrote an essay "Gukwan-shō 感覚抄," in which he expressed his views on history
based on the theory. We cannot think of the new Buddhist sects sprouting forth in the Kamakura period without thinking of the theory of impending doom. Buddhism in Japan from that time onward has been under the influence of the Mappō theory. Until the Meiji Restoration in the nineteenth century, the Japanese people could not be free from such a view which, originating in India, was advocated in China in the sixth century. At present the Japanese people are too much modernized to hold such an eschatological theory. But as far as man suffers spiritually and socially, the feeling of religious crisis will time and again be awakened in the conscious mind.

* Those who wish to make further studies on this subject are referred to the following articles written by me:

1) 遺留物語についてーグプタ末期のインド仏教事情ー (山口博士遺愛記念印度学佛教学論文, pp. 110–123)
2) 末劫思想についてー大乘経の成立問題ー (印度学佛教学研究 4-2, pp. 54–63)
3) 末劫思想 (日本文化史講座 3, 日本文化の展開 pp. 88–104)

THE CONSTRUCTION OF FUNDAMENTAL EVIL IN MAHÂYÂNA

BY

REIMON YUKI

The topic which I want to discuss here is based on a thought developed in the 5th century A.D. in India by one of the principal Mahâyâna schools, the Vijñâpatimâtratâ School; however, the method by which this thought is considered and applied to our daily experience is solely mine. The ideas of this school later spread to China and by the middle of the 7th century A.D., they found their way to Japan. In these respective places, they were further developed in the course of time until they reached their final form. Needless to say, this school is considered one of the basic schools of Mahâyâna and its doctrines are of prime importance in understanding the teachings of the various Mahâyâna schools existing in Japan and China.

Buddhism indeed, is divided into many sects and schools, each having its own peculiar doctrines; yet each and all are one in that they all understand the fundamental teaching of the historical Buddha to be that of non-self. There is, to be sure, a fierce struggle within every individual between the forces which attempt to harmonize the self with the fundamental non-self and the forces which only function in terms of greed, i.e. which are motivated by self-love, self-profit or self-advancement. Self-interest or an egoistical soul going against the spirit of non-self — that is what is here referred to as the sense of evil. Buddhism originally termed it kleśa. The reason why kleśa refers to a soul motivated by self-interest lies in this: When such a soul exists and when, for instance, it experiences dissatisfaction or discontent due to non-attainment of its desires, only then it suffers. Furthermore, if, for example, there is only momentary satisfaction due to a fulfillment of desires, then there are bound to be some reasons causing suffering later on. The actions of such a soul then are taken to be kleśa and they indicate the fact that suffering either mental or physical is an inevitable thing. Mahâyâna divides kleśa into the primary (mûlavkleśa) and the secondary types (upakleśa). A minute and systematic study of kleśa in Mahâyâna is best represented in the
literature of the Viśñupūrītā school, i.e. more specifically in the teachings of Dharmaṇā Ṛṣabha as seen in Chapter VI of the Viśñupūrītā Siddhā.

In this chapter the primary type of klesha is divided into six kinds and the secondary type into twenty, and their respective characteristics are defined both psychologically and morally; while further, the problems concerning them are divided into twelve different types and considered in detail. For this reason the study of the sense of evil in Mahāyāna, namely, the doctrinal study concerning klesha, is best treated by centering on the above divisions. But my purpose today is not to discuss them; rather, it is to evoke the fact that the sense of fundamental evil lies dormant in the background of acts and good deeds which are consciously thought to have avoided all evil and wrong. And further that all matters which are said to be good are, in reality, constitutive of and based on this sense of fundamental evil. Thus I attempt to utilize the results of the theory of klesha borne out by the studies made in the Viśñupūrītā Siddhā and to present the case in our daily experience.

Buddhism says that with the rise of the good soul, the cause of the rise of the various personal desires is swept away. The good soul means that all personal desires have been dissociated and an identity has been established with the non-self. Thus it must be said that a person who has attained the good soul has also destroyed or overcome any sense of evil. We must attempt to understand the fact that there is actually another more fundamental and primary sense of evil lying dormant behind the ordinary consciousness and power of reason even though we normally think that nothing exists after having destroyed all evil and attaining the nature of personal good. We must then attempt to seek a way to understand this situation.

In seeking a way, I would like to present two situations which analyze and bring out the psychological make-up of man. One is the situation in which a man is about to commit suicide and the other is the situation where a man thinks that he is in the state of good because he destroyed all personal desires.

When a man contemplates suicide he is supposed to desire and work toward that end, unmindful of anything, in a spiritual and bodily manner. Let us assume that suddenly death is near and that he is looking for a place to commit it. He is on a high cliff and about to plunge into the blue ocean below. All of a sudden, there is a rumbling from above and a huge rock is pouncing directly at him. He need no longer seek a place to jump into the ocean for the pouncing rock has created an ideal situation for his suicide. Yet, instead of remaining

still and letting the rock bring his desired death, he instinctively sidesteps to safety. This is a common phenomenon and shows that the real act is to escape, not desire, death. From this it cannot be denied that there exists another self different from the self which had seemingly sought after death, totally and completely. I believe there is no other way of interpreting this implicated phenomenon than to assume that this separate self upsets the sole existence of the ordinary self bent on suicide. As a consequence, we must acknowledge the fact that there are two selves functioning at the same time, the one always latent behind the other and which, in terms of time and circumstances, either function harmoniously without conflicting appearances of function separately and distinctively.

Let us now take up the other situation, that is, the psychological analysis of a man who is in a state of good by reason of having destroyed all personal desires. In this situation, we are again able to observe the encounter and the conflict between the latent self and the ordinary self. For example, let us take the case of an office worker who does a good deed based on the conception of office duty. He seeks no rewards or remuneration because his deed arises out of his sense of duty. In fact, he is so sensitive that a slight calculative act would bother him in no small way. Let us assume further that his good deed is not outwardly appreciated and even ignored by his fellow workers. Now, although he is very careful in suppressing his feelings of displeasure at not being appreciated, it is only natural that he be discontented and unhappy in the long run. The discontent and unhappiness underscores the oppression of the ordinary self by the latent self. If only the ordinary self existed, the natural course for him would be to avoid the immoralities of demanding appreciation and to suppress his feelings because non-appreciation is consonant with a self guided by the sense of duty which ought to feel rights satisfied. But this is definitely not the case. As a consequence, it is inevitably true that we must acknowledge the existence of the two selves.

To return to the thought manifested in the Viśñupūrītā Siddhā, the above two situations can be treated in an understandable manner. The Siddhā states that in a conscious self which is supposedly without self-interest and in the realm of non-self, acts such as almsgiving require a giver and a receiver. But such a duality is resolved by the fact that there is a self which lies at the base in a transcendental manner and functions in an opposite direction from the conscious self. The opposition then sets up the duality which is only an internal phenomenon. The two selves arrived at in the two situations presented
above can be interpreted as entities functioning or moving in opposite directions. Well then, What is the character of this latent self which stands behind and beyond the ordinary self? In order to understand it, let us examine situations which are the exact opposites of the two instances illustrated above. Namely, on the question of suicide, a person desirous of living even one day longer does not instinctively choose death (e.g. remain where a rock may fall), and on the question of the good deed performed out of a sense of duty, the worker is not unhappy but rather contented because of the lack of appreciation shown by others. Stated in another manner, in the case of a man who is governed only by self-respect and self-gain, the latent self resides silently and co-functions with the ordinary self; but in the reverse situation, regardless of the determined will to act in a self-respectful and self-gainful manner, the latent self immediately acts or imposes itself in a contradictory manner. From all this it can be inferred that one of the characteristics of the latent self is to be in sympathy with and work toward the well-being of the ordinary self. By getting at a bit of the true nature of the latent self we are able to arrive at the whole picture by analogy. According to the study of kleśa made by the Viññapti-mātratā School and with regard to the most simple six fundamental kleśas, the rise of covetousness is due to ignorance of the truth of non-self. Because of this ignorance the self is established and it is loved, coveted and arrogantly protected. This process is a natural phenomenon. How then do we come to understand the fundamental evil in man? We must first arrive at the state of good by doing away with evil and wrongdoing of the conscious and willful ordinary self. Then it will be known that the state of good thus attained is still governed by the latent self which is characterized by the primary kleśas of ignorance, false views, covetousness, and arrogance. At the level of the latent self, the limits of man's conscious good are reached but this good cannot unconditionally be said to be in the nature of absolute good. The situation exhibits man's fundamental evil and accounts for his inexorable state of fate. In this manner, the consciousness of evil as treated in Mahāyāna is based on an existential construction which establishes that even conscious good rests upon a more fundamental evil.

Section IV
General:

Phenomenology
Psychology of Religion
Sociology of Religion
Philosophy of Religion
SOME USES OF ANALOGY IN RELIGIOUS SOCIAL THOUGHT

By

JAMES LUTHER ADAMS

Analogia entis is a familiar philosophical device for delineating similarity and dissimilarity between the finite and the infinite. Much older than the method of analogy in metaphysics is the symbolization of social order through the use of analogy. This "procedure of rationalism" (Whitehead) presupposes that various areas of experience are interrelated in such a way that the basic structure of one area can be used as a key to the pattern of other areas. Certain analogies have dominated attention in the history of Western religious-social analogies thought, such as organism, mechanism, and creative process.

A system of religious belief generally adopts a controlling image, a root metaphor, that provides a model of social integration. The integrating image, a collective representation of social order, purports to represent the divine intention, *sub specie analogiae*. Thus it serves a multiple purpose for members of the religious group. It becomes at the same time an object of identification, an occasion for the internalization of the symbolized social order, and an indication of a decisive means of participation in being.

The integrating image may be employed analogically from one level of being to another, for example, from the celestial to the mundane. This is the vertical application of analogy (cf. M. Eliade, "celestial archetypes"). Familiar here is the microcosmological image of society, for example, the Babylonian view that society follows the pattern of celestial revolutions. In contrast to the vertical is the horizontal application of analogy. Here the image, perhaps ostensibly a celestial or metaphysical archetype, may be drawn from one sphere of the mundane order and be applied to another sphere, for example, the macroanthropological analogy employed where the state is viewed as man writ large (Plato). Again, the image, initially applied in the ecclesiastical sphere, may be adopted as a model of integration for the non-ecclesiastical sphere, or vice versa. In the present paper our concern will be primarily with the horizontal uses of analogy.
The conflicts in religious-social thought have generally been conflicts between rivalalogies. The war between the gods of men is a war over analogies. Conflict and change in social philosophy take place when the attempt is made to substitute one societal analogy for another, or to reinterpret a prevalent analogy. Sometimes a change in analogy will be rejected on the ground that it allegedly involves the illegitimate transfer of an analogy from the sacred to the profane or from the profane to the sacred sphere. The Protestant Reformer, Martin Luther, for example, with his Two-Kingdom theory objected to any such transfer in either direction. Sometimes, however, the horizontal transfer of analogy will be approved in one direction, but it will be disapproved in the opposite direction. Roman Catholic social philosophers, for example, characteristically have approved the transfer of the organic metaphor of hierarchy from the ecclesiastical to the political sphere, but they have vigorously rejected the proposal that analogies drawn from the democratic civil society be transferred to the ecclesiastical order. This question as to the validity of the horizontal use of analogy has given rise to one of the most persistent and vigorous controversies that has appeared in the century-long development of Christian social thought.

An example of this controversy regarding the horizontal use of analogy is presented sharply in the construction of the evolution of the primitive Christian Ecclesia offered by Rudolph Sohm, a Lutheran jurist of half a century ago. His view reminds one of Thomas Hobbes's statement that the Roman Catholic church is the ghost of the Roman Empire sitting at its grave. Sohm would agree with Hobbes that a political form of organization was adopted by the Roman church, and herein he sees the "fall" of the church from its proper order. In other words, he rejects the analogy between the political and the ecclesiastical spheres. In his *Kirc.eurech* (1892) Sohm argues that the primitive Christian Ecclesia, described by St. Paul as the Body of Christ, was an organism ruled spontaneously by the Holy Spirit, that is, by charismatic authority. The Ecclesia was changed and corrupted into the Roman church when it adopted an alien principle, the principle of law, an authority that belongs to the political order. Thus, the Ecclesia "fell" from grace into law, from pneumatocracy into bureaucracy. Henceforth the church leaders claimed not charismatic authority but rather legal authority and tenure of office. This whole view is of course stoutly rejected by Roman Catholic authorities who, instead of viewing the primitive Ecclesia as decisively under charismatic authority, interpret the Body of Christ as an organism under a dominical authority issuing from St. Peter to whom the keys of the church were entrusted. It is not possible to evaluate Sohm's thesis here. It will suffice to recall that Max Weber considered the process described by Sohm as ubiquitous in institutional existence. Accordingly, he radicalized Sohm's concept of charismatic authority and then characterized the bureaucratization of authority as the routinization of charisma, a process to be observed in non-ecclesiastical as well as in ecclesiastical institutions.

In the Middle Ages, the analogy of organism is the dominant metaphor, and again the analogy gives rise to conflicting interpretations. Generally associated with this analogy is the conception of the Whole and the Parts, the macrocosm and the microcosm. In medieval theory is the analogy bifurcated so that under the universal Whole and under the Whole of making the spiritual and the temporal orders may serve different purposes. In this fashion, the organic analogy is given bureaucratic articulation, an articulation that in its vertical dimension is sanctioned by the theory of the chain or hierarchy of being. Indeed, we may say that the neo-Aristotelian conception of the hierarchy of being provides a metaphysical sanction for the bureaucratic organization of society.

Within the framework of the hierarchy of being and of the bifurcation of the spiritual and the temporal powers, the principle of conflict over analogies emerges in the attempt to resolve the duality between church and state. Already with Athenius in the fourth century, the theory of the High Church party is prefaced: The Emperor, so to speak, is put out of the chancel and into the pew. In the Middle Ages, the High Church party claims temporal as well as spiritual power for the Pope, though bifurcation is retained in the sense that the temporal jurisdiction of the Pope is finally confined to the priesthood, whereas the remaining temporal power is mediated through the church. In the last resort, the state is considered to be an ecclesiastical institution, and its temporal offices are ecclesiastical offices. Thus the spiritual hierarchy is taken as the model of integration for church and society, that is, for the corpus christianum as well as for the church. In this way, the organic principle of the Whole is guarded.

In face of this claim of the church, resisting parties take up the struggle by attempting to reinterpret the organic analogy. The partisans of the autonomy of the state do battle against the High Church party's use of the analogy of the Whole, by insisting upon the coherency of the spiritual and the temporal powers. According to the theory of coordinated powers the temporal authority possesses its own
inherent authority not mediated by the church and not dependent upon ecclesiastical canons. In the course of time decentralizing tendencies of a federalist sort bring about the reinterpretation of the organic analogy by giving greater authority to the *pars* of the Whole. The organic analogy begins to break in two. New analogies appear such as covenant and contract, analogies ostensibly derived from the Bible, and such as the analogies of eschat and reversion drawn from the Roman legitms. Out of these tendencies comes the revision of the organic analogy which affirms the right of a whole Body to institute its Head "from below", a right allegedly sanctioned by divine and natural law. This thrust in the direction of popular sovereignty finds its parallel in the Conciliar movement which tries to mitigate the centralized power claimed by papal interpretation of the analogy of organism. In this whole development, we see quite different, indeed almost opposite interpretations assigned to the concept of organism.

The organic analogy continues to exercise its appeal in the later periods, for the most part being used in such a way as again to transfer the analogy from the ecclesiastical to the non-ecclesiastical spheres. The analogy reappears not only in Calvin who combines it with mitigating pneumatic and constitutional elements but also in the later century of the divine right of kings. It appears again in the early nineteenth-century Restorationist Catholics and Protestants who use it for radically conservative purposes. In the subsequent period, the Saint-Simonians adopt the analogy of organism from medieval church theory, using it to justify a totalitarian society ruled by scientific technocrats instead of by priests. They even propound a philosophy of history which contrasts authoritarian organic periods with liberal periods pervaded by disintegrating freedom of criticism. In all of these views which emerged after the Industrial Revolution and after the French Revolution, the organic analogy is set up in opposition to mechanistic-functional analogies favored by proponents of laissez-faire.

Previous to these developments radical reinterpretation of analogy appear in a variety of ways in neo-Calvinism and in the aggressive sects of the Left Wing of the Reformation. These movements stand in opposition to both Catholic and Right Wing Protestant conceptions of hierarchy. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the attempt is made to revive charismatic authority. Appealing to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, for example, the proponents of congregational polity demand a radical dispersion of power. Adopting Biblical theories of covenant, they set forth the theory of the voluntary "gathered church", they demand the separation of church and state, they insti-

ute a radical laicism that favors the priesthood and prophethood of all believers. In the name of the Holy Spirit they demand the protection of minority views within the church. Thus they reject the medieval principle of *corpus christianum*, insisting that stable social order does not require uniformity of religious belief. The Holy Spirit must be free to blow where it listeth. The Body of Christ is the arena of free-flowing charismatic power.

But the analogy is carried further. It is transferred to the state. In seventeenth-century England and New England, the new organic doctrine of the free church is by analogy, applied also the political order. We must recognize that the evidence in this matter is not entirely consistent, as Prof. Leo Salt has recently shown. Moreover, the sectarians place some restrictions on the application of the analogy to the secular order. Nevertheless, by means of the principle of analogy the liberty and equality which had been claimed as appropriate for the church is now demanded also in the state. In general, we may say that the birth of Anglo-Saxon democracy comes as a consequence of the discovery of an analogy, the analogy of a dynamic organism. We have here perhaps an anticipation of the popular modern analogy of creative process. (The organicism analogy).

We have mentioned earlier Martin Luther's rejection of just this horizontal use of analogy, the transfer of analogy from church to society. As against Luther, the Calvinist theologian, Karl Barth has recently attempted to show the implications of the Gospel which favor the democratic society.

One should not, however, overlook Luther's assertion of analogy between the mundane spheres, and in particular, his assertion of analogy between the family and the state. Here we encounter the concept of "father" as a controlling image providing a model of integration within the framework of organism. In face of the collapse of Roman Catholic hierarchism in the Protestant milieu, Luther assigns a new status and role to the *pater familias*, not only in the family, but also in the state. The Fourth Commandment, "Honor thy father and thy mother," is interpreted by Luther as a divine sanction for obedience to the magistrate as well as to the domestic parent. The horizontal use of this analogy has served in German Lutheranism to promote an ethos of obedience in family, school, church and state. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Lutheran jurist, Friedrich Julius Stahl exalted the patriarchal authority of divinely given "ordinances" in favor of a personalistic and absolute monarchism. In doing so, he neglected mitigating elements in Luther's view. Yet, since his time, as Emil
Brunner has pointed out, the tendency of conservative Lutherans has been to see Luther through the spectacles of Stahl.

In the present survey, however, our principal concern has been with organic and organismic analogies related to the doctrine of the Body of Christ. Looking back over the uses of analogy, we may say that the social philosophies produced by the churches tend to reflect the kinds of church polity represented in the several types of religious association. A given type of religious association, as Troeltsch has observed, tends to view its own polity as a model of social integration. This polity becomes a criterion for non-ecclesiastical as well as for ecclesiastical organization. We may add that the general pertinence of the controlling image of any particular polity alter with a changed social situation. Or, it may alter to suit the needs of newly emerging interests. The image is something like a wax nose to be twisted according to wish. Hence, any given model of integration will pass through stages of relative anachronism and renewed relevance. The patterns of the Left Wing of the Reformation enjoyed special relevance, for example, in the period of expanding capitalism. In the changed situation of the later phases of capitalism, on the other hand, the need for newly integrating controls has appeared to give new relevance to the centralizing patterns of Roman Catholicism and of the Right Wing of the Reformation. Thus, one sees the continuing struggle between the rival analogies, the character of the struggle, shifting with changing rival definitions of the changing situation. In any event, if we take a long view over the history of religious-social thought and conflict in the West we may say that analogy conquers all. But it does this primarily through the reinterpretation of analogies that possess power.

EASTERN FEATURES IN THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL

BY

VAN METER AMES

The Chinese ideal of spiritual achievement as inseparable from competence in ordinary living has been expressed as "the way of sageliness within and kingliness without." In Fung Yu-lan's words this means: "in the midst of daily life 'to... ferry over into the beyond'." He wrote thus as a Neo-Confucianist. Daisetz T. Suzuki has said much the same thing as a Zen spokesman: "...when a Buddhist philosopher declares that there is nothing to see, nothing to hear, etc., we must understand it as not denying the experiences of our daily life but as indeed confirming them in every way." "To ferry over into the beyond" means to arrive beyond dualism at the undivided life. Fung has called this "the open secret" of Chinese philosophy, the secret of "realizing the highest values in daily life itself..." He recognized that this is close to what William James meant by appreciation of "pure experience"—not as the baby begins with it but as the sage comes back to it after "crossing the boundary" to wisdom.

In Chicago two thousand years of Chinese thought converged with two hundred years of American thought. The Chicago thinkers unconsciously approached the Chinese by way of William James (1842–1910) and Charles Peirce (1839–1914). James had pioneered in a naturalistic psychology, identifying the self with the biological organism, but as more than body, and yet without going outside nature and experience. In his view the "more than body" develops through the use of signs in communication, in the direction of abstract concepts. But the process of intellectual abstraction fosters and enriches immediate experience. James felt that if this empirical approach were applied to religion a new era of religion would begin. As an Eastern sage might say, William James said: "Philosophy lives in words, but truth and fact well up into our lives in ways that exceed verbal formulation." Charles Peirce analyzed what is involved in verbal formulation,
and in the use of mathematical and other signs as well. He saw that the meaning of a term or a sentence is to be sought in what it leads to in further terms and in their consequences. As in the case of James, Peirce's scientific interest merged with his religious feeling. He realized that human life is not sealed in individual units, and is less so the more thoughtful it becomes, since thought is the use of symbols, and symbols are essentially social, being developed through the communication and cooperation of human beings; that is, through love. So Peirce saw no break between what is technical, logical, scientific, and what is most human. Reflection upon the import of his research led him to regard religion as "a great, perhaps the greatest factor of that social life which extends beyond one's own circle of friends." The ceaseless progression, the "more" always involved in the sign-using process, which never stops with a final sign, pointed for James, as for Peirce, to the outreach of religion in a man's "total reaction upon life." 

John Dewey (1859–1952) expressed the same sense of "the human abode" within "the mysterious totality of being the imagination calls the universe." in A Common Faith. With his leadership at The University of Chicago from 1894 to 1904 "The Chicago School" became famous in philosophy, and continued vigorously after his departure for Columbia. But he made no application of his thought to religion until A Common Faith in 1934. There he used ideas which his younger colleague Edward Scribner Ames (1870–1958) had worked out in The Psychology of Religious Experience (1910) and Religion (1929). Ames said in the latter book that God is for men "the grand total, living process in which they live and move and have their being... idealized and personified." 

In his thought about the idea of God, Ames had the benefit of the very original thinking of his Chicago colleague George H. Mead (1869–1931), whose study of biology and of social psychology enabled him to carry further and put together James' pioneering study of the self and Peirce's analysis of the use of signs; incidentally confirming scientifically the Buddhist insight that the self is a process rather than an entity. For Mead the self develops through give-and-take with other selves by means of gesture, mainly vocal; taking over the responses of others, their roles, and fusing them with the impulses of the "I's" own life, to form a new "me" which grows through further communication and cooperation; and through carrying on in the I-me "private forum" the same process of sign-using. In building up a new mind or self there is, in addition to awareness of other individual selves, the merging of them in what Mead called "the generalized other." 

The question has been asked by Charles Morris: "How far does the generalized other provide the psychological equivalent of the historical concept of God...?" 

Mead himself was alienated from his religious upbringing, but did not altogether avoid the religious implication of his ideas. James and Peirce had failed to see the full religious import of theirs. It was left for Ames to work out for religion the significance of James' and Mead's finding that the self (or consciousness) is not an entity but a kind of activity: discriminating and choosing ends, and striving for them, while interacting with such activity in other people, in a boundless experience. The generalized other, in its full meaning, however, is not just other people in contemporary society, with their limitations, but reaches beyond them, especially in the grand extension of the sign-using process which is science, exploring to the utmost all that is and all that may be done. Here is the comprehensive sense of "communion with God."

Conceiving the divine as the close yet all-enfolding other, to rely upon and be guided by, was anticipated in China not only by Confucius but by Mo Tzu (born 470 B.C. in the decade after the death of Confucius). In both these ancient teachers the emphasis was social rather than supernatural. The Chinese parallel is noted by Professor Y. P. Mei (a Chinese Ph. D.), saying that Mo Tzu "relied on common sense" in finding the Will of Heaven to be "universal love and mutual aid"; and that, if Mo Tzu believed in spirits, he made clear that the value of believing in them was in supposing that their all-seeing would discourage misconduct. "Their explicit function is to make happiness follow virtue... and to idealize and intensify the highest social values, in Professor Ames' favourite phrase."

The naturalistic, social and psychological approach to religion, both in China and Chicago, represents, to quote Mei again, "a happy balance between the moral and the aesthetic elements of life." In the words of Ames: "God is conceived as the soul of social values, the embodiment of ideals, the reality of the good and the beautiful, the meaning of the world." Accordingly, for Ames there is: "no longer the old difficulty concerning his existence. His reality is as demonstrable as the world itself... If there is any reality to the life of a city, or of a nation, or of humanity, then there is that kind and degree of reality to God. No doubt the reality of God is greater but it is of this kind... God is the spirit of the world of living beings, taken in their associated and ideal experience." This seems to be what Dewey had in mind when he came to speak of God as the "active
relation between the ideal and the actual."134 Horace M. Kallen has said he is sure that the work of Ames "enabled Dewey to accept and use the word 'God' with a good conscience."135

For Ames "religion has no values of its own"; but finds "the values which it cherishes, in the stream of actual, concrete experience."136 After pointing out the increasing importance of democracy and science, he observed: "Therefore Christianity faces a new epoch, an epoch which requires that she identify herself completely in spirit and purpose with the highest values of modern democracy and science."137 Since absolutism is both undemocratic and unscientific, it was clear to Ames that religion could not continue to insist upon preconceptions about life and society in the form of any fixed tradition or final revelation. His explanation of the religious absolutism in the past was that action demands absolutes, and that religion was always concerned with the most insistent activities and emergencies of life, involving food and sex, birth and death. Nevertheless he expected that religion would come to a point where "the practical absolute of action will be accompanied by a process of reflective reconstruction in the direction of an expansive social ideal."138

To abandon absolutism in the West, through the inquiring and experimental spirit of modern science and democracy, would be to recover something like the open and flexible outlook of Confucius.139 Then Western religion might become coscientific, recognize the unfinished character of the world, and enjoy venturing into unforeseen consequences, beyond all that can be calculated, with confidence that men can meet them with resourcefulness and courage, and with one another.

There is the saving sense of belonging to the surrounding, ongoing oneness of men and nature in Mead’s generalized other, in the outreach of the self holding together the not-self and the not-other. The Chicago philosophy reaffirms in new terms the wisdom of ancestor worship. It not only enhanced the continuity with descendants; in the interpretation of Fung Yu-lan it enabled the Chinese to take "life and death as biological facts" while "the psychological effect is that a man is 'saved' from the momentariness of his life and gains a genuine feeling of a life beyond."140

In the East and in the West the disintegration of traditional cults, whether in the remote past or more recently, has left, as Mead said: "the demand for the relation of the self to the universe….. unsatisfied and unmediated." But, if the "old formulas are no longer adequate," for Mead: "Life is in no sense less interesting. Its values are there and are as precious as ever they were. But we are forced to redefine them if we are to use our means to secure them."141

With all the difference which modern science makes between the philosophy of Chicago and that of ancient China or of traditional Japan, the need has been the same: to find a way of conserving and renewing the sense of values. Dewey spoke for The Chicago School in admitting there is no absolute guarantee that "the method of intelligence and thoughtful valuation" will "save from ruin and destruction." Recognizing that hazard and contingency cannot be ruled out, he said that "faith in a wholesale and final triumph is fantastic," but that the method of intelligence is recommended by the results of the alternatives, which are "authority, imitation, caprice and ignorance, prejudice and passion."142

Dewey’s emphasis upon intelligence may be closer to Confucianism than to the intuitionism of Zen. But it seems that Zen came about through a fusion of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. And it has been common for the same person in the Far East to follow more than one philosophy. In America it is increasingly important to be more than one thing at once. Mead showed that this is basically what it means to be a person: to entertain various attitudes, take over diverse roles and put them together. In strenuous and troubled America today the need is felt especially to blend intellectual energy and moral earnestness with a meditative serenity like that of Taoism or Zen. In effect the Chicago thinkers knew this. To them all thought and effort were for the purpose of enhancing the "pure experience" celebrated by William James, which has no purpose beyond itself. It is not merely a question of being energetic in order to take it easy. The real point is the Zen-and-Dewey point that means and ends flow together; that doing what needs to be done is as good as doing nothing; because there is no difference between doing and enjoying when oneness is won.

THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION

BY

ANTON ANTWEILER

1. The aim of enquiry

It is a commendable usage, may be a law even, to start with the definition or definitions of the object or objects into which the enquiry is to be made. But in the case before us it is impossible to do so because the definition of religion is the intended result of this enquiry.

Generally speaking the giving of definitions is difficult enough, for several reasons, which spring from the fact that man is not the creator of his thinking and its objects. From the rule that it is in the last analysis impossible to give exact definitions we may except only the definitions in mathematics – such as of number, exponent, extracting a root, integral, or point, line, space – and Natural Sciences – such as of idealized objects, centre of gravity, frictionless motion, electrical charge concentrated in a point. But if Man, World, God – whatever we mean by these terms – are to be taken into consideration it is highly difficult to find a definition that combines Man, World and God in a proper balance and without contradiction as it is required in defining religion.

Nevertheless it seems to be necessary to tackle this task, at least with the intention of showing and solving the difficulties arising and of characterizing the position taken up. Above all this it is fascinating to ask and search for a definition of religion that tries to comprehend the different forms and confessions of religious experiences, such as primitive religions, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity; this definition would have to give the feeling, thinking and way of expression common to all these.

2. The foundations: experience

The starting point and the centre of religious experience is the fact that man experiences and – in consequence of this experiencing – knows that he is not self-sufficient in any way whatever. On the contrary – or the same fact expressed in other words –: there is some other
being or even other beings, mighty tremendous, fascinating, demanding respect and obedience.

It is not to be wondered at that this experience of not-self-sufficiency is different amongst men in its breadth and depth, in intensity and consciousness, in expression and behaviour, in starting point and aim, in feeling and thinking, in scales of values and in appreciation by the followers themselves or other men, and in consequence in the definitions of religion.

But in every case there are two poles: man and not-man, or whatever word we use. Therefore it would be useful to divide the definitions to be given into two groups, the first giving the definitions respecting primarily man and the second giving definitions respecting primarily not-man, in most cases called: God.

3. Religion as self-representation of man

Religion is the expression of a certain conception of life which is mostly irrational in character and ultimately inexpressible in words (Lebensgefühl). Religion comprehends the whole of human life. The expression of religion is not subdivided and specialized as are art, science, craftsmanship and engineering; it is not confined to and does not confine the things expressed, the means of expression or the intention in expressing them; it is not restricted to the short period of a life-time.

Religion is the deepest and finest form of self-experience. It is, so to speak, an instinct of the mind. It comprehends the primeval and primitive mental state of man. This means first the primeval situation of mankind, both of men and man, the origin, source and content of experience as such. This means secondly the sensations and reactions of man, permanently existing and erupting (Urgefühle), anxiety and fear, love and hatred, security and persecution, activity and passivity. This means thirdly primeval and spontaneous reactions, of eating or drinking, of speaking or being silent, of crying or weeping, of approaching or avoiding, of saving or killing, of making gestures with parts of the body or with the body as a whole.

Religion is the centre and expression of the life-core of the individual. The life-core is simple, but not uniform or poor. Though simple it contains ethics directed towards goodness, action directed towards forming materials of any kind, science in its search for truth, and art in its search for the beautiful. It is lasting, it is not dependent on fashion, or if so, then only on the surface. It is sincere, and it may in some cases be feigned or camouflaged or acted: all this is not more than a mere adaptation to persons and things; in itself it is clear. Religion as understood in this sense includes differences: man feels what he is—great or little, gay or serious, active or receptive, and he feels even more what he is not, neither in this world nor in the world beyond. The consequences arising from this idea of religion are noteworthy: his conception of life being shaken up, his religion is also shaken up, and vice versa. Another consequence: the generation or uncontrolled eruption of life-gifts turns in religion into a fanatical and destructive enthusiasm, into sentimentality and hybris. On the other hand religion deteriorates if the life-force dwindles away. An important example is the knowledge of sin and punishment.

Religion as knowledge is an other form of man's self-expression. Knowledge is possible, in the form of a dream, of experience, of scientific truth, of wisdom and of knowledge based upon revelation (credulit intelligam). Without any doubt religion causes dreams as a way to come into contact with higher (or deeper, but mighty) beings; causes experiences with the aim of getting wider and deeper insight into creation; urges on to scientific researches which enquire into the content of the statements given and the truth of religious sayings; urges on to wisdom as a way of life which conforms to knowledge and mystery; urges on to looking for revelation as the last and highest way of satisfying the purposes of the intellect. Religion is the universe of the spirit.

Religion is the consciousness of being powerful. The mighty god—or whatever he may be called—figures foremost, and in his name his followers feel themselves powerful, against the enemies of god, against the enemies of their religious society, against their own enemies, both in their interior and exterior lives. History gives ample proof of this statement.

Religion is the sphere of progressive improvement and transcendence. Man feels himself as a being that has to rise above himself. He is too unimportant, too weak and too liable to sin. Exactly for this reason he does not despair, on the contrary: he is convinced that he has to be transmuted to a higher level. Prayer and mercy express this fact, also the incarnation of god—or gods—into human beings, really or apparently (dokeism). Saints are living super-men, and some monks and nuns try to live as angels.

This conception of religion leads to the last meaning of religion in this part of our enquiry: religion is not the only but the most powerful means of redemption. First redemption is liberation, from physical pain (illness, weakness, death) as well as from psychic dolours.
(hopelessness, despair, dejection, unsuccessfulness, loneliness and the being excluded from human respect and society). Secondly and more important redemption is liberation from sin.

4. Religion as a relationship to God

The survey of the different forms of religion as self-representation of man reveals that he is fundamentally related to other beings, God being the highest and mightiest of these. The modes of relationship between man and God are manifold. Only a few shall be mentioned in the following.

Religion is the experience and the knowledge of being dependent on God. Man finds himself depending on powers within the world, beyond and above the world. These powers are felt as impersonal or personal and are named accordingly. Not only do they cause things and processes, but they also impose their will upon the will of man. Men accept the higher will or do not accept it; in the first case they feel themselves devoted to it, in the second they feel themselves disobedient and sinful. Fideism and determinism are special forms of this experience and knowledge of dependency.

Religion is reverence of the Absolute. Reverence however is a complex feeling. It contains the fear of a powerful being to which we are related; contains the inclination towards giving him honour, an honour which is founded in his high ethical qualities; and contains the feeling of security – all these components being permeated by the consciousness of being different and distant from that Absolute. There is no question put that the reverence of the Absolute is more impressive for most men if the Absolute is a person. But there is also no question put that the feeling for reverence is also present if the highest being is conceived as being impersonal, as is for instance shown by the idea of Nirvana and the different concepts of the Absolute in an indefinite or negative form.

Religion is finally lively reciprocal contact with God. This contact is a comprehensive expression of life, relationship, union and obligation – not excluding relationship of other kinds. Life means that God is a living God, that only by living according to his will he can be served by men, that man's life has to express his inner life, given to him by God. Relationship means that the divine life of religion has its origin in God, its aim in man, that man has to return to God, intentionally and finally. Union means that God searches for men who will serve him, in other words that God will live in his followers, and that on the other hand man will live in God temporarily and very imperfectly during this life here, but eternally and perfectly in the life beyond – in Paradise of with Brahma or in Nirvana. Obligation comprehends the duties of daily life amongst men, the witness of God in thought and action, the glorification in prayer and service.

5. A proposal for a condensed definition

The definitions of religion given so far are taken from a larger number, but I hope that they will be representative of the main positions possible in this field. What they have in common is this: that man is not selfsufficient, that on the contrary he is put into a relationship with something – with something beside, below and above him, and that he has to act according to this fact. Let me try to compose these points of view into a comprehensive definition, by starting from a simple definition and progressing to a more and more definite definition.

Religion is an exhortation or a demand to show respect to the whole. This whole differs in wideness, value, intensity of living or number of and connection between the parts of the whole. But in every case man sees himself as an essential part of the whole.

Religion is the readiness for experiences without making reservations. This follows from the fact that man does not perceive and understand simultaneously either himself or his surroundings; but he proceeds step by step towards the experience of himself by getting to know his surroundings and towards the experience of his surroundings by getting to know himself. Religion demands and causes willingness and readiness to proceed further – throughout one's life.

Religion is the ability and decision to live – which means to think and to act according to the most important being or thing of this world. It does not matter whether the important being or thing is really important or important only to the understanding of the believers. The fact that it is necessary to choose some things or persons or processes as most important, depends on the other fact that man can not know and respect all individual things contained in the whole of his world or even of the world. He has to select, and this selection is the fundamental action on his way towards religion.

Religion is the connection with the core and the re-ligio to the origin. This core and origin may be conceived as things or persons or processes, but not in every case on the same level. They are arranged; from the point of space: they have a core; from the point of time: they have an origin; from the point of value: they have a summit.
There are however three different cases: the core and origin may be—first—wholly unknown, as for instance Nirvana; or may be—secondly—a god beside whom the world is nearly nothing; or may be—thirdly—a god in his sacred essence, connected with the creation as his own work.

In the first case religion is the way to become man, but to be man no more as an individual being. In the second case religion is the way to leave the visible world and to go to into the invisible. In the third case religion is the way to serve God and to search for him within and beyond this world.

In each of these religions is a matter belonging to a person. Therefore it is possible to define religion as a way of assigning to a person his place within the order of reality. Or in greater detail: religion is the unconditional and best possible insertion of a person into the highest obtainable structure and order of reality.

If one wishes the reality to be distinguished into God an! World (or Universe), than religion may be defined as connection with God and relation-ship to the (outer-god) Universe.

If it seems to be superfuous expressly to include the Universe in the definition of religion, that religion is direction of man towards the centre of reality, in most cases the centre understood as person, called God.

The most general definition seems to be: religion is the unconditional and best possible insertion of a person into the highest obtainable structure and order of reality.

The varieties of religion are given by the differences of what one understands by reality, universe or world, centre, structure and order, obtainable and possible, highest and best, and finally: god.

In every case religion is an attitude of man that demands obligations towards God, World, Man, within and beyond this life-time and earth.

FACES OF GOD: A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS IMAGERY

BY MARGUERITE BLOCK

We derive our knowledge of conceptions of deity in the various religions mainly from sacred books and theological writings, but there is another source of knowledge, less used by scholars but, perhaps, equally important, that is, religious art. From the artists we learn what the gods look like to their worshipers, what feelings they evoke, and how they are to be approached—in fear, in awe, or in love. Applying Rudolph Otto's categories of aspects of "the Holy" to these images, we discover interesting correlations, for, in the faces of the gods, we find the tremendum, the numinosum, and the fascinans in various degrees and combinations. Otto himself says that in art the numinos is expressed by the sublime, but, especially in primitive art, we often find it in forms impressive, but hardly sublime.

In these examples chosen from primitive cultures, the tremendum, the aspect of fearfulness, predominates, and this is to be expected from a people beset by dangers, and helpless before the capricious powers of nature. Their closeness to the animal world, their main food supply as well as their greatest peril, results in deities in animal form, or part animal and part human, in which frightfulness is the chief attribute. The unidentified deity from Colombia, in Central America, with its animal tusks and brutal countenance, is a terrifying image before which the worshiper trembles. Where there is constant inter-tribal warfare, fear of the enemy finds expression in faces of ruthless cruelty, such as the war god from Dahomey, in West Africa, whose bared teeth create an impression of sheer ferocity. But the Nutka Indian mask from North America adds another dimension, that of the numinosum, in which fear and awe are blended. This is the Forest Spirit, lord of the dark, mysterious forest, peopled with supernatural beings. Otto speaks of the weird and the uncanny as characteristic of primitive religion, the dread of the demonic and the unknown. This strange mask portrays an awesome being, invested with mysterious powers. But primitive religion has also its brighter aspects, especially in the fertility gods of
agricultural peoples. These are benevolent deities, gracious gods of the fruitful earth, who are worthy of gratitude and love. Here the element of the *fascinans* predominates. From ancient Mexico comes the strangely attractive figure of the young maize god, Xochipilli, sitting with head thrown back in an attitude of ecstatic joy, singing his magic chant. It is a Dionysian figure, full of rapture and exaltation.

It is a far cry from these inhuman images to the beautiful gods of Greece, made in the image of man, but with an aura of divinity—divinely human, never “wholly other.” Here there is no antithesis between divine and human. The element of fear has given way before an overwhelming fascination. Zeus the Thunderer is transformed into the majestic Olympian Zeus, “Father of Gods and Men,” under whoseegis a new concept of justice based on reason supplanted the ancient code of blood vengeance, and civilization as we know it was born. And the numinous still remains in the awe and reverence he evokes. This is also true of Apollo, son of Zeus and a mortal woman, in whom there is a perfect blend of human and divine. His colossal image from the pediment of the Temple of Zeus at Olympia is a superb portrayal of glorified manhood, an austere figure, full of grandeur and spiritual power. In a great work of a later century, the Herms of Praxiteles, fascination is predominant. In this beautiful human body, young manhood at the zenith of perfection, we have the beatific quality which Otto calls “delight in the loveliness of god.” He stands at ease, regarding his charge, the infant Dionysos, with an almost maternal tenderness. It is small wonder that the Greeks adored their gods! But in the mystery gods the numinous is retained. Asklepios, god of healing, is no aloof Olympian; he is a suffering god. His anguished face portrays the insoluble mystery of pain. Truly here is the divine in a new dimension, participation, which creates an emotional bond of great intensity between god and worshiper, the shared experience of suffering.

In Christian art the emphasis is on the *numinosum*, for what the artist is attempting to depict is the *mysterium tremendum*, the inscrutable mystery underlying the dogmas of the Church. The Trinity poses the most difficult problem, with no satisfactory solutions. The three-headed form remains the most aesthetically acceptable, because it is purely symbolic. Donatello has used this form most impressively—a central head with two profiles emerging from its sides (exactly the same device used in the Elephanta Trimurti). But this is theologically unsound, being contrary to the *filioque* clause of the Nicene Creed, for here the Third Person, like the Second, proceeds from the Father alone, so the form was condemned by Pope Urban VIII. The figure of God the Father is seldom shown in separate images, due, perhaps, to the tabu against any visualization of God which is part of our Jewish inheritance. But Michelangelo, in the Sistine ceiling frescoes, has come close to depicting the dynamic power of the god of Genesis. Here God rides upon the whirlwind in a terrific burst of creative energy. The Incarnation, Atonement, and Resurrection present no problem, but only a great challenge, for here dogma can be represented concretely in the person of Christ. In the crucified Savior we find once more the image of a suffering god, bereft of his divine power, submitting to human pain and death. Velasquez portrays the Atonement with poignant simplicity and force, bathing the figure on the cross in an unearthly radiance which reveals the divine within the human. But in the Resurrection the power of the godhead is triumphantly restored, and in his tremendous painting, Piero della Francesca depicts the awful majesty of the Risen Christ. That it was no easy victory is testified by the gaunt body and haunted eyes, still holding awful memories of Hell. In this sublime face are revealed all the tragedy of man’s fall and the fearful price paid for his redemption.

The religious art of the Orient presents quite different problems, being illustrative rather than representational. The artists were illustrating the metaphors and hyperboles of their scriptures, multiple arms and heads being merely symbols of multiple functions, or devices for showing multiple attributes. Thus, the four-headed Brahma from Cambodia, seated firmly on his lotus pedestal, his four heads facing the four quarters, represents the idea of a divine stability at the center of a universe in constant flux—Reality at the heart of Mayâ. The personified god is simply a mask concealing the impersonal Absolute. But the Vedic gods were Aryan deities, nature gods like the Greek, the crucial difference being that they remained nature gods to the end. Sûrya, the sun god, never descends from his golden chariot to become part of human culture, as did Apollo. He remains forever the “Shining One” in the heavens.

Swift and all beautiful art thou, O Sûrya, maker of the light, Illuming all the radiant realm. (Rigveda I. 50)

But, with the growth of the sectarian movements, the gods became personalized, especially the human avatars of Vishnu. The worshiper wanted to know what his *ishta devata* looked like, and poets and artists obliged. The august figure of the cosmic Vishnu was replaced in popular devotion by the sportive herd god, Krishna, the divine lover, center of a cult of erotic mysticism. The numinous has vanished; only the fascination remains. As described in the Brahma Vaivarta.
(Part III, SBH, Vol. 24, pp. 230 f.) Puräja, he is “in the prime of his youth, lovely and dark-blue in complexion, in a yellow dress and decked with ornaments of gems . . . . His eyes resembled a pool of lotuses blooming in autumn; his face had the grace of the full moon of autumn.”

But with the god Shiva the numinous is still dominant, for he represents a divine paradox — procreator and destroyer, lingam and ascetic, male and female, all the irreconcilable opposites — the *mysterium tremendum* of nature itself. The great Trimurti relief at Elephanta is an awe-inspiring portrayal of this paradox. In the words of Heinrich Zimmer:

“What it represents is precisely the mystery of the unfolding of the Absolute into the dualities of phenomenal existence, these being personified and culminated in human experience by the polarity of the female and the male. The middle head of the threefold image is a representation of the Absolute. Majestic and sublime, it is the divine essence out of which proceed the other two (the male and female profiles) . . . . Great with transcendent quietude, comprehensive, enigmatic, it subsumes them and annihilates in eternal rest the effects of their creative tension . . . . This is the portrait of Âtman-Brahman.” *(Myths and Symbols in Indian Art, pp. 148 ff.)*

In images of the Buddha there are no polarities and no tensions — only the peace of nirvāna. In the small bronze mask from Cambodia the *numinosum* is paramount. There is an uncanny quality in its deep introversion, hinting at a divine mystery — the mystery of nirvana, which the Buddha was too wise to define. In early Buddhism, of course, Gautama was not worshiped as a god, but only venerated as a human being who achieved the supreme Enlightenment and evoked his life to teaching his way of salvation. But, in the Mahāyāna sects he was worshiped as an embodiment of the Buddha essence, so we may properly regard these images as portrayals of a divine being. And surely this is the face of no mortal man. It is interesting that Otto cites the colossal Buddha of Lung Men, in Honan Province, as an example of “the numinous expressed by the sublime.” He quotes Oswald Sirén, who calls it “a complete work of art permeated by a spiritual will, which communicates itself to the beholder . . . . The religious element of such a figure is inmanent; it is 'a presence' . . . .; it lies beyond intellectual definition.” The great height of this figure (fifty feet), gives it a cosmic quality, numinous in its calm aloofness and fascinating in its gentleness. The face of this Vairocana is compassionate, as befits the Buddha of Healing, but it is not the face of a suffering god. In his Tantric “terrible form” this same Vairocana appears as the Japanese Fudo, in which the *tremendum* is powerfully

**Expressed.** Fudo, the Immovable Will, standing firm on a blazing pyre, sword in hand, was the chosen divinity of medieval warriors who espoused the Shingon form of Buddhism. It is an impressive symbol of undaunted courage and fortitude. But it is in the Buddha of Infinite Light and Infinite Compassion, Amītābha, that Mahāyāna Buddhism reaches its culmination as a religion of grace. In the lovely “Sunrise Amida”, painted in the thirteenth century by Yeishin Sozu, he appears as a solar deity, rising above the mountains, shedding his light over all. His calm face shines with ineffable splendor, fascinating and numinous. Below, his two Bodhisattvas descend on clouds to bring his redeeming grace to all mankind. In this doctrine of the Bodhisattva, Mahāyāna finds its most sublime expression of the compassion which lies at the heart of Buddhism. For these are beings who choose to forego their own nirvāna and sacrifice all the hard-won merit of thousands of incarnations for the sake of suffering humanity. In the words of a Tibetan proverb:

Compassion speaketh and saith: “Can there be bliss when all that lives must suffer? Shalt thou be saved and hear the whole world cry? . . . . Hast thou attained thy being to humanity’s great pain, O candidate for light?"**

From these examples from the art of various religions, we find that Rudolph Otto’s categories do apply to the gods themselves, in whose faces we read fear and fascination and mystery. This would seem to illustrate Whitehead’s “principle of concretion” at work in religious imagery, making the abstract “idea of the Holy” into a living reality for men to worship.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND OCCIDENTAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

BY

JOSEPH CAMPBELL

In the earliest of the Indian Upanishads, the Brihadāranyaka, which is to be dated circa 700 B.C., the genesis of the universe is represented in psychological terms.

In the Beginning, we read, there was only the Self. He said to himself, "I am"; but as soon as he had uttered the word "I" (aham), he became afraid. Then he reasoned: "Whom should I fear, since there is no being but myself?" Whereupon his fear departed and he was filled, instead, with desire—the desire that there should be another. He became as large as a man and woman embracing; then he split in two, and embraced the woman. She thought: "But how can he embrace me when I am of his own substance?" and she turned into a cow to avoid him. He turned into a bull and embraced her. She became a mare, he a stallion; she an ass, he a donkey; she a sheep, he a ram—and so on, down to the ants. In this way—we are told—the whole world was generated by the Self.

A psychological approach to the mystery of the universe has remained characteristic of Oriental thought to the present day. It underlies not only Hinduism, but also Jainism and Buddhism; and the fundamental insight is, firstly, that the notion of ego (aham) is the initial error from which all fears and desires proceed, secondly, that the experienced universe is a function of delusions generated by these fears and desires, and finally that, release from delusion is the ultimate goal of all thought and effort. The traditions differ as to the nature of this ultimate release. For the Jains it amounts to physical extinction, whereas for the Mahāyāna Buddhist schools it is more like a recovery from sickness. But for all, ego (aham) is the nuclear point of the world delusion and egolessness the first end to be attained.

In the present paper I shall not discuss the metaphysical aspect of this philosophy. My interest is in the resemblance of its psychology to the modern psychologies of Sigmund Freud and Carl G. Jung. For in these, too, the fundamental motivations of all thought and action are described as fear and desire. Freud terms them, respectively, *destrudo* and *libido*; or again, *thanatos* and *eros*. Jung describes the individual motivated by the first as an "introvert" and by the second as an "extravert." Furthermore, according to both, the chief cause of mental disorder is fear and desire. The individual is enwrapped in a web of his own fear-and-desire-inspired illusions (māyā) and the aim of the cure is to dissolve this web through illumination (a sort of bodhi or satori).

The Orient and Occident developed their psychologies independently and from differing approaches: the first—by far the earlier—drew its evidence from the inward experiences of yoga; the second from the data of the psychiatric clinic. We can, perhaps, regard the two, then, as mutually corroborative: to some extent their results must represent an irreducible fundament of the mentality of Homo sapiens. However, there are differences to be noted, also, which separate and oppose the two psychologies—and it is these that I would stress today, as representing an important line of cleavage between the two worlds of East and West.

The best known Oriental illustration of man's release from his web of illusion, the web of māyā, is the episode of the Buddha's Awakening beneath the Bo Tree. After years of spiritual search, he established himself on the Immovable Spot, the axial point of the universe: that still point around which the pairs-of-opposites revolve. And when he was perfectly concentrated, in perfect meditation, there approached him the tempter, Kāma-Māra, the god whose name means "desire and death"—precisely *eros* (kāma) and *thanatos* (māra); the same being that we met in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad: the Self that said "I" (aham) and through fear and desire brought forth the world.

But the Blessed One beneath the Bo Tree had no thought of "I" (aham). Hence, when the tempter in his character as Kāma (Desire) sent before him his voluptuous daughters, he was unaware of them as other than himself and remained unmoved. Whereupon the tempter in his character as Māra (Death) flung at him his army. But again, on that Immovable Spot to which the Blessed One had attained there was no duality of "I and Thou". When the weapons hurled at him reached the field of his non-dual realization they were transformed into flowers. For where there is no ego (aham), there is no duality. And so we see that just as the world-creating Self of the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad moved through ego to duality and therewith brought forth the world illusion, so now the Buddha—egoless—penetrating the world.
navel, returned to the source, the non-dual, all-transcending, all-inhabiting Void.

But, as we have said, differing traditions exist in the Orient as to the nature of the Great Awakening. Many represent what is first and finally a negative view, wherein the world in all its sorrow and beauty is absolutely denied. Their way is the way of “not this, not that” (neti neti), “all is delusion” (mâyá) : a way of retreat, dismissal of the universe. And their aim is complete absorption in the Void, sânya, brahman, the ri-hokkai, the “absolute field.” Such a psychology is altogether repugnant to the modern Occidental sense of man’s responsibility to life, and so, I do not believe that any profitable comparison can be suggested between its goals and those of our modern therapy.

The Oriental methods of the positive way, on the other hand, not only bear comparison with the most advanced psychologies of the West, but are contributing to their development. The realization of the Universal Presence represented in the Indian formulae of tī tī, “it is here, it is here,” and sarvâbrahmanasti, “all is brahman,” as well as the Mahâyâna ideal of the Bodhisattva and the Kegon philosophies of ri-ji muge and ji-ji muge, spontaneous arising and the return to the natural, have much to say and a great appeal to the modern West. And yet this appeal is somewhat deceptive. We do not interpret the message quite in the sense in which it is delivered. For at the root, our sense of life and the Hindu-Buddhist sense of life are profoundly different, so that when we talk, exchanging veils like this, we never hear each other quite in the other’s terms.

Let me suggest that we take as our key to the difference of the two culture worlds, the contrast of the Oriental concepts of reincarnation and the ultimate extinction of the personality in nirvâna with the Occidental idea of one life and the value for all time of the unique individual. It is surely clear that if the personality as such (the soul or individual psyche) is to be regarded as man’s ultimate concern instead of an anonymous, transcendent yet immanent Self (âtman) or Void (sânya), man’s proper task cannot be the quenching of ego (âham), and therewith fear and desire, but rather the fosterage, development, and integration in each and every individual of the particular powers, psychological functions, and social responsibilities of his particular character and station. For this, no general laws can be announced, no guru, no teacher, can be found. The responsibility, finally, is on the individual himself, who must seek and find his own particular way— as Goethe has said in his Faust— “through obscurest aspiration.”

However, just as in the Orient there have been differing traditions of the Great Awakening, so in the West of this difficult task of Self Discovery and Realization.

For example: although both Freud and Jung concede that the lord of life is Eros-Thanatos, Kâma-Mâra, and (in contrast to the way of the Orient) accept this Will to Life and Power as a force not to be broken and dissolved but to be composed in a pattern of rationally regulated action, the two men differ radically as to the method by which such a composition may be realized. Freud’s veiw is epitomized in his celebrated phrase: “Where there is òò there shall be ego.” The meaning is, that the rational, conscious ego must become the ultimate director of each individual life—and such a view, surely, is as repulsive to the psychology of the Orient as the negative way of neti neti to the West. Carl G. Jung, on the other hand, represents the ideal of a running dialogue between the rational, self-defensive and aggressive ego, and the deeper, apparently irrational but actually superrational, superindividual forces of the inner life—a dialogue of the personal and impersonal factors of the human character—an interpenetration of the two. And it has been by Carl G. Jung and other thinkers of his kind (I would name also James Joyce and Thomas Mann) that the earnest study of Eastern thought has been most profitably cultivated.

The earliest Oriental influence to affect Occidental thought derived from India, and the impact— as we all know— was immense. However, the persistent tendency of Indian thought to favor the negative way and to break out of the context of the universe is finally incompatible with the Occidental sense of the responsibility of the individual to the field of life-in-being. A more congenial influence and inspiration has come to us from the Chinese concept of the Tao; for here (if we understand the idea correctly) the dialectic of the pair-of-opposites (yang and yin) in nature and in oneself is taken as the proper field of human interest and guidance. And one can see immediately that this is close or apparently close to what I have just represented as the position of Carl G. Jung.

But there is a third force from the Orient that has recently come to us, largely by way of the writings on Zen of Drs. D.T. Suzuki and Alan W. Watts. The emphasis here on preñhâ as a mode of immediate experience released from the web, not of life but of conceptualization, has added depth to our understanding of our own most acute problem. For our incorrigible dedication to rational categories, ends, and means, even in our approach to life and to art and to the ultimate experiences of the psyche, is directly assaulted by this teaching of no-mind (mu-
skin), and our need to release ourselves from our net of thought for an
unconditioned experience of the life that we claim to love so well, becomes
apparent.

Yet even here we shall have to reckon with the dialogue of East and West. Consider, for example, the following Japanese poem in
which the attitude of no-mind (mu-shin) is rendered:

The wild geese do not intend to cast their reflection:
The water has no mind to receive their image.
Contrast this with the words of Goethe’s Faust, when he made his con-
tract with Mephistopheles:

If I should ever cry to the fleeting moment,
“Ah, stay a while, thou art so fair!”
Then you may bind me in your eternal bonds.

Both poems speak of non-attachment. But, as everyone who
has read Goethe’s Faust knows well, the non-attachment of the Western
hero was a function of his yearning onward toward the unattained.

Ji-ji muge: things maintain their difference; and yet through
all the one spirit flows and all are reflected in each. And so it is with
our two worlds of East and West.

ABOUT THE DESCRIPTION OF
RELIGIOUS FAITH

BY
HARALD EKLUND

To describe a conviction about something as ‘faith’ or ‘believing’ is
always a significant act, for the description qualifies to a considerable
extent our conception of the conviction in question, and affects our
future treatment of it. It is true that the expression ‘believing’ can
imply ‘He is of the opinion that . . . .’ with the implied suggestion that
it is based on inadequate grounds, or even that it has no real grounds
at all, but ‘believing’ is usually a conviction about something essential
or fundamental, and it seems to have some justification. Just as it is
possible to say ‘this we know’, so also can we say ‘this is a religious
belief’, giving it thereby a certain authority, even though it may still
be difficult to define its exact nature.

What are the grounds for this sort of analysis of the implications
of ‘believing something’? Is it strictly correct to make ‘believing’
and ‘knowing’ parallel and alternative functions? If we are to answer
these questions precisely, drawing out the exact shades of meaning,
the ‘religious believing’, the ‘faith’ which is said to be parallel to, and
yet independent of knowledge, must be analysed along the following
lines: it should (I) be specified what one believes in, that is to say,
what are the particular facts that are the object of belief. (II) The
conviction (the act of believing) must be classified according to the
limitations and demands made by the facts in question. And lastly
(III) we must disentangle the relation in which that which is believed
stands to other facts whose existence and nature we have convictions
about.

I. From this point of view ‘believing in something’ is like ‘the
assertion of something’ in that one has already abandoned one’s
neutrality with regard to its truth or falsehood when one says one
believes something. What Gottlob Frege says of every ‘judgment’ is
also true of the assertion ‘I believe’: ‘the step from the level of thoughts
to the level of reference (the objective) has already been taken.’ It
is impossible to believe in something vague and undefined, which is
already covered by the emphatic religious formula "This is the Truth." We should also question the possibility of dealing with what is by
definition 'inexpressible' and can be categorized as 'the mystical'. It is indeed harder to deny than to affirm that it will eventually be possible further to express and define something. If 'to believe in . . .' is simply identical with 'to be conscious of . . . ' or 'to have a feeling of . . . ', then a subjection, a covert shift of meaning, has taken place, and thereby support is given to the idea that belief in something indefinite and indefinable is possible. Such identifications endow the concepts 'religious belief' and 'content of belief' with an elusiveness, which, though it may at times seem acceptable from the point of view of apologetic, becomes painfully clear when treated by more careful analysis. Thus we find that there are many shifts of meaning and confusions of quite different phenomena in modern attempts to describe what 'believing' is. In fact the question of the definition of the concept 'belief' is one of the moral weaknesses of contemporary theology and study of religion.

When considering the content of belief, therefore, we must describe what it is that is believed in or what is included in believing (and also sometimes, what clear conceptions one has that are supposed to have something real corresponding to them). The question arises already at this point whether this complex of words ('faith', 'belief', 'believe') really has any tangible meaning. It can be manifestly impossible to form a clear conception, and this impossibility is, from one point of view, a fact of experience in the same sense as an axiom of geometry is.1)

We may note at this point that many theories about the content of belief leave it surprisingly unclear what this content is. In the realm of knowledge it is of the greatest importance to be able to state exactly what it is that one knows, assumes, supposes, makes a hypothesis about or seeks to define. What is indefinite can only be spoken of in terms of clear alternative possibilities. Theories of religion, on the other hand, seem surprisingly unconcerned with certainty about anything, and speak of the 'unimaginable' and 'inexpressible'.

It seems rather to be the case that feeling can quite readily be said to perceive something diffuse and indefinite (at least something that is at present diffuse and indefinite) which nevertheless is considered real, more easily than the convictions of a believer can. Mysticism can speak of something similar. That is to say that the feeling of the irrational and numinous (what Otto calls 'sensus numinis') has a content

that is indefinite for the one who has the experience as well as for others. Paul also speaks of hearing 'things that cannot be told, which man may not utter' (II Cor. 12.4). Yet at the same time something quite definite and tangible is there, or at least certain features of the thing in question are substantially present. This is the case, for example, in the Thomas story, where something quite definite and tangible is seen and believed in; the disciples had the risen Master before them. Even if as little as possible is made of this story, there still remains something very distinct in what is felt and in what is believed.

The question of what can be called 'the content of belief' and 'the content of experience' is diffuse and can hardly be given a general answer as it bears upon empirical and psychological facts. On the contrary there are good reasons for asserting that it is risky to draw up precise definitions; an indefiniteness which is definitely labelled once and for all is hard to maintain both on practical and theoretical grounds.

Both religious faith and theories of religion have much to learn from the care with which, when it is a question of knowledge, the object under consideration is defined. It is a matter firstly of what is sometimes called the psychological object, that is to say roughly what we imagine, or what is present to the mind's eye, but it is obviously more vital to consider that which is said to be objectively real. If nothing is made precise, and if vague symbols and ambiguities are allowed to remain, then it is impossible even to say 'That is just what I believe'.

That a man is unable to form a clear conception, is a serious ground for wondering if he really does believe what he says he believes, or if he does have a conviction about anything tangible at all. The everyday task of finding out what a thing is like 'in reality' is a profoundly serious and upsetting matter; it must be determined whether there is only a vague and subjective idea, or an imaginative creation that has a definite content, but corresponds to no reality, or a distinct concept which can also be clarified with the help of something in reality which corresponds to it.1) Even for a belief it is decisive that what is believed can 'be thought of in reality', thought of definitely, made clear and concrete.

II. What an act of believing is, is likewise among the more inadequately treated questions in the study of religion. This is shown,

1) Often it is simply a matter of setting the concept into the context of spatial and temporal reality, which admits certain things, but uncom-

promisingly excludes others. The terminology I have used depends here also to some extent on Axel Hagerström. Compare, for example, his

Selbstdarstellung, p. 5: 'Die Objektivität der Erkenntnis muss in der eigenen Natur des Aufgefassten, des Objektes, liegen.'
for example, in Kant’s assertion that belief in God and another world is, to put it briefly, just as certain as the moral conviction of right and wrong. It has always proved difficult to say what this particularly assured religious conviction rests on (or what a ‘practical postulate’ is), what its nature is and what exact realms of fact it covers. We cannot fail to notice how many attempts there have been to classify religious belief, and how little they convince us that there is a single specific character, and a definite content, in what is called religious conviction.

Various philosophical systems have been used in the description of religious belief. Even in a relatively ‘simple’ author like William James there is, on the one hand, “belief in an object that we cannot see,” and, on the other hand, experience of something that is present with us and in some way known. In recent times existentialist speculation has said that in religious belief ‘existence discloses itself;’ this means that contact is made with a new reality in a situation that allows the acquisition of knowledge. It is clear that an act of this nature loses its specific differentiation from knowledge. Throughout one hovers between descriptions of believing as a hypothesis, a pragmatic conviction, an assumption of the world’s correspondence with those evaluations we feel the need to make, and open or covert identifications of believing with a higher form of knowledge (expressed in some such forms as ‘the eye of faith’ ‘the believer sees’). This is especially clear among those theologians who assert that ‘to believe’ is at the same time ‘to know’.

Logically we must make a choice in this situation: if believing and knowing are different, religious belief cannot be identified with any forms of knowing. If it rests on some form of knowing, it must be classified, even in its peculiar function ‘over and above’ knowing, according to its relation to the knowing which is its basis.

The tendency to regard the act of belief as an independent entity sometimes takes the form of statements that something exists in a particular way ‘in’ or ‘for’ faith. By this we may imply or assert that this something exists in this way only for faith (and that it is only real for faith, while knowledge can never assert or prove reality). Because faith exists, there exists also a special form of ‘believer’s knowledge’ which, to distinguish it from knowledge in the ordinary sense, is called ‘alogical’ or impossible to test by scientific methods. We find an example of this in an exegete who thus describes the unique position of certain New Testament experiences: “In considering spiritual experiences no pronouncement can be made from the scientific standpoint about the reality of the content of the experience. On this question empirical science has nothing to say. Only in faith in Christ does it become possible to suppose that the experience has an origin beyond the realm of the empirical, and this supposition does not appear in the least difficult for one who has experienced the power of Christ.”

Such a description of the nature of the act of believing gives rise to many problems of language and of fact, and all of these constitute criticisms of the ambiguous expression ‘in faith’. Does the expression mean that something is given ‘in faith’, but in no sense ‘in reality’, so that it is in no respect manifest apart from faith? Or does it imply that the thing in question is really present in faith? In this case the meaning must already be said to be modified: the assertion that something is really present in faith no longer states that something exists in a particular way in faith, but only that its particular way of existing is accessible only in faith. Faith then becomes the only medium or instrument with which a particular piece of objective reality can be apprehended. Apart from faith or for everyone except the believers this particular thing is not visible (and this, by the way, would imply that the guards at the tomb in the Gospel narrative could not possibly have any significance for a conviction about the resurrection, for what they saw—assuming that they were not believers—would not support the belief that the resurrection had taken place, while those who did believe that it had taken place could not in principle support their faith with someone else’s knowledge).

It is clear that in the question of the believer’s contact with reality, as with mystical and aesthetic reality, certain cases where access to reality is difficult and creates a certain exclusiveness, are conceivable. Even a man’s mind is hard to fathom, how much harder is what the Bible calls ‘the mind of the Lord’ or mysteries that are not intended to be clear! If, however, we make this sort of exclusiveness a matter of principle (and something easily gained), it creates a privileged position for certain realities against all analysis. We have laid claim to a ‘pneumatic’ advantage, and have taken up a most precarious position. We must be able to maintain that there are as many scientific ‘pneumatics’ as theological theory demands.

When it is asserted, to give an example of 'faith' theology, that faith and faith alone makes an event a 'saving event' (Heilsgeschehen) and, furthermore, that faith comes from preaching, which is already a 'saving event', then the assertion contains several mistakes in its method of explanation and some obscurity in its meaning. Preaching presupposes faith, and an explanation of faith out of preaching therefore goes round in a circle. Moreover the expression 'comes from preaching' or 'is formed by preaching' must imply (quite simply) that a part of the saving event is occasioned by an earlier part. The only explanation reached, therefore, by saying that for faith (sub specie fidei) something becomes a fact of salvation is the explanation that earlier parts of an occurrence give rise to later ones of precisely the same sort, since both include realities plus convictions about them. Moreover to say that something is present and has a particular meaning for faith is not, strictly speaking, to do more than to point out how the conditions for apprehending and understanding something are subjectively realized. This being so, it is not primarily for faith that anything is a saving event, except in the sense that now and for me – when I have apprehended and understood it – something has that significance, and such an explanation comes down to the level of the trivial.\(^1\)

III. This over-interpreting of religious belief mentioned here, leads us on to the question of what believing is in its 'unsophisticated' form. What for example does a religious-historical study of the New Testament say about it?

It is clear that a fact as fundamental as the resurrection in the primary conviction is not really an object of belief. Our expression 'believing in the resurrection' (resurrection faith) is something modern compared with the fundamental assertions of the New Testament, which include such sayings as 'I (Paul) have seen the Lord', 'he appeared to more than five hundred brethren at one time', Jesus has 'presented himself alive after his passion by many proofs' and others of the same sort. To an unreserved religious-historical interpretation these sayings appear to be assertions about things that have actually been experienced, and this has many far-reaching consequences, both objective and subjective.

a. First it must be said that if Jesus' contemporaries 'saw', i.e., experienced and knew, while later generations 'only believe', then these primary and secondary convictions are of different kinds and rest on different grounds. A later generation must be convinced on quite other grounds – of pure belief – than the no longer available grounds of the earliest witnesses.

b. Furthermore, if our believing today depends on something that we have been specially given, something such as 'the inner witness of the Spirit' (or God's voice in conscience), the question must be asked whether this does not in fact constitute for us a form of knowledge. This brings us to the paradoxical conclusion that, with 'a transposition of the evidence', our experience finds greater reliance than that of the New Testament.

c. Finally the fact that the New Testament contains material of both the 'seeing' type and the 'believing' type, means that right from the beginning both types must have had their own independent roles. That which is conventionally called 'Christian belief' contains an epistemological wealth of contacts with reality, convictions about those contacts, ideas, hypotheses, analogisms, etc. The analysis of 'belief' covers a number of facts and convictions arising from those facts, convictions of a higher or lower order, which are all examples of 'knowing' (albeit, knowing with greater or less reason). None of this material however seems to include a conviction that is both parallel to, and yet of quite a distinct type from, knowledge, that is completely certain, and that is through and through 'believing'. Rather, everything points to the conclusion that an analysis of religious conviction ought to be a logical and empirical analysis of a whole complex of experiences and the assumptions and 'theoretical' interpretations which arise therefrom.

An unbiased interpretation of the New Testament strongly suggests that religious faith ought more properly to be called a feeling or knowledge of a higher order within whose frame that which can be known makes considerable claims to supporting evidence. In addition to examples given already there are, inter alia, the many significant expressions of knowledge in the Fourth Gospel: "We worship that we know" (4.22), "All that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you" (15.15), "Henceforth you know him and have seen him" (14.7) and "He who has seen me has seen the Father" (14.9) are a few of these possibly gnostic expressions. That faith and knowledge are spoken of together in the original tradition without having, as later theories imply, the force of alternatives, either conceptually or in fact, has important consequences. We can say, moreover, that another alternative than 'faith or knowledge' was the important one for the New Testament, the alternative of knowledge versus delusion, reality versus

\(^1\) See E. Gräßer, *Das Problem der Parusienverzögerung in den synoptischen Evangelien und in der Apostelgeschichte*, 1957, p. 16.
devised myths, true against supposed wisdom. The problem therefore becomes acute when arguments and proofs are brought forward from both sides and played off against each other. These arguments can be generally empirical as well as rational, but fail (in my view) when it is alleged that we are talking of things that cannot be argued for or against. Tradition speaks of 'many proofs' (Acts 1.3) for basic facts, and there is therefore good reason for examining their validity. To a great extent it has been considered meaningful and quite rational to prove even the existence of God. This attitude leads our thoughts to a quite other understanding of religion's true place in the context of human knowledge. It ought in principle to be true that all facts, all probability and all logical operations are relevant when it is a question of deciding what truths and probabilities are the concern of religion. It is questionable whether we can even describe the nature of religious statements at all without taking up a position with regard to their truth and falsehood. The impartiality we often ascribe to ourselves is not consistently applied to other religions, and we may ask if it is ever more than a fiction, a shirking of the assumption of any definite attitude and a leaving of the decision to some other authority or some other field. Whatever the case may be, no sooner is a description given than the question 'What actual reasons for the religious convictions have been decisive?' becomes live. It is necessary to analyse out what is primary and what is secondary as a creator of conviction. What is known, and what is asserted hypothetically? What is fact (or apparent fact) and what is mere opinion? Neither the thought that religious statements ought to be untheoretical nor the view that the introduction of theoretical categories into a religious context would be misleading and make it impossible to grasp realities, has any objective and traditional support.

Current thought is often content to say that religious faith is 'autonomous' in relation to knowledge. This way of thinking can serve to support a strategical modus vivendi between positive religion and modern scientific thought. There is however, as has already become clear, much that can be said against such an autonomy. It can be asserted generally that an actual uniqueness or peculiarity in religious, such as Schleiermacher and others have emphasized, is far from being the same as autonomy, which must include laws which justify making one's own judgements without reference to other cases. We shall not discuss here how far this politic way of thinking can be justified, but it must be emphasized that as soon as it knows anything, religion abrogates its autonomy. Its own knowledge is clearly governed by exactly the same laws as are valid in general when anything is known, and that implies no other autonomy than that which knowledge and rationality in general claim against irrationality. Even if religion is knowledge from sources other than the usual ones (reason and common experience, for example), 'faith or knowledge' is no longer a valid alternative, for even on this view religion asserts something, and all that is asserted, that is to say, expressed with a claim to signify something real and not to be a trivial make-believe, needs both to be clear and to be set in a context. A careful analysis shows that everything that is asserted must in principle be supported by empirical and logical arguments. This is also shown in fact by the documents; they do not deal with religious realities or the content of faith as matters of purely academic interest, but, on the contrary, bring forward all manner of proofs of the reality of this content. Religious faith does give a theoretical account of itself and demands that this description be completed, particularly in the direction of bringing to light those facts that are related and testified to.
THE STRUCTURE OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM

BY

MIRCEA ELIADE

1) Religious symbols are capable of revealing a modality of the real or a structure of the World which is not evident on the plane of immediate experience. In order to illustrate in what sense the symbol aims at a modality of the real which is inaccessible to human experience, let us recall a single example, the symbolism of water, which is capable of expressing the preformal, the virtual, and the chaotic. This is obviously not a question of rational knowledge, but of a grasping by the living consciousness, anterior to reflection. Concerning the capacity of symbols to reveal a profound structure of the World one will remember the principal meanings of the Cosmic Tree. This symbol reveals the world as a living totality, periodically regenerating itself and, because of this regeneration, continually fruitful, rich, and inexhaustible. In this case also, it is not a question of a reflexive knowledge, but of an immediate intuition of a “cipher” of the world. The Cosmos “speaks” through the symbol of the Cosmic Tree, and this “word” is understood directly. The world is apprehended as life, and in primitive thought, life is a disguise of being.

The religious symbols which point to the structure of life reveal a more profound, more mysterious life than the vital one grasped by the daily experience. They unveil the miraculous, inexplicable side of life, and at the same time the sacramental dimension of human existence. “Deciphered” in the light of religious symbols, human life itself reveals a hidden side; it comes from “another part,” from far off; it is “divine” in the sense that it is the work of the gods or of supernatural beings.

2) This leads us to a second general remark: for the primitive, symbols are always religious, because they aim at something real or at a structure of the world. On the archaic levels of culture, the real—that is, the powerful, the significant, the living—is equivalent to the sacred. On the other hand, the World is a creation of gods or supernatural beings; to unfold a structure of the World is equivalent to revealing a secret or a “cipher” signification of the divine workmanship.

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It is a question, obviously, of a pre-systematic ontology, the expression of a judgment that is not formulated in concepts and which rarely lends itself to conceptualisation.

3) An essential characteristic of religious symbolism is its multivalence, its capacity to express simultaneously a number of meanings whose continuity is not evident on the plane of immediate experience. The symbolism of the moon, for example, reveals a connatural solidarity between the lunar rhythms, temporal becoming, water, the growth of plants, the female principle, death and resurrection, human destiny, weaving, and so forth. In the final analysis, the symbolism of the moon reveals a correspondence of mystical order between the various levels of cosmic reality and certain modalities of human existence. Let us remark that this correspondence becomes evident neither spontaneously in immediate experience nor through critical reflection. It is the result of a certain mode of “being present” in the world.

4) This capacity of religious symbolism to reveal a multitude of structurally coherent meanings has an important consequence. The symbol is thus able to reveal a perspective in which heterogeneous realities are susceptible of being articulated into a whole, or even of being integrated into a “system”. In other words, the religious symbol allows man to discover a certain unity of the World and, at the same time, to reveal to himself his proper destiny as an integrating part of the World. We then understand the sense in which the different meanings of lunar symbols make a “system”. On different levels (cosmological, anthropological, “spiritual”), the lunar rhythm reveals homologous structure: that is to say, modalities of existence subject to the law of time and of cyclic becoming, existence destined to a “life” carrying in its very structure death and rebirth. Owing to the symbolism of the Moon, the World no longer appears as an arbitrary assemblage of heterogeneous and divergent realities. The diverse cosmic levels communicate with each other; they are “bound together” by the same lunar rhythm, just as human life is also “woven together” by the moon and is predestined by the “Spinning” Goddesses.

Another example will illustrate even better this capacity that symbols have for opening up a perspective in which things allow themselves to be grasped and articulated in a system. The symbolism of night and darkness—which can be discerned in the cosmogonic mythus, in initiation rites, in iconographies portraying nocturnal or subterranean animals—reveals the structural solidarity between pre-cosmic and pre-natal darkness on the one hand, and death, rebirth and initiation on the other.
5) Perhaps the most important function of religious symbolism—important above all because of the role which it will play in later philosophical speculations—is its capacity for expressing paradoxical situations, or certain structures of ultimate reality, otherwise impossible of expression. An example will suffice: the symbolism of the Sympelgades, which may be deciphered in numerous myths, legends and images presenting the paradoxical passage from one mode of being to another, such as transfer from this world to another world, from the Earth to Heaven or Hell, or passage from a profane mode of existence to a spiritual existence. The most frequent images are: passing between two rocks or two icebergs that touch continuously, or between two mountains in continual movement, or between two jaws of a monster, or penetrating and withdrawing undamaged from a vagina dentata, or enter a mountain that offers no opening. One understands what all these images point to: if there exists the possibility of a "passage", this cannot be effectuated except "in spirit".

No other symbol of the "difficult passage"—not even the celebrated motif of the thin, swordblade-like bridge or the edge of the razor, to which allusion is made in the Katha Upanishad (III, 14)—reveals better than the symplegades that there is a mode of being inaccessible to immediate experience, and that one cannot attain to this mode of being except through renouncing the naive belief in the inextinguishability of matter.

One could make similar remarks on the capacity of symbols to express the contradictory aspects of ultimate reality. Cusanus considered the coincidentia oppositorum as the most appropriate definition of the nature of God. But for many centuries this symbol was already used to signify that which we call the "totality" or the "absolute", that paradoxical co-existence in the divinity of polar and antagonist principles. The conjunction of the Serpent (or of another symbol of the chthonian darkness and of the non-manifested) and of the Eagle (symbol of solar light and of the manifested) express, in iconography or in myths, the mystery of totality or cosmic unity. Although the concepts of polarity and of the coincidentia oppositorum have been used in a systematic fashion since the beginnings of philosophical speculation, the symbols that have revealed them obscurely have not been the product of critical reflection, but the result of an existential tension. One of the most important discoveries of the human spirit was naively anticipated when, through certain religious symbols, man guessed that the polarities and the antinomies could be articulated into a unity. Since then, the negative and sinister aspects of the cosmos and of the gods not only found a justification, but revealed themselves as an integral part of all reality or "sacrality".

6) Finally, it is necessary to underline the existential value of religious symbolism, that is, the fact that a symbol always aims at a reality or a situation in which human existence is engaged. It is, above all, this existential dimension that marks off and distinguishes symbols from concepts. Symbols still keep their contact with the profound sources of life; they express, one might say, the "spiritual as lived" (le Spirituell vu). This is why symbols have as it were a "mimious aura"; they reveal that the modalities of the Spirit are at the same time manifestations of life, and, consequently, they directly engage human existence. The religious symbol not only unveils a structure of reality or a dimension of existence; at the same stroke it brings a meaning into human existence. This is why even symbols aiming at the ultimate reality conjointly constitute existential revelations for the man who deciphers their message.

The religious symbol translates a human situation into cosmological terms, and vice-versa; more precisely, it reveals the continuity between the structures of human existence and cosmic structures. This would say that man does not feel himself "isolated" in the cosmos, but that he "opens" out to a world which, thanks to a symbol, proves "familiar". On the other hand, the cosmological values of symbols permit him to recognize the objectivity of his personal experiences.

It follows that he who understands a symbol not only "opens" out upon the objective world, but at the same time succeeds in emerging from his particular situation and in attaining to a comprehension of the universal. This is explained by the fact that symbols have a way of causing immediate reality as well as particular situations to "burst". When a certain tree incarnates the World Tree or when a spade is associated with the phallus and agricultural work with the act of generation, one could say that the immediate reality of these objects or actions "bursts" or "explodes" under the irruptive force of a more profound reality. Consequently, because of the symbol, the individual experiences is "awakened" and transmuted in a spiritual act. To "live" a symbol and to decipher its message correctly, implies an opening toward the Spirit, and, finally, access to the universal.

These few general remarks on religious symbolism certainly need to be elaborated and refined. Since it is impossible to undertake this work here, let us be content to add two observations. The first concerns what may be called the "history" of a symbol. To say that a symbol has a "history" can mean two things: a) that this symbol was constituted at a certain historical moment and, as a consequence,
it could not have existed before that moment: or b) that this symbol has been diffused, beginning from a precise cultural center, and that for this reason one must not consider it as spontaneously rediscovered in all the cultures where it is found.

That there have been symbols dependent upon precise historical situations seem indubitable in a number of cases. It is evident, for instance, that the horse could not have become, among other things, a symbol of death, before being domesticated. It is evident as well that the spade could not have been associated with the phallus, nor agricultural work homologous to the sexual act before the discovery of agriculture. In the same manner, the symbolic value of the number “7” and, consequently, the image of the Cosmic Tree with seven branches did not appear before the discovery of the seven planets, which in Mesopotamia led to the conception of the seven planetary heavens. Moreover, there are numerous symbols that appear in specific socio-political situations existing only in certain areas and taking form at precise historical moments, such as the symbols of royalty or of the matriarchate.

If all this is true, it follows that the second meaning that the expression “history of a symbol” can have is likewise true. The symbols depending on agriculture or royalty were very probably diffused together with other elements of culture and their respective ideologies. But to recognize the historicity of certain religious symbols does not cancel out what we have said above about the function of religious symbols in general. On the one hand, it is important to note that although numerous, these symbols which are bound up with the facts of culture and thus with history, are appreciably less numerous than the symbols of cosmic structure of those related to the human condition. The majority of religious symbols reveal the World in its totality or one of its structures (night, water, heaven, stars, seasons, vegetation, temporal rhythms, animal life, etc.), or they refer to situations constitutive of all human existence, that is to say, to the fact that man is mortal, is a sexual being and is seeking what today we call “ultimate reality”. In certain cases, archaic symbols linked with death, with sexuality, or with hope for an after-life have been modified, or even replaced, by similar symbols brought in by waves of superior cultures. But these modifications, although they complicate the work of the historian of religions, do not change the central problem.

In sum, symbols linked with recent facts of culture, although they had a beginning in historic times, have become religious symbols because they have contributed to the making of a “world”, in the sense that they have served to illuminate these new “worlds” which are revealed through agriculture, through the domestication of animals, through royalty. In other words, symbols bound up with recent phases of culture are themselves constituted after the same manner as the most archaic symbols, that is, as the result of existential tensions and of total coming to grips with the world. Whatever the history of a religious symbol may be, its function remains the same. A study of the origin and diffusion of a symbol does not release the historian of religions from the obligation of understanding it; it is for him to restore to it all the meanings it has had during the course of its history.

The second observation proceeds somewhat from the first, since it bears on the capacity of symbols to become enriched in history. Under the influence of Mesopotamian ideas, the Cosmic Tree happens to symbolize, with its seven branches, the seven planetary heavens. In theology and Christian folklore, the Cross is believed to rise up from the Center of the World, being substituted for the Cosmic Tree. But we have shown in a preceding study that these newly attributed meanings are conditioned by the very structure of the symbol of the Cosmic Tree. Salvation by the Cross is a new value bound to a precise historical fact — the agony and death of Jesus — but this new idea extends and perfects the idea of cosmic renovatio symbolized by the World Tree.

All this could be formulated in another manner. Symbols are capable of being understood on more and more “elevated” planes of reference. The symbolism of darkness and shadows allows us to grasp its meaning not only in its cosmological and initiatory contexts (cosmic night, prenatal darkness, etc.), but also in the mystical experience of the “dark night of the soul” of St. John of the Cross. The case of the symplegades is still more evident. As for the symbols expressing the coincidentia oppositorum, it is well-known what role they have played in philosophical and theological speculation. But then one may ask if these “elevated” meanings were not in some manner implied in the other meanings, and if, as a consequence, they were not, if not plainly understood, at least vaguely felt by men living on archaic levels of culture. This poses an important problem which unfortunately we cannot discuss here: how can one judge up to what point these “elevated” meanings of a symbol are completely recognized and assumed by such and such an individual, belonging to such and such a culture?

The difficulty of the problem rests in the fact that symbols address themselves not only to the awakened consciousness, but to the totality of the psychic life. Depth psychology has taught us that the symbol delivers its message and fulfills its function even when its meaning
escapes awareness.

This admitted, two important consequences follow:

1) If at a certain moment in history a religious symbol has expressed a transcendent meaning with clarity, one is justified in supposing that at an earlier epoch this meaning might have been grasped obscurely.

2) In order to decipher a religious symbol, not only it is necessary to take into consideration all of its contexts, but one must above all reflect on the meanings that this symbol has had in what we may call its "maturity". Analyzing the symbolism of magic flight, in a previous work, we have come to the conclusion that it reveals obscurely the ideas of "liberty" and of "transcendence", but that it is chiefly on the level of spiritual activity that the symbolism of flight and of ascension becomes completely intelligible. This is not to say that one must put all meanings of this symbolism on the same plane — from the flight of shamans to mystical ascensions. However, since the "cipher" constituted by this symbolism carries with it in its structure all the values that have been progressively revealed to man in the course of time, it is imperative to take account, in deciphering them, their most general meaning, that is, the one meaning which can articulate all the other, particular meanings and which alone permits us to understand how these can be seen as constituting a structure.

THE IDEA OF INSTITUTION IN THE MAJOR RELIGIONS

BY

MAX HAROLD FISCH

The problem of our time is the creation of a world community. Philosophers and prophets, men of state and men of arms, have long dreamed of such a community, but never until now was it even a physical possibility. Now it is a physical possibility. Is it a cultural or spiritual possibility? That is in large part a question of institutions. What existing institutions conduce to world community? What others are obstacles to it? What institutions must be destroyed or changed, and what new ones must be created?

These questions must be raised concerning religious institutions among others, and it may be within the province of our Congress to raise them. It is a different question, however, that I wish to consider. Our ability to create a world community may depend in part upon how we conceive institutions in general. With respect to their genesis, two opposed views have been held, which may be called the rationalistic view and the naturalistic view. In the West the rationalistic view prevailed until the end of the eighteenth century; the naturalistic view has prevailed in the nineteenth and the twentieth. According to the rationalistic view, institutions are invented and established by rational contrivance, choice, and decision; in a word, they are instituted. According to the naturalistic view, they grow by insensible degrees over long periods of time, by processes in which deliberation and intent play only minor roles; in a word they are not instituted.

Suppose that we have a limited period of time within which we shall either have established a world community or, by large-scale mutual destruction, have put it beyond the range of possibility for centuries to come. On that supposition, it would be a severe handicap to be committed to a conception of institutions according to which they are not instituted.

It is a fair presumption that a conception of institutions that has been prevalent in a given religion is more or less prevalent in a society in which that religion is dominant, even though, in that society, there may
be at the present time a professional class of social scientists among whom a different view has been cultivated or has come to be assumed. It may be a matter of some importance, therefore, to trace the conception of institutions in the major religions as well as in the social sciences.

Our concern is not with what each religion asserts about its own institution in particular, but with what they assert or assume about institutions in general – family, school, state, industry, commerce, science, art, language – including religious institutions other than their own.

In Greco-Roman paganism, all institutions had been instituted, some by gods, some by heroes, some by men. The only effective challenge to the rationalistic view was that of Epicurus, and it is noteworthy that his argument to show why language could not have been invented is the same as his argument to show that the world could not have been created.

The rationalistic view is even more prominent in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and more closely associated with the idea of a transcendent creator.

The naturalistic view began to gain ground in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a result of the voyages of exploration and the reports of travelers. They described primitive societies, each with a full complement of institutions, but such as the travelers could not imagine to have been rationally designed, proposed, and adopted. It seemed more likely that they had never been instituted, but had simply grown. The rising middle class soon found in the naturalistic view a convenient argument for laissez-faire economy. The excesses of the French Revolution provoked a conservative reaction. It was asserted that what the Revolution had attempted – the deliberate destruction of old institutions and the deliberate creation of new ones – was impossible. After the middle of the nineteenth century the general idea of natural development gained authority from the growing conviction that biological species had evolved in some such way as Darwin proposed. The Marxist theory of the dialectical development of economic institutions, and of all other institutions as determined by that of economic institutions, was widely influential even among those who rejected it; for they did not, for the most part, defend rationalism against it, but worked out variant forms of naturalism. And finally, the rise of the social sciences in the form in which we now know them both presupposed widespread acceptance of the naturalistic view of institutions and greatly enhanced its authority.

The rationalistic view survives, however, in the western religions and in a common sense not yet transformed by the social sciences; and more recently the reconstruction of the social sciences as policy sciences promises a partial reinstatement of rationalism.

Two further points should be noted before we turn to the religions of the East.

1. Though the naturalistic theory has on the whole been anti-revolutionary and conservative, the rationalistic theory has not always been revolutionary or radically progressive. There have in fact been two chief forms of rationalism, one conservative in tendency, the other progressive.

a. Athena sprang full-grown from the head of Zeus. The laws and institutions of Sparta were designed as a whole by Lycurgus. Those of the Hebrews were promulgated by Moses. Writing was invented by Thrice-Great Hermes. All that was taught by later Pythagoreans had already been discovered and announced by Pythagoras. This form of rationalism is conservative. It sanctifies existing institutions by ascribing to them a factitious antiquity. It admits innovation only under the guise of a restoration of institutions to the pristine purity which they had when fresh from the fount of a founding god or hero or from that of the founding fathers.

b. Institutions are works of reason, but human reason does not see everything at once, nor can its work ever be finished. As occasion arises, it creates new sciences and new institutions, as well as continuing or extending, revising or reconstructing, discontinuing or discarding, old ones. Just as in science what has passed unquestioned for centuries may be questioned tomorrow, and everything remains tentative, so in institutions antiquity is no title to exemption from criticism, nor is there any other such title. This form of rationalism is progressive. It is also less opposed to naturalism, and this leads me to the second point.

2. There have been many attempts to overcome the opposition between the two conceptions of institutions. Aristotle said that the state existed by nature, but that he who first founded one was a great benefactor of mankind. Vico said that the world of nations or of civil society was made by men, but that this world of institutions has issued from a mind often diverse, at times quite contrary, and always superior to the particular ends that men have proposed to themselves; which narrow ends, made means to serve wider ends, it has always employed to preserve the human race upon the earth. Hegel said that institutions were the work of objective mind, but he denied that a constitution could be invented, and he said that the means mind had used were the passions. It was the cunning of reason to bring the institutions of society into being in the very way in which the naturalistic
rather than the rationalistic theory asserted they had come into being.

If no synthesis so far effected is altogether tenable, certainly no form of either theory is now tenable which excludes all forms of the other. With regard to any institution it is wise to inquire what purpose it was designed to serve, whether that purpose is still our purpose, whether in fact the institution still serves that purpose, and whether it might be better served by changing the institution so as to bring it into harmony with others designed to serve other purposes to which we are also committed. It is wise to inquire whether needs have arisen not met by any existing institutions, and whether they can best be met by new institutions or by changes in old ones. But it is also wise to take account of the facts brought to light by historians and social scientists, such as that rapid and far-reaching changes, whether or not they accomplish their intentions, often have unintended consequences which, had we foreseen them, would have deterred us from change; and that, on the other hand, though institutions often outlive their original functions and even the memory of them, they sometimes, by slow processes of unintended change, acquire values other and greater than those they were intended to sustain.

In proceeding now to some brief notes concerning the idea of institution in the East, I pass quite beyond the range of my competence, and I venture to do so only in the hope that competent scholars will correct my errors, or, still better, that they will investigate the matter in their own ways, and gradually lay the foundations for comparative, synthetic, and critical studies.

The Indian village community was taken in the West as evidence for the naturalistic theory of institutions. In Hindu India itself, however, neither the naturalistic nor the rationalistic nor any other general theory of institutions has had any prominence in religion or philosophy. The gulf between religion and philosophy on the one hand, with their immense time scale of kalpas and their cycles of births and deaths, and economics and politics on the other, with their time scale of months and years, has left religion and philosophy without a motive for institutional creativity. In political theory it has usually been assumed that institutions are means to ends and may be reconstituted or discarded to suit changing conditions; but this assumption has not applied to the basic social and religious institutions of Hindu society. In religion and philosophy, it is assumed that all institutions belong to the veil of Maya, but no social consequences are drawn from this metaphysical premise. Thus religion has been conservative in effect without benefit of an explicitly conservative theory.

Under Asoka in India, and much later and in different ways in Tibet and Japan, Buddhism has played a secular role, but these are conspicuous exceptions to its general tendency. In Tibet the monasteries became the chief military as well as the chief political power, and they nearly did so in Japan as well. More recently, Buddhism has developed a wide range of charitable and other institutions, perhaps in part under Christian influence, but I am not aware that Buddhism has at any time developed or committed itself to a general theory of institutions.

Only in Confucianism, Taoism, and, perhaps, in Shintoism under Confucian influence, has the idea of institution become prominent in the East.

In Confucianism perhaps the prevalent view has been that the Way of Confucius was simply the Way of the early kings. As in the case of Rome and its early kings, it was said that each successive king had added this or that until the Way was complete, including rites, music, law enforcement, political administration, and other institutions. The views thereby rejected are (1) that the Way was natural or heaven-sent and (2) that it was created at one time or by one man, Confucius. This is rationalism in its conservative form. Since the Way was already complete before the time of Confucius, there is nothing for reason to do but to preserve it or to reinstate it after lapses from it. There was a synthesis of this conservative form of rationalism with conservative naturalism. All the institutions created by the ancient kings and sages were of course man-made, but their structures were determined by the natures of things. In some periods of neo-Confucianism, however, both in China and in Japan, a progressive form of the rationalist view has been reached by reflection upon the practice, when founding a new dynasty, of changing the capital city, the title, the beginning of the year, the color of the cloth, and sometimes other institutions. It has been said that the institutions of the former kings were intended to meet the needs of their times. If they are not discarded after the time for them has passed, they become artificial in the bad sense.

Taoism has often seemed to attach less importance to institutions than Confucianism has, and to discourage reliance upon them, and especially to discourage reliance upon new institutions or upon changes in old ones, since these will produce reactions contrary to the intentions of their advocates. But in some forms of Taoism at least, and perhaps in all, the point has rather been institutional laissez-faire. In order to meet the changes of the times, it is natural that men should devise new institutions. By allowing full scope to such innovation, it
is possible for the ruler to achieve the Taoist ideal of non-action, wu wei, whereby everything is accomplished.

These observations probably contain radical errors, and are certainly incomplete and insufficient. I offer them only because I saw no other way to bring before this Congress a question which seems to me to be of great importance, and to urge competent scholars to explore this part of the resources of faith and intelligence with which the major religions face the task of creating a world community.

THE EVALUATION OF SYMBOLS IN HISTORY

ERWIN RAMSDELL GOODENOUGH

We of the intelligentsia have been expounding our philosophies to one another for many years, and may be said to have come to an excellent understanding. Hindu or Buddhist philosophers, Christian, Jewish, or Moslem philosophers, now understand one another perhaps as well as do the various philosophic schools in the West.

The mass of men, intelligent or unintelligent, however, pay little consistent heed to the philosophy, religious or otherwise, by which they profess to live. They adjust their lives to what seem to them immediate realities of great impact, but they rarely try to explain these in terms of a greater single Reality. The immediate realities are family, good manners, and holy places, along with ways of getting crops, children, healing, and security in various dangers. These in every civilization have produced symbolic acts, rites, and designs or images, which have had the merit of relating the immediate with a universal. The vague and undefined concepts of spiritual or divine or metaphysical sources of help are by symbols applied directly to immediate needs. The objective religious symbols of phrase, rite, form, or object relieve man of the necessity to think philosophically, and the great majority of men in all civilizations must have this relief.

The importance of symbols has in the last half century been coming into a new recognition. Study of them now seems to many to be more basic than even study of the literary documents of the various religions. We have by no means agreed upon a technique in such study, however, and probably will not agree for many decades, since most scholars are trained in the study of verbal documents; but symbols act as a language of their own, one which can as little be translated into words as can the language of music. Modern study of religious symbols has been emphasizing their common nature. To the Freidians, the Jungians, the older anthropologists, or to those who study the "Perennial Philosophy", the universality of symbolic forms and formulations has seemed so important that local differences
have appeared relatively inconsequential.

The thesis of this paper will be, then, that we must indeed study symbols in religion, but that history offers us the most promising technique for understanding them. In suggesting that we take history thus seriously, I am resisting the most productive students of symbolic studies in the West. For these men seek escape from what they call the world of "history" to the world of the timeless and eternal. Their most potent spokesman announces that in these "archetypal" symbols we have the means to come into the totality of symbolism, where "history ceases to be." We need no longer be immobilized in the historico-cultural perspective, he tells us, for "a symbol, a myth, a ritual can reveal to us the human condition with respect to its mode of existence proper in the universe...... The function of a symbol is precisely to reveal a total reality, inaccessible to other means of knowledge. The coincidence of opposites, for example, so abundantly and simply expressed by symbols, is never presented by the cosmos, and is accessible neither to the immediate experience of man, nor to discursive thought." (1)

In taking us out of the world of "history," such study takes from us all methods of scientific criticism, and all ground for studying the greatest problem of mankind, i.e. the differences which divide us. For if the minds of all men have always been fed with archetypal symbols from a single source of meaning and reality, I see no way of explaining that nothing divides us more than our symbols. Here, I believe, history will help us.

The vast ages of prehistory can, I believe, best be approached by man's symbols and rites, as the childhood of an individual can best be recovered through his dreams and habits. But as a historian, it seems to me that we must be as cautious in supposing that a given symbol has the same meaning or value wherever it appears, in leaping to conclusions about the meaning of a symbol, as in concluding that the dreams of individuals can be decoded or translated by a standardized lexicon of dream figures. We can quickly get into a vicious circle if we identify the original meaning of a symbol with the common value we can now find in their various uses.

We historians must take a much slower way, and study the religious experiences of men within the ages of which we have direct evidence, indeed have enough of it to give some hope that they can be made into a connected story. Most historians of religion who have been concerned with the story of religions have primarily used written documents.

They have traced the development of Chirstianity, Islam, or Buddhism, from its earlier documents to its later ones. Usually the story has told about changes but sometimes about a constant reaffirmation of a basic tradition, which was adapted to changing conditions and languages, while remaining essentially unchanged. In either case, the historian must have a principle of continuity, as a story must have a hero. The continuity of histories of religion in the past has largely been in the changing or unchanging ideas of its thinkers through the ages. Now we have discovered that a continuity lies in the religious experiences of men, and, as we have said, that these are much better recorded for the masses in their rites and symbols than in the ideas of their philosophers.

The question now becomes clear: how can symbols be used as historical data? The historian is much interested to learn that a symbol is universally, or widely, used. But his training makes him ask as keenly what are the differences in meaning as what are the similarities. And he discards at once fanciful projections of meaning. In a book published in the United States this year we are told that the stem of a flower "is invariably phallic" in its symbolism. The historian can hardly take such statements seriously. Is there a technique for evaluating symbols that does not fall into such subjective fancies? I have been attempting to work out a technique for dealing with symbols that is still too novel to have been generally accepted in the West; but in it many western scholars are finding promise, and it may possibly prove suggestive for the study of Eastern religions.

We must begin, of course, by further defining our terms. Especially the term symbol cannot be discussed while each of us has his own meaning of it in mind. I have said that the symbol brings immediate realities into relation with greater realities. Now, more generally, may I say that a symbol is any object that brings to the observer's conscious or unconscious mind more than the object inherently is. When a piece of colored cloth becomes a flag, for example, it has an impact that ordinary colored cloths do not have. We all honor it, have rituals before it, not as a piece of cloth but as the nation itself. Does the nation create its flag, or does the flag create the nation? For the little American or French child the flag certainly creates Ameria or France as an entity. The child must begin with reverence for the symbol. Whether or not you agree with me that the flag is a religious symbol will depend upon your definition of religion. But what I have said of the flag applies to the images of the gods, to fetishes, and to symbolic marks like the halo or mandala. When we translate

the halo into language, and say it is a token of light or radiance, we
have only substituted a verbal symbol for the plastic one, since we do
not mean literal light, but that vague reality which the word
light itself symbolizes. Even a cultic human figure has symbolic value
only as it brings more to mind than it represents. None but the ignorant
and insensitive suppose that Shiva has human form with several arms.
Such symbols, also, as the figure of the Buddha and the Crucifix, take
us beyond the historical characters into a universal conception. One
prays to the eternal living Christ, not to the dead figure one sees: or
to the quite uniformed Universal which the Buddha is contemplating
and sharing, not to the historical Gautama. But the child is introduced
to the greater reality through reverence to the symbol, and the vast
majority of men never get far beyond it.

That such are the values of these particular images can easily be
demonstrated from historical evidence of all kinds: from devotional
literature, from the consecutive use of the images, from the rituals
practised with them. The cult stories, which in religions not our own
we call myths, embellish these values with verbal fancies. But I am
steadily introducing a word whose meaning is, I believe, clear, but
which itself needs further elucidation. For I have spoken of the
"value" of the symbol, and found it something distinct from, perhaps
anterior to, the mythical or philosophical explanation of the value.
In studying symbols of the West I found it helpful to dissociate a
symbol's value from the explanations given it, the myths told about
it, or the divine characters with which it was associated, since in the
passing of symbols from one religion to another they amazingly keep
historical continuity in their value, although new names and stories
come to be associated with them. In contrast, an explanation of a
symbol would be a verbal account of the symbol's value, whether a
direct rational account in the modern sense, or an account in the form
of a myth or cult legend. These accounts, explanations, have changed
from civilization to civilization, and, important as they are, they seem
to have received a quite disproportionate amount of attention in our
histories. The number of myths told to account for a single rite, or
for a single divine symbol like the eagle or the bull, become completely
bewildering when we take them literally. Even within a single civili-
zation, people can tell a variety of stories to explain a symbol because
the stories really do not matter as compared with the symbol which
inspires them. To westerners, trained in the literal truth of Christian
legend, and taught in creeds to rehearse it with precise verbal
accuracy, this distinction between value and explanation seems at

first unreal. But it becomes increasingly valid as one works with it.
The value of the symbol is its subverbal impact which no words
properly explain. No treatise on the cross has ever expressed fully
the value of the cross, its impact, for devout Christians: hence its
value must be felt to be understood. Similarly the value of the image
of the Buddha cannot be verbally explained. As we can understand
color only by seeing it, sound only by hearing, so we must feel the
impact of the symbol to understand it. We need have no fear of this
idea of subverbal understanding. Everyone has an understanding of
his father, mother, wife, or child which can only vaguely be conveyed
in words to another person. Mystic knowledge, mystics have always
said, can begin only when what Philo calls the light of our own minds,
that is, rationalism in the Greek sense, has ceased. But this example
only estranges most westerners, who want demonstration, not anything
that smacks of mysticism. For them we must return to the simple
fact that most of the convictions by which they themselves live, the
loyalties that guide them, the principles they try to instill within their
children, hold their sway at a level quite too deep for words. True,
at this level some people are apt to have a verbal symbol, a word like
democracy or liberty or sincerity, not one of which he could define in
a way satisfactory to himself or others. That is, even a word-symbol,
in so far as it is a symbol, has its value for a kind of impact we cannot
verbally define in the ordinary sense at all. This the rationalist in us,
or the rationalists among us, call muddy thinking, sentimentality. I
simply call it human nature, and ask him who is without undefined
ultimates in his life to cast the first stone. Indeed, I ask if the truths
brought to us by symbolic words or forms are not more important to
our actual living, than anything we can precisely formulate. Through-
out the past men have dedicated themselves to the image or rites of
their religion, and to symbolic words.

When we have thus separated the subverbal value of a symbol
from its mythical or theological explanations or apologies, we enter a
world where as men we are all deeply experienced, but as scholars have
no techniques at all. The historian, I said, has one of several techniques
which might, and should, be adapted to this sort of material, and it is
a valuable one. He can trace the usages of symbols through the ages.
He will trace a symbol—the tree, the vine, the peacock, the shell—
through a series of historically consecutive civilizations and diverging
mythologies within a single region, to see whether behind the diver-
gences of explanation the values of the symbols do not give us a new
constant. In such a study the differences of verbal interpretations
will be as important as the basic identity of value.

I have no disposition to beg the question before us, however, as my last sentence seems to do. For the question is: granted that a symbol has a value deeper than its verbal explanations, does that value remain a constant at all, or will the value appear to vary as much as the explanations in the course of time. Only in establishing this can we hope to show a man of modern training that it makes any sense to talk of the characteristic value of a symbol.

To determine this, I suggest, we must take symbols one by one in an historical context and see how they were actually used. A further preliminary problem, however, will at once appear. To say, as we have done, that a symbol is a form (or word) with impact beyond what it represents does not help us to determine when forms represented in a historical period have symbolic force, and when they do not. For symbols can lose their impact, and become purely ornamental. I like to say that in that case as symbols the forms have died, and so to contrast dead symbols, used for mere decoration, with live symbols. From my own study it seems safe to suggest that within a given environment, a live symbol can never be separated from its value, can never be used as mere decoration. Symbols whose value we do not like we cannot use at all. An American flag could never be displayed in Russia as mere decoration, any more than a Russian flag in an American auditorium. An American Jew can use an American flag, for he is a loyal citizen of the United States, but he cannot wear a cross. A temple or church which displayed for worship an image of Shiva alongside a Madonna and Child would mark itself as being apart from either pure Hinduism or Christianity, for these images together would say, more loudly than any written documents, that the devotees of that shrine had mingled puja with Christian piety.

If this is true, the historian of religion can conclude that when he can establish that a symbol is alive with one group (a matter in which he must take the greatest care), its adoption by followers of another religion in that civilization has real significance. It indicates that followers of the second religion have aspirations and experiences like the first, even though we must presume that the explanations in the second religion would, if we had them, probably speak of other deities, other mythologies, use distinctive rites. We must presume these differences, else the two religions would have fused. So long as the explanations are kept different, the religions will remain distinct. When explanations are fused, real syncretism has taken place.

In summary may I say that the historian must bear clearly in mind that to use symbols as historical data he must first be sure that the symbols he is treating are alive. He must then distinguish the value of the symbol from its explanations. This he will do by tracing the way in which the symbols were used and discussed by devotees through the period and civilization he is studying. In that process he must always bear in mind that devotees made no such distinction, but understand a symbol’s value in terms of their own explanations. Both the value and the explanations will have the greatest importance for him as a historian, the one as showing the varieties of history, the other as suggesting the constants. For history is written only with an eye to both.
TWO TYPES OF EXISTENTIALIST RELIGION AND ETHICS

BY

SIDNEY HOOK

It is commonly assumed that religion and morality reinforce each other’s claims and that despite differences in emphasis they express a common outlook which assigns man an intelligible place in an ordered world. Historically the connection between religion and ethics has always been intimate. It is possible, of course, to define religion in such a way that every strong ethical or unethical position is religious and the distinction between the religious and ethical categories disappears. Little is to be gained by such procedure. It does violence to the actual historical materials. Further, the differences between ethics and religion reappear in the recognized differences among religions.

In this paper I wish to call attention to two types of existentialist religious thinking in the 19th and 20th century which point up the difference between the attitude of faith— which I regard as strictly religious, —and the attitude of morality, which I regard as primarily secular.

By the two types of existentialist religion I mean the types of religious thinking represented by Søren Kierkegaard and Ludwig Feuerbach. The first is oriented towards some transcendent element which conditions the whole of human experience; the second regards human experience as the matrix of all religion. Although in polar opposition to each other, both were critical reactions to the idealistic pan-logism of Hegel for whom religion was nothing but an aesthetic or symbolic rendition of the truths discovered by philosophy. Kierkegaard has become the most influential philosopher of religion of the Western world in our time; Feuerbach still awaits his proper recognition.

Kierkegaard is an existentialist who takes as his point of departure man’s subjective experience, supposedly universal, of incompleteness, insufficiency, and despair, “an anxious dread of an unknown something.” On the basis of this and similar subjective experiences Kierkegaard postulates, he cannot rationally establish, the existence beyond an “infinite yawning abyss” of an objective Absolute, completely transcendent to man and therefore essentially unknowable and mysterious. In the words of Karl Barth, a lineal theological descendant of Kierkegaard, God is “wholly other than man.”

Feuerbach is an even more radical existentialist than Kierkegaard. He interprets man’s religious beliefs as projections of human needs and care. They are either ideal liberations from his most pressing concerns or, when they express longings, ideal fulfillments. For him “the secret of theology is anthropology.” This is meant in two senses. The first as a heuristic principle in the study of comparative religion; second, and more important, as a naturalistic interpretation in cultural and psychological terms of belief in the supernatural. “Religion is the dream of the human mind. But even in dreams we do not find ourselves in emptiness or in heaven, but on earth, in the realm of reality.”

The school of existential theism from Kierkegaard to Barth recognizes the fact that Man’s nature is expressed in his religious beliefs. It places, however, an altogether different interpretation from that of Feuerbach upon this fact. It dismisses the Feuerbachian approach as a stupendous but dangerous commonplace; a commonplace because every man does and thinks bears witness to his faltering mortality; a dangerous commonplace because unless disciplined by the humble realization that the conceptions of finite, wicked and mortal creatures violently distort the nature of God, they inescapably lead to idolatry, in which the part is worshipped as the whole, and man impossibly confused with God. Indeed some modern followers of Kierkegaard regard Feuerbach’s existential humanism as a reductio ad absurdum of any interpretation which takes its point of departure from the facts of religious experience alone independently of its ontological correlative.

The Kierkegaardian point of view is correct in pointing out that there is an inescapable reference to man in all his works, from art to astronomy and religion. The fact that astronomy is a human enterprise does not preclude our achieving objective knowledge of the behavior of heavenly bodies. But certainly this element of subjectivity is not a sufficient condition of knowledge, else there would be no difference between veridical and hallucinatory experience on any level. The only way objectivity can be established on the basis of human experience is by empirical evidence and or reasoning both of which are rejected out of hand by the existentialists of this school. This leaves the only way open to them the unmediated “leap” of faith, the reliance upon “paradox, inaccessible to thought,” the glorification of “the absurd,” the refusal to apply any categories of reason or logic to “the revealed.”
Since it disdains human reason, not in the light of a higher Reason, for this, too, is infected with man's imperfect nature, it is impervious to rational criticism. Nonetheless, it is not beyond the reach of psychological analysis and social criticism.

The existentialism of Feuerbach denies that human projection in religion distorts "reality" because projections are not literal reports of antecedent existence but a mode of experiencing things. For something to be distorted requires that it have a normal or natural appearance. But if all appearances are essentially related to the finite eye and mind of men, it makes no sense to counterpose what human beings experience to some allegedly objective transcendent entity. The eternal can only be grasped in a temporal frame. The "absurd" for Feuerbach always consists in the negation of human sense and understanding and is therefore rejected by him as a negation of the true nature of religion as he conceives it.

Of the two thinkers, it is apparent that although Feuerbach's development took him further away from the Hegelian philosophy of religion than did Kierkegaard, the latter made the more radical break with the Hegelian tradition of reason and the systematic unity of the concrete universal. Feuerbach is closer to Hegel because like Hegel he rejects all dualisms, epistemological, metaphysical or theological. For Hegel, Spirit, divine or human, is one, and it develops by alienating itself into objective forms which become both temporary obstacles and stimuli to its further advance. Feuerbach interprets the process of human alienation as consisting in this unconscious worship of its own projections. He naturalizes and demythologizes the Absolute Spirit of Hegel. He reinterprets the different stages in the progressive development of the Idea or Absolute or God as a succession of different historical expressions of the human species or essence. "Man—this is the mystery of religion—projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself an object to this projected image of himself thus converted into a subject...." Feuerbach's attitude towards religion is reverential and sensitive. He believes that it is an irreducible aspect of human experience no matter how profoundly its images, symbols and dogmas change. "What yesterday was still religion, is no longer such today: and what today is atheism, tomorrow will be religion."

The profoundest difference between the approach of existential theism and existential humanism to religion is in their conceptions of ethics and morality. Existential humanism, especially in its post-Feuerbachian developments, sees man's moral vocation in redoing, remaking, reforming the world and self in the light of consciously held ethical ideals to which religious myths and rituals can give only emotional and aesthetic support. Existential theism, aware of human finitude and weakness and self-idolatry, places the greatest emphasis upon the acceptance of the world and its underlying plan, so unclear to human eyes, upon the explanation and justification of evil rather than on the duty of eliminating specific evils. This is sometimes obscured by the fact that the transcendent and Absolute God of existential theism is considered to be beyond good and evil. Psychologically it is apparent that the belief that the difference between human good and human evil disappears in the light of the Absolute or that what appears good or evil in the sight of Man may be quite different in the sight of the Lord cannot serve as a premise for the active transformation of the world. In effect, it accepts the existing order of things, whatever it is, as a basis of preparation for salvation either by a leap of faith or a transformation of self.

This is brilliantly illustrated in Kierkegaard's remarkable analysis of the Abraham-Isaac story in his Fear and Trembling. According to Kierkegaard, God's command to Abraham to sacrifice his only and dearly beloved son, Isaac, to Him as a burnt-offering ran counter to one of the highest ethical principles. The test of Abraham's religious faith was his willingness to violate his duty as a father, husband, citizen and compassionate human being in order to carry out his absolute duty to God. This "teleological suspension of the ethical" raises Abraham in Kierkegaard's eyes above tragic heroes like Agamemnon, Jeptha, and Brutus who sacrificed their children to the common good. They were "tragic heroes", exalting the universal over the particular. Abraham is no tragic hero. He must be regarded, says Kierkegaard, as either "a murderer", from the ethical standpoint, or a true "believer" from the standpoint of absolute religion. Kierkegaard's account is powerful and honest. He admits that Abraham "acts by virtue of the absurd" and that although in ethics it is wrong to subordinate the universal to the particular, in the case of one's absolute duty to God "the particular is higher than the universal." In serving God one is beyond good and evil. "Hence it is," writes Kierkegaard, "that I can understand the tragic hero but cannot understand Abraham, though in a certain crazy sense I admire him more than all other men."

We can use this parable to point up the difference between the approaches of Kierkegaard and Feuerbach. The latter would interpret the story quite differently. First, he would maintain that despite Kierkegaard there is no escaping the standpoint of morality, that we are all responsible for our judgments, and for the consequences of our
judgments, no matter what we believe the external source of our moral duty to be. Here the Feuerbachian view follows the Kantian view. When Abraham, knife in hand, prepared to sacrifice Isaac, the Biblical account says an Angel of the Lord commanded him to stay his hand. How did Abraham know that this message was a message from the Lord and not from Satan, or that it was not the voice of his own longing, the expression of the anguished wish of a loving father not to be bereaved of a son? The existential humanist answers that Abraham attributes the source of this command to God not to Satan because it is he who finds it good. Every statement which asserts that the Good is what God commands presupposes that we already have independent knowledge of what is good or bad in order to attribute the good to God and the bad to Satan. The command from the Angel of the Lord represents the birth of a new moral insight in man, in Abraham, according to which it is not necessary to sacrifice human life in thanksgiving to or, in fear of, the imputed author of creation. The earlier injunction to sacrifice Isaac undoubtedly reflected a local religious practice.

Certainly, after the Abraham-Isaac episode even Kierkegaard would judge a man willing to sacrifice his son or any other human being on the altar of the Gods, by a different standard. Abraham’s resolution to carry out the first Divine Command can be justified only because he knows or believes it is a Divine Command and only because he knows or believes that the Divine Command is the source of good. Feuerbach believed, I think truly, that men create God in their own moral image, that morality is autonomous of religion, and that although religious beliefs and symbols may support moral values the latter can never be derived from the former. Where this is denied or overlooked then the satas quo in all its infamy is either accepted in terms of a disguised value judgment or it is ignored as something irrelevant to man’s profoundest concern.

It is of course true that even an immanent theology can adopt a morality which leads, as in the Hegelian system, to the belief that whatever is, is right. (*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*). Such an identification receives a well-merited rebuke from existentialist theism on the ground that it results in an idolatry of history, especially when, as in Hegel, the path of history is interpreted as the path of divinity. The great paradox of existentialist theism is that it properly perceives the finitude of all human standpoints, the relativity of all philosophical absolutes but fails to see that a finite creature can criticize the finite only in the light of another finite, the relative (or relational) only from the basis of another relative (or relational) position.

The question remains whether existential humanism is also another form of idolatry. If ethical ideals are related to human interests is not man’s pursuit of the good a worship of his own nature? There is no doubt that sometimes this is the case. But it need not be. Men, by projecting their ideals as standards, may appeal from an existing self to a developing self, from what things and men actually are to what they may possibly be or become. They may criticize the structure of the self from the standpoint of shared interests with others which forms the basis of community. Time guarantees that whatever the world is or may be, new visions of human excellence, whether in conflict or cooperation, will prevent men from identifying their limitations with the limitations of all human possibility.
FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

BY
TERUJI ISHIZU

There are many theories concerning the truth of and reason for the existence of religion. My method is to study religion from the viewpoint of actual religious experience. In contrast to Kant, Max Scheler took a similar attitude in his phenomenological discussion. However, I intend to consider more practical and actual situations with particular reference to the contributions of the social sciences.

There are two ways to grasp the essential core of religion. One is to resolve the religious experience of a particular religion into its component elements. Each religion, whether highly developed or undeveloped, world religion, racial or even natural religion has its own ideas and code of behavior. The ideas and code of behavior are dependent on their historical and social background. When we strip off such factors from a positive structure of religious experience by way of the so-called “destruction” in terms of phenomenology or phenomenological ontology, it is found that religious experience is ultimately based on the very being of “existence” which has proved “ontology” to be the ultimate ground of beings.

I have followed such a method, but now I would like to discuss a second method. In this method, the object studied is not the experience of a particular religion. But, what matters first is our adaptation to special situations in our daily life. By special situations I mean crises. Malinowsky established a working hypothesis that the origin of magical or magico-religious behavior which is traditionally handed over, must have been linked with that of man’s natural or spontaneous adaptation to crises. Since then, further and more profound developments of the problem have been presented.

Practically speaking, man does not resort to religion or magic only when confronted with crises. Magic and religions exist as institutions of society and customs. However, for our purpose, I would like to prove that the only possible adaptation to crises is a religious one and also that the religious function is ultimately based on the fundamental structure of the existence of the human being.

As is well known, many of the present social sciences adopt the apological way of research and consider the functional relation between the needs and satisfactions of the human organism. Especially neobehaviorism and topological psychology deal with the bio-social and physio-social case where the human organism adapts itself to its environment. And it is said that self-defence and security are the original inclinations of such an organism.

Living up to those inclinations, human adults have high plasticity. On the other hand, however, there are many cases of frustration of needs and conflicts which are, by nature, unsuscceptible of a solution. In such cases, the result is maladjustment or non-adjustment. In severe cases, catastrophe and crisis follow. Then two kinds of adaptation, collapse and withdrawal, are brought about. The former is the break-down of the human organism itself and the latter is a temporary syncope withdrawal from the environment and has no actual relation with the environment. In other words, man retires into a world of imagination and phantasy and plays only with ideas and symbols. Then he applies the new ideas and symbols to the confronting environment. In some cases, the trial is successful and in others, not. When the trial fails, the phantasy and imagination related to the environment return back and cause strong emotional sentiments such as fear and anxiety. In this mechanism of mentality, both phantasy and anxiety are correlative. In a catastrophic situation, no prediction or estimation can be made and hence no practical relation exists between the self and its environment. Consequently, the anxiety of the subject is correlatively increased by delusion and obsession. The result is paranoia and phobia. When those states are fixed, symptoms of various functional diseases appear.

In a crisis and critical situation, no positive measure, can be taken and the only possible means is retirement into the world of imagination and phantasy. There uncertainty, incalculability and helplessness, anxiety and fear are dominant. There is no means of adaptation. The only alternative for the human organism is the reaction through substitute imagination and phantasy.

The only possible response which is actual and positive is taking the situation for what it really is, an unaccountable, incalculable situation. In other words, it is to accept the uncontrollable beyondness as it is and to leave oneself with the situation.

It is an actual response to realize. It is of course beyond common sense and science. This response is qualitatively different from
one based upon common sense and science. Psychiatrists and clinical psychologists say that such a response cannot but be regarded as “religious.”

I do not decide here whether this response is religious or not. The limited situation or crisis stated above is accidental to the subject but is not failures experienced in this limitation based on the imperfection, innate in the fundamental structure of the existence of the human being.

Let us try to find the source of the anxieties with which men are confronted in these frustrating and critical circumstances.

Today, anxiety is regarded as different from fear. Unlike fear, anxiety has no definite object. Anxiety does not correspond to its circumstances and object, because its quality is transformed from its object. Therefore, anxiety cannot be grasped; it is invisible and irrational. Anxiety is connected with uncertainty and helplessness and is combined with imagination and phantasy.

The source of anxiety is explained variously by psychiatry and psychology. In this field, Freudianism came first, next came the behavioristic standpoint and the so-called Neo-Freudianism. And thirdly came anthropological and existentialist psychiatry and psychology. Freudianism analyzes the source of anxiety in the light of the past of the individual. Behaviorism and the so-called Neo-Freudianism analyze them in the light of environment and inter-human relationship.

Psychiatry and psychology based on a functionalistic standpoint recently began to deal with personal subjectivity or responsibility.

There are problems to be solved philosophically. Among those three schools, the third type of psychiatry and psychology is good at finding the very source of anxiety. They deal with the futurity in the realm of the possibilities which control the existence of the self. Men, including abnormal ones, are controlled by the limitations which prevent them from being a really free existence. Existentialism deals chiefly with the interpretation of the way of being controlled in this way. But psychiatry and psychology have contributed much to the task from their own viewpoints.

Existentialism has succeeded in explaining the fact that men are controlled by possibilities, especially by limited possibilities. It also gave an ontological reason for the mental state of man. The source of anxiety lies in a deficiency in the fundamental structure of existence. Heidegger defined the state of “I am” as geworfen Entwarf in his fundamental ontology. There is no one who throws the ball; there is no other side to receive the ball either. Existence in this limitation is the foundation of every thing. But this foundation is in the deficiency which has its character in nothingness as a Nichtigkeit. He also speaks of this state of being as schuldig. Real existence is in the structure in which it has no power of doing away with the control given to it in the realm of limited possibilities.

Kierkegaard was the first to indicate that the realm of real existence lies in that of possibilities. But he saw real existence in “das Werden.” He pointed out the uncertainty of the possible in real existence which is made through the transformation of the possible in to the real, and said that the realm of real existence, that is, the realm of the possibilities which control real existence, is unsupported “nothing” to the subject. He went on to say that the sense of sinfulness and indebtedness gained through this sense of nothingness controls the present state of real existence. Here we also notice that, in his view, the nothingness of real existence under the limitation of possibilities provides the key to the solution of the problem. The theme of today’s existentialism is the problem of transcendence, but, fundamentally speaking, the deficiency in the structure and the indebted reality constitute the foundation of real existence.

As stated already, our everyday experience involves a special phase, in which we are confronted with the uncertain, unexpected and helpless “beyondness” under limited circumstances. We also saw that the only way to adapt ourselves actually to this special phase is by receiving it as it is, and giving up ourselves wholly to it. The source of the uncertain and helpless beyondness has been identified as the deficiency which lies in the very structure of our existence. To give ourselves up wholly to this beyondness, therefore, means to adapt ourselves to this nothingness, that is, deficiency, to be as nothing is. In other words, it means the negation of self, denial of the self-loving self.

What, then, is the fundamental structure of religious experience from this viewpoint? As already stated, various religions have their peculiar forms according to their particular constituent elements. Notwithstanding their variety, they agree in holding that to behave religiously means to be as nothingness is, that is, to say, to receive the deficiency in the structure of the existence of the human being as it is, in other words, to deny and to transcend the self-loving self.

Not much can be said here of things religious. Scientists and philosophers say that supernaturalism and the idea of sacredness are the core ideas of religion. It is also said that things supernatural and
mysterious coexist with the element of sacredness in the core of religion, but, speaking from the functional side of religion, the components of religion can be resolved into two elements: otherness and negation of the individual subject. That is why religious experience is regarded as different from other experiences. To place ourselves in this sort of experience is to transcend the egotistic understanding self and to acknowledge ourselves in the attitude and judgment stated above. It means, at the same time, to adapt ourselves to the fundamental structure of the existence of being.

DIE EMPIRISCHE RELIGIONSPSYCHOLOGIE ALS GRUNDLAGE DER RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE

VON

WILHELM KEILBACH

Es soll hier weder das Ergebnis einer Detailforschung vorgelegt werden noch eine Zusammenfassung der Forschungsergebnisse eines engeren Fachgebiets zur Darstellung gelangen. Das Interesse gilt einer Strukturfrage, wie sie in grundsätzlicher Hinsicht von neunmäßig geworden ist; im letzten geht es um die Stellung der Religionspsychologie und Religionsphänomenologie in ihrem Verhältnis zur Religionsphilosophie.


1. Die Religionspsychologie als empirische Wissenschaft


James will durch die Erforschung ausgezeichneter Fälle bloß eine „inhaltliche Beschreibung“ religiöser Neigungen (wir würden sagen: religiöser Erfahrung) geben. Er ist bemüht, nur ein Tatsachenerteil, nicht auch ein Werturteil auszusprechen. Wenn er versichert, nur das Wesen, nicht auch die philosophische Bedeutung der religiösen Erfahrung erforschen zu wollen, so deutet er mit dieser wenig angebrachten Ausdrucksweise (die Wesensfrage gehört nämlich in die Metaphysik!)
den Unterschied zwischen Religionspsychologie und Religionsphilosophie so an, daß empirische und normative Wissenschaft einander gegenüber stehen. Aber auch in seiner Darstellung unterläuft, was vermieden werden soll. Der religiöse Erlebnisvorgang, namentlich in der Form der Bekehrung, erfährt eine pragmatische Deutung. Das aber ist Folge und Ausdruck eines erkenntnistheoretischen Standpunktes, über dessen Berechtigung in ganz anderer Schau entschieden werden muß.

Auch die von Flourney angewandte Methode der Beobachtung will grundsätzlich nur die innere Erfahrung als Tatsachen in den Blick bekommen; die Wahrheitsfrage (Sinn, Wert und Berechtigung) soll Gegenstand philosophischer Überlegung bleiben.41 Es ist aber nicht zu übersehen, daß Flourney Ansichten, wie sie als Ergebnisse seiner Tatsachenforschung dargelegt werden, von positivistisch-pathologischen Tendenzen beherrscht sind; namentlich die mystische Erfahrung erscheint in die Nähe von Epilepsie und Hysterie gerückt.

Wenn Wundts völkerpsychologische Methode die Befragung der Erfahrung oder Tatsachen gar nicht erst abwartet, sondern diese nur im Lichte des Entwicklungsprinzips aufscheinen läßt, so sind damit die Grenzen zwischen empirischem und metaphysischem Wissen aufgegeben.42 Daß Rudolf Otto in seinem weithin bekannten Buch „Das Heilige“ seinen Fundamentalsatz von den elementaren religiösen Gefühlen nur aufstellt, aber nicht beweist, hat J. Lindworsky nachdrücklich hervorgehoben43; der von Otto vertretene Irrationalismus ist jedenfalls kein empirisch nachgewiesener Befund.

Was die tiefenpsychologischen Verfasser betrifft, so wird uns von Freud versichert, die Psychoanalyse werde nicht versucht sein, „etwas so Kompliziertes wie die Religion aus einem einzigen Ursprung abzuleiten.“44 Dennoch endet Freuds Untervergang in der Annahme, die Religion sei „die allgemein menschliche Zwangsnervose“ „einer Kindheitsnervose vergleichbar.“45 Wer das ganze Schrifttum Freuds überseht, weiß, daß das nicht im Sinne einer Arbeitshypothese gemeint ist, sondern als Theorie vom religiösen Seelenleben aufgefaßt werden will. So wird denn religiöses Erleben nicht genommen als das, was es ist, sondern als das, was vorgefaßte Schemen aus ihm machen. – Bei Adler ist das nicht viel anders, nur daß an Stelle von Libido das Streben nach Macht bzw. Überwindung steht. Die Religion hat nur noch den Sinn eines fiktiven Zieles.46 Im Begriff der Religion fehlt als Merkmal die Beziehung zu einem außerweltlichen persönlichen Gott. „Fromm sein heißt nicht an den Gott glauben, der hinter Wolken thront und ‚nur von außen stieße‘, sondern es heißt, sich in schlechthiniger Abhängigkeit wissen von einer schöpferischen, allverpflichtenden

Endgültig, die nicht unermeßlich hoch über, sondern tief verschüttet
in uns selber liegt.“11 Das aber ist nicht festgestellte Erfahrung, sondern
subjektive Deutung. – Grundsätzlich betrachtet C. G. Jung seine
Ansichten als Vorschläge und Versuche zur Formulierung einer
modernen naturwissenschaftlichen Psychologie, welche sich in erster
Linie auf die unmittelbare Erfahrung vom Menschen gründet.111 In
Vermittlung finden wir, daß Jung seine methodische Selbstbeschränkung
geprüft, „wenn er Religion, Dogma, Existenz Gottes usw. durch das
Spiel seiner psychologischen Kritik laufen läßt.“112 Die Methode hält
nicht, was sie verspricht; oder besser gesagt, die Methode wird nicht
richtig angewandt. Trotz aller Versicherungen, von Deutungen
abzusehen, werden Deutungen vorgelegt.113

In protestantischen theologischen Kreisen fand die als Wissenschaft
autotretende Religionspsychologie um die Jahrhundertwende Eingang. –
Reischke hat über den Sinn religionspsychologischer Forschung keine
klare Auffassung.110 Der dänische Gelehrte Höfnding findet es nicht
ungereimt, von einer psychologischen Religionsphilosophie zu sprechen.111
Daß der von Vorbrodt eingeschlagene Weg zu einer Psychologisierung
der Theologie führen würde, befürchtet Wobbermin, dessen Kompro-
mißlösung lautet: „Systematische Theologie nach religionspsycholo-
mischer Methode.“ Wie Wobbermin der Gefahr des Psychologismus
entgehen will, zeigen seine folgenden Worte: „Keineswegs erfordert
die religionspsychologische Methode, von der eigenen religiösen Erfahrung
auszugehen, noch viel weniger, die eigene religiöse Erfahrung zur
durchsehenden Instanz der Glaubens’erehre. Das wäre nicht eine
religionspsychologische Betrachtung, sondern eine bloß psychologische,
noch besser: eine psychologistische.“116 Zu beachten bleibt, daß
wichtige Werken insbesondere die >empirische< Wissenschaft
seine Religionen entwickelt gestaltete, und zwar als „transzendente
Religionspsychologie“ apriorische Prämisse trägt. Der Wahrheitsanspruch gehört als konstitutives Element
dem Wesen der religiösen Erfahrung. Wobbermin ist der Phänomeno-
lologie Husserls verpflichtet. Seine Arbeitsweise ist im Verfahren so, daß
die Grenzen zwischen Religionspsychologie und Religionsphilosophie
weiter eingehalten noch überhaupt aufgezeigt werden. Um so mehr
trotzlich Wert darauf gelegt, diese Grenze scharf herauszustellen.
Der Religionspsychologe weist er die empirische Erforschung des
subjektiven religiösen Bewußtseins auf; dabei wirkt störend, daß die
Religionspsychologie als ein Teil der Religionsphilosophie zu gelten
hätte.118

Beachtenswert ist, daß z.B. H. Maier in seiner „Psychologie des
emotionalen Denkens“119 viel Verständnis für das Interesse an der
Empirie zeigt, während H. Mandel in seinen Schriften eher den Willen zur Ablehnung dieses Anliegens bekundet. Als Gegenstand der Religionspsychologie betrachtet Mandel „die unreflektiert wirksamen Motive und Wege“, „die den Menschen unmittelbar und ohne Reflexion aus seiner Erfahrungswelt zum Glauben und zum religiösen Verhalten führen konnten.“20) Von einer rein deskriptiven oder explikativen Religionspsychologie hält er nichts. Sie sei mehr an den Wirkungen als an den Motiven der Religionspsychologie interessiert; sie sei darum wie „ein Bau in die Luft ohne Fundament.“21) 


Zu bemerken bleibt, daß die in der Nachkriegszeit erschienenen einschlägigen Werke von R. Jelke,28) W. Hellpach29) und W. Trilhaas30) mehr eigene Gedanken entwickeln als die Tatsachen selbst sprechen lassen.

2. Die Religionspsychologie als Grundlage der Religionsphilosophie

Wir wissen, mit welchem Mißtrauen man seinerzeit den Forschungs- ergebnissen Girgensohns und Gruenhs begegnete. Man konnte und wollte sich nicht daran gewöhnen, diese Ergebnisse im Sinne der

exaktpychologischen Forschungsmethode und Fachsprache, also nach Maß und Methode (die hier auf den zu erforschenden Gegenstand entsprechend adäquiert war), durch die sie erreicht worden waren, zu verstehen, zu beurteilen und anzuerkennen. Immer wieder griff man zu einem neuen Wertmesser, verlangte Antworten, zu denen der eroberte Stoff keine Berechtigung gab, und verstieg sich sogar zum Versuch einer Umdeutung der mitgeteilten Ergebnisse, in grober Verkennung der Sachlage. Es versteht sich freilich, daß das auf die experimentelle Methode zurückzuführende Verfahren nicht der einzige Weg der empirischen Religionspsychologie ist und es auch nicht sein kann. Zu erstreben ist aber eine scharfe Trennung zwischen Religionspsychologie und Religionsphilosophie, zumal sinnvoll eine Religionsphänomenologie als dritter religionswissenschaftlicher Zweig zwischen beiden berechtigt erscheint. Die Religion als Tatsachenfrage, als Sinnfragen und als Wahrheitsfrage kann den je verschiedenen Gegenstandsbereich einer Psychologie, Phänomenologie und Philosophie der Religion abgeben.

Was von Phänomenologen am Westen eines Dinges oder eines Sachverhältnisses intuitiv erschafft und als originär gegeben erkannt wird, deckt sich nicht immer mit dem, was sich im induktiven Verfahren der empirischen Forschung dem Erkennen stellt. Aber auch umgekehrt, so will uns scheinen, steht der empirische Forscher – der Religionspsychologe in diesem Fall – seinerseits in der ständigen Gefahr der Grenzüberschreitung. Diese Gefahr ist naturgemäß gegeben, wenn der Religionspsychologe sein empirisch erarbeitetes Material sichtet, beurteilt und ordnet, d.h. wenn er die methodisch freigelegten Tatsachen deutet, wenn auch zunächst nur in dem Sinne, daß Konkretes und Individuelles in die abstrakte Erkenntnis gehoben und zum Gegenstand gültiger Aussage genommen werden. Vielleicht haben Rudolf Ottos feinsinnige Analysen am meisten darunter gelitten, daß sie einer Methodik entstammten, der es nicht gelungen ist, die Grenzen von Psychologie und Phänomenologie klar zu sehen und peinlich zu respektieren. Jeder Phänomenologe müßte sich im Vollzug seines Verfahrens immerfort fragen, was er eigentlich tut, d.h. prüfen, ob er im Betreiben seiner Wesenswissenschaft noch Tatsachenforscher oder schon Metaphysiker ist. Wenn das „Daseinsmoment“ eingekehrt wird, geschieht doch im Gunde das gleiche, wie wenn die traditionelle Philosophie in der Bewußtseinsbildung des Abstrahierens über das Individuelle hinweg das Wesen erreicht. Daß sich die Phänomenologie gegen die Willkürspekulation des Idealismus wendet und eine von den „Sachen“ her begründete und auf die „Sachen“ hin ausgerichtete Spekulation fordert,
erscheint durchaus berechtigt. Daß sie aber diese Forderung zum Sturmlauf gegen jede Metaphysik macht, ist eine Fehlforderung. Eine Besinnung könnte hier manches berichten.


In solchem Zusammenspiel wissenschaftlichen Bemühens und nur in ihm können wir der Erforschung des Religiösen gerecht werden. Die Tatsachen werden respektiert als das, was sie wirklich sind. Das Phänomen (als die je gegebene Erscheinung der Tatsachen) wird hingenommen, wie es sich selbst gibt, so daß sein Sinn nicht künstlich konstruiert, sondern an den „Sachen“ selbst erschaffen. Die Wahrheit (d.h. die in der Natur der Sache begründete Berechtigung) der in Erscheinung tretenden und in ihrem Sinn geliehten Tatsachen wird schließlich mit Hilfe der grundlegenden Seinsprinzipien einsichtig gemacht.


Als empirische Grundlage der Religionsphilosophie ist die Religionspsychologie (zusammen mit der Religiongeschichte) eine auch der Religionsphänomenologie voraus- und zugrundeliegende Wissenschaft. Von der Erfahrung zum Sinn des in der Erfahrung Verwirklichten, vom Sinn weiter zur Wahrheit als der einen (von mehreren) tatsächlich zutreffenden Möglichkeit!

**Anmerkungen**

3) Ebd. 2, vgl. auch 5.
4) Th. Flournoy, Les principes de la psychologie religieuse. (Archives de Psychologie. 2, 1903, 30-57.) Weiter : Observations de psychologie religieuse. (Ebd. 327-366.)
8) S. Freud, Totem und Tabu. Leipzig und Wien 1913, 92.
15) M. Reischl, Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Religion. Freiburg i. B. 1889, 71-76.
19) Tübingen 1908, 508.
20) Im Beitrag : Religionspsychologie. (Theologischer Literaturbericht.
THE ROLE OF MOUNTAINS IN THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

(With Illustrations)

By

Hideo Kishimoto

Mountains play a conspicuous role in the religious life of the Japanese people. For years, I have, with a team of trained specialists, conducted field research into this phenomenon.

There are many well-shaped mountains with pointed tops, easily visible from the plains where people live. According to the results of our survey, almost all of them, in one way or another, are related to some kind of religious faith. Our survey map already marks about six hundred of them. If we count the numerous tiny mountains, which nevertheless play important roles in village folk rites, the number will be several times bigger than this.

The concept of mountain is deeply engraved in the minds of the people. It reflects in various kinds of religious observances of the people. In order to illustrate this, I would like to begin with describing just one aspect of it. When the season opens, people go up the mountain with devotional feelings in their minds. This season falls mostly in the summer. After days of due purification, the pilgrims, clad in white robes, climb up the mountain. They pay respect to the holy of holies, which usually takes the form of a small shrine on the top of the mountain, and piously clap their hands to adore the glory of the holy sunrise. During one season, a popular mountain may be visited by several tens of thousands of religious climbers. We estimate that, at the present time, throughout Japan, far more than a million people climb up such holy mountains for religious purposes every year.

According to the traditional terminology of religious studies, the whole phenomenon may be called, "mountain worship." It may very well be called so. But, if so, "mountain worship" should certainly be understood in a very wide sense and as a complicated social phenomenon. All the roles of the mountain as an integral factor in the religious life of the people are involved. In other words, it is related
with all the aspects of the relations between one phase of natural environment and man's religious activities.

The more closely investigated, the clearer it becomes how complicated the whole phenomenon is. We can resolve it into its factors, and we can classify those into types. First, to be analytical, various factors are connected with the present day religious role of the mountain. If I try to select only the most important factors, still at least the following five must be mentioned.

Factor No. 1: The topography of the country. Eighty percent of the land of Japan is mountainous. Several volcanic chains run through it. A great number of beautiful, steep mountains are rising up all over Japan. They are not only impressive, but graceful, because, owing to abundant rainfalls, thick green foliage covers them.

Factor No. 2: Certain characteristic traits of the Japanese people. The Japanese are generally rather intuitive. The way their minds work is not as analytical as the Western people. They tend to go directly to the given experience. So, outside objects can hit their minds more straightly. Natural objects such as mountains can be very near to them.

Factor No. 3: The attitude of the people toward nature. They are very friendly to nature. The soil is fertile for agriculture. The climate is mild, though with seasonal typhoons. They are thankful for the gifts of nature, and obedient to it. They never thought of conquering nature. To regard man and nature as ultimately one in harmony, is their cultural tradition. Such an attitude reflects on the role of the mountains.

Factor No. 4: The social system and its historical changes. In her history, Japan went through various types of social structures; the ages of tribal, aristocratic, feudal, and modern societies. The structure of society in each age reflected upon the religious life of the people, and consequently, the religious role of the mountains. Its present day features reveal the indelible social influences of all these ages.

Factor No. 5: The religious history of Japan. The historical changes of religious situations have no doubt left lasting effects on the present day role of the mountains. The introduction of Buddhism in the sixth century was an important event in this sense.

Such factors always work as integral elements of the phenomenon. Keeping them in our mind, we now turn to an investigation of the types of the religious role of the mountains. Let me try to classify them from the standpoint of man's basic action patterns. From that point of view, they may be divided into two types, the symbolic type and the behavioral type.

There is one element common to both types. Steep mountains stand rising up. Just think of Mt. Fuji, Mt. Nantai at Nikko, Mt. Ontake and Mt. Iwaki. Morning and evening, people look up at the sublime form of the mountain and adore it. This must be regarded as the most basic element. Based on this, the action patterns develop into two directions. In the case of the first direction, the symbolic type, people do not try to go to the mountain. They rather tend to stay away from it. The mountain functions symbolically in the mind of the people. The other direction is the behavioral type. People actually go up the mountain. They seek to get into close physical touch with the mountain.

As to the symbolic type, a typical example is Mt. Miwa. Mt. Miwa, located to the south of Nara.

Mt. Miwa is not a high mountain. But it is beautifully conic-shaped. It rises up to the west of the Nara plain, which is the oldest site of Japanese civilization. The oldest written document in Japan, dating from the seventh century, already tells about the religious character of this mountain. At the foot of the mountain is a Shinto shrine, Omiwa Jinja, with a peculiar architectural structure. Worshippers go only as far as this shrine. No secular foot is allowed to step on Mt. Miwa. The entire mountain is tabooed.

Another example are the deities of the rice field, “ta-no-kami”. Rice farming is the most important branch of agriculture in Japan. It is generally believed that this deity comes down from the mountains, when the season opens for rice cultivation in the early spring. All the religious rituals performed conform with that idea. During the season, the deity abides in the field. When the season is over, in late fall, after due rituals, the deity goes back to the mountain again.

The whereabouts of the souls of the dead is also connected with the concept of mountains. According to folk belief, such souls go up into the mountain and abide there. The case of Mt. Osore, located in the northern extremity of the mainland, is an interesting example. Among the people of the northern districts, the bereaved relatives of the dead often visit Mt. Osore. They go up the mountain to meet the dead. The relatives not seldom talk to the dead, using a woman medium.

Once a year, during the All Souls days in summer, the souls of the dead are believed to come back home. On the eve of the All Souls day, the villagers go out, carrying lighted paper lanterns to meet the
souls. Often, they go out as far as the nearest mountain pass and welcome the returning souls. In each case, symbolically, to this day, the souls are coming back from the mountain.

The above is a brief exposition of the symbolic type. This symbolic type seems to reflect more the indigenous cultural tradition of the Japanese people. The other pattern, the behavioral type, regards mountains as a training ground for attaining religious ideal. It is based upon an entirely different interpretation of the meaning of the mountains. While in the symbolic type, the mountain is something sacred, inhibitive and to be worshipped from far away; in the behavioral type, the mountain is not the object of worship. It is rather the means of attaining a religious ideal. So men, instead of staying away from it, climb up to the mountain.

Such a radical change in interpretation could not occur without some special cause. A new stimulus had to come from outside. This stimulus was Buddhism.

Buddhism was introduced into Japan in the sixth century. Buddhist temples and monasteries were built on mountain tops. There, Buddhist priests and monks stayed and lived. This in itself is another role of the mountains; mountains as the sites of religious monasteries, such as Mt. Hiei near Kyoto, and Mt. Kōya, south of Osaka.

But mountains too steep and too inaccessible for establishing monasteries were assigned another role. They became training grounds for spiritual exercises. This gradually developed into a peculiar trend of Buddhism. Though these monks were all supposed to be Buddhists, they did not shave their heads. They could get married. They lived half for farming and half for religious duties. This constituted an acculturation of two cultural traditions, Shinto and Buddhist, founding a new harmonized form of religious activities. These mountaineering monks were called Yamabushi or Shugen, and the entire trend was called Shugendō.

The Shugen, mountaineering monks, went through hard training. Rigorous training programs were formulated, making use of all the natural features of mountains; rock-climbing, waterfall ablutions, and sleeping out-of-doors deep in the mountains for many consecutive days. This involved both asceticism and nature mysticism. The Shugen not only trained themselves, but came down from the mountain. When the villagers were more at leisure, they visited the villages. They observed religious rituals for the people and prayed for their happiness and health. Thousands of mountains were affi-

liated with Shugendō. The three most important centers used to be Ōmine Shugen in central Japan, Haguro Shugen in northern Japan, and Hikosan Shugen in Kyūshū. This is one aspect of the behavioral type.

Those who stayed in the mountains and went through the ascetic training were exclusively professional mountaineering monks. But the lay people in deep devotion also go up the mountain. They climb up with great toil, pay a visit to the sanctuary on the top of the mountain, and climb down all the way again. It is hard exercise, and a very effective method of purifying the mind and deepening religious beliefs. From around the fifteenth century, when Japanese social conditions reached a stage where the populace could move around more easily the number of religious lay climbers increased. Such tendencies grew much stronger under the Tokugawa regime from the seventeenth century on.

Shugendō as a system of the Buddhist church was abolished in 1872. But the populace did not stop. They kept on climbing holy mountains with devotional feeling. These people are organized after the pattern of the Kō system. The Kō system is a peculiar system developed, everywhere in Japanese society in the medieval age. Not a few of these groups developed into definite religious bodies. For instance, Ontakekyō, one of these religious bodies, counts many hundred churches. Thus, in present day Japan, innumerable people make religious ascents to holy mountains.

We are still mid-way in our field survey. It is still too early to draw any conclusions. But, even at this stage, one point is very clear. That is the fact that the religious role of the mountain is not a simple matter. Too often, it has been categorically stated that mountain worship consists in two types of worship: first, the mountain itself is worshipped in a preaninistic fashion. Then, not the mountain itself, but the spirit which abides in the mountain is worshipped in the fashion of animism. Such categorical statements cover only a very small part of the religious role of mountain and limited aspects of it. In actual fact, as far as we see in Japan, it plays a far more complicated role, in intricate ways interwoven with the religious life of the people.
THE SAMGHA AND THE ECCLESIA

BY

JOSEPH MITSUO KITAGAWA

This paper deals with the nature and characteristics of religious communities, with special reference to the Samgha of Buddhism and the Ecclesia of Christianity.

Buddhism and Christianity, like other world-wide religions, regard humanity as essentially one community and their religious structures as reflections, albeit imperfect ones, of the ideal human community. All religions have what Mircea Eliade calls "nostalgia for paradise," or the desire of religious man "to transcend, by natural means, the human condition and regain a divine state of affairs."1 At the same time, all religions have some kind of vision of the beatific end of the world, when all evils will be redressed and the divine order of the cosmos will be restored. Thus, religious rites, symbols and myths signify simultaneously both the "eternal return"2 and the celebration of the telos. In this connection, van der Leeuw has rightly pointed out that religious man views man's cycle communally: "human life is first of all not the life of the individual, but that of the community."3 Hence the importance of Rites de passage, such as birth, naming, initiation, death and burial.4 Through these communal religious acts, individuals as members of the religious community are related both to the beginning and the end of the world.

Religion is by nature a fellowship and communion. The relationship between religious fellowship and other human fellowships is intricate and complex. It has often been pointed out that primitive man knew only one community, which was both the human and the "holy" community, because "the primitive and precivilized communities [were] held together essentially by common understandings as to the ultimate nature and purpose of life."5 In such a community the sacred and the secular are interpenetrating, and the individual's biological cycle finds its corresponding social and religious cycles. Furthermore, primitive man considered the earthly community an extension and counterpart of the celestial community.

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In civilized societies the social and religious fellowships tend to separate. In this process, some religions—for example, Hinduism, Confucianism, and Shinto—tend to intensify or even transform the human community, while others—for instance, Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism—create their own "holy communities" in the midst of, and yet apart from, other human fellowships.

Historically, Buddhism and Christianity were destined to be rejected in the lands of their origin, basically because they are world religions par excellence in the sense that to both of them the fundamental meaning of life and the world cannot be derived solely from the experience of one group of people or one culture. It is but natural that the universalistic tenets of these two religions are reflected in the structures of the Samgha of Buddhism and the Ecclesia of Christianity.

The uniqueness of Buddhism, among all religions of salvation, lies in the fact that while accepting Sakyamuni as its founder, it knows no savior in the usual sense of the term. For forty years after his Enlightenment the Buddha preached the gospel of Nirvana. To him, the primary question was not "what is Nirvana?" but "how to attain Nirvana?" From the time of Sakyamuni, his followers were exhorted to take refuge in the Three Jewels, that is, in Buddha, Dharma and Sangha. While the Three Jewels are integrally interrelated, at the same time each is a philosophical and religious focus. Also, behind the Three Jewels lies the beatific vision or "image of Nirvana." Thus, Buddhist ecclesiology cannot be understood without taking into account Buddhismology, the doctrine of the nature of reality, and the image of Nirvana. It must also be pointed out that the Samgha is more than a sociological entity; what is involved is some sort of dualism, not unlike the Lutheran concept of the invisible church and the visible body, which was rooted in the reformer's paradoxical view of the Deity as "Deus absconditus" and "Deus revelatus."6

Sakyamuni, in creating the Samgha, took the name and form of the political samgha that existed in northwestern India in his time.7 Originally, the Buddhist Samgha was a monastic order, loosely organized and with no specific buildings for its own use. Gradually the vihara came into existence for the meditation of the Samgha and the lodging of learned men. In the course of time, the Samgha took on educational, social and cultural activities. During the second and third centuries A.D. the pursuit of secular knowledge became an ideal of these monastic institutions, and the doors of the Samgha were "thrown open to the students as well, who, if they chose, were at liberty to leave the monastery and embrace once more the life of a house-holder, after
their education was over.”

This changed the character of the Buddhist community from the purely monastic Samgha to a mixed community of monks and lay Buddhists. This process of “secularization” of the Samgha also had the effect of narrowing the gulf between the Samgha and culture. Increasingly, the Buddhist monasteries developed into important social, educational and cultural centers wherever Buddhism was established. Inevitably the Samgha became highly institutionalized. There is much truth in Przybulski’s observation that the development of the Samgha had three distinct stages—the egalitarian ideal of primitive Buddhism, the aristocratic ideal of the Theravada tradition, and the hierarchical structure of the Mahayana tradition. While the Samgha continued to our day as the normative path for all Buddhists, in the Mahayana tradition the philosophical identification of Nirvana with Samsara, coupled with a widening of the “soteriological distance” between the two, has siphoned out the imperative character of the monastic life. In the Theravada countries, too, the monastic life has lost its imperative character.

In one sense at least, it may be argued that only the monastic orders should be called specifically Buddhist. However, as early as the time of Sakyamuni, the lay disciples were treated as something like associate members of the Samgha. Gradually the laity began to play an increasingly active role in ecclesiastical affairs, and today the Samgha for all practical purposes embraces all the faithful, monastic or otherwise. Also, various forms of folk piety, which was a mixture of Buddhist and non-Buddhist beliefs, were incorporated into the Buddhist community. Thus, Buddhism developed an uneasy alliance with existing local religions, such as Nat Worship in Burma, Bon religion in Tibet, Taoism and Confucianism in China, and Shinto in Japan. These socio-historic institutionalized forms of the Samgha, however, do not exhaust its religious meaning. Different traditions of Buddhism subscribe to the religious ideal of the Samgha universal, of which the empirical Samgha is regarded as an incomplete manifestation.

In the Christian tradition, the inauguration of the church is not attributed to Jesus himself. The Christian Ecclesia was regarded as the new “covenanted” community, built on the structure and history of the old Hebrew covenanted community. The early Christians believed that the hidden potentialities of the Hebrew community were actualized in the Ecclesia. The Ecclesia was viewed as a new kind of community, both visible and invisible, “at once humanly organized and mystically animated, spiritual and cosmic.” Hence the affirmation: “credo ... unam sanctam catholicam ecclesiam.”

As the Christian community came to realize that the end of the world was not impending, or perhaps had been partially realized already in the Pentecost, it began to develop its own group consciousness and visible structure, such as the graded offices of ministry, the sacred scriptures, the liturgy and the creeds. In the course of time, the Christian church developed a special inner community in the form of monastic orders. Eventually monasticism came to be regarded as a higher way of salvation, and it began to exercise a strong influence over the life of the church and society. In this connection, it might be pointed out that the Byzantine church recognized the emperor not merely as the civil ruler but also as the spiritual head of the church, while the Western church was marked by a strong centralization of polity within the church, which after the fifth century gradually developed into the papacy. The ideal of the medieval papal church was not the spiritual independence of the church. “The full freedom and independence of the church was only reached when the temporal powers were subordinate to the church ... and directed by her in all matters pertaining to salvation.” As everything was ultimately related to salvation, the medieval church came to equate soteriology with ecclesiology. To be sure, the historic tension between the earthly Ecclesia and the ecclesia triumphans was widened by the insertion of purgatory in between. And yet, the church as the Body of Christ came to be understood almost in a physical sense in that the church was believed to have Christ’s power to impart grace on earth.

The Protestant reformers were concerned with reforming and restoring the essential character of the Ecclesia as the covenanted community of the faith. However, in rejecting the papal church’s view of the ecclesiastification of the whole social order, the reformers were nevertheless conscious of the fact that the Ecclesia must manifest itself in the social order which is also ordained by God. Such a view of the relation of the church to the social order necessarily took seriously the nation states that were becoming increasingly important, replacing outmoded feudalism in Europe. It is a matter of interest to note that while the expansion of Buddhism was on the whole free from any colonial expansion of Buddhist nations, the Christian missionary movement, which in principle did not accept colonialism, followed the colonial expansion of the modern European nation states.

It is significant that today both Buddhism and Christianity are keenly aware of the discrepancy between the ideal and the reality of their holy communities. The current interest of Buddhists in the nature of the Samgha, as evidenced by the Sixth Great Council held
in Rangoon several years ago, finds its Christian parallel in the so-called ecumenical movement which stimulates discussion about the nature of the Ecclesia.

Recent years have seen the development of two kinds of sociology of religion(s), one as a subdivision of sociology and another as a subdivision of Religionswissenschaft. Although both kinds of sociology of religion deal with the nature of various religious and ecclesiastical bodies, one sociology of religion inevitably views the data "sociologically", while the other views the same data "religio-scientifically."\(^\text{13}\)

It goes without saying that Religionswissenschaft is concerned with a historical and sociological inquiry into the holy communities of various religions. It is also seriously concerned with the religious meaning of these communities, because the development of a holy community cannot be explained solely in terms of historic factors, however important they may be. Just as the concept of the Sangha has changed with the changing image of Nirvana and the corresponding development of the doctrines of Buddha and of Dharma, the Christian concept of the Ecclesia has changed with the historic development of the doctrines of God, Christ, the Holy Spirit and the world. How to relate the socio-historical and religious dimensions of these holy communities is one of the relevant tasks for students of Religionswissenschaft in our time.

Bibliography

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DER ATHEISMUS ALS PHILOSOPHISHES PROBLEM

VON

KARL LÖWITH


beweisen, von einem radikalen Zweifel ausgeht, von dem nur die formale Selbstgewissheit des *cogito sum* ausgenommen ist. Descartes
denkt als ein selbstbewusst Zweifelnder *ohne* und *gegen* Gott, um dann
in seinem eigenen Selbstbewusstsein die Idee Gottes zu finden und
von da aus Gottes Existenz zu begründen. Gemäß diesem glaubens-
losen Ausgangspunkt konnte Descartes seinen Beweis der theologischen
Fakultät der Sorbonne widmen, mit der Begründung, dass sein logischer
Beweis den Vorzug habe, auch Ungläubige überzeugen zu müssen.
Descartes' Gott ist ein "Gott der Philosophen", wie es Pascal verächtlich
genannt hat, weil er begriiffen hatte, dass Descartes im Grunde um den
Gottesglauben herumkommen möchte. Zwar hat Descartes noch nicht,
nach ihm Spinoza, eine ausführliche Bibelkritik gewagt, aber er steht
der biblischen Autorität doch schon so kritisch gegenüber, dass sein
atheistischer Beweis der Existenz Gottes schon bei seinen Zeitgenossen
den verschiedensten Auslegungen Anlass gab.

**Hegel**s Philosophie ist eine philosophische Theologie und eine
theologische Philosophie, die sich nach beiden Seiten hin interpretieren
lässt: griechisch und christlich, christlich und unchristlich. Ihr Grund-
begriff vom "Geist" oder "Logos" ist ebensoweit griechisch (Aristoteles)
wie neutestamentlich (Johannes-Evangelium) gedacht und schon in
seinen Jugendschriften hat Hegel beides, den Geist des Christentums
und des Griechentums, zum Thema gemacht, um am Begriff der
"lebendigen Beziehung der Liebe" die dialytische Bewegung des Geistes
tzu entwickeln, der, wie die Liebe, die starre Entgegensetzung von
Subjekt und Objekt aufheben soll.

In der Abhandlung über "Glauben und Wissen" hat Hegel dann,
in der Auseinandersetzung mit Kant, Jacobi und Fichte, den Gegensatz
von Wissen und Glauben in einer höheren und ursprünglicheren Einheit
aufzuheben versucht, um schliesslich in einem Kapitel der "Phänomeno-
logie des Geistes" über den "Kampf der Aufklärung mit dem
Aberglauben" sowohl das aufgeklärte Wissen wie den abergläubigen
Glauben im vernünftigen Vernehmen des Absoluten hinter sich zu
lassen. Denn wenn wir von Gott nichts wissen und ihn nur glauben
können, wenn die vernehmende Vernunft der Philosophie nicht fähig
ist, Gott oder das Absolute zu erkennen, dann gibt es auch keinen
vernünftig begründbaren Glauben, sondern nur den toten Gegensatz
von aufgeklärtem Wissen und unaufgeklärtem Aberglauben. Die
Absicht von Hegels Religions-Philosophie ist die Aufhebung der gloss
"positiven" Form der religiösen "Vorstellungen" in eine philosophisch
griiffene Religion. Was sich bei dieser Umformung der Vorstellungen
dein Begriff ändere sei nicht der wesentliche Inhalt der christlichen

Religion, sondern nur deren gewohnte Form. Indem die Philosophie
diese gewöhnliche Vorstellungsform abstreift, wird aus dem empirisch-
historischen Kreuzzustod Christi und seiner Auferstehung ein "spukla-
tiver Karfreitag", der begriffene "Tod Gottes", aus dem sich die Freiheit
 des Geistes erhebt. Infolge dieser Umwandlung der Religion in
Philosophie kann Hegel sagen, dass diese schon selber "der wahre
Gottesdienst" sei und den Geist des Christentums expliziere, indem sie
sich selbst expliziert.

Mit dieser Umformung der christlichen Lehre in eine Religions-
Philosophie vollzieht sich zweierlei: eine Rechtfertigung des christlichen
Glaubens durch die Philosophie und zugleich seine Kritik. An diese
Zweideutigkeit von Hegels Erhebung und Aufhebung des christlichen
Glaubens in den vernünftigen Begriff der Philosophie knüpft alle
nachfolgende Religionskritik der Linkshegelianer an. Feuerbach
erkannte in Hegels Philosophie den letzten grossen Versuch der gemacht wurde,
Umvereinbares zu vereinen: christliche Theologie und griechische
Philosophie, überhaupt Religion und Atheismus auf dem Gipfel der
Metaphysik. Und schliesslich hat der Linkshegelianer Bruno Bauer
in seiner polemischen Schrift von 1841 "Die Posaune des jüngsten
Gerichts über Hegel den Atheisten und Antichristen" zu zeigen versucht,
 dass von dem persönlichen und lebendigen Gott der Bibel in Hegels
Philosophie keine Rede sein könne und dass Hegels Vergeistigung des
Christentums ein viel gefährlicherer Atheismus sei, als der platte und
offenkundige Atheismus der kirchenfeindlichen Aufklärung.

Erst mit Nietzsche trat eine neue Wende im Problem des philoso-
phischen Atheismus auf. Nietzsche war kein Freigeist im Sinne der
Aufklärung und ebensowenig ein Religionsphilosoph, sondern ein frei
gewordener Geist, der am äussersten Ende der Freiheit zum Nichts
des "Nihilismus" nach einer neuen Bindung suchte und schon in der
ersten Krisis seiner Jugend einen neuen, "unbekannten Gott" anrief.
Mit den Reden Zarathustras, die ein "fünftes Evangelium" und eine
umgekehrte Bergpredigt sind, beginnt in der Geschichte der deutschen
Philosophie ein Angriff auf das Christentum, der keinerlei philoso-
phische Vermittlung duldet, sondern eindeutig nicht nur gegen die
religiöse Vorstellungsform gerichtet ist, sondern gegen Gott selbst,
gegen Jesus und Paulus und gegen das ganze weltgeschichtlich gewor-
dene Christentum. Was Nietzsche wollte war ein "unbedingt
redlicher" Atheismus und dem entspricht, dass der "Übemensch" im
selben Augenblick auftritt als "Gott tot" ist. Der Wille zu einem
unbedingt redlichen Atheismus bestimmt auch Nietzsches Kritik der
deutschen Philosophie als einer halben, hinterlistigen Theologie. Kant,
Fichte und Hegel, aber auch Feuerbach und D. F. Strauss, sind für Nietzsche alle noch “Halbpriester” und ihre Philosophie eine Verfallsform des Protestantismus. Während Hegels Philosophie als Religionsphilosophie das geschichtliche Christentum philosophisch vol-

tenden wollte, denkt Nietzsche im Bewusstsein um ein zu Endes gehenden Christentum und seine Kritik beschränkt sich daher nicht, wie bei Hegel, auf eine philosophische Umformung desselben christlichen Inhalts, sondern sie richtet sich gegen sämtliche Formen des Christen-


— ‘Was höre ich!’ sprach hier der alte Papst mit gespitzten Ohren; ‘oh Zarathustra, du bist frömer als du glaubst, mit einem solchen Unglauben! Irgend ein Gott in dir bekehrte dich zu deiner Gottlosig-


tkeit’.

ON DIVINE CONCEPTION

BY

HITOO MARUKAWA

By the term “divine conception” I here mean an abnormal or unusual conception (including birth as its natural sequence) that is, a conception which is not related to the normal sexual intercourse of male and female, in other words, that caused by some spiritual being, some natural phenomenon, or the powers in nature. Of course, I am not expecting to arrive at any solution concerning the physiological nature or truth of those conceptions. What I am hoping to do here is to discuss various cases of them and to interpret the meaning of those beliefs or legends which declare that One so and so was conceived in his or her mother’s body by some divine invisible prover or some other medium.

Famous is the story that Mary, the mother of Jesus, while she was yet a virgin, became pregnant by the holy spirit. And even now Christian belief, especially the Catholic doctrine, claims this to be true or real. This belief seems to have sprung up very early in the history of Christianity since it is found in the Gospels of the N. T. It seems that the story has become known or believed in by the followers of Christ at least not long after his death.

In some Apocrypha of the N. T. written in a later period, this story of divine conception appears in further advanced form. For instance the Protevangelium of James tells the following story. The mother of the Virgin Mary, the wife of Joachim, named Anna, had long been barren. But she prayed and prayed to the Lord God and at last an angel of the Lord came to her saying:— Anna, the Lord hath heard thy prayer and thou shalt conceive, and shalt bring forth, and thy seed shall be spoken of in all the world—This very seed was the Virgin Mary. Mary herself was said to be born through her mother’s divine conception.

In connection with this story of Anna’s conception, some famous women in the O. T. are also mentioned in the Apocrypha. For instance Sarah who was said to have been barren up to her eightieth year,
became pregnant and gave birth to Isaac, and the same was the case with Rachel, the mother of Joseph.

There are many traditions and legends concerning divine conceptions in Japan, too. For instance, some great priests and heroes were born from mothers who had conceived by having a gem, a rager, the sun or a golden priest and so forth come into their bodies.

One famous legend tells about the birth of the god venerated in the Kamo-shrine in Kyoto as follows: Once upon a time, his mother went to a river and while she was playing at the river side, a red-coloured arrow came floating down. She took it home with her and put it by her bedside. Then she became pregnant and gave birth to a son.

Our ancient document called Kojiki relates another interesting story, namely, one god enshrined at Naniwa who had come from Silla was the daughter of a mother who had conceived by sunbeams shining into her womb.

Stories such as those mentioned above are countless in our country as well as in Korea, Mongolia and China. Arrows, gems, sunbeams, serpents, dragons, lightning etc. are often the cause of the conception of a virgin or a woman in general.

Moreover, in the old Japan, even if the cause of the conception was not exactly mentioned, a child was sometimes called "God-sent child". Perhaps the stories of God-sent children originally pointed out some unusual cause or supernatural originator. But later the cause and originator were forgotten and only the idea of a God-sent child was handed down mixed with superstitious practices.

There are several traditions concerning the life of Romulus, the founder of Rome. Plutarch, however, narrates a story involving virgin-birth. His mother Rhea was a Vestal Virgin and, of course, was forbidden to get married. But she became pregnant and bore Romulus and Remus. Their father is said to have been the God Mars. And we find similar cases in the stories of Danae and Leda who had intercourse with Zeus who changed his body into a non-human form. These are some examples of divine conception by superhuman gods in ancient Greek religious belief. But the Olympian Gods are so human-like gods that we must leave them out in this study, because it is difficult to consider them the cause of an unusual divine conception.

But noteworthy is the legend of Attis who was a shepherd boy and was beloved by the goddess Cybele. Attis's mother was said to have been a virgin who conceived by pressing a ripe almond or pomegranate to her bosom. We know some other examples of plants which were believed to have become the cause of conception. May I quote one example which was related by J. Frazer about Baganda women. "Baganda women imagined that without the help of the other sex they could be impregnated—While a woman was busy in her garden under the shadow of banana trees, a great purple bloom chanced to fall from one of the trees on her back or shoulders, it was quite enough, in the opinion of the Baganda, to get her with child."

There are examples of fruits and flowers and also of many other objects, which appear in ancient legends and in primitive people's beliefs and customs and are believed to be effective causes of women conceiving without having any relationship with the other sex. I will only refer to some of them. A rice-grain, resin mixed with milk or some kind of fish and worms were believed to be effective. In some cases, by drinking water, or by bathing in water, by sitting on a stone, by touching a feather or a finger, and by swallowing a portion of the bodily substance of the hero, impregnations resulted. Moreover, rain, wind, sunbeams, fire, sparks and lightning or some odor or a glance and breath of the divine or quasi-divine being caused impregnations. Thus stories and beliefs of super-natural or unusual conceptions and births are worldwide and countless in number.

But in addition to the above mentioned, we must pay attention to spirits as the effective causes of conceptions. Spirits in general or a particular spirit, for instance, that of a dead husband, of a dead saint, or of a beloved dead child might consort with women and beget children from them. And such beliefs are closely akin to the idea that the souls of the dead may pass directly into the womb of women and be born again as infants. Such ideas illustrate what is called metempsychosis. And again when fish, fruit, worms and other objects enter the bodies of women as food or otherwise and render them pregnant and act not only as vehicles of fertilization but also become human beings by the process of pregnancy and birth, they represent examples of metamorphosis. The difference between metempsychosis and metamorphosis is too delicate to allow a very clear distinction. Here I understand metamorphosis as one phase of metempsychosis.

Not every metempsychosis necessarily leaves out intercourse between the sexes, but it is often connected with divine conception. That is, in metempsychosis, the child is engendered by conveying into the mother's body a previously existing soul or some other object, and in that case, coition is not considered necessary nor is it entirely unrecognized. It would be possible to point out such instances also in the illustrations mentioned above. Buddha's story constitutes an
interesting example which might be called the "borrowed womb" birth of Buddha. According to Buddhist legends, a white elephant came down from heaven, entered the body of Buddha’s mother through her right side, and the mother became pregnant. The white elephant was regarded as the most divine animal, and in one case the elephant was thought to be Bodhisattva himself in a changed form. The origin of this doctrine is not known, but it seems to have been known at least ca. 300 years after Buddha’s death.

Now, the belief or the idea of divine conception is handed down to us in fairy tales or märchen, in legends and myths, as folk-lore practices and religious doctrines. And we also know it as the living pattern of expression among the primitive people. This belief or idea of divine conception may have had its origin in ignorance of the sexual reproductive process as is often stated, and also in the veneration of motherhood which represents in itself the principle of reproduction. In some societies, even if the father is acknowledged, it does not include the idea of paternity. Such social circumstances could easily become the background of the belief of divine conception. Moreover, as to the origin of this belief, one may discern a political intention in attributing a heightened sanctity or augustness to one’s nation and to the founder of the nation, and also discern an intention of glorifying a particular genealogy, which resulted from contact with different races and cultures.

We must, however, pay special attention to the religious factor in these unusual conceptions. I said in the beginning of this study that divine conception means an unusual one in which a divine idea, some supernatural power or invisible spiritual being is often considered as the active factor. Among primitive people, the effective pregnancy is considered to have resulted not only from objects such as fruit, fish, wind and so on, but sometimes also by the magical and religious power expressed in a divine word, breath, or glance. Namely the object itself does not necessarily possess full impregnating power, but in some cases such results are effected through the instrumentality of a magician or medicine man. In such cases, even if ignorance of the sexual reproductive process would be generally prevalent, the magico-religious factor working therein might not be ignored.

Even in a highly developed society, where the reproductive role of sex is well known, we can see that many relics of the belief in divine conception are not forgotten or thrown away. They remain not simply as legends or as some kind of religious practice, but as a living belief as seen in the Virgin-birth of Jesus. Whatever the theory of that
ON THREE MYTHS CONCERNING THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD

BY

FUMIO MASUTANI

In the present paper, I want to discuss three myths which contain old stories about the beginning of the world. The first, an Indian myth from *Rig-veda*; the second, a Greek myth from the *Theogonia* of Hesiod; and the third, the well-known Hebrew myth related in the Genesis of the Old Testament. The reason why I have taken up these myths will become clear as my exposition goes on.

Now, in the tenth volume of *Rig-veda* there is a significant hymn named ‘Nāsadāstyā-sūkta’, which goes as follows:

‘Nāsad āsī — in the beginning there was no being, (sat) not even non-being (asat); there was no sky and no heaven above; what covered it? Where was it? Who protected it? What was the water? What was the abyss?’

This is the first stanza, and the hymnist comes to narrate the beginning of the world. The order of the beginning narrated there is illustrated in the following graph.

First and foremost there was *tad eham*. *Tad eham* means ‘that one’ in English, it was covered with darkness and is likened to the *khāos* in Greek.

Next emerged *ābhū* and *kāma*. *Ābhū* denotes the original matter without form, which was brought into being by *tapas*, the heat of ‘that one’. *Kāma* is love, which is not only the affectionate feeling, but also the attractive power, combining one thing with another and bringing forth new ones.

( 566 )

Then came *visrishtī*. *Visrishtī* means ‘letting go’ or ‘discharge’, which is not the creation of the world by the high and lofty one, but the birth and growth of the world. The hymn intimates a voluntary appearance of the world, not a creation decreed by the will of the ‘Ganz Andere’. The Indo-Aryans, too, have many gods, but they have nothing to do with the original beginning of the world; “they also belong to the later days of *visrishtī*”, sings hymnist in the sixth stanza of the hymn.

In Greece, we find a brief account of the beginning of the world in the one hundred and sixteenth stanza of the *Theogonia* of Hesiod, which is also illustrated in the following graph.

Here we can see the counterpart of the old Indian mythical cosmology. In the beginning, there was *Khāos* which was disorder and had no form. Then came *Gaia* and *Tārtaros* which were the original matter, and at the same time came forth *Erēs*, the god of love, which played the role of *kāma* in India as the attractive power. Thenceforth the necessary requisites of *Kósmos* were furnished; the original materials to be combined with each other, and the attractive power to join them together, and the world was able to unfold itself freely. “From there came all things, what was, and is now, and will be; trees, men and women, birds and animals, fish in the water, and the immortal gods;” as a Greek thinker has sung. Here we see the exact counterpart of the Indian myth concerning the beginning of the world.

However, in the well-known Hebrew myth, the *Genesis* of the Old Testament, we shall meet another type of cosmology, which may be illustrated as follows:

This type of cosmology is totally different from the above mentioned. Here, the world was created by God the Creator, who is the ‘Ganz Andere’ with respect to men and the world. God said, let there be light, and there was light. He said, let the waters under
the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land appear; and it was so. He said, let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven to divide the day from the night, and it was so. All things were createdly the will and the word of God; and the world itself contributes nothing to the creation. The creative potency comes down one-sidedly from on high from the Omnipotent God, and the world is cast into a passive role with no voluntary action on its part. Such is the creation by God in the Genesis of the Old Testament.

In conclusion, these analyses of myths reveal some characteristic aspects of their respective ways of thinking.

First, the former two are based on the idea of birth, and the latter one on the idea of making something as a potter makes vessels. When we reflect upon the beginning of something, we find two ways of thinking and no other way; one is based on the idea of birth and the other on the idea of making. The Indo-Aryans and the Greeks have chosen the former, the generative theory, and the Hebrews the latter, the point of view of creation.

Second, the location of the originating power. In the former type of thinking, the productive power lies inside the world. Eros and kāma, the attractive powers, combine the original materials and produce new beings as father and mother love each other and generate offspring. Here we can see the outcome of voluntarism.

On the contrary, the creative power lies outside the world in the latter type of thinking. As a potter has power over the clay, the power of the Almighty came down from outside the world and created all things according to his will with his omnipotence; and the world has nothing to do with. Here is the natural way to predestination.

"Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?""71"

Thirdly, the first principle to be searched after. As is well known, the Indo-Aryans and the Greeks have been interested in and tried to find the primary cause or law. With them "Ex nihilo nihil fit". If we call the original matter and the attractive power the cause, nothing can exist without cause. If we consider the offspring the effect, all things will come forth and go away in an infinite succession of cause and effect. Thence the first principle to be searched after must be the cause, above all, the primary cause, and the law or principle of the way how the generative power operates, or how the materials are combined with each other. There appear the great figures of prōtē aitia or arkhē in Greece and of brahma or dharma in India.

On the contrary, the Hebrews have nothing in the world to look

for except the grace of God. The world finds itself in a perfectly passive situation, and the power comes one-sidedly from the Creator on high. He can create everything 'ex nihilo' freely at will. He has the power 'of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour'.79 Thence the only thing for the Hebrews to seek after must be the grace of God, saying:

"Our Father which art in heaven,
Hallowed be thy name.
Thy kingdom come.
Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven.
Give us this day our daily bread.
And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.
And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.
For thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for ever."80

Fourthly, we can notice some remarkable difference in nature between God of the Hebrew myth and the gods of the Indo-Aryans and the Greeks. One exists prior to the creation of all things, and behaves as the Creator:

"All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made."101

And, as Karl Barth asserted in his Credo, "As far as He is the Creator, the world cannot be 'the world entrusted to its own law'."111

On the other hand, the gods of the Indo-Aryans and the Greeks belong to the later days in the beginning of the world. They are not the creators, but creatures; nay, not creatures, but beings, a little superior to men.

Students have often tried to classify religions after the number of their gods—monotheism, polytheism, pantheism, and so on. Their attempt, however, will prove to be all nonsense, for gods differ from one another natures, in their situations, and in the parts they play, as we have now examined. The God of the Hebrews is Creator by nature, is situated in a high and lofty place apart from the world, and comes on the scene of the world as a lonely figure. On the contrary, gods of the Indo-Aryans and the Greeks have never been allowed to cut such brilliant figures. They have presented rather lesser figures. Instead, prōtē aitia and arkhē, dharma and brahma are the leading actors in the world of the Indo-Aryans and the Greeks.

I have devoted myself to the comparative study of Buddhism and Christianity, and noticed that Buddhist thought is, after all, based on the idea of dharma, and the Christian conviction rests on the basis
of the idea of God; and the naive idea of dharma is alluded to early in
the cosmological myth in Rig-veda on the birth of the world, and the
most candid idea of God presents itself in the Genesis of the Old
Testament.

NOTES
2) Besides Nasadattya-sakha, Rig-veda contains the following four
hymns concerning the beginning of the world:
a. Prajapatiya-sakha (Rig-veda, vol. X, 12, 1-10)
b. Visvakarman (ibid., vol. X, 81, 1-7 : 82, 1-7)
c. Brihaspati or Brhadmanaspati (ibid., vol. X, 72, 1-9)
d. Purusha-sakha (ibid., vol. X, 90, 1-16)
They all narrate the birth or the voluntary appearance of the world.
3) We find the following passage in Aristophanes’ Aves:
“Before Erê combines each other of them all, there were no tribes
of the immortal gods.”
4) Empedocles: Peri physeis, 159, 13 (Diels-Kranz, 31 B 23)
Here he talks of love and hate as the originating power, and hate is
the negative side of love.
5) There are two myths concerning Creation in Genesis;
b. ibid., II, 5-24.
in the latter, we find the following passage:
“And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and
breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living
soul.” (2-7)
This story, too, rests on the idea of making something as a potter makes
vessels.
6) cf. Romans, IX, 20.
7) ibid., IX, 20.
8) ibid., IX, 21.
10) John, I, 3.
11) Karl Barth: Credo, 4 Kap.
12) cf. deus (Lt.), theos (Gr.), deva (Skt.); they are all derived from a
common origin.

TYPE OF RELIGIOUS ABSOLUTE EXPERIENCES

BY

YOSHINORI MOROI

I am going to speak about ‘Types of Religious Absolute Experi-
nences’. It seems to me that people have recently opened their eyes
to the necessity of typological studies in religion, but few of them
grasp their true sense.
Here I want to investigate this problem fundamentally.
Now, in religious phenomena we find experiences capable of being
immediately realized by religious subjects, which are usually called
religious experiences and are very characteristic. It is the most
fundamental element to be found in these religious experiences what we
call a religious absolute experience. What we mean here by a
religious absolute experience has two meanings: First it is a religious
experience of the absolute, secondly this experience is the absolute in
religious experiences. This experience includes these two meanings,
which in reality are the same. This is because of a religious experience
of the absolute, and of the absolute meaning in religious experiences.

Such religious absolute experiences are usually called mystical
experiences. But the word “mystical experience” is apt to be con-
fused with mysticism itself as a religious phenomenon. In this study
in order to avoid this error, we are going to use not the word “mystical
experience”, but the word “religious absolute experience.”

Generally in investigating religious phenomena, their special and
various aspects can be often understood by several classifications not
as a mere separate instance, but as what can be thought of as a universal
and at the same time an individual characteristic. We can get various
types by examining those classifications according to their principle
and modality. Such an investigation of types is not only helpful as
an experimental understanding of each fact, but also very useful as a
general and scientific understanding in itself. Furthermore, we cannot
understand nor can we detect what is universal and essential, unless we
make such an investigation of types. This is the reason for a typological
study.
However, a typological study of religions has never been undertaken hitherto with full knowledge of the problem. In many cases, religions have been classified according to denominations, races, culture, etc. They have been regarded as the standard of this study. The mode of everyone of them is superficially pointed out and arranged in order. We cannot identify a typology with mere classifications like these. There may be, as a result of these studies, some cases in which classification and typology overlap. However the investigations of various types should be based on many actual religious phenomena through a factual study of their contents.

When trying to make a typological study of religions, we need many viewpoints and we must avoid a simple classification. We might say that in a typological study of religions the most fundamental fact that there are various types of religious absolute experiences. Now, when investigating various types of religious absolute experiences, we have four viewpoints, which are divided into two kinds of viewpoints, each of which is subdivided into two viewpoints. They are (1) (A) what is manifested by the subject of the religious experience (1) (B) what is observed by outsiders concerning the religious experience and (2) (A) what is expressed in the original source, (2) (B) what is expressed in its popularized phenomena. We must take up (1) (A)-viewpoint and (2) (A)-viewpoint as the most fundamental of the four viewpoints. So, we are going to deal with the problem of typology from these viewpoints as much as possible.

Then, what types can we find in religious absolute experiences? In this case, what is to be considered is how the absolute being is previously viewed and recognized as its religious object in various religions. It should be said that, in accordance with the difference of view on the absolute being, absolute experiences themselves come to show various characteristic aspects. This may become more clear when the typical differences of the substantial character of religious object are brought into focus.

When we consider religious phenomena widely, we can find many types of religious objects. They are indicated by appellations like maniaism, naturism, fetishism, mānism, animism, spiritism, daemonology polytheism, pantheism, monotheism, and so on. But we want to take up the following as the most representative of them. Religious objects are (1) a supreme being as power, (2) a superhuman being as spirit, (3) a supreme being as a person, and (4) The absolute being as reality. In accordance with the differences expressed in these classifications, we can find many characteristic and typical differences in the aspects of absolute experiences.

(1) When the religious object is a superhuman being regarded as power, religious absolute experiences can be generally realized as what is perceived. But there are two types: what is intentionally perceived of things, and what is interpretively expressed in symbols. These experiences are found in both primitive and civilized peoples. They are found in maniaism, fetishism, naturism, etc. After all, strange things and nature's miracles are experienced as phenomena brought about by a superhuman power, the religious object. The ideas of strangeness and wonders of primitive and civilized peoples are very different. Especially in the former, mass-understanding is strong and individual differentiation is weak, while, in the latter, individual differentiation caused by various elements of the individual's character is very strong. And, in the former, these experiences are little recognized as an intuition or an interpretation, but they are immediately received as a general objective experience, while, in the latter, they are recognized as a subjective experience, but generally, except the external idea of its objects, they are experienced not by a concrete impression, but with a sense of fear or worship.

Though we find a sort of absolute experiences such as divination, prediction and so on, these experiences are presented as what is interpretation. Here also we find a difference between primitive peoples and civilized peoples. In the former, the immediate relation between these divinations, predictions and their religious objects is strong. Although such a relationship is not so strong in civilized peoples as in primitive peoples, the experience of divinations and predictions appear when the religious objects come intensively into the level of consciousness, as a kind of super human being of power.

(2) When the religious object is a superhuman being regarded as spirit, absolute experiences can be generally realized in the way that the religious objects come to or come into the religious subject. There are, moreover, several types. Namely, there are some types characterized by the fact that religious objects come into a religious subject and make this mediator say and report thing by uttering words through its mouth, and there are other types characterized by the fact that the appearance and behaviour of the religious subject, as well as its words, change suddenly into some other kind of behaviour or action. The most remarkably phénomena are presented by Shamanism, but, in its background, there are maniaism, animism, spiritism, daemonology, polytheism, and even monotheism. All these phenomena imply a kind of religious technique by which man tries to get into touch with
what is regarded as a spiritual subject and superhuman being and tries to get its help. Actually such an attitude aims at a social message. But the experience presupposes the loss of the usual consciousness of the religious subject. So, in this case, the experience of contact between the religious object and subject cannot always be realized as a conscious absolute experience. These experiences are only told vaguely afterwards with a sense of strange trace, and only the external changes of the religious subject are very conspicuously noticeable. Now, what is presented in speech has two types; namely, that which takes the form of dialogue, and that which is declaimed as a monologue. What is transforming in attitude has two types; namely, that which is confronting religious objects, and that which is accompanying them. For instance, such types of behaviour appear when man travels with a spirit. In the Shamanism of the arctic races in Siberia, something more like the latter type is often found.

(3) When the religious object is a supreme being regarded as a person, absolute experiences can be generally realized in the way that religious objects, as subjects, immediately descend upon and touch the religious subject. Here the religious objects are met as absolute subjects of a higher dimension. Human subjects of religious subjects, as what confront them, only bow down before them, and obey their intentions. Here no purposive and artistic aspect can be found. And yet, this experience also has two types; namely, that in which the confronting religious objects are absolute subjects of a higher dimension which one-sidedly descend and command, and that in which the contact with the religious objects takes the form of an immediate communion with absolute subjects. Such absolute experiences are found in transcendental theism as, in the founders, prophets, apostles, or mystics in the old Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and so on. Especially in the so-called original experiences of founders, the former type, namely, that in which the religious object descends upon subjects, is strongly presented. On the other hand, in Saint Paul or the Islamic mystics the so-called Sūfī, the latter type, in which the descent appears as communion, is clearly found. It is in this point that the situation of the mystic and the meaning of his experience are suggestive of beliefs in a transcendent god. Namely, in these religions, even mystics could not be recognized, if they could not point to the absolute descending upon them in their background. Anyone of these absolute experiences, however, has two aspects that of the inner senses and that of the external senses. If we generally think of them and take their ensuing activities and influences into consideration, we know that the former, namely, the inner sense, play an important part. But, on the contrary, when absolute experiences as things in themselves are told and manifested, the latter, namely, the part played by the external senses is more impressively stated. This may be due to the fact that, when the mysteriousness of absolute experiences is stressed, its vividness may be shown in the acuteness of a sensitive judgement. In this way, it touches religious objects by a special impression, by the external senses, visionally, audibly, or tactually. A special impression, of course, need not be confined to a single sense, but may be, in many cases, a synthesized impression.

(4) When religious objects are regarded as the Reality of the Absolute Being, absolute experiences may be generally realized in the way that a religious subject becomes united with religious objects. This means that, by understanding Absolute Truth, a religious subject becomes the same as Truth in a new standpoint of a higher dimension beyond its standpoint of a lower dimension. Such experiences, however, are not always the same. In some cases, a religious subject goes beyond its old being and, by understanding Absolute Truth, changes into oneness with a new being. On the other hand, in other cases, this means that he becomes one with the objective Being in the realm of Absolute Truth by bringing the way of its original possibility to a true realization. For example in India, we find early Buddhism as an instance of the former, and the Upanishads or a part of Mahāyānist Buddhism as an instance of the latter. Buddha’s perfect knowledge is a sort of knowledge by which a change of life is brought forth. To know the absolute knowledge is to become the absolute knowledge. To become the absolute knowledge, however, does not necessarily mean to accomplish self, but to become self-realized through self-effacement. This is the so-called nirvāṇa. On the other hand, the statement in the Upanishads that the absolute and the self become united, in the name of Brahman and Ātman, means that a religious subject becomes one with religious objects.

As we have generally seen, there are some differences in the types of absolute experiences.

When viewed from their origin, such matters as mentioned are seen not only in the case of special persons but also in the case of ordinary persons. Thus the differences in the modes of religious absolute experiences derive from this lineage of types. Of course, there will be found experiences in which two or three types are included. All experiences in the same religion or religious sect are not always the same. Generally speaking, however, we can maintain the lineage of the above
mentioned types. This may be pointed out by many interesting facts. There are so many concrete instances in Christians, Jews, Moslems, Hindus, Buddhists, etc., that we cannot count all of them. Each of them cannot help having its own types of experiences which derive from their lineage. If the lineage of types is not taken into account, one may easily mistake one mode of absolute experience for something universal. Such mistakes should be corrected as religious prejudices. On this point, a cultural exchange requires deep understanding of and clear insight into other cultures by reflecting on the own modes of types, even if they are unconsciously thought to be universal.

DIE RELIGIÖSE EXISTENZ IM BUDDHISMUS

VON

KEIJI NISHITANI


Es ist bekannt, dass der Begriff des anātman (etwa das Selbst-lose) ein Grundbegriff des Buddhismus ist. Dieser Begriff bedeutet die Verneinung der Realität eines Wesens wie des atman, d.i. dessen, was in jedem einzelnen Seienden als permanenter und einheitlicher Träger seiner Identität herrscht. Im Mahāyāna-Buddhismus wird der Begriff des anātman in gleicher Weise für zwei unterschiedliche Gebieten in Anspruch genommen, einmal für das der Dinge überhaupt, zum anderen für das der Menschen insbesondere. Man kann vielleicht sagen, dass der Begriff ātman (das Selbst) hinsichtlich der Dinge überhaupt

Der Gedanke des anätnman trat nun im Buddhismus auf, um die Realität eines solchen subjectum zu verleugnen. Auf was für eine Weise, will der Buddhismus mit dem Begriff des anätnman, des Nicht-Subjekts hindeuten? Um dies zu zeigen, mag es vielleicht nützlich sein, ihn mit einigen Grundbegriffen zu vergleichen, die wir in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte treffen.


Trotzdem kann man nicht umhin, in dem Einen und in der Materie stets den Charakter des Subjekts zu bemerken. Sie haben einen Grund in sich, dass man sie sich immer so vorstellen muss, als waren sie ein Subjekt. Man vermag sie sich nicht anders vorzustellen, denn als etwas, das identisch mit sich selbst ist, das seine eigene Identität in sich trägt. Woher kommt das? Daher, dass beide trotz ihres Anspruchs oder vielmehr gerade wegen des Anspruchs, Urprinzip zu sein, in einer Gegensätzlichkeit auftreten müssen. Jedes der beiden ist nicht das Andere; das Eine ist nicht die Materie, und die Materie ist nicht das Eine. Jedes also muss mit sich selbst identisch sein.


wie hielte ich's aus, kein Gott zu sein! Also gibt es keine Götter." Man kann dieses bekannte Wort Nietzsches nicht ernst genug nehmen. Es enthält ja die ganze Schwierigkeit, mit der wir uns jetzt beschäftigen.


Der Mönch wurde zum Nicht-Subjektum, zum Urgrund von Allem, und befreite sich zum Jenseits von Allem. Die Urwahrheit hat sich ihm offenbart. Und als ihm dies geschah, konnte er auch erkennen, dass ihm sein Lehrer gerade durch die grausame Handlung selbst dieselbe Urwahrheit, nach welcher er ihn gefragt hatte, offenbar machte. Was bedeutet das? Folgende drei Umstände liegen darin:


2) Durch diese Leuchten konnte der Schüler dieselbe Urwahrheit sowohl in sich als seine eigenste als auch zugleich in seinem Lehrer als dessen eigenste erkennen.

3) Durch diese Erkenntnis vermochte er sich selbst wesentlich zu erkennen und ebenso vermochte er seinen Lehrer wesentlich zu erkennen.

THE JAPANESE RELIGIOUS MIND
A METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION

BY

ROKUSABURO NIYEDA

1) There are people who say that the Japanese attitude toward religion is incomprehensible. Such an opinion is by no means unreasonable from a certain viewpoint. There are so many kinds of religions in this small country. How can they coexist within such a small land. The same Japanese goes to both the Shinto shrine and Buddhist temple. And in his home there can be found both Shinto and Buddhist household shrines. Besides, Japanese who are not Christians join in Christmas celebrations. Moreover there are many who are completely indifferent to any religion. Such tendencies can be treated from a psychological viewpoint. Then my subject would be altered into Japanese religious consciousness. In the field of religious psychology, Japanese religions have been explained by many scholars. The results of such research may have objective truth indeed, and all the propositions derived from those would be much more persuasive than philosophical ones. But at the same time the psychological method is usually limited to mere observation — it can be only empirical. Therefore, I think, psychological results in religious studies are always far from religious experience itself. As William James in his “Varieties of Religious Experience” has pointed out religious experience is something mystic and personal, so religious experience cannot be empirically observed but must be really experienced. Now, I would like to treat my subject from a metaphysical standpoint. But even in such an interpretation another difficulty would yet remain. And, if this would be defined from the pure philosophical point of view, foreign scholars would get into the fog of oriental mysticism. So I shall avoid such an approach.

2) Japanese religions in their essentials are best considered as based on Shintoism, which is a natural religion and somewhat polytheistic. Therefore they contain few elements of divine revelation, such as characterizes Christianity. Those who adhere to Shintoism do not consider it a natural religion, but to me Shintoism is nothing but this; as I said before, there is no revelation in Shintoism such as that which is indispensable to Christian monotheism. Our ancient myths have already been studied from various viewpoints, but at any rate, we can conclude that it is in “nature” in which our myths were developed. Nature is the background of ancient Japanese myths just as of ancient Greek mythology, and at least in Japan there was nothing radically alien to “nature”. The ancient mind could recognize the same consistent idea of causality between gods and men or among all things which exist in the universe, as is found for example in the philosophical systems of Plotinus or Spinoza. In other words there are no heterogenous strata nor inconsistencies. In this sense the milieu of Shinto development is one thing, while that of monotheistic supernaturalism is another.

The filed of “nature” will be more clearly understood when we see it in the relations of the gods of Shintoism to men. These relations can be seen first of all in the concept of “ancestors”. The gods of Shintoism are the forefathers of earthly human beings. But in this case it must be carefully noticed what the principles are which regulate the relations between these ancestors and their descendants. In Christianity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit are in supernatural relations. Contrary to this, in our Shintoism it is flesh and blood, that is to say, an entirely natural relationship of parents and children, that is important, and the condition which makes this possible is the place and, if we think of it more broadly, it is our country — Japan.

3) The streams of Japanese Shintoism can be divided into the following two kinds. The first is Shintoism in a wider sense and the other in a narrower. The former is not a specialized religion but a general factor controlling our life and thought. The latter is found in festivals and celebrations of Shinto shrines which are the main concerns of orthodox Shintoism. The question I intend to discuss here, is Shinto thought in the wider sense. It has been blended into Japanese life and thought for many centuries, and is always rooted in “nature”. However the notion of “nature” I mention here is by no means the same as that of natural science. This “nature” is rather of a pantheistic character and is supplied with a certain metaphysical element which originated in the East. Japanese people have continually been receiving any kinds of religions on the basis of this “nature”. But the Japanese people in their history did not use such a term, but only pointed out each natural thing, for instance, the cherry-blossom, rain, breeze, snow and the like. There has been no scientific definition. In both Shintoism and Buddhism many concepts and terms are used without any strict definition. If we understood them in a scientific way of thinking, these oriental realities would slip away from us. The Japanese, conceiving
impersonal and polytheistic ideas, prefer to use undefined terms and sometimes avoid terminological definitions intentionally. The systems of Aristotelian and Hegelian logic are not suitable for oriental thought. Expressions both in printed characters and in the countenances of the oriental nations have usually some strange nuances. And they are defined by the persons who are talking with each other. Such a tendency of religious thought has been very convenient for introducing foreign thought. In Buddhism there is an impersonal nihilism. This nihilism was very favorable to the Japanese way of thinking which is rooted in "nature". Zen Buddhism in particular emphasizes "nothingness". "Nothingness" contains immense implications. Therefore Zen does not admit of terminological definitions. And Zen ignores all kinds of expression, particularly letters and words are all prohibited. Its only principle is telepathy. This manner of Zen was easily grasped by the Japanese religious mind based on "nature". Zen is apt to take examples from various kinds of natural things. "Like clouds and streams" is the most famous saying in the Zen-shū sect — clouds and streams belonging to nature.

The Shin-shū sect, which is a sect opposed to Zen, also rationalized Buddhism into Japanese "nature". It ignored the difference between priest and layman. Shin-shū priests married and ate meat — which was strictly prohibited in other sects. A Shinto shrine must have trees, and a Zen temple must have a garden and a tea-house. These are all natural things under the sky. Marriage with a young woman is a natural human instinct for man. Such a tendency has been a traditional undercurrent, in which the differences of various religions are usually a slight and trivial matter. Besides even high religious thought with elaborate metaphysics has been transmitted to the Japanese people without losing its own validities. And gradually it has been synthesized into Japanese daily life through the medium of "nature".

4) Japanese religions in the past were closely connected with political power. The Imperial Court was the protector of Shintoism and Buddhism, invested much in shrines and temples, and employed artists to construct images of Buddha, which became objects of religious art. It is a great inconsistency that the same Emperor should be a pious devotee of both Buddhism and Shintoism, and it is truly an inconsistency if we take only religion into account. But our political leaders, including our Emperors, thought of polytheistic nature in their religious policies. Frankly speaking, what rules here is not the kind of religion we study, but it is policies based on natural tendencies that were influential. It was very important for Japanese political leaders to justify the historical connection with their ancestors. Here Shintoism became essential, for it forms a tie with the past. But at the same time there are problems of human existence in the present and future, and in this case Buddhism seemed to be much more useful. In this way, our religions have come to play a political role. When the age of military ascendency started, the religious state of affairs was still the same, except for the fact that Confucianism was added to these religions. But this Confucianism had been translated into Japanese from the Chinese original.

It is said that Japanese people have no religious faith. This may true when our religious consciousness is understood in the sense of European scientific theories. From my point of view, Japanese religions can be called, as it were, logical polytheism.

This is entirely my own interpretation, therefore it cannot indicate the historical fact itself.

Thank you for your kind attention.
A STUDY OF JAPANESE PROTESTANT
PASTORS’ PERCEPTION

BY
NOBUKIYO NOMURA

Personality and Religion is the most challenging subject of my studies, and Personality and Protestantism is an essential part of this study. In this paper, I would like to refer only to perception among the many functions of personality.

Perception must be examined in the frame of reference to personality dynamics as well as cultural dynamics. It is asserted that personality dynamics will be observed as a whole in perception. Clarification of such perception will be a first step toward understanding human behaviour in the sense that behavior will vary according to one’s perception of the given situation.

Yet, this perception of the given situation changes in different ages and is determined by different localities even within the same set of belief such as Protestantism. So, Protestant Pastors in Contemporary Japan will be discussed in this paper. A group of protestant pastors (P) will be compared with (G) group of general public who are not interested in religion and (S) group of Shintoist priests.

Comparison was done by a T.A.T. test, using nine pictures: free association test, questionnaire test, analysis of biographical data, measurement of brain waves, Galvanic skin response under definite stimulus situation.

This paper is based mainly on the findings of reaction to pictures, free association test and others. We would like to refer to some interesting features observed in Frustration Perception, Value Perception, Object Perception, Time Perception, Sex Perception, and Self Perception.

a) Frustration perception

Protestant pastors are different from the general public and Shinto priests. Hereafter, with your permission, I shall refer to Protestant pastors as P, the general public as G, and Shinto Priests as S. P does not show frustration where G and S do, and conversely, P does so, where G and S do not. For example P’s reaction to Picture 9 showed less regard for poverty and sex as the cause of the young man’s frustration than the other groups; and frustration caused by conflict within the self and the analysis of the self and others are seen only in P. A different frustration perception is projected here. This is observed also in free Association to “Sorrow” “Suffering”, “sorrow of no sorrows” and “faith does not resolve suffering, but invites more afflictions because of the very faith.” The attitude to frustration is also quite different. When G and S state in their free association “I like to escape”, or “I hate this”, P assumes a more positive approach such as, “faith builds human character,” and “affliction makes man better and more profound.”

And P perceives affliction as something not temporary, but something constant in life. We frequently come across statements such as, “suffering will never cease to be.” While G and S do not regard this problem as a serious one, this is the central issue in Buddhism. In the case of P, sin is more fundamental than suffering. T.A.T. reactions reflect various aspects of personality based on sin consciousness. This is revealed most vividly in P’s reaction to the black space of Picture 9.

b) Value Perception

P has different value perceptions from G and S. In P’s perception money and position are weak factors, whereas they are the central values in G and S. P is less apt to be influenced by these factors, and to use them as a measure of his value judgement. In Picture 9, for instance, we found less statements by P concerning money. His perception showed little consideration for social status. P was apt to interpret the difference between two persons in Picture 9 as the difference of the state of mind. The difference of the state of mind of these persons was never mentioned by G, while 60% of P and 38% of S referred to this point. Free association to a word stimuli such as “deep”, “quiet”, and “soft” showed the same results. When G and S associated the depthness, quietness and tenderness of nature with, for example, the ocean, mountain and marshmallow; P associated them to a condition of the mind: “I am happy because I can achieve peace of mind by closing my eyes even in noise and turmoil,” “man of profound personality,” “compassion.” From these, it is concluded that in P’s perception, the state of mind of a person is inclined to be magnified.

In the case of “want” expressed by the figures in Pictures, P showed a great deal of inner want. For example, in Picture 9, the percentages of inner want demonstrated were, G 17% S 50% and P 64%. It may be fair to conclude that inner want is the dominant want in P and has a dominant value.

Next, we would like to speak of God in a value system revealing P’s
perception. In the symbol system of P, God has the highest value and all happenings and matters have their own places in this hierarchy of value according to the degree of their intimate relation with God. In Picture 8, the book which was noticed only by P, was regarded as the Bible and given a central position in the T.A.T. story. Thus, the relation to God is one pole of a measure used for value judgment. The other pole is the needs of self as a biological organism. P's reference to God appeared much more frequently and played a more important role in their stories and free association. We can see here also a clear difference of the role of God in their perspectives of value systems.

c) Nature Perception

In P, nature is perceived as a less important factor than it is to G and S. P hardly mentioned the relation between person and nature behind Picture 9.

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<th>G</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>42%</td>
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This was also clearly seen in the free association test to the word stimuli of “quiet”, “soft”, and “deep.” P associated these words with such things as, “tender-hearted” or “peace of mind,” while G and S associated them with nature. Problems of life and the state of mind are more essential than nature in P. S shows the recovery from frustration by means of nature, and finds happiness in her. Those who worship mountains, for example, Mt. Dewa-Sanzan and Mt. Iwaki, look upon mountains with a feeling of gratitude, spiritual reliance and protector. P's reaction data hardly show such a friendly relation with nature. Rather, P's reaction even shows loneliness and fear, which is unthinkable in the case of S. P's characteristic perception of nature is that he attributes it to God, the Creator. Reacting to Picture 9, P says, “I can’t help being filled with awe and gratefulness to God, knowing that all this beautiful nature is in His hand,” and “those who appreciate nature can not but think of the Maker.” We can not find a slight shadow of such an idea in the other groups. On seeing the Picture 9, P referred to God in many cases, while we find no case in G and only one case in S. So, P has an extremely strong tendency to perceive God in nature. Nature is not independent, but created by God in Christian tradition, while nature is something great and independent in traditional Shinto.

d) Time Perception

The psychological meaning of a situation varies a great deal according to the time perspective in which the scene has been perceived.

In picture reaction, P seems to have a longer time perspective than G in any situation. Let us examine his reactions to Picture 9. The range of the time perspective of the three groups on viewing this old man was as follows:

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<th></th>
<th>G</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>P</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Bophood</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Youth</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touched on his life story</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not refer to his life story</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
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P seems to understand the old man in longer time perspective than G and S. The term “life” is used more often by P than the rest. From this, it may be concluded that P regards life as a time unit. There is a little difference between G and S on this point. Psychological future in the time perspective of P has a complex structure and power. Scholars like Kurt Lewin clarifies how personality behavior is determined by the value of the goal to be obtained and the possibility of its pursuit. In reaction to Picture 9, P reveals the hopeful nature of his psychological future, saying, “He will live in the new world and be given a new power,” promising it on darkness and sin. Furthermore, death has a more important position for P and S than G. Picture 9 was interpreted as the scene of death by 21% of G, 58% of S, and 74% of P. Most of the P's described death as the central theme, while G have only short simple descriptions. Eschatology is a fundamental doctrine in Christianity; yet, we can hardly discern this way of thinking in these data. Of course, we were not able to find anything to suggest such a mood in G and S. This P's time perception is contrary to some Buddhist interpretation of time which is not recognized as continuous.

e) Sex Perception

P seems to show controlled sex perception. Comparing the groups, all subjects were males 35 years of age or older. P showed the least tendency to perceive an ambiguous figure as female. The lying figure in Picture 8 was identified with female by 58% of G, 50% of S, and 17% of P. The figure in Picture I was thought to be a woman by 16% of G, 8% of S, and 9% of P. In other explanatory stories, P gave a passive role to the man in the sexual scene, and less frequently talked about relationship between man and woman.

According to the findings of the questionnaire test, sexual tension decreases with religious maturity. Protestantism has a strong tendency to control personality and their sexual control is also comparatively constant. On the other hand we could not find any difference in daily life between S and G, on this point.
f) Self perception

Self image is to be perceived and constructed as Gardner Murphy asserts. There are obviously two selves in P's perception: namely, "self of flesh and self of spirit", "an outer self which is destroyed day by day, and an inner self which is renewed day after day." The struggles between ideal self and physical desires is quite intense and gives rise to a strong consciousness of sin. Self is nothing in the presence of God. In the questionnaire test P showed a tendency to be conscious of his smallness, and this consciousness distinguishes him from other groups. P tries to control himself, abnegate his own self, and replace it with Christ. Christ is regarded not only as a significant other, but ultimately given the throne of his ego. This self is the sinner. His perception of self as a sinner is clearly shown in his reaction to the black space in Picture @. Such a complicated self is the core of P's personality and its functions are seen in each dimension. S has no image of such a sinner in reaction to the above mentioned black space. In the faith of P, self is the subject of responsibility and substantial being, while Buddhists do not recognize the constant self.

These are the findings of a partial study, and may be used as a working hypothesis for future studies.
THE COLLECTIVE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN RELIGION: MYTHS, SYMBOLS, RITES AND ARCHETYPES ACCORDING TO C. G. JUNG.

BY

EDMOND ROCHEDEU

1 The problem of the Collective and the Individual in Religion.

More and more, the historian of Religions acknowledges his indebtedness to the findings of other spheres of learning while remaining loyal to the historical method. At the present time Modern Psychology throws new light on a problem which up to now was considered to be the particular concern of the History of Religions. In this matter Professor C. G. Jung is one of those whose works command respect and attention of the specialists of Religions.

Henri Bergson already had noted that one of the sources of Religion was to be sought for in society, but in a shut up society, self-sufficient and excluding all that is alien to it. Yet he pointed out to another source, this one merely individual, and that was the voice of prophets and of founders of religions whose message distinct from collective affirmations opposes itself to the religion of the clan, transcends it and discloses to men new spiritual values. This religion, declared Bergson, is dynamical, whereas the piety of a society retired within itself remains static; it is identical with mysticism and its most perfect form was realized in the person of Christ.

Bergson’s point of view has but little been withheld by the historians of religions, doubtlessly because the mystics of whom he speaks don’t overlay the totality of what is set under the term mysticism; before resorting this word to designate the summit of religious experience, it would have been necessary on the one hand to fathom the deep meaning of various non-christian mysticisms and on the other hand to examine more closely christianism, in order to ascertain that its highest values really are the appanage of the sole mystics.

Nevertheless in Bergson’s explanation one point deserves to be kept back, which precisely is wanting in Jung’s conception, and that is the primeval part of the personality of those who know the Enlighten-
ment or become aware that they are the subject of a Revelation, operates in the various religions.

II C. G. Jung's Theory.

To have a right perspective of C. G. Jung's work, it should be recalled that for forty years to now, many psychologists have laid stress on the importance of the social element in human behaviour. It is not surprising that during this time their studies in collective Psychology should find their application in the sphere of religion. This was the line taken by professor C. G. Jung.

Examining Symbols and Myths, this writer concludes in the first that Myths and Symbols are an irrational and spontaneous expression of a primordial psychological experience. Can this experience be closer defined? It is here that the theory of Archetypes appears. Going back to a basic platonic conception and employing a term borrowed from Denys the Areopagite, Jung affirms that the psyche is not a "tabula rasa" but contains primordial images, the Archetypes, which belong to the Collective Unconscious, the parallel of the Personal Unconscious; these Archetypes account for associations of ideas astonishing in their abiding permanence, initiating in all human beings analogous patterns. The motives of Myths are taken from them, which explains their similarity in all civilizations, and the Symbols employed in the Myths reveal still more clearly that they are indigenous to the archetypical world.

What are the Archetypes? Difficult for comprehension because one cannot refine them by a single formula, they indicate at the same time the unseen sources of the consciousness of the individual and the unshakable elements of our unconscious, and they condition a priori the psychological processes. Virtual and unaffected by the passage of time, they never fail to act when the conscious weakens. "As soon as it is no longer the being but the mass that stirs, human regulation ceases and the archetypes begin to assert their influence." 1)

Archetypes are bipolar: issuing from the collective unconscious, they comprise a dark facet and a light, the personal unconscious rendering themselves alternately menacing or beneficent. This bipolarity constitutes a danger, for when they are set into motion no one knows how this processes will emerge, the cognition of the archetype making it possible for a mass movement to spring up. Catastrophe will not be avoided unless the majority retain a consciousness of reality and dam up the inevitable processes of the collective unconscious.

Nevertheless the beneficent aspect of the archetype must not be undervalued, since very often it acts as protector and saviour, only becoming dangerous when it is out of control; for it compensates for the extravagances of the conscious tending to a manifestly short-sighted view of progress and leads back to a recognition of the immovable laws of the universe; it personifies those certain fundamental instincts and acquires functional and vital meaning. The archetypes are felt like magical forces and appear as a first aspect of religion, whereas their unseizable activity shows itself in myths and symbols.

The Myths, products of a remote and unascertainable tradition, are not allegories invented by a primitive disposition of the mind, but the irrational and spontaneous formulation of a primordial psychological experience; thus the Mythology of a human group institutes a living religion which mingles with its particular system of archetypes.

Whereas the Symbols which appeal to the conscious, they express the numinous experience far better than concepts would, for they allow the archetype experience to revive, thanks to a sympathetic participation. Former to any differentiation and rationalization, they are "the invaluable means which render us able to utilize in an effective way the simply instinctive flood of energetic process." 2)

At the same time mainspring of direction and source of energy, they serve as channel and transformers to the highest numinous archetype, that of divinity, for in order to be approached the Infinite must be expressed in religious symbols which always are vital manifestations, not products from the intellect. Rising from the elementary and unconscious stratum of the psyche, they make up the very roots of the religious phenomenon and remain charged with numinous energy, even when doctrines and dogmas rationally comprehensive have lost a part of this power.

The Rites themselves will also be at the same time protective and intermediate. Real walls built up by men around the experience of the Divine, they canalize its terrifying energy. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the ritual act obliges the Ego to remember the existence of the Non-Ego. "In the ritual act, man sets himself to the disposition of an autonomous "Eternal", of a cause existing beyond all the


2) C. G. Jung, Unter psychische Energetik in das Wesen der Traume, (Zurich 1948, p. 83), quoted by Gerhard Adler, in Études de Psychologie jungienne (Genève 1957, p. 68).
categories of the conscious."  

1) C. G. JUNG, "Das Wandlungssymbol in der Messe", Eratos-Jahrbuch 1940–1941 (Zurich 1948, p. 124); quoted by Gerhard ADLER, in Etudes de psychologie jungienne (Genève 1957, p. 216).


briefly, “the ritual circle vouches for the possibility of a connection with the experience of divinity if the conscious succeeds in penetrating to the primordial meaning of the rite. Hence the ritual is the mediator between the supra-individual Non-Ego and the individual Ego.”

It is why, concludes Jung, any authentic rite may claim to be founded on a Revelation, which in the psychological point of view will be the emergence in the conscious of the numinous Non-Ego under the form of archetypical images. Now these expressions are “eternal”, they contain a “Truth” and a wisdom which infinitely transcend the knowledge possessed by the Ego; it is by virtue of this, that they possess a character of “revelation” of facts unrecognizable by other means and which offer themselves to the Ego to take conscience of them.

Moreover, these considerations prove that human psyche, unceasingly penetrated by the numinous Non-Ego, is “naturaliter religiosa”; in other terms, it possesses a religious function and will harbour with stupid elements if the good ones are denied.

III Criticism of C. G. Jung’s thesis.

C.G. Jung’s conception is fascinating, for it explains the resemblances between different religions without having recourse to the work of influences: don’t the unconscious and collective forces rise the mythical symbols accompanied by the same rites? However this theory seems to us to neglect an essential and irreducible aspect of religious life, that which is covered by the words Revelation and Enlightenment.

All the great prophets, founders and reformers of religions were something else than beings taking conscience, in order to canalize them, of the numinous forces of the collective unconscious. They have had the conviction, which was shared by their disciples, that they were bringing to the world a message that transcends what every man conceals in his unconscious.

To be sure they felt themselves in harmony with the laws of nature; nevertheless they were opposed to the religious manifestations of their time and their sphere, not admitting all the symbols, myths and rites, expressions of the eternal archetypes.

Bergson calls them “privileged personalities”; they have answered a call coming from further than the collective unconscious, and if in the psychological point of view it is allowable to call “Revelation” the emergence of the numinous Non-Ego under the form of the archetypical images and to assert that these untimely expressions contain a truth and a wisdom transcending the knowledge of the conscious Ego, this conception does not explain the opposition of the prophet facing the religious authorities and proclaiming with certainty the message that was revealed to him and with which he is enlightened.

In short, the Jungian archetype, if it informs us about what is in common in the myths, symbols and rites of the various religions, if it renders an account of the power inherent to these manifestations, doesn’t reveal that irreducible matter which is contained in each of them.

The theory of the archetypes paints a picture of religions which reminds one of the syncretism where the diversities are reduced to a single denominator, here the archetype. Now, if we want to go beyond this point of view and fathom the secret of all true religions where the synthesis of ancient and recent elements produces a new creation which transcends the collective, it is towards another form of the Jungian psychology that we will have to turn, the one which describes the individual psychic life.

Above the conscious Ego exists in posse another personality, the Self, at the same time conscious and unconscious, which completes the Ego and constitutes the real center of psychical totality, quite as the Ego represents the center of the conscious.

This virtual center, by the strength of its radiance, compensates what is lacking in our conscious life and its action allows the individual to be entirely realized. Well, declares Jung, it is in the Self that our individual participation with God reveals itself. Does he mean the personal God of the Bible tradition or any immanent force diffused in the universe? On this point, Jung’s posture remains ambiguous for he wants to maintain himself on the psychological ground; best, behind the scholar who observes we may guess the believer who is obsessed by the religious problem. It matters little, as the Self is quite the point where the enlightenment and the revelation take place.

Thus in the outlook which interests us, that of the origin of myths, symbols and rites, a dualism appears in the Jungian conception: on one hand the world of the collective unconscious which by its archetypes arises the mythic, symbolic and ritual aspect of religion, on the other hand the world of the individual unconscious, where by the transition of the Self, the immanent spiritual forces, issued from a transcendent
power, propagate the highest religious values.

Can the historian of religions admit such opposition? We don’t believe it. For the enlightenment and the certitude to be the object of a revelation, if they sometimes react violently against the established religion, also meet in these symbols and myths the spark which gives birth to them. Besides, it happens that the personal faith of the prophet, of the reformer, or of the saint utilizes these symbols, rites and myths which raise from the archetypes but are not so far a pure product of the collective unconscious.

Briefly, the symbols, rites and myths, if unquestionably they are indispensable means of communication to create a religious society and if they present themselves as manifestations which convey to a group the numinous energy, they are religious fundamental data of the interior and individual life. In the secret of this intimate sanctuary that the Self is they become then the source of Enlightenment and the way to Revelation.

THE REVALUATION OF MYTH AS A STEP TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

BY

FLOYD H. ROSS

Three Introductory Affirmations

(1) What is religion?

Religion in its experiential sense is the search of the entire human organism for coherence and meaning in all phases of its being. Man senses that he is made for wholeness, rather than for fragmentation. He seeks a certain quality of relatedness, and is not content merely with quantity of relationships which have no coherence.

(2) What is man’s deepest human problem?

The problem of man is that he suffers from a sense of being divided against himself. This was called dukkha – dis-ease – by Gautama the Buddha. In the terms of modern depth psychology it is known as anxiety. In the Semitic religious traditions man has shown marked signs of feeling distinctly alienated from the core of Being or of Reality. Indeed, in Judaism, Christianity and Islam this sense of alienation has sometimes taken fairly extreme forms. But even in Chinese and Japanese traditional thought and ritual, man has shown evidence of sensing a partial separation from Reality. Rituals of purification and devices to drive away evil spirits are evidences of this sense of estrangement, dis-ease or inner uneasiness.

(3) What is man’s greatest gift?

Man’s greatest gift is his capacity for symbolic transformation, expressed through myth, ritual, language, art, superstition, religion, mathematics, science. Man’s brain is more than a telephone switchboard. A switchboard is a marvellous device for handling signals and messages efficiently, but it creates nothing. Man’s brain is now recognized as being a transformer; it plays a creative role in the living of man’s life and in helping the organism come to grips with and understand, at least in part, his total world. This brain engages con-
stantly in symbolic transformation. As Cassirer, Langer and others have pointed out, man seems to have a basic “need of symbolization” and the brain is continually translating experiences into symbols.

Nature of Myth

Myth, ritual, language arise spontaneously from this primary human need. Man is not man without engaging in symbolic transformation. No man, then, can live without myth. But modern man in most cases can no longer live with the old interpretations of the myths. This has led some to say that the myths of the past are only childish science or sheer fantasy engaged in by persons who were not capable of more mature thought.

But myth is not fiction nor the by-product of childish fantasy. The myth-making process is part of the deepest psycho-biological structure of man. It is evidence coming to us from the largely unprobed regions of the psyche. A mythical fact cannot be established as having any “objective truth” in the positivistic sense of the term, but its validity is timeless. Myth is related to the human search for meaning. It is the voice of the unconscious trying to speak to the conscious mind. Historical chronology is of purely incidental value in dealing with myth. Myth is that which is meaningful over and above its temporal setting or its historical flavor, yet it does not deny time nor destroy the particular flavor of its historical setting.1

An imaginative study of myth can thus teach us much about man’s search for integration, for orientation and for meaningful coherence. Such a study is indispensable to an understanding of religion and of the psychic life of man. Man is an inveterate myth-maker who is usually not aware of the myth which is shaping his own life. Hence, by studying the myths of earlier generations, he can gain some measure of understanding and objectivity. After this oblique approach to a study of the human consciousness, perhaps then he can turn to himself and his own times more fruitfully.2

1) Judaism and Christianity have had a tendency to find meaning only in the temporal-historical scene primarily if not exclusively in the “once-for-all” event (of Sinai, or of Jesus Christ). On the other hand, the Oriental traditions have sometimes seemed to fly toward the opposite extremes: they have tended to deny the value of the temporal, the relative, the realm of maya or of samsara. Not all have gone to these extremes. Both in East and West there have been important men and movements that have sought to preserve the mystery of the “two in one,” or the identity of “samsara and Nirvana.”

2) While all of man’s experiences may in one sense be called “religious” an analogy is provided for us by the way in which a psychoanalyst or psychotherapist seeks to understand the dreams of his patient, his daily rituals or his compulsions. To the extent that the psychoanalyst is sensitive, some of the best clues for understanding his counselee will be provided by the dreams told to him. In a similar way, the historian and psychologist of religion must be sympathetically concerned with the “dreams” (i.e. the myths) of a tribe or of a people.

The modern depth psychologist uses many projective tests, including the ink-blot test (Rorschach) to find out important processes at work in the experience of his patient. The myths, symbols and rituals of mankind’s religions are the large-scale “Rorschach tests” for the careful student of religious experience. These are the “projections” of the human psyche. The words of Protagoras are now seen to be true in a richer sense than was earlier realized. “Man is the measure of all things.” Man’s yardstick for measuring and understanding the world is himself, his own body and his own psyche. What man finds in the so-called “outer world” is largely controlled by what he has begun to find “in himself.” The world we live in—as distinct from the world we presume to describe “scientifically”— is the world we make. The world we describe scientifically is a cold abstraction which can only partly remind us of the world of flesh and blood, loves and hates, fears and joys. It is like a photograph of a person, not the living, breathing person himself.

Man is a dynamic movie projector, interminably throwing images on a screen, both while sleeping and while awake. The “screen” is man’s total environment, personal and non-personal. Man constructs his value-laden world out of his hopes and fears, his partial insights and his confusion; he “projects” out of his desire for order and system, and he “projects” out of his muddled disorders within. If he has found some order and meaning in his inner world, he will probably find order and meaning in his outer world.

If in the past all people tended to overemphasize the significance of dream states as compared with waking states, the danger sophisticated, scientifically-minded moderns run is just the reverse. Both the “inner” and the “outer” worlds of man must be recognized as interpenetrating and as giving us significant clues as to the nature of the “one world,” or Reality. An over-concern for statistics, “objective” in that they relate to some degree to his search for coherent meaningfulness and qualitative relatedness, some of man’s experiences have a deeper significance than others. Similarly, some myths are more fruitful for exploration than others.
facts, proven hypotheses, sterilized concepts cleansed of any "subjectivity" can convert us into "scientific" eunuchs unable to respond with any insight to the deeper currents of the human psyche. Our initial concern is not with what can be proved or disproved; it is to enter empathetically into the rich data of the human laboratory, avoiding naivete and brutality.

Our concern is to discover the "Real World" in both its inner and outer dimensions. A great scientist like Einstein continued to dream of a unified field theory that would throw light on otherwise unrelated phenomena. This should be the dream of the historian and psychologist of religion. We find out more about the "Real World" by starting with the world we live in, by creeping up on ourselves, as it were, through a friendly study of the projective systems and symbols of our ancestors. In this way we can learn something not only about our ancestors but also about ourselves.

The myths of any people must be studied without any fixed metaphysical assumptions or dogmas in the minds of the searcher. Yet the student of myth must be willing to deal with his data without ruling out the metaphysical and "meta-psychological" implications. He must avoid "psychologism" and "scientism" just as carefully as he avoids "theologism," "eclesiasticism," and any other variety of speculative dogmatism.

The influence of infantile and childhood states of consciousness upon people's concepts of Reality and the rituals which they use in trying to come to terms with that dimly-apprehended Reality, must be explored much more completely. Some with psychoanalytic orientations have written upon the possible significance of animal, food and human sacrifices for an understanding of human nature (Cf. Theodore Reik; R. Money-Kyrle; etc.). Others have concentrated upon the role of the mother (Cf. Robert Briffault; Erich Neumann; Simone de Beauvoir; etc.). The place of the father, the significance of sexuality, sibling rivalry, the influence of matriarchal and patriarchal patterns of tribal organization have been explored to some extent. But many more such studies need to be made; the results of the research of anthropologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, and historians must be more imaginatively correlated, even when much of the evidence can never by final. The persisting human problem of the male-female polarity, both between the sexes and within the consciousness of each human being, demands further study. The Yin/Yang, Shiva/Shakti symbols are taking on renewed significance in these days of the Freuds and the Jungians. The non-dogmatic humanism of such

men as Erich Fromm raises again the issue posed by jnana marga: how far can certain persons transcend the over-personalized categories of theistic religion and assimilate inwardly the principles and insights which the personalistic theist always personalizes "out there" as it were?

The great recurring myths of mankind – of the primal sacrifice at the creation, of the terrible Mother and the beneficent Mother, of the terrible Father and of the good Father, of the Hero's journey and his victory, of the Sleeping Beauty and the handsome Prince, of the sacrifice that must be repeated over and over if man is to be redeemed, of the efforts to return to the cosmic womb – must be studied by persons who combine poetic sensitivity with a concern for rational understanding; who possess piety without being pietistic; who are rational without being rationalistic; who are compassionate without being moralistic. Human nature being what it is, these qualities are rarely found in complete balance in one person. But what cannot be found in one person can often be supplied by a community of scholars, working with diverse tools and aptitudes but with a common concern for a wider and deeper understanding of what each of us can know only in part.

Japan provides rich laboratory material for those ready to start the search. The Japanese feeling for oneness with nature, their genuine openness to a non-moralistic feeling for reality denied largely to the Jew, Moslem, and Christian, their capacity for poetic insight – all these things make Japan a fruitful place for the study of myth, ritual and symbol. If these studies can combine an interest in ethnology, anthropology, history and depth psychology, many fruitful hypotheses and illuminating results should emerge. Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung are two giants who have given us keys with which to unlock hitherto little-explored areas of human experience. Japan can give us other such giants. So can any of the nations of the earth, if her scholars are not too timid about crossing boundary lines – both inner and outer – as citizen—scholars exploring one Reality.
THE NEED FOR RELIGIOUSNESS

BY

LUANG SURIABONGS

I feel deeply honoured to have been invited to participate in the deliberations of this 9th International Congress for the History of Religions.

One of the main purposes of this Congress is to study the impact of religion on our modern civilization and to bring our religious views into harmony with one another.

We cannot deny the fact that the Extreme Materialism from which the whole world is suffering is trying to undermine our religious beliefs and will succeed to do so, unless we are determined to do something against it. We need a revival of our religiousness. We need a new outlook upon life that is not based on Materialism nor on human ideals, but that is based on natural laws and the true nature of man, in order to bring happiness, peace of mind and universal peace. We must try to find a common basis upon which all religions can work together towards a great revival of religiousness.

There is, indeed, such a common basis. Every religion of the world has the following beliefs in common:

FIRST: That there is a universal justice;
SECONDLY: That there is a certain class of thoughts, words, deeds, which are "right" and another class of actions that are "wrong";
THIRDLY: That there is some power in the world which rewards good and brings retribution for unrighteous conduct;
FOURTHLY: All religions aim at purifying man’s heart and want him to do good.

Thus all religions have the idea of righteousness and unrighteousness at the basis of their teachings.

Nevertheless, the great differences which exist between the religions of faith and Buddhist religion lie in the difference of scale with which good and evil are measured, and the different conception of life and of man’s true nature. Yet these differences should not by any means prevent us from working closely in a good and friendly atmosphere towards a world-wide revival of religiousness. After all, each religion believes in the sanctity of life and in the dignity of man his right to determine his own will-actions. And so there is undoubtedly a common basis upon which all religions can happily work in harmony.

May I therefore take this auspicious opportunity to make the following suggestions:

That we recognise that Extreme Materialism will destroy us all, unless it is impeded by high standards of morality and ethics;
That we realize that Materialism in itself does not lead to lasting peace and happiness, because the more one has the more one wants; and there is no limit to man’s insatiable craving for the pleasures of life and worldly gain;
And, lastly, that we are fully aware that the purpose of life is not self-indulgence but the attainment of a higher spiritual life which will lead us to lasting happiness and peace. This can be achieved by self-restraint and self-control: by the practice of love, compassion, loving-kindness (Metta-Karuna); and by tolerance, mutual understanding and good-will.

In the light of these suggestions I profoundly believe that by working closely together we could attain a world-wide revival of religiousness as an effective measure to counteract the Extreme Materialism from which the world suffers today.

It is not good enough to keep on raising the standards of living, nor is it good enough just to believe in universal justice and in our ideals.

But we must actively create good Karma for ourselves by exercising loving-kindness, forgiveness, tolerance and good-will towards all, which will take care of itself and will lead to peace and happiness. Let us revive our religiousness and by our own good deeds help the world at large to find peace desired by all mankind.
WORLD PEACE AND WORLD ORDER

BY

ROBERT H. LAWSON SLATER

A glance at the agenda shows that the concern for World Peace which is so general to-day and to which this paper refers is reflected in this Congress. We should, indeed, be considerably less than human if this were not the case, and I venture to add that we should also be less alert to the nature of the subject which brings us together. For the depths of life are plumbed when the issues of history are discerned, including the issue of war or peace, order or disorder, and Religion pertains to these depths.

It is the recognition that the better understanding of Religion has a direct bearing on the concern for World Peace which prompts this paper. This recognition is not confined to scholars or religious leaders. It is shared by many others, including statesmen who are seeking to establish some means of international order and co-operation which will not only avert suicidal conflicts but promote human welfare in a world which today is indeed One World. Many of them would say emphatically that if this World Order is to be achieved and maintained something more is needed than adroit diplomacy or intelligent organization. Many turn to Religion for this 'something more'. Nothing short of a strong religious motive, they believe, will suffice to overcome the hesitations and the divergent interests which hinder progress towards such order. And this conviction persists in spite of the fact that Religion itself must be named as one of the causes of division.

A notable example of this appeal to Religion was provided by the Resolution passed by the Legislature of the Union of Burma before the meeting of the Sixth Great Buddhist Council. "Not being satisfied with the measures usually undertaken hitherto by the peoples and governments of the world for the solution of the problems confronting mankind by promoting the material well-being of man," the Burmese Parliament declared its "firm belief that it is necessary to devise . . . such measures . . . for the spiritual and moral well-being of man as would remove these problems." It was necessary to help man to overcome the

greed (lobha), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha) which were at the root of all his troubles - a diagnosis in terms of the Buddhist faith. In the same category, was the plea of President Eisenhower to the delegates assembled for the World Council of Churches at Evanston, a plea for prayer - sustained, earnest prayer in the interests of world peace - a plea in terms of the Christian Faith.

But the appeal to Religion is often accompanied by demands and expectations which ignore important aspects of the religious situation. It needs to be informed by a better understanding of the nature of Religion.

It is towards such a better understanding that scholars engaged in the more critical study of Religion might well be expected to make their contribution. It would be strange indeed if this were not the case, for the critical study of Religion, as it has been pursued in modern times, has meant a sustained and methodical research from many different points of view. It has also meant a wider perspective as students have looked beyond the boundaries of their own traditions and have grown in the knowledge of other faiths. It has meant, again, a greater concern for accurate description than might be observed in popular discussion, together with an avowed impartiality in surveys designed to include all the relevant evidence, with theory adjusted to what is actually observed. In this regard, it has involved the discipline which pertains to conscientious science. But in the attempt to pass beyond mere description to understanding, it has also been critical study in the sense that it has involved an appreciation of questions beyond the realm of science proper - particularly, perhaps, the epistemological question and the conditions of religious reception.

At the same time, it would be agreed, I think that this study at present raises more questions than agreed conclusions. For it is still a very adolescent study. There is need, for example, for much greater co-operation between scholars of different religions, and also between scholars of different disciplines. Nevertheless, even if we can do no more than raise pertinent questions, these questions may at least serve to call attention to aspects of the religious situation which are frequently ignored and hence to statements and expectations which are unrealistic.

The particular question I would raise in this paper is one related to two confused demands, and the answer I would suggest, or the light in which these demands might be considered, is related to what I would venture to describe as one of the more significant developments in our modern studies.

The first demand is the demand for credal uniformity or substantial
philosophical tradition, which aims at 'conceptualization', whereas much of the subject matter of Religionswissenschaft, namely, religions in the East, aims at immediate apprehension of the totality or essence of Ultimate Reality.' I take this to refer, in part, to our Western zeal for definition and classification. We have tended to classify different traditions in terms of their dominant concepts, even when such dominance is questionable and articulation hesitant. Attempts to indicate more indefinite and more immediate apprehensions have been dismissed as a perverse resort to the fog of obscurantism. As to the opposite tendency in Eastern thought to which Professor Kitagawa refers, its antiquity and present persistence are indicated by Sri Aurobindo’s remark that “the knowledge we have to arrive at is not truth of the intellect; it is not right belief, right opinions, right information...Ancient Indian thought meant by knowledge a consciousness which possesses the highest Truth in a direct perception and in self-experience.” Some of the meditation disciplines taught in the East, including the disciplines of Theravada and Zen Buddhism (at least as I understand them) point to the same conclusion. Western mystics, too, it might be argued, have said much the same thing and no hard and fast line can be drawn between Eastern and Western thought.

There have, however, been sufficient grounds for contrast in the past to give special interest to this new tendency in the West to look beneath the surface. The term Depth Religion is suggested by some of the phrases used to-day in analyses of the religious situation. A recent Gifford lecturer, for example, speaks of “those deeper levels of a man's being in relation to which alone the idea of God ceases to be a mere idea”; he refers to “a more deeply felt awareness of what really is at stake in religion” as distinct from “a merely notional awareness” and he considers whether rational arguments may “penetrate to deeper levels of the mind than the discursive intellect.” He agrees with Rudolf Otto in attributing the element of theism in the thought of Sankara, the great Indian sage, to “the deeper compulsions of the human spirit.” In other Western writers we may observe a distinction between the “deep Ahnungen” (intuitions) to be found in all traditions and the terms of thought in different systems of belief, a distinction between what pertains to “the religious consciousness,” with an emphasis on what is known “in the depths” of this consciousness, and what pertains to religious or theological interpretation. A distinction is similarly drawn between the profound “apprehensions” pertaining to the “poetry of faith” to be found in the Bible and the more precise

unanimity of belief, with an end to disturbing conflicts of religious opinion and divergent interpretations. This demand is frequently associated with the view that the 'something more' required from Religion is primarily the unifying influence which is discerned in Religion—that influence which enabled the Prophet Muhammad to overcome tribal feuds and achieve the solidarity associated with the Islamic faith or that influence which led Christians to think in terms of a Holy Roman Empire. What is often believed is that this unifying influence will only be effective when all religious teachers interpret their faith in substantially the same way. This is often what is meant when it is said that religious leaders must first come together and set their own house in order if they would lead the nations in the way of peace. But parallel with this demand is also the estimate that the 'something more' required of Religion in the cause of World Order is primarily the dynamic which pertains to deep religious persuasion. The issue arises whether this second demand can be reconciled with the first. For, to say the least, the dynamic pioneers in religion, the prophets and the sages who have recalled men to effective vision have not been notable for their conformity. For that affinity one with another which has prompted the remark that the saints of all religions recognise each other, we must look beneath the surface of their credal professions and intellectual explanations.

It is the growing disposition to do precisely this—to look beneath the surface of our different expressions and interpretations of faith—which constitutes, I believe, one of the major developments in the study of Religion to-day—at least in the West. The result, in part, of our growing recognition of the multivariable and complex character of religious expression, this new disposition, means an emphasis of the significance of what may be described as Depth Religion. It is in the light of this recognition that we may examine the issue which arises from the demand for intellectual unanimity and the parallel demand for new vision and deep persuasion.

I said that the recognition of Depth Religion constituted a new development at least in the West. I made this qualification because it might be held that in this respect Western thought is moving more into line with what has been anticipated in Eastern thought. In his recent article on Joachim Wach’s development of Religionswissenschaft, Professor Kitagawa remarks that traditional Western scholarship in this field has often been too “Western” in basic orientation and framework, even in regard to Eastern faiths. “The scientific study of religions,” he observes, “...is deeply rooted in the Western
formulations of theology. One writer speaks of the higher religions “sending their roots down below the intellectual surface to the subconscious depths of Human Nature.”

What is often implied is that there is some original response to that Ultimate Reality with which religion has to do—that Reality which Christians and others name God—a response which is prior to, or fundamental to, our multivarious expressions of faith, our systems of belief and our interpretations. Behind all such formulations there is a basic and originitive “awareness” or “apprehension” which discerns more, but for that very reason, can say less, and which so to speak, is at the back of our minds, or deep within our consciousness, and even, in part, below our consciousness, never fully articulated. What is further or frequently implied is that there is constant need of a return to this fundamental response or apprehension in order to renew the vision it portends, if faith is to remain vital.

Such a brief summary, I am well aware, cries aloud for further elucidation. It may suggest false trails. The fact that the recognition of Depth Religion is in part due to our modern interest in depth psychology, as well as the name itself—depth religion—may suggest that we are here concerned entirely with responses below the level of consciousness; depth religion may be construed to mean no more than sub-conscious religion. The deeper vision which nourishes faith may be associated with ‘flashes of insight’, ‘swift intuitions’ and the like in a way that suggests the less we think about our faith the better, while the postulate of some ‘immediate apprehension’ prior to all structures of belief may be taken to mean that this and this alone is the source of greater understanding. But the analysis which points to such a background or depth does not exclude the possibility of a two-way traffic between what is deliberate and rational and what is more immediate and less articulate, a traffic which is not only compatible but essential to fuller vision. If this is so, it cannot be said that our various interpretations are of no account or that one interpretation is as good as another. In short, the concept of Depth Religion does not necessarily mean any flight from reason.

What it does mean, however, is that our intellectual explanations, our creeds and systems of belief, derive in part from fundamental apprehensions or responses and express only in part the personal faith which is still informed, or should be informed, by these same fundamental recognitions. And our creeds and systems, which are there to encourage such deeper faith, may either be enriched by it or become detached from it. Beneath the surface of professed belief, then, there is the faith by which men actually live, a faith which is never adequately expressed. Therefore—and this is the conclusion which applies to our present discussion—the unity which pertains to vital religion cannot be equated with intellectual unanimity and may even exist apart from it. Such agreement may be desirable in so far as the lack of it may result in disturbing conflicts. But this cannot be the first consideration if what is most required from Religion in the interests of World Order is the dynamic which pertains to vital faith. The first consideration is that this faith must be deeply founded in a living response to that ‘immensely Rich Reality’ with which religion has to do. A surface unanimity may be purchased at too great a price if it is taken to mean that we must silence those disturbing sages and prophets, who in different ways and by divers interpretations, may be seek to persuade men in the way that leads to that Vision without which the people perish. Vital religion cannot be streamlined or produced to order.

If this is a substantially true estimate of the religious situation in the light of our studies and developments of thought, East and West—and I believe it is—we need not wait for religious co-operation in the interests of World Peace and Order until the day when men are persuaded to interpret or express their faith in the same way—if that day ever comes.

With your indulgence I may perhaps point this same conclusion by a more personal confession in terms of my own Christian belief. If I were told that 50,000 nominal Christians and 50,000 nominal Buddhists were meeting together to promote World Peace by subscription to some deduced Credo, I should not say that such a meeting would be futile. It might indeed do some good. But I should not be greatly interested. But I should be interested if I were told that fifty Christians really dedicated to God and fifty Buddhists really taking ‘refuge’ in the Dhamma were meeting for the same purpose, even if they professed no common Credo. For they might have the faith which moves mountains.
Plenary Session

Religion in the East
UNE INSCRIPTION GRECO-ARAMÉENNE DU ROI ASOKA RECÉMENT DÉCOUVERTE EN AFGHANISTAN

PAR
A. DUPONT-SOMMER

Le document épigraphique que j'ai l'honneur de présenter à ce IXe Congrès International d'Histoire des Religions est l'un des plus anciens témoignages intéressant l'histoire de la religion bouddhique. A Tokyo, sur cette terre japonaise où la religion bouddhique s'est si fortement enracinée et si puissamment développée, et devant tant d'éminents collègues bouddhistes, quel plaisir et quelle émotion que d'avoir à révéler la proclamation solennelle de l'un des adeptes les plus illustres de la foi bouddhique dans l'antiquité !

Ce document a été découvert il y a seulement quelques mois ; c'est une inscription gravée sur un rocher non loin de Kandahar, au sud de l'Afghanistan : repérée par un instituteur de la région, elle fut signalée par le Musée afghan de Kaboul à la Délégation archéologique française en Afghanistan, dont le directeur est M. Daniel Schlumberger. Vers la fin d'avril dernier, M. Jean-Marie Casal, de la part de cette Délégation, se rendit sur les lieux pour y prendre des photographies et un estampage de l'inscription ; ces documents parvinrent à Paris le 13 juin 1958, et, le 20 juin, le Professeur Louis Robert annonça la découverte à l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.

Cette inscription est bilingue : grecque et araméenne. Elle a pour auteur le fameux Asoka, roi de l'Inde, troisième souverain de la dynastie des Mauryas ; converti au bouddhisme, ce roi, comme chacun sait, fit graver sur des rochers et sur des colonnes de nombreuses inscriptions rédigées en divers dialectes indiens, témoignant de son zèle et de ses efforts pour la propagation de la Loi. Dans la partie grecque de notre bilingue, il est appelé "le roi Piodassés" (basileus Piodassês) ; dans la partie araméenne, "notre seigneur Priyadarśi le roi" : Piodassés et Priyadarśi sont deux variantes de la forme indienne Piýadassi, mot qui veut dire "au regard amical" et qui sert couramment dans les inscriptions indiennes à désigner le roi Asoka.

Celui-ci a commencé son règne, comme on l'admet généralement, en 260 av. J.-C. ; et c'est dix ans après son sacre qu'eut lieu sa
conversion au bouddhisme. Notre inscription, tout au début, rappelle cet événement mémorable : elle est donc postérieure à 250. D’autre part, le règne d’Asoka a duré au total 36 ou 37 ans, ce qui fixe à 224 ou 223 la date extrême de l’inscription.

La partie grecque, inscrite en premier, compte 14 lignes, d’une excellente gravure, et d’une écriture tout à fait conforme à l’écriture hellénistique du IIIᵉ siècle avant J.-C., sans rien d’exotique ou de provincial. Voici la traduction de ce texte grec, dont M. Louis Robert a donné lecture à l’Académie :

“Dix ans étant révolus, le roi Piodassès a montré aux hommes la Piété.

“Et depuis lors il a rendu les hommes plus pieux, et tout prospère sur toute la terre.

“Et le roi s’abstient des êtres vivants, et les autres hommes et tous les chasseurs et pêcheurs du roi ont cessé de chasser.

“Et ceux qui n’étaient pas maîtres d’eux-mêmes ont cessé, dans la mesure de leurs forces, de ne pas maîtriser.

“Et ils (sont devenus) obéissants à père et mère et aux gens âgés, à l’inverse de ce qui était le cas précédemment.

“Et désormais, en agissant ainsi, ils vivront de façon meilleure et plus profitable en tout.”

La partie araméenne, inscrite juste au-dessous de la partie grecque, compte 7 lignes 3, qui sont parfaitement conservées. Le déchiffrement en a été confié à l’auteur de la présente communication. L’écriture est très nette et tout à fait semblable à celle des deux autres inscriptions araméennes du même roi Asoka antérieurement découvertes à Taxila et à Pui-I-Darunth. La langue est dans l’ensemble conforme à cet “araméen d’empire” qui avait été en usage dans les chancelleries achéménides ; mais elle manifeste un certain relâchement dans la syntaxe, ainsi que quelques provincialismes. Comme à l’époque achéménide, elle accueille un certain nombre de termes proprement iraniens ; sur environ 80 mots, notre inscription araméenne ne compte pas moins de 9 mots iraniens. Le Professeur E. Benveniste a bien voulu les étudier et me communiquer le résultat de ses recherches. Voici la traduction, encore inédite, que je propose pour l’inscription araméenne tout entière (les mots d’origine iranienne sont soulignés) :

“Dix ans étant révolus (?), il advint (?) que notre seigneur Priyadarsî le roi se fit l’instaurateur de la Vérité.

“Depuis lors le mal a diminué pour tous les hommes, et toutes les infortunes (?), il les a fait disparaître ; et sur toute la terre (il y a) paix (et joie).”

“Et, en outre, (il y a) ceci en ce qui concerne la nourriture : pour notre seigneur le roi on (ne) tue (que) peu d’animaux) ; en voyant cela, tous les hommes ont cessé (de tuer des animaux) ; même (?) ceux qui prennent les poissons (= les pêcheurs), ces hommes-là sont l’objet d’une interdiction.

“Pareillement, ceux qui étaient sans frein, ceux-là ont cessé d’être sans frein.

“Et (règne) l’obéissance à sa mère et à son père et aux gens âgés conformément aux obligations qu’a imposées à chacun le sort.

“Et il n’y a pas de Jugement pour tous les hommes pieux. Cela (=la pratique de la Loi) a été profitable pour tous les hommes et sera encore profitable.”

Si l’on compare le texte grec et le texte araméen, il est aisé de constater qu’on se trouve en présence de deux recensions distinctes, assez étroitement parallèles, mais indépendantes l’une de l’autre. La recension araméenne, un peu plus longue, se montre plus proche du texte indien qui doit avoir servi de modèle tant au scribe grec qu’au scribe araméen. Le scribe grec, pour sa part, tout en respectant l’ordre des divers paragraphes du modèle et le contenu essentiel de chacun d’eux, a très sensiblement adapté ce modèle, de façon à rendre la déclaration d’Asoka plus intelligible aux membres de la colonie grecque de la province de Kandahar (cette ville est peut-être à identifier avec l’Alexandrie d’Arachosie), et il a donné au style, aux expressions et même aux idées un coloris hellénique tout à fait marqué. Quant au scribe araméen, dont la recension était destinée à la population iranienne habitant la région – probablement les Kambojas, adeptes du mazdéisme –, il est vraisemblable qu’il a également adapté le message d’Asoka, bien qu’à un moindre degré que le scribe grec, aux conceptions religieuses de ceux auxquels il l’adressait.

Pour le démontrer, esquissons un bref parallèle entre les deux recensions.


Les “dix ans” dont il est question dans les deux recensions font manifestement allusion à la conversion du roi, point de départ de ses mesures réformatrices ; rappelons le passage suivant de l’une des inscriptions indiennes d’Asoka : “Or, le roi ami des dieux au regard amical, dix ans après son sacre, est parti pour l’illumination. Dès lors, quand il y a tournée de la Loi, il se passe ceci . . . .” Il est
remarquable que, là où le grec dit "la Piété" (eusebía), l'araméen porte "la Vérité" (qasîdî); ces deux mots transcrivent vraisemblablement l'un et l'autre l'idée indienne de la Loi (dhamma), mais en la transposant respectivement sur le plan de l'hellénisme et celui du mazdéisme.

Deuxième phrase. Grec: "Et depuis lors il a rendu les hommes plus pieux, et tout prospère sur toute la terre." - Araméen: "Depuis lors maladie ? a diminué pour tous les hommes, et toutes les infortunes (?), il les a fait disparaître; et sur toute la terre (il y a) paix (et) joie."

Le parallélisme des deux recensions est manifeste; mais, tandis que la recension grecque est d'un tour très général, la recension araméenne rappelle de près certains passages des inscriptions indiennes d'Asoka, par exemple celui-ci: 

"Partout le roi ami des dieux au regard amical a institué les deux secours médicaux, secours pour les hommes, secours pour les bêtes. Les plantes médicinales utiles aux hommes et celles utiles aux bêtes, là où elles manquent, ont été partout envoyées et plantées. Racines et fruits, partout où ils manquent, ont été envoyés et plantés. Etc." D'autre part, l'inscription araméenne avec l'expression "tous les hommes", accentue plus clairement que l'inscription grecque ("il a rendu les hommes plus pieux"), l'universalisme des tendances réformatrices d'Asoka, universalisme qui caractérise nettement les inscriptions indiennes, ainsi qu'en témoignent, par exemple, les passages suivants: "Car je considère que mon devoir est le bien de tout le monde... Car il n'y a pas d'activité supérieure à faire le bien du monde entier..."; "Tous les hommes sont mes enfants, je désire qu'ils aient tout bien et bonheur dans ce monde et dans l'autre, c'est aussi ce que je désire pour tous les hommes..."

Troisième phrase. Grec: "Et le roi s'abstient des êtres vivants, et les autres hommes et tous les chasseurs et pêcheurs du roi ont cessé de chasser." - Araméen: "Et, en outre, (il y a) ceci en ce qui concerne la nourriture: pour notre seigneur le roi on (ne )tue (que) peu (d'animaux) en voyant cela, tous les hommes ont cessé (de tuer des animaux) même (?) ceux qui prennent les poissons (= les pêcheurs), ces hommes-là sont l'objet d'une interdiction."

Relevons ici que, pour décrire la prescription typique concernant la nourriture, la recension grecque emploie une locution générale de style pythagoricien ("le roi s'abstient des êtres vivants"), tandis que la recension araméenne ("pour notre seigneur le roi on ne tue que peu d'animaux") rappelle avec précision le pittoresque passage que voici dans les inscriptions indiennes d'Asoka: "Aparavart, dans la cuisine du roi,... chaque jour plusieurs centaines de milliers d'animaux étaient tués pour le repas; mais maintenant... on ne tue (pour le repas) que trois animaux: deux paons, une gazelle; et cette gazelle même, pas constamment. Même ces trois animaux ne seront plus tués désormais.

Quatrième phrase. Grec: "Et ceux qui n'étaient pas maîtres d'eux-mêmes ont cessé, dans la mesure de leurs forces, de ne pas se maîtriser." - Araméen: "Pareillement, ceux qui étaient sans frein, ceux-là ont cessé d'être sans frein."

Ces deux phrases sont tout à fait parallèles. Toutefois, les mots katu dūnamī ("autant que possible"), "dans la mesure de leurs forces", sont absents de l'araméen; sans doute ont-ils été ajoutés par le scribe grec qui introduit ainsi dans l'affirmation d'Asoka une note d'indulgence modérée bien conforme à l'esprit grec.

Cinquième phrase. Grec: "Il est aussi devenus obéissants à père et mère et aux gens âgés, à l'inverse de ce qui était le cas précédemment." - Araméen: "Et (règle) l'obéissance à sa mère et à son père et aux gens âgés conformément aux obligations qu'elles imposées à chacun le sort."

On notera ici que le grec porte "père et mère", alors que l'araméen, conformément à l'expression indienne, invente en disant: "sa mère et son père." En outre, la fin de la phrase, dans les deux recensions, est toute différente: au lieu de para ta protēron "contrairement à la situation antérieure," "à l'inverse de ce qui était le cas précédemment," l'araméen porte: "conformément aux obligations qu'elles imposées à chacun le sort," ce qui rappelle ce passage des inscriptions indiennes: "Il faut obéir à ses mère et père... Pour la famille se comporter à son égard comme il convient selon la règle antique..."; mais l'idée se trouve transposée sur le plan du mazdéisme par l'introduction de l'idée du sort, du Destin.

Sixième phrase. Grec: "Et désormais, en agissant ainsi, ils vivront de façon meilleure et plus profitable en tout." - Araméen: "Et il n'y a pas de Jugement pour tous les hommes pieux. Cela (= la pratique de la Loi) a été profitable pour tous les hommes et sera encore profitable."

Tandis que, pour conclure, la recension grecque n’a qu’une seule phrase, d’un tour général, la recension araméenne juxtapose deux propositions qui possèdent sans doute entre elles un lien logique; la première veut dire vraisemblablement que "tous les hommes pieux", c'est-à-dire ceux qui vivent conformément au dhamma, échappent et échapperont au Jugement divin, entendons au jugement de condamnation, au châtiment divin, - ce mot de Jugement semblant
emprunté à la terminologie mazdéenne ; la seconde proposition, procla-
mant l’utilité passée et future de la Loi, est d’un tour qui rappelle typi-
quement les inscriptions indiennes, par exemple : “Cette pratique de
la Loi a grandi et grandira encore grâce au roi ami des dieux au regard
amical ; les fils, petits-fils et arrière-petits-fils du roi … feront encore
grandir cette Loi jusqu’à la fin de ce monde . . . .”

Ainsi recension grecque et recension araméenne sont toutes deux
des adaptations du même modèle indien destinées respectivement aux
colons grecs et à la population iranienne de la province de Kandahar.
Observons qu’un tel souci d’adaptation a été relevé dans les inscriptions
indiennes elles-mêmes, celles qu’Asoka a fait graver à l’adresse des
diverses populations indiennes de son empire ; ainsi que l’a très
justement expliqué l’indianiste Jules Bloch, “pour que les populations
indiennes si éloignées les unes des autres qu’elles ne se comprennent
pas encore à notre époque puissent recevoir sans trop d’effort ses
déclarations et ses ordres, Asoka fait adapter son texte original aux
habitudes des diverses provinces – suivant en cela le précepte du
Bouddha lui-même…. Une certaine liberté laissée aux traducteurs
témoigne qu’ils n’ont pas été abusivement prisonniers de l’original.”
Notre bilingue de Kandahar atteste doublement cette préoccupation
inspirée par un zèle ardent de propagandiste.

La découverte d’une inscription nouvelle d’Asoka, où se trouve
rappelé l’événement capital de sa conversion et où sont signalés
quelques-uns des principaux articles de la Loi dont ce roi s’était fait
l’ardent propagateur, quel heureux événement pour les historiens de
l’Inde et ceux de la religion bouddhique !

Pour les hellénistes, qui s’étonnaient que l’Afghanistan et le Panjab
n’aient pas encore livré une seule inscription grecque alors qu’on con-
naissait la présence dans ces deux contrées, aux IIIe et IIe siècles avant
l’ère chrétienne, d’une colonie grecque importante, l’inscription de
Kandahar constitue, comme l’a dit le Professeur Louis Robert, “un des
joys de l’épigraphie grecque, par son caractère unique et sa place à
la charnière de deux civilisations si différentes.”

Quant aux aramaïsants, la nouvelle inscription d’Asoka leur ap-
porte un magnifique témoignage de la diffusion de l’araméen jusque
dans les satrapies les plus orientales de l’empire achéménide et de sa
permanence dans les mêmes régions. Les inscriptions de Taxila et
de Pul-i-Darunteh, antérieurement connues, avaient justement retenu
l’attention des spécialistes ; mais elles étaient toutes deux fragmentaires
et l’on n’y pouvait lire une seule phrase entière. L’inscription
araméenne de Kandahar, au contraire, intégralement conservée, et
dont l’interprétation reçoit du texte grec parallèle une aide considérable,
est un document d’une valeur exceptionnelle pour la connaissance
de la koiné araméenne au IIIe siècle avant J.-C.

La bilingue d’Asoka sera publiée dans le prochain fascicule du
Journal Asiatique (Tome CCXLVI, 1958, p. 1-48, et cinq planches hors-
texte) sous les signatures des Professeurs D. Schlumberger, L. Robert,
A. Dupont-Sommer et E. Benveniste.
UNIVERSAL ELEMENTS IN
MAHAYANIST THOUGHT

BY

CLARENCE H. HAMILTON

In today's world, the religions of formerly separated culture areas are brought into closer contacts and interchange within a context of problems that are world-wide. For research this tends to pose two questions. 1. What are the actual facts of a given religion within its historical environment? 2. What elements of its traditions may be regarded as having universal value?

The concern of the present paper is with the second of these questions, conducting the inquiry in the field of Buddhism and limiting it to the area of Mahāyānist thought, with which as a student of philosophy the writer happens to be more closely familiar. Historically, the Mahāyānist tendency is itself a movement in the direction of universality, emerging in the midst of the eighteen schools of teaching which developed in India during the two centuries following the death of Emperor Aśoka in 237 B.C. It manifested a readily adaptive character which enabled it to spread to lands northward and eastward in Asia. In this paper it is our task to examine basic concepts germane to this movement for, to intellectuals at least, these have conveyed its widest meaning.

Inquiry in this field naturally begins with the concepts of the bodhisattva, for this represents the ideal man as envisaged in Mahāyāna Buddhism. The word itself is older than the rise of the Mahāyāna, for we find it in early Theravāda teachings. In the Pāli texts it refers chiefly to Śākyamuni in previous lives when on the way to enlightenment, but before his actual arrival at the goal.1) He is a bodhisattva, as were all previous buddhas in their preliminary stages. In another early school, however, namely the Sarvāstivādin, a wider connotation of the term appears. The principal text of this school is the Jāhana-prasthāna, which Junjiro Takakusu assigns to about 200 B.C.3) Numerous commentaries followed this text. At some time in the fourth or fifth century A.D. the philosopher Vasubandhu wrote his famous compendium of Sarvāstivādin teachings known as the Abhidharma-kosa.4)

an ordered summation of the accumulated reflections of the school down to his time. He there states the generalized conception of the bodhisattva which emerged as follows:

The bodhisattvas seek for enlightenment .... (and) undertake infinite labor for the good of others because they want to become capable of pulling others out of this flood of suffering. But what personal benefit do they find in the benefit of others? The benefit of others is their own benefit because they desire it .... Growing in pitying solicitude for others they are ready to suffer a thousand pains for this solicitude.33)

While the Sarvāstivādin school is regarded as belonging to the Mahāyāna division of Buddhism, this bodhisattva conception points definitely toward the Mahāyāna development. Yet in the Abhidharma-kosa itself it is not particularly emphasized over two other ways of seeking enlightenment. Equally recognized is the way of the arhat disciplining himself for entering nirvāna, and the way of the pratyeka-buddha, or solitary buddha, who cultivates a species of private enlightenment without concern to teach and save others.

In Mahāyāna literature proper, however, there is a decided change. In such scriptures as the Saddharma-pundarka, the Bodhisattva-bhumi and others we find that the way of the bodhisattva who vows to devote himself to the deliverance and happiness of others is regarded as definitely superior to either the path to nirvāna or the way of cultivating solitary enlightenment. These latter are considered as disciplines belonging to lower stages of spiritual advance. Their concern is individualistic and particular, not altruistic and universal as is that of the bodhisattva.4) In the Prajñā-pāramitā, or Perfection of Wisdom, literature the reason for this is clearly given. Both the arhats and the pratyeka-buddhas make up their minds that

One single self we shall tame, one single self we shall pacify, one single self we shall lead to final nirvāna.5)

The bodhisattva, on the other hand, says that he “will lead to nirvāna the whole immeasurable world of beings.”6) The range of concern here is co-extensive, not merely with the human race, but with the entire realm of suffering sentient beings. It is an altruism that is universal in scope, forming an essential part of devotion to an ultimate goal.

Universality in breadth of concern, however, is not the only dimension of a bodhisattva's character. There is also a dimension in depth. This is observable in his motivation. Endowed with wise insight, he surveys the countless beings in all their forms of suffering,
In the *Ashtasāhasrikā* it is said,

He sees all beings as on the way to their slaughter. Great compassion thereby takes hold of him.\(^3\)

Compassion (karuṇā) as the fundamental motive in religious life holds a unique place in Mahāyāna thought. In Theravāda teaching, while compassion is indeed one of the virtues to be cultivated, it is not so central. Buddhaghosa, the great commentator, lists it as one of the four sublime states belonging to the forty subjects for meditation.\(^4\) But as these meditations are all instrumental to developing the individual disciple, the significance is neither so basic nor so intense. In Mahāyāna doctrine, however, compassion is an original and pervasive force. It takes hold of the sensitive individual when he gains a full view of the world’s suffering. It arouses in him the desire to win full enlightenment, wisdom in the endeavor to emancipate sufferers from their misery. It motivates all his labors through the whole of his career. It is the bodhisattva’s guiding star. It sustains him on the way to enlightenment and remains with him after his enlightenment. It is the source of his original vow to become enlightened for the sake of others. All this is abundantly shown in Har Dayal’s noted study, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine*.\(^5\) Compassion is the universal motive in the great Mahāyāna Sūtras, the Prajñā-ārāmatā literature, and the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra philosophies.

As an untrained original impulse, however, compassion is not enough. Very understandably, the Mahāyāna teachers linked it closely with the necessity for true knowledge and perfect wisdom. If devotion to the welfare of others is to be effective, that follows. This is especially noticeable in the Perfection of Wisdom scriptures. Although the method of exposition here reflects habits of thought unfamiliar to the modern mind, the point is repeatedly made that the cultivation of highest wisdom removes the darkness of ignorance, clears the mind of defilements and wrong views, and leads beings into paths of right conduct. Stated in these general terms, we may recognize a broad principle to which thoughtful persons concerned for the good of mankind everywhere would assent. Universal compassion calls for universal wisdom for its implementation in action, whether it is believed that man in his finitude can ever achieve it or not. In Buddhist faith, of course, the possibility of such achievement is taken for granted, although the bodhisattva at the time of arrival at his goal is practically a transcendent being, one with universal truth itself.

On the way to the goal, however, there are virtues to be cultivated. The larger Prajñā-ārāmatā texts devote considerable space to

analyzing six of these in particular.\(^6\) They are the six paramātā, or perfections. One devoted to universal welfare practises them. He learns the art of giving, wisely and unselfishly, sharing both material and spiritual possessions with others. He observes the recognized ten precepts of morality by abstaining from taking life, from taking what is not given, from wrong sensual pleasures, from intoxicants that cloud the mind, from lying, malicious, harsh or frivolous speech, from covetousness, ill-will, and wrong views. He practises patience in the midst of great provocation, having no ill-will or desire to harm. He exerts himself with vigor, not for the sake of a limited number of beings, but for all. He seeks to perfect himself in the art of concentration or meditation, whereby to be calm in the midst of the agitations of the world. Above all, he seeks after the perfection of wisdom, for that, it is said, “controls, guides and leads the (other) five perfections.”\(^7\) Perfect wisdom thus imparts skill in the means employed in all efforts to deliver others from their ignorance and suffering.

For furnishing examples of these ethical qualities, the Mahāyāna teachers had recourse to stories, legends and allegories which on the surface appear imaginative and unrealistic. This is true, as Har Dayal has shown, for even such parables as we find in the Lotus Scripture. However, disentangling principles from their literary forms of expression, we find precepts which would not meet serious dissent any where. Wise giving is still a recognized good, even if not easy to achieve. So are unselfishness, refraining from killing and injury, from wrong indulgences and careless speech. Compassion, patience, vigor, the undistracted mind, and wisdom in seeking ways to serve the good of all are unquestioned values to minds not clouded by ignorance or egocentric preoccupation. In all this, Mahāyānist thought presents ethical qualities that are universal for the enlightened consciousness of mankind.

So far we have dealt with universality in the ethics of a bodhisattva’s career. When we turn to the field of systematic philosophy we come to universality in a more metaphysical sense. Both the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra (or Viśñavādā) philosophies are concerned to indicate finally true and abiding reality. The position of the first is centered in the concept of Voidness (or Śūnyatā); that of the second in the concept of consciousness (viśīṣṭa or viśīṣṭa). We shall examine each of these for the character of its universal intent. Then, for a conception of reality as the total universe in all its complex inter-relations, we shall turn to the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* (Chinese Hua Yen, Japanese Kegon Scripture) as understood in China and Japan.
In his recent admirable study of Mādhyamika thought, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Mr. T.R.V. Murti of India has been at pains to analyze and state the significance of Voidness (Śūnyatā) as a name for the Absolute. It is well known that in the Prajñā-paramitā scriptures on which the philosophy of Nāgārjuna is based, twenty aspects or modes of Śūnyatā are recognized and enumerated. These refer to various kinds of mental states, the various categories and doctrines of early Buddhism, and lastly to the concept of Voidness itself. The judgment with reference to all these, however, is that they are unreal. This is made in the interest of the intuition that ultimate reality is inexpressible, always beyond apprehensible in the relative experience of conditioned beings. Nāgārjuna has the same interest in his systematic application of a dialectical critical method to all concepts and intimations from any source whatsoever. One notes a universality here, but it is a universality of negation for the whole world of relative particulars and conceptions. Even Voidness as a concept is labeled empty and unreal, Śūnyatā may be the highest stabile concept we can frame, but it is not to be confused with absolute reality such as it is in itself. In the world of interdependent entities and concepts as we know them, everything is relative and in an absolute sense unreal. Such ideas as causality, motion and rest, constituent elements of things, self-substance, space, time, nirvāṇa, buddha, path of salvation etc., while provisionally useful in teaching, are yet full of contradictions when tested in the fires of Nāgārjuna’s dialectical method. Hence their rejection. They are not ultimately real and true. What is universally true of all discriminating things, of all intellectual constructions, is that they are veiled, superficial appearances only.

The outcome of such universality in negation reminds one of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s observation about all philosophical propositions, including his own: 

One must surmount these propositions when he sees the world rightly. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. For Nāgārjuna, however, recognition of the universal emptiness of all empirical determinations is, paradoxically enough, an awakening to what is absolutely indeterminate. Involved here is a positive universality, the insight common to all enlightened ones, or buddhas. This is insight into reality as it truly is. Since it cannot be stated in relative terms without distortion, however, the universal vision of those whose wisdom is perfected is best left undiscussed. To all metaphysical questioning, silence is the appropriate response. Nevertheless, conviction is strong that absolute reality is there to be realized, without words or expressive concepts.

In passing we may remark that recognition of an ineffable intuition of final reality is not unknown in Western thought. We notice it in the traditions of Neo-Platonism, Negative Theology, Meister Eckhart and the greater mysteries generally, though terms indicating it are different.

Returning to Mahāyāna thought, we next consider the form of universality characteristic of the Yogācāra or Idealist school. The central doctrine of this school is expressed in Sanskrit as viśṇumārtā or viśṇuprākāśa, in Chinese as wei-shih, in Japanese as yui-shiki. Here the thought is that ultimate reality is consciousness, and consciousness only. All discriminated entities are regarded as mental events within an all-embracing receptacle consciousness, the ālaya-vijñāna. Here are contained the results of all past actions as well as the seeds or potentialities of all future actions. In developing the Idealist position, thinkers of this school have used a number of special terms. The universal consciousness, in respect to its content is called the ideation-store consciousness, as in the the Sāṃskāramātr. (See Takakusu: Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 83) The philosopher Vasubandhu, conducting a polemic against extra-mental objects in his Treatise in twenty Stanzas (Vimśatikā) argues that they are mere ideations, seeming representations, mental constructs only. In the Dharma-lakṣana school, which expounds Vasubandhu’s thought, distinction is made between the specific characters of things as they emerge in consciousness and their ultimate universal nature which is pure consciousness in itself.

Although homogeneous, this pure consciousness in its movement, gives rise to a variety of forms, just as a homogeneous body of water, when in motion, gives rise to a variety of waves on its surface. Hence there develops in universal consciousness the subject-object awareness, the five senses with their corresponding sense objects, and a sixth or intellective consciousness which perceives intelligible objects within the world of sense. Thus through an eight-fold functioning of consciousness arises the total world of discriminated entities with which we are familiar in ordinary experience. All these entities, however, are to be regarded only as aspects of consciousness. They are developments from and within itself. There are no extra-mental objects serving as their source. The all-embracing consciousness, (ālaya-vijñāna) is like an ever-flowing stream, neither permanent nor discontinuous. It is a homogeneous movement, “a current,” says Vasubandhu, “continuous as the surge of a river.” Its multifarious waves arise and
Perish momentarily under whatever causal conditions, but as bearer of them it is the basic, enduring reality.

Detailed expositions of this idealism are given in commentaries on the works of Asanga and Vasubandhu, especially in Hsüan Tsang's notable synthesis, the *Ch'eng Wei-si-shih Lun*. In the West we are indebted to the labors of scholars such as Sylvain Lévi and Louis de La Vallée Poussin who have given us valuable translations, and to Jiryo Masuda, Junjiro Takakusu, and D.T. Suzuki who have demonstrated the wide perspectives of the subject. Full expositions show how the universal underlying consciousness unfolds through its own activity into one hundred elements of existence with all their distinguishing characteristics. In terms of these latter we are given to understand the immense variety of the world of experience. It is colorful and full of seeming objectivity, but in final analysis it consists of ideations (vijnaptis), or mental representation only, which are modifications, so to speak of one ultimate nature. This ultimate true nature of all things is eternal, unchanging, ineffable. Known only to enlightened ones or buddhas as it truly is, it is called Tathātā, Suchness or the Truly So. One universal being, then, is in everything, the basic, all-sustaining all-embracing consciousness. In itself it is pure, but as known through its aspects it is stained by deceiving appearances and passions in the experience of all who are not yet awakened to the truth. To cease viewing these deceiving appearances as final and to perceive through them what is ultimately real and true is the great desideratum. Deliverance is thus a movement of thought from defilement to purity, or as Susumu Yamaguchi has put it, "the movement of fundamental consciousness from the state of erroneous consciousness to the state of awakened intelligence." Jiryo Masuda has effectively shown how this metaphysical idealism provides foundation for a theory of deliverance. The end result is not knowledge as an intellectual achievement, but supreme illumination of a Buddha, one who is aware of reality as it truly is.

The universality involved in this outcome is evidently the universality of mystical insight. Aspiration is directed to ultimate truth, but this can be indicated only approximately through expressions concepts and symbols. Even the philosophy of universal consciousness is a limited instrument. It is not the only interpretation of the universe known to mankind, but to Buddhists of the Yogācāra school it is the one best suited to purify the mind of whatever veils ultimate vision. By showing that all things proceed from mind through developing a duality of subject and object, with all subsidiary distinctions, it points to a transcendence of subject and object incoalescence with reality itself. In exalting such a goal the Yogācāra philosophers agree with the mystics of all times and cultures. They accord also with the old tradition that the great awakening of the Buddha was to what is absolutely and perfectly true.

Mystical insight, while universal for all mystics, however, is subject to this limitation: it is a privilege open only to persons with a special capacity. Louis de La Vallée Poussin has pointed out that the Buddhist idealists, in many of their sources, admitted that in one class of persons (agotarakas, icchāntikas) such capacity is entirely lacking. It is not until we come to doctrines of the Avatamsaka (the Hua-yen, or Kegon) school that we find universality in its fullest extent. Here it is arrived at, not by separating a realm of absolute reality from a realm of empty apparent aspects, nor by exalting pure consciousness in itself as against illusory extra-mental objects, but by recognizing a complete interpenetration of all realms, a total universe in which interdependence is everywhere, and each element is both effect of and cooperating cause of all the rest. This total universe (Dharma-dhātu) is One. Reality is one with all its manifestations. The Chinese expositor Pa-tsang (643-712), in a famous essay, compared it to a lion made of gold.

If we look at the lion as a lion only, without gold, then the lion is prominent while the gold becomes obscure. But if we look at the gold as gold only, without the lion, then the gold is prominent while the lion becomes obscure. Whereas if we consider both of them together, they are then both equally prominent and equally obscure. Obscure they are hidden; prominent they are displayed. This is called the theory of hidden-and-displayed co-relation.

In other words, reality is one with all phenomena, universally and equally present through all of them.

Perception of this universal, interdependent, interpenetration of all things within one reality is the meaning of Enlightenment for the Hua-yen or Kegon school. It involves recognition of the fact that everyone, in common with all, possesses the true nature of things, or Buddha-nature as it is called, and needs only to awaken to the fact. Here the possibility of deliverance is universal, and there is faith that all mortals, not just a spiritual elite may awaken to the truth. Furthermore, they who as buddhas or bodhisattvas share this great wisdom are thought to be moved to universal compassion and help for all other beings who live and suffer. As is said in the *Avatamsaka*...
Sûtra itself, their dwelling

is the abode of those who, being devoted to the salvation of the world, do not relax their efforts for countless ages to bring one being to maturity, and would do so with the entire world as one being. 23

In the Avatâmasaka Sûtra this universal insight is expressed through an abundance of imagery suggesting light and harmony. All things are inter-related and interfused, each shining by its own light, yet reflecting all the rest. Rightly seen, all beings in mutual interdependence and mutual support should make up the harmony of the total universe. The lesson seems to be: we live together in one world; all rightful effort should be cooperative and constructive for the good of all. Where such is not achieved, the world of all the living has not yet realized its full potentiality.

In this paper the purpose has been to detect and state elements of universality in Mahâyânist thought that are suggestive of values worthy of consideration in general reflective thinking today. Beginning with the ethical values in the bodhisattva conception, we have noted the ideal of unbounded altruism appearing in Sarvâsûtanâdin literature, the underlying motive of compassion, fully recognized in the Prajnâ-pâramîtâ and later Mahâyânist literature, together with the six perfections of virtue in giving, morality, patience, vigor, concentration, and wisdom, all of which are principles having enduring worth and relevance.

In the systematically reasoned philosophies we have examined metaphysical concepts. In the Mâdhyamika system we noted emphasis on the inexpressible, supra-rational character of the Absolute by means of a method of universal negation for all particular apprehensions in the world of conditioned beings. Idealistic metaphysics we observed in the Vijñânavâda philosophy, which finds in pure or fundamental consciousness the absolute reality from which all phenomena evolve. The proposition that “all is consciousness-only” paves the way to mystical realization in the Yogâcâra school. This experience, however, we saw not to be universal since it is held that there are those innately lacking in this capacity.

Finally, we noted the universality characteristic of the Avatâmasaka, or Kegon philosophy. Here the ultimate world is conceived as one in which there is complete interpenetration and interfusion of all realms—of noumenon and phenomena, of principle and elements of existence—and in which all things are interdependent and mutually originating, while all beings partake of the Buddha-nature and are hence capable of enlightenment.

Conclusion: All of these elements of universality in Mahâyânist thought present valuable data from the history of Buddhist reflective experience. The broad principles and perspectives they offer in both ethical and metaphysical fields are suggestive for any thoughtful consideration of the associated higher life of man.

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6) Iden., p. 33


10) Cf. Conze: op. cit., pp. 62–74. Also Har Dayal, Ch. V.


16) The Chinese version of Vasubandhu’s Vijñâtapratimârâsuk, Trimsâkhâ, with ten combined commentaries. This is the work translated into French as indicated in Note 15.


19) Susumu Yamaguchi: Ch. 4 on “Development of Mahâyânâ
BELIEFS,” in The Path of the Buddha, edited by Kenneth W. Morgan. New
21) La Vallée Poussin: Viśṇu-piṭhamātāsaiddhi. Tome II, 1929. PP.

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22) From the Gandavyūha section of the Avatamsaka Sūtra as translated
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CONCERNING THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER
OF JAPANESE BUDDHISM

BY
SHINSHO HANAYAMA

I would like to consider five major traits which, I believe, serve
to define the general character of Japanese Buddhism.

1) First, I wish to affirm that Ekayāna Buddhism which teaches
that all men are essentially the same and are endowed with equal
aptitudes to become Buddhas is fundamental and basic to the whole
of Japanese Buddhism.

A look at the history of Buddhism reveals that after the death
of its founder, Śākyamuni Buddha, Buddhism gradually became
stagnant and highly formal; it had succeeded in preserving the external
form but at the expense of inner content. At this critical stage, the
school of philosophy known as Mahāyāna arose and it attempted to
revive the original spirit of Buddhism by interpreting and understanding
Buddhism on the basis of a much freer and liberal standpoint.
Because of the nature of its position, Mahāyāna Buddhism was critical of
the traditional or conservative school of thought known as Hinayāna
or Theravāda, which, it asserted, had failed to retain the essence of
Śākyamuni Buddha’s teaching. Maintaining two antithetical
approaches to Buddhism, these two great schools of thought found
themselves existing in opposition to each other, and eventually, there
were some who questioned the truth or validity of a Buddhism,
Mahāyāna or Theravāda, which fostered such a division.

The investigation into this problem led to the formation of
Ekayāna Buddhist thought which attempted to resolve the conflict
by stating that all men were absolutely equal and would achieve their
deliverance through Ekayāna or the single vehicle. Ekayāna Buddhism
found expression in such works as the “Śaddhārma-Puṇḍarīka-Sūtra”,
the “Avatāṃsaka-Sūtra”, “Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra”, “Sūrīnā-Sūtra”
and the “Sukhāvatt-vyūha-Sūtra.” For instance the “Śaddhārma-
Puṇḍarīka-Sūtra,” which is sometimes referred to as “The Lotus of the
True Law”, states that “within True Buddhism, there can be no distinc-
tion between Theravāda and Mahāyāna; furthermore, the three vehicles

(685)
which would deliver man – the śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, and the bodhisattva – must also be considered invalid. The ultimate purpose of Śākyamuni Buddha was to teach that all men were absolutely equal within Ekāyāna Buddhism.”

Due to the efforts of such great translators as Lokārakṣa Sangavarmā, Dharmarākṣa, Kumārajiva, BuddhāBADra, Guṇabhadra, these sūtras were rendered into Chinese, and by the fifth century, Ekāyāna Buddhism was firmly implanted in Chinese Buddhist thought.

The initial transmission of this philosophy from China to Japan in the beginning of the seventh century was largely the work of Prince Shōtoku (A.D. 573–622), the author of a learned commentary on three sūtras – the “Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka,” “Āśāmīṭa” and “Vimalakīrti” sūtras. The commentary, which is written in Chinese characters, is composed of eight volumes and is considered the oldest literary work in the history of Japanese letters. The four-volume commentary on the “Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka-Sūtra”, reputed to have been personally written by the Prince, is still extant as one of the private possessions of the Emperor of Japan.

A reading of the commentaries reveals that the fundamental philosophy common to the three works is Ekāyāna Buddhism, which has remained as the undercurrent flowing through the diverse sects of Japanese Buddhism. Such sects as Kegon, Tendai, Shingon, Jōdo, Zen and Nichiren all share this common trait. (confer page 641)

(2) Next, I wish to comment upon the practice of Mahāyāna Buddhism of always searching for the meaning, intent, and spirit of the Teaching rather than emphasizing strict adherence to formal precepts and rules. This, of course, is significant in this context because Japanese Buddhism has developed in and through Mahāyāna thought.

Originally, Buddhism maintained that the three pursuits, that is, the three paths of the spiritual practices of discipline, meditation, and wisdom, must be faithfully performed as a necessary procedure for reaching enlightenment from a state of ignorance. For the ordinary man, the five disciplines which prohibited killing, stealing, adultery, falsehood, and drinking were set forth, and for the monks devoting their full time to religious practice, a more detailed discipline of two hundred and fifty precepts was formulated.

These disciplines were primarily intended to control man’s outward actions; in order, therefore, to discipline the inner man, the mind, the practice of meditation or dhyāna was established. At the moment in which inward, spiritual unity was achieved, the third of the three disciplines, namely wisdom or jñāna, was said to manifest itself.

In contrast to the teaching which emphasized these rules and precepts, Mahāyāna Buddhism sought to grasp the essence or truth inherent in the disciplines. It stressed the importance of man’s will rather than physical action; in other words, it placed greater weight on inner motivation.

In Japan of the early Heian Period (A.D. 794–1185), Saichō, or more fully Dengyō Daishi, asserted that those who practised meditation and wisdom according to Mahāyāna Buddhism should also practise discipline as taught in that particular school. Discipline in Mahāyāna Buddhism is most clearly defined in such works as the Brahmajāla-Sūtra, which lists ten Major Disciplines and forty eight Minor Disciplines. Following Saichō, the later founders of the various schools of Buddhism in Japan discarded the form of discipline traditional in Theravāda Buddhism and adhered solely to the practice of discipline as taught in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Consequently, the figure of the bhikṣu-priests, so familiar in the countries of Southeast Asia, disappeared from the Japanese scene, and the temples in Japan were all placed in the hands of bodhisattva-priests.

This characteristic of placing emphasis on the intent or spirit of the Three Pursuits of discipline, meditation, and wisdom while emphasizing rules and maxims can be seen in the three sects of Jōdo-shinshū, Zen-shū, and Nichiren-shū.

The sect known as Jōdo-shinshū, which claims fifteen million followers, is the largest sect in Japan. Its founder, Shinran (Kamakura Period: 1192–1232), after a period of deep spiritual reflection concluded that any true and meaningful practice of discipline, meditation, and wisdom was far beyond the nature and ability of man. Shinran taught that these three pursuits, which were intended for man, had already been consummated and practised to perfection by Amita Buddha. And finally, Shinran preached that man should rely absolutely on the Other Power, that is, Amita Buddha, who, because of His infinite compassion, gives to man all the merits which He had acquired through the practice of the Three Pursuits. In Zen Buddhism the act of sitting in meditation, called “zazen” in Japanese, was said to include the other two pursuits of discipline and wisdom. In Nichiren-shū, it is believed that the Three Pursuits are embraced within the words “nammyō-hō-ren-ge-kyō”, which is derived from the title of the “Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka-Sūtra”, the recitation, therefore, of the words “nammyō-hō-ren-ge-kyō” is their way of practising the Three Pursuits. In this manner the practice of discipline, meditation and wisdom are present in Japanese Buddhism, but are neither clearly defined nor practised as
distinct and separate paths.

(3) Within the tolerant framework of Japanese Buddhism based on Ekayāna Buddhist thought with its emphasis on the absolute equality of man and its proportionate emphasis on the meaning and spirit of the Teaching, the discrimination between the saint and the common ordinary man, priest and lay man, male and female gradually disappeared. This resulted in the formation of a Buddhism which more than ever, came to be closely identified with the life of the common people.

Originally, a man intent on attaining eventual enlightenment became a bhikṣu and joined the sangha. He forsook all family life and, following the example set by Śākyamuni Buddha, he entered the mountain-forests to meditate in seclusion. Abandoning such extreme practices which necessarily disrupted normal life, Japanese Buddhism attempted to bring itself into a closer relationship with the ordinary man and the problems of his everyday life. Two of the men whom I would like to consider in relation with this evolution are Prince Shōtoku and Hōnen.

The primary figure in the movement to spread Buddhism among the Japanese people was Prince Shōtoku, who served as Prince Regent during the reign of his aunt, Empress Suiko. The philosophy or the Buddhist view of Prince Shōtoku was mainly shaped by three sūtras—the “Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka”, the “Vimalakirti” and the “Śrīmālā” sūtras. His conclusions that fundamentally all men were equal and that Buddhism should serve as the basis for peace and harmony within the life of the individual as well as within the Japanese nation we were derived from these sūtras.

The “Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka-Sūtra” teaches that the various acts performed during the course of man’s daily life by himself constituted the path toward enlightenment. In other words, the idea of pursuing a special life for the sake of enlightenment is discarded. The “Vimalakirti-Sūtra” praises the life of a bodhisattva who is, at the same time, a layman. The “Śrīmālā-Sūtra” teaches that the fundamental natures of both men and women are equally pure and without any difference.

Even the monasteries stop Mt. Hiei and Mt. Kōya, which apparently contradict the idea of equality and the assertion that Japanese Buddhism is primarily for the common mass, were not intended for the ascetic. They were first built as places of seclusion from the degenerated priests and their temples in the city of Nara; the ultimate purpose, however, was to cultivate bodhisattva-priests who would be capable of leading and edifying the people. With the subsequent degeneration of these monasteries, Buddhism came down from the mountains and once again entered the city. In this way, Buddhism in Japan slowly changed from a religion primarily intended for the saintly to a religion which had the emancipation of the common man as its objective.

The same movement was reflected in the life of Hōnen, the founder of Jodo-shū or the Sect of the Pure Land as it is called in English. Hōnen, after thirty long years of study and discipline, descended from Mt. Hiei at the age of forty-three in the year A.D. 1175. His act of renunciation resulted from his deep realization that the way of the saint, which required reliance on one’s own power to achieve enlightenment, was incompatible with his own nature and with the nature of the ordinary man. Out of this awareness, Hōnen preached that all men, without discrimination between wise and foolish or good and evil, would be granted deliverance if they would believe in the original vow of Amita Buddha and would utter his name. His religious thought was based on the “Sukhāvatī-Vyūha-Sūtra” and the commentary on this sūtra by the Chinese scholar Shan Tao or Zenjō, in Japanese (A.D. 618–681).

Although such men as Myō-e of Togano-o (A.D. 1173–1232) and Dōgen of Eihei-ji (A.D. 1200–1253) stressed the necessity of maintaining a rigid priestly life, eventually nearly all priests residing in the temples of the various sects were married and lived a life quite similar to the life of the layman. This evolution is based on Ekayāna thought which teaches that all men are equal and without essential differences.

(4) Next, I would like to discuss the views concerning Buddha found in Japanese Buddhism, and the paths it lays down for the attainment of Buddhahood.

At the beginning, the disciples of Śākyamuni Buddha believed that He was unique and that there existed no other Buddhas. The highest stage, therefore, to which they could aspire was Arhathood and not Buddhahood. However, Mahāyāna Buddhism regarded Śākyamuni as one among innumerable Buddhas who covered the whole of the universe and, in point of time, spanned the three periods of past, present, and future. Śākyamuni Buddha was looked upon by Mahāyānists as a Buddha who had manifested himself on this earth.

Among these countless Buddhas, the essential and fundamental Buddha was sought; this gave rise to the three Buddhas known as Dharmakāya, Sambhogakāya, and Nirmanakāya. Śākyamuni Buddha was regarded as a Nirmanakāya or a Buddha who had accomodated...
himself to this world. Furthermore, the Mahāyāna Sūtras described Buddhas such as Amīta Buddha and Vairocana Buddha who were revered as ideal and fundamental beings. They were said to be endowed with eternal life, infinite wisdom, and infinite compassion; they existed as absolute beings transcendent of space and time.

The ultimate objective of the Buddhist is to achieve wisdom through spiritual discipline and thereby, to become one with the Absolute Buddha. Originally, however, this discipline or the process of becoming a Buddha required almost superhuman effort spanning an immeasurable long period of time. Japanese Buddhism affirmed the idea and the logic behind this, but discarded this approach as improbable and conceived of a path more suited towards the capacity of the ordinary man. A path which would lead to a state of oneness in this present existence. This has been the point of departure for nearly all the sects of Buddhism in Japan. Some taught that through meditation one could grasp the identity of the "T" and the absolute; others taught that man could only rely totally on the absolute Buddha for salvation; but whatever the way laid down, these sects of Japanese Buddhism stressed that deliverance could be attained during man's single life time.

(5) Finally, I wish to comment on the relationship between Japanese Buddhism and Japan as a nation. From the time of its acceptance up to the present day, Buddhism has always been closely identified with the welfare of this country. The most concrete expression of this closeness is the Seventeen Article Constitution established by Prince Shōtoku. The second article of this constitution exhorts the Japanese people to rely on Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha. Furthermore, the Hōryūji-temple erected by Prince Shōtoku, the Tōdai-ji temple built by Emperor Shōmu in the latter part of the Nara period, the temples on Mt. Hei and Mt. Kōya dating from the Heian Period were all constructed for the purpose of training priests who would be able to lead the Japanese people toward a better understanding of Buddhist teaching. From the outset, Buddhism was a powerful force in molding the ethical, aesthetic, cultural, and religious life of the Japanese, and in recognition of its value, it was granted the patronage of the government.

Approximately ninety years ago, during the Meiji period, in order to insure fairness, the patronage extended to Buddhism by the state was withdrawn. However, the tradition of Japanese Buddhism—in the emphasis on absolute equality as taught by Ekyō, the attempt always to maintain the spirit rather than the form, and the tendency towards simplification for the sake of the ordinary man—has continued to exist. Japanese Buddhism has sustained the spiritual life of the Japanese people for over a thousand years, and it has become an integral part of their religious consciousness.

Attached is a more complete list of Japanese sects which share the Mahāyāna Buddhist thought: they form the core of Japanese Buddhism.

1. **Kegon-shū**:
   - Chief temple, Tōdaiji in Nara city. Founded in A.D. 740 by Emperor Shōmu.
2. **Tendai-shū**:
   - Chief temple, Enryakuji on Mt. Hiei in Shiga prefecture. Founded in A.D. 805 by Saichō.
3. **Shingon-shū**:
4. **Yūzenbutsu-shū**:
   - Chief temple, Dainenbutsuji in Osaka city. Founded in A.D. 1117 by Ryōnin.
5. **Jōdo-shū**:
   - Chief temple, Chion-in in Kyōto city. Founded in A.D. 1175 by Hōnen.
6. **Jōdoshin-shū**:
   - Chief temples, (East and West) Hongwanji temples in Kyōto city. Founded in A.D. 1224 by Shinran.
7. **Rinzai-shū**:
   - Chief temple, Kenninji in Kyōto city. Founded in 1202 by Eisai.
8. **Sōtō-shū**:
   - Chief temples, Eiheiji in Fukui prefecture and Sōji-ji in Kanagawa prefecture. Founded in A.D. 1244 by Dōgen.
9. **Nichiren-shū**:
10. **Ji-shū**:
    - Chief temple, Shōjōkō-ji in Kanagawa prefecture. Founded in A.D. 1273 by Ippen.
CHRIST IN THE QURAN AND IN MODERN ARABIC LITERATURE

by

ISHAK M. HUSAINI

I

The Quran is the fundamental book which contains the Islamic beliefs and ideals. No other book, in the whole history of Islam, is comparable with the Quran.

The traditions of the Prophet Muhammad which are regarded as a supplement to the Quran do not, by any means, stand on the same footing as the Quran. The main function of the traditions is to explain the doubtful and to expound the brief, but never to add a new element to the Islamic doctrine. It is admitted that the genuine traditions shed light on the life and practices of the Prophet Muhammad, and as such they are, indeed, indispensable. Yet the authentic traditions are like a handful of grain in a heap of Chaff. Further, it is the Quran alone which is considered to be revelation, that is to say, the words of God.

In contrast to the Bible, both the Old and New Testaments, the Quran is the utterances delivered by one single person, the Prophet Muhammad, in his capacity as a Prophet, during a limited period of time (from 610-632 A.D.). Muslim and non-Muslim scholars unanimously agree “that the original form and contents of Muhammad’s discourses were preserved with scrupulous precision.”

It follows, therefore, that the Quran is the only book which contains the Islamic beliefs and principles, and that its authenticity is beyond all doubt.

II

Jesus Christ, or Jesus the son of Mary or the Messiah as the Quran calls him, is the central figure in Christianity. His utterances are the core of the Christian doctrine. He is from the spirit of God

* H.A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism, p. 50.

(Q. IV, 171)* and the word of God. (Q. III, 43) Some scholars find a similarity between the idea of revelation, as conceived by Muslims, and the character of Christ, the word of God, as conceived by Christians.

Not withstanding the fact that Muslims regard Christ as Prophet and Apostle of God, (Q. XIX, 30; LVII, 27) yet he is a prophet of a unique type. He is the only Prophet born from a virgin mother, being from the spirit of God, and thus described in the Quran as “Illustrious in the world and the Hereafter, and one of those brought near unto God.” (Q. III, 43) The late Rev. S.M. Zwemer commented on this verse saying, “If Moslems were willing to admit all that these words imply, it would not be difficult to prove that in this passage of the Koran the person and character of Jesus Christ are superior to those of all other prophets and apostles.” (The Moslem Christ, 1912, p. 38)

It is superfluous to say that Muslims believe wholeheartedly in the words of the Quran, and that they are not allowed to make any discrimination between its verses.

III

What Does the Quran Say about Christ?

Firstly, the Quran relates in detail the miraculous birth of Christ. Mary, Christ’s mother, according to the Quran, has been chosen by God and made pure, and has been preferred above (all) the women of creation. (Q. III, 42) The angels spoke to Mary saying: “O Mary! God giveth thee glad tidings of a word from Him, whose name is the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, illustrious in the world and the Hereafter, and one of those brought near unto God. He will speak unto mankind in his cradle and in his manhood, and he is of the righteous. She said: My Lord! How can I have a child when no mortal hath touched me? He said, So it will be. God createth what He will. If He decreeth a thing, He saith unto it only: Be! and it is.” (Q. III, 43-47)

In another chapter titled “the Chapter of Mary,” details are given regarding the birth of Christ. It asserts his birth from a virgin mother and that God’s spirit spoke to Mary and assured her that God intended to make of Christ a sign (revelation) for mankind and a mercy from Him. (Q. XIX, 21)

Secondly, the Quran advocated the prophecy of Christ and that God has given manifest sign and strengthened him by the Holy

* All Quranic quotations are from “The Meaning of the Glorious Koran,” a Mentor Book
spirit. Each apostle has been favoured by a special favour and has been given a message to communicate to the world. Christ was favoured by the aid of the Holy Spirit and his message was incorporated in the Gospel. The Quran praised the followers of Christ saying that God placed in their hearts kindness and compassion. It reproached those who rejected his message and accused them of arrogance and discrimination. It enjoined Muslims to believe in all the prophets from Abraham to Jesus and to make no distinction between any of them (Chapter V).

Thirdly, the Quran enumerated the miracles of Christ which were signs of his prophecy, such as creating a living bird out of a clay, healing the blind and lapers, bringing the dead to life, knowing what the people eat and store up in their houses, and the bringing down of a table from heaven to be used as a festival. All these miracles Christ produced by the will of God in order to convince those who doubted his mission. (Q. III, 46-49; V, 114-115) It is noteworthy that Muhammad did not attribute miracles to himself. The Quran is his only miracle.

Fourthly, the Quran made a sharp distinction between Christ and Deity. “The Messiah, Jesus the son of Mary, is but the apostle of God and His word, which he cast into Mary, and a spirit from Him; believe then in God and His apostles, and say not ‘Three’. God is only one God….” (Q. IV, 171)

The Quran quoted Jesus of having said: “O Children of Israel! worship God, my Lord and Your Lord.” (Q. V, 117)

It rejected trinity: “They misbelieve who say ‘verily, God is the third of three’, for there is no God but one…” (Q. V, 73)

Consequently, it denied that Christ is a son of God. “God could not take to Himself any son…” (Q. XIX, 35)

A thorough examination of this point reveals that Islam “is distinguished from Christianity, not so much (in spite of all outward appearances) by its repudiation of the trinitarian concept of the unity of God, as by its rejection of the soteriology of Christian doctrine and the relics of the old nature cults which survived in the rites and practices of the Christian Church.” (H.A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism p. 69)

Fifthly, the Quran confirms the view of the Gospel that God raised up Christ unto Himself, (Q. IV, 188) but it rejects the claim of Christ’s enemy that they killed him and crucified him. “They slew him not nor crucified, but it appeared so unto them.” (Q. IV, 187) “They slew him not for certain. But God took him up unto Himself.” (Q. 157-158)

This Quranic statement has been a subject of controversy and interpretation for a long time. There is difference between death and killing. It is possible that they have attempted to put him to death but they failed. According to St. John’s Gospel “one of the soldiers pierced Christ’s side with a spear, and at once there came out blood and water.” (John 19, 34) This proves that he did not die. Again, Christ, according to St. John’s Gospel spoke to Mary Magdalene, after his crucifixion, and informed her that he was ascending to his father, God. (St. John 20, 17)

However, both the Quran and the Gospel agree that “God raised up Christ unto Himself. God was ever Mighty, Wise.” (cf. Q. IV, 158 and St. John 20, 17)

To sum up the Quran (a) Recognizes the virgin birth of Christ (b) Recognizes his miracles, (c) Places him in a higher rank than that of all preceding prophets (d) States that he was supported by the Holy Spirit, (e) Calls him the word of God (f) defends his mission and approaches those who rejected it (g) Supports the New Testament – the Gospel – and that it is the revelation of God (h) confirms his ascension to God.

Could one infer from these eight fundamental principles, in which the two great religions agree, that Islam and Christianity are basically identical, and that the gap between the two communities was widened in later centuries mostly for political reasons?

V

What is the attitude of Muslims in modern times towards Christ? Time does not permit to give a full list of works written by modern Muslims about Christ. It suffices to mention five works written between 1894 and 1958.

Firstly, the prince of Arab poets in our age, the late Ahmad Shawqi 1932, composed a long poem titled “The Great Events in the Nile Valley” which he recited in the Orientalist Congress at Geneva in 1894, of which he dedicated 16 verses in praise of Christ. He said:

1) Kindness, guidance, chivalry and humility were born the day Jesus was born.
2) His coming brightened the world, his light illuminating it.
3) Like the light of dawn flowing through the universe, so did Jesus’ sign flow.
4) Filling the world with light, making the earth shine with its brightness.
5) No threat, no tyranny, no revenge, no sword, no raids, no bloodshed (did he use in his call for the new faith).
6) A king he lived on earth, but wearying of it, substituted heaven for it.
7) To his faith were attracted wise men, humble, submissive, and weak before him.
8) Their submission was followed by the submission of kings, common people and sages.
9) His faith found roots in every land and anchor on every shore.
10) They entered Thapesh, and were cordially met by the wise men of the city.
11) They understood the secret (the core of the new faith); for it is easy for the wise to comprehend the truth.
12) The holy alter became a monastery, a monastery all splendid and brightness.
13) Thapesh, Memphis, the Nile and the plain all became his.
14) Indeed, earth and space are God's; the real kings are the prophets.
15) Theirs (the prophets) is the love of their followers—utmost love and loyalty are theirs.
16) They who deny religions suffer as a result of their denial.

Secondly, four books draw our attention (a) "The Messiah Jesus son of Mary", by the novelist Abd Al-Hamid Judah Al-Sahhar, published in 1962 (b) "An Unjust Town" by the physician Dr. Muhammad Kamal Husayan, published in 1954 (c) "The Genius of Christ" by the distinguished author Abbas Mahmoud Al-Aqaud, published in 1953 (d) "Together on the Road, Muhammad and Jesus" by the Asharite Khalid Muhammad Khalid, published in 1958.

The first two books are written in a form of a novel. The former is a thrilling reproduction of the life of Christ from the beginning of his birth to his ascension to heaven. The facts are drawn from three sources, the Quran, the Bible and historical works, equally. The setting—i.e. the temporal and spatial environment of the events—is provided with minute details; and the life of Christ with its spiritual richness and dignity is depicted by the writer's maximum literary output. Christ's teachings are quoted from the Gospels literally. The author upholds Christ's sermons with great admiration, being "pouring from a heart lit by the love of humanity and enlightened by divine love." (p. 145)

Regarding Christ's relation to God, the author maintains that it is spiritual. He is not the son of God physically, nor God Himself. Christ said that all the prophets are sons of God just as David said. (p. 184) It was the Egyptian monk Origenes who first introduced the notion of Christ's divinity and sonship to God into Christ. (p. 184)

Concerning Christ's crucifixion, the author maintains that he was not crucified. It was Judas Iscariot who was crucified in his place. This view has been held by several sectaries long before Muhammad, such as the Basililians, the Christians and the Corpocrations. (p. 245; cf. George Sale's Translation of the Koran p. 42)

Besides these two controversial points, the author vindicates Christ's teachings incorporated in the Gospels.

The latter book is a profound analysis of Christ's teachings as stated in the Gospels exclusively. The author upholds these teachings with enthusiasm and tries to prove their validity by reason. He holds the view that "conscience" is the essence of humanity (p. 145); that war is not justified except in case of self defence; that believing in abstract and in God is man's main concern (p. 211); that religion should be based on three principles, rejection of idolatry, reciprocal love and avoidance of intense passion (p. 225); that religion should be isolated from worldly interest, that man's prosperity lies in his ability to reconcile his three natures, the sentient, the rational and the spiritual. (p. 239)

The author regards Christ's crucifixion as the greatest crime in the history of human kind. This implies that he believes in the crucifixion (p. 74), but he also believes in Christ's ascension. (p. 75)

It is worthy noting that this book received the state prize (Egypt) in 1957, which points out its literary and scientific accomplishment.

The third book, "The Genius of Christ", is a historical survey of Judaism and Christianity and "a display of the Christian genius in a modern way, a genius which has no parallel in the whole history of the world" (p. 216) because it terminated the religion bigotry which monopolized the guidance of God and His mercy by one single generation. (p. 216)

Christianity, according to the author, is a natural development of the process of religions (p. 89) and the best testimony of its truth is that it came out into view in the proper time, fitting into the need of the age.

The backbone of the doctrine is that man will be completely lost if he owns the world and yet loses himself; and that the heavenly kingdom lies in man's conscience and not in palaces and thrones; and that man is valued by what he keeps in his conscience and by what he thinks of, rather than by what he eats and drinks and what he erects of temples.

The main trait of Christ is that he is the light of the world, the bread of life, the real dignity, the son of God and the son of man. (p.
207) The author maintains that since Christ is from the spirit of God, he is qualified to be called the son of God. (p. 207)

As regards the end of Christ’s life, the author does not give a definite answer, since he is interested in the genius of Christ more than in the historical ending of his life. (p. 216)

The fourth book is an evaluation of the ethical and social principles incorporated in the Bible and the Quran. The author aims at proving that Jesus and his brother Muhammad (p. 70, 114) strove for one common cause, that is to liberate man from tyranny, poverty, social injustice, caste discrimination and similar vices. Both of them stressed love (p. 147), respect of life of all beings, human or non-human (p. 150), humility (p. 158), faithfulness (p. 161), labour (p. 164), peace (p. 166) and mercy.

The author quotes the Bible, the Quran and the traditions of Muhammad equally to advocate “socialism” which he adopts. “Our duty,” he says, “whenever we remember Christ and Muhammad, is to give to our human existence a meaning and a significance, and to discharge our responsibilities towards man and life with full truthfulness and intimate love.” (p. 169)

May I end with two remarks. Firstly, that the favorable attitude of the Quran towards Christ and Christianity determined the attitude of modern Muslim Writers, whose sympathy and love for Christ are diffused through all their works. Secondly, that the bond of contention between the two religions lies in the interpretation of the “symbolism” which occurred in the prophet’s utterances, rather than in the essence of the faith which is found in the New Testament and the Quran in full compatibility.

THE PHENOMENON OF CRITICISM IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

BY

GUSTAV MENSCHING

The history of religious teaches us that criticism has been exercised at many points, by no means only from a standpoint outside of religion, but by religious individuals themselves. Living religion does not therefore, under certain conditions, exclude criticism, but directly compels it. At what is such criticism directed?

In the course of the history of a religion factors arise, which, while indeed being necessary and justified from religious experience, are however conditioned by human attitudes in addition to the encounter with holy reality. These factors, which can become the objects of criticism, are: the myth, holy scriptures, religious doctrines, cult and forms of religious organization.

1. The Myth as the Object of Criticism

One of the earliest forms of religious expression is the myth. So unquestioningly as it was, in the early days of man, immediately understood, so much the more did it become, with the growth of a certain distance from the religious tradition, the object of inquiry after its essence and its truth. We will indicate, with the brevity which is unfortunately required, those places within religious history where we meet criticism of the myth. In Greece of the 6th century B.C. the myth began to totter. Theognis was one of the first to criticise the mythical picture of the gods, Xenophanes likewise objected to the all-too human conceptions of the gods, which originated in Homer and Hesiod. Myth-criticism was, of course, also present in the attempts to reinterpret somehow the objectionable myth, as did Theognis of Rhegium and the Eleatic philosophers Parmenides and Empedocles, who assumed a natural basis for the myth. The Sophist Critias thought to see in the divine myths a purpositive invention for the moral guidance of man.

In India too, we find examples of myth-criticism; for example in the late Xth Book of the Rigveda (X, 120), where at first the old
mythical speculation about the Creation is presented, in order then to
ask the critical question: "But who knows such things for certain?"
The naive figures abundant in the myth disappear before the mystical
intuition of the primal unity of being.

We also meet myth-criticism in the New Testament, in the sense
that for example 1. Tim. (1, 4) is warned against the "mythoi", which
create superbless questions, or Titus (1, 14) against the Jewish "mythoi",
which "turn from the truth." Thus myths here are untrue stories.

We come across myth-criticism again in the European Rationalism
of the 17th and 18th centuries. David Hume, for example, derives
the origin of the myth from fear, hope and anxiety. As, however, this
epoch saw the birth and gradual development of exact science, the
growing knowledge of the natural laws offered a new viewpoint for
myth-criticism: the compatibility of the mythical accounts of events
with the natural possibilities. The scientific view of the world became
the opponent of the myths of e.g. the Creation.

In Islam, one of the great universal religions, the sect of the
Mutazilites criticised the mythical declarations, which were taken
literally by orthodoxy, about Allah seeing, hearing, walking etc. And
within modern Protestant theology Rudolf Bultmann is endeavouring
to "de-mythologize" the conceptual world of Christianity.

What motives are then to be found for myth-criticism, within the
history of religion?

The general pre-condition for the appearance of this, as indeed
of every form of criticism within religion, is a certain distance on the
part of individuals from formerly naive acknowledged traditions.
The individual motives of myth-criticism can be split into two groups:
into motives, which are concerned with the inadequacy of the myth
in the face of the numinous reality which it intends, and into those,
which take as the standard of criticism the compatibility of the myth
with the religious or scientific standpoint reached by man at a given
time.

2. The Holy Scriptures as the Object of Criticism

That occasionally criticism of the holy scriptures awakes, and
the long valid and respected authority of the written word is curtailed,
has its basis in the fact that, with the authoritative and final
establishment and canonization of scriptures in a religion, typical
dangers are united, to which the religions, or rather their representatives
and followers, not seldom fall prey. These dangers are the following:
the isolation from new religious and scientific insights through fixation
of the canon; the identification of the rational word-sense of the
scriptures with the religious intention; and the impossibility of
understanding the original religious intention, due to the estrangement
of men of later times from the world-picture, which stands behind the
old scriptures.

Scriptural criticism can occur from different viewpoints. It can
act so that, while the authority of the scriptures is upheld, they are
interpreted from new religious positions, as e.g. in the criticisms by
Ramanuja of Shankara's interpretations, or by the Mutazilites of the
orthodox scriptural appreciation.

Two further forms of scriptural criticism are directed, from dif-
erent sides, at the authority of the scripture itself. Mysticism every-
where adopts an independent and critical attitude to the holy scriptures
of its own religion, in that it either tries to discover in them a mystical
depth of meaning, or else regards them as entirely superfluous.
The other form of criticism of the scripture itself is of a literary or theological
nature. In the first case, with suspension of the tabus surrounding
the holy scriptures, they are examined by the methods of secular science
with regard to their literary origins, the sources which in them have
been woven together, the influence of their environment etc. The
science of religion, too, can further this research by the study of the
religo-historical environment of a religion, and the connections of
the one with the other, as was e.g. very successfully done, within
Protestant Theology towards the end of the 19th and at the beginning
of the 20th century, by the so-called "Religionsgeschichtliche Schule."

3. Religious Doctrine as the Object of Criticism

In the great universal religions "doctrine" develops as the rational
and considered expression of the self-understanding of the religion
concerned. Doctrine, also, intends the Numen and the connections
with it. But doctrine too has an attendant danger: instead of it being
understood in its original and symbolical sense, one sees repeatedly
in the rational-sounding statements of doctrine genuine perceptions,
analogous to scientific truth, which can be learned, and which can be
passed on to all gifted with understanding. There is a wide field open
to criticism here. In the course of the dogmatic development of a
religion there arises an ever more complicated system of doctrines, which
are considered by the usually likewise developing organization as
"orthodox." The danger now threatens, that the essence of the religion
be displaced more and more from its proper sphere of the irrational
and emotional, into the territory of the rational, of that which can be
taught and learnt. This displacement is the object of criticism of
reformatory spirits, as e.g. in the case of Hōnen Shōnin and Shinran Shōnin.

Mysticism generally directs its criticism against doctrine as such, as did Buddha, who indeed himself proclaimed a doctrine of salvation, but constantly emphasized its relative value, as e.g. when he compared doctrine with a boat which one leaves behind, once the other bank is reached. The important thing is, in the apt words of the Buddhist King Asoka, “the growth of the essential.” But doctrine is not fitted for this task. Doctrines divide men, but the religious life unites them.

Finally, criticism can be exercised on the basis of the authoritative doctrinal forms, against possible new doctrines, coming from those who, faced with an inflexible system, wish to restore the vitality and immediacy of the religion. The phenomenon of heresy and its history are to be seen in this connection. Here, then, it is a question of criticism based on a norm of belief. This form of criticism can manifest itself in violent inquisition (cf. G. Mensching, Toleranz und Wahrheit in der Religion, 1855, p. 43 ff).

4. Criticism of the Cult

Like all original forms of expression of religious life, the cult also serves, in the fullness of its forms, to guide further the stream of true life, free from the disturbing changes in the individuals who sustain the cult, in the varying circumstances. This legitimate idea behind the fashioning of a cult presupposes the continued consciousness, that it is directed at the religiously essential. Where this consciousness is lost, the cult-form degenerates and becomes the object of criticism.

On the part of those who administer the cult-forms, there is a tendency to make them ever more independent and ever more elaborate. This has the consequence, that the naive believer can no longer find his own way through the cultic stipulations, so that proper specialists become necessary, who then claim the sole right to execute the cult-forms.

The functionaries of the cultic apparatus strive to represent the cult-forms as such as absolutely necessary, and the product of divine arrangement. The ever-imminent tendency to magical interpretation of cultic practices leads further to the point, where the effect of a cultic act is made dependent on its correct execution, and thus the unconditioned dynamic from the side of the divinity is restricted.

A further factor in the degeneration of the cult, is that the execution of the cult-forms frequently becomes mechanical, in that it becomes independent of the personal inner attitude of the individual.

What is meant here is expressed e.g. by the Israelite prophet Hosea in the name of his God Jahve (7,14): “And they have not cried unto me with their heart, when they howled upon their beds.”

Finally it is to be noted, that in a cult the Numen is frequently materialized, in so far as the material of the cult, such as holy objects, persons or pictures, becomes identified with the Numen. All these possibilities of degeneration give occasion for criticism in the sense of a regression to the essential intention of a cult.

Jesus, Hōnen Shōnin and Luther, for example, advocate, in opposition to the complication of cult-forms, a simple and natural lay piety, which has no need of formalism. In place of the static of the objective cult-system the great reformers demand a living and immediate dynamic in intercourse with God. As compared with the mechanization of cultic acts, as e.g. the cumulation of prayers and their superficial recitation, Jesus, in the Sermon on the Mount, demands complete devotion of the heart. The materialisation of the Holy into cult-objects caused, in many religions, criticism which on occasions went so far as iconoclasm.

The most widespread form of cult is the sacrifice, which likewise easily degenerates, and thus often has become the object of criticism. The original sacrificial intention is not to give to the Divinity in the hope of a return gift, but is a symbolic surrendering of the life which one receives anew from the Divinity. The sacrifice seeks to secure the unbroken stream of life from the Divinity to man, from man back to the Divinity. Where it becomes a material gift, it has degenerated. A further object of criticism is the sacrificial matter. Human and animal sacrifices are criticised from a higher ethic, as e.g. by Buddha. The prophets of Israel turn against the sacrifice, because it was not commanded by Jhaye (Jer. 7,21 ff).

5. Criticism of the Religious Organization

We need not here go into the motives for the growth of religious organizations. In this connection I refer you to J. Nach, Religions-soziologie, 1851; and my own “Soziologie der Religion”, 1947. Which points are then the objects of criticism in and of a religious organization?

In the large organizations there appears without exception one factor above all which brings about those aspects which become objects of criticism: namely the masses, by which we understand the religiously dependent and creative average. In the mass-organizations they continually gain the majority, and bring with them their ineradicable
primitive tendencies. While the original communities arose from personal and free decision, the mass-organization develops inevitably into a community determined by birth, into which good and bad, pious and indifferent enter. The result is that an average religion spreads, against which protest those sects above all, who cherish the ideal of an effective sanctified community. The need of the masses is continually directed at the objectivity of religious values, because they can only be disposed of administratively, so that all, who subject themselves to the organization, can share the values. This change to objectivity, i.e. the growth of an form of institutionalized grace, is criticised by those who hold religion to be a matter of personal experience. The belief of the masses is astonishingly uniform with that which flourished in the old folk-religions. The latter perished, but people brought the forms of belief with them into the new universal religion and its organization. Thus arose in all universal religions a "popular belief" (Volksgläube) of primitive kind, against which the reformers turned.

Furthermore, the masses desire authority. Whereas the founders of the universal religions freed their disciples from the external compulsion of traditional authority, and knew and wished to have recognized only the inner authority, this form of establishing authority is beyond the reach of the masses. If therefore the mass are to be organized and led, individual freedom must be replaced by an inflexible external authority. The restoration of genuine freedom is thus the aim of reformatory criticism. Since the masses cannot attain the heights of the ethical ideals as laid down by the founders, the mass-organizations are only able to secure a modest, average morality in its members. This piety of good works comes again under the criticism of those, who would like to see ethical and religious highest values realized.

It must finally be noted, that to the religious organization belongs the functionary, the priest. He is the very type of the conservative guardian of tradition. The prophets who appear from time to time in religious history, who are legitimised by no sacral tradition, but act from free vocation, exercise criticism on the priests, as e.g. Hosea (4, 4 f) or Isaiah (28, 7 f). Jesus also turned against the representatives of his native church. Conversely, the priests turn against the prophets, who endanger the unity of the organization. For this reason the prophets of free vocation were so often rejected and persecuted by the guardians of the sacral organization.

There still remains a wide area of criticism to discuss, with which, owing to the lack of time, we cannot deal: namely, the criticism of each other by religions. There is here a wide untreated field of research, which we can in this instance only indicate.

Criticism is a symptom of distance from the religious tradition. This distance, however, can mean either complete detachment, or critical preservation of the essential. Therefore there are, in respect of the traditional religion and its forms of expression, two possibilities of criticism: on the one side, criticism without a sense of the Holy, together with a misunderstanding of the principle of the essence of religion, as in the case of Rationalism and all materialistic, anti-religious propaganda. Or else criticism is the expression of a creative distance from tradition. The forms of criticism of degenerated aspects of religion, with which we have dealt here, signify a creative protest, and serve the true religious life.
MYSTICAL AND MAGICAL CONTEMPLATION IN 16TH CENTURY KABBALAH

BY

RAPHAEL JUDAH ZWI WERBLOWSKY

I do not propose to discuss here the speculative systems and the theosophical gnosis of the 16th century kabbalists, but to review briefly the more practical side of their mystical life, that is their contemplative practice and their techniques of meditation.

Already earlier periods of Jewish mysticism had known diverse forms of ecstatic experience. The most interesting of these were, no doubt, the visionary *Eimnolaterie* of the Merkabah-mystics and the light-experiences cultivate in the school of Abraham Abulafia (Spain, 13th cent.). Both traditions seem to have fallen into desuetude though they influenced the mystical practice of the great 16th cent. kabbalists in Safed.

The *via mystica* may pursue diverse aims; it may aspire to certain states of awareness of the divine reality (union, communion, blessed vision etc.) or it may seek esoteric knowledge (e.g. gnosis). The latter was clearly the purpose of the method of inducing inspirations, as it was practised by Moses Cordovero, his teacher and brother-in-law Solomon Alkabets and their circle. As a peculiar technique of spontaneously producing discursive and highly specialized theoretical kabbalistic material without conscious effort or thought, it bears some faint resemblance to the method of “active imagination” as practiced in analytical psychology as a supplement to or substitute for dreams. The method may, perhaps, be described as “induced intuition” or “automatic thinking.” The underlying theory obviously assumes that whatever suddenly “falls” into consciousness (cf. the German Einfall) is of supernatural origin. The practical problem was how to achieve that vacuity of mind in which unobstructed intuition became possible. The method adopted by Cordovero and Alkabets consisted of wandering through the Galilian countryside and fervently praying at the numerous tombs of holy rabbis in the district. The verse from Scripture and its kabbalistic interpretations that “fell” into the wanderer’s mind were then regarded as inspired. The proceedings were the usual, dialectical ones of the rabbinic academies. The “intuition” must therefore have consisted of a) the spontaneity with which a particular verse occurred to the mind, and b) the unreflected immediacy of questions, answers and interpretations. The emotions which the experience aroused in the participants is described by Cordovero in his account of these mystical peregrinations: ... my master and I wandered alone and the words of the Torah were shining in us and were spoken of themselves ... So far the study of that day, and thanks be to God that we were so favoured, for all these words came from above, infused without any reflection whatsoever.” Here mystical life is markedly intellectual and speculative in character.

All kabbalists agreed that the traditional norms of rabbinic Judaism, including strict observance of the Law and moral and spiritual perfection, were mere preliminaries to the ideal life. This was none other than the *via contemplativa* of communion with God which, in 16th century Safed, acquired an almost erotic quality reminiscent, in some ways, of Sufi piety. Taking up a famous statement of Maimonides, Eliezer Azikri in his *Book of the Descent* draws all the consequences of violent love: sleeplessness (i.e. nightly vigils), calling God fond names and singing songs of love to the divine Beloved. Love is fulfilled in the realization of the presence of God or *devehath*. *Devehath*, as Prof. Scholmen has pointed out more than once, is no unio mystica but communio; it is, in Azikri’s words, an immediate cleaving to God “without any partition whatsoever.” *Devehath* was possible because of the powerful awareness that the mystic’s heart was God’s true dwelling. This idea is, of course, more at home among Sufis than among kabbalists, and it is quite obvious that the Safed authors who use this kind of vocabulary draw heavily upon those writings of earlier kabbalists who had, in fact, absorbed Sufi influence. But the deceptively simple idea of the heart as God’s dwelling is enormously complicated once it is absorbed into the context of kabbalistic theories on the relation of the divine sephirah-macrocsm to the human microcosm. In spite of this, the basic idea is expressed in movingly simple words by Azikri who impresses upon his reader: “Know, o man, that thy soul is the seat of God ... for the Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp” (Deut. 23: 15) – “the midst” that is thy heart, which is in the midst of “thy camp”, which is thy body. ‘Prepare to meet thy God, O Israel’ (Amos 4: 12) for thy soul is His throne and thy heart is His footstool (cf. Isaiah 61: 1) ... and which is the place of His rest? It is the heart, as the sages have said: the Lord dwelleth in the hearts of those that love Him ...”. The royal road to


**PLENARY SESSION**

*Daveneth* was solitary contemplation and the reduction of all talk, business and social intercourse to a minimum. Noah in his ark is described as the type of the exemplary hermit: "It is written (Gen. 6:9) 'and Noah walked with God'. This signifies that he practised solitude with his Creator and held no intercourse with men." This is one of the classical ways of contemplative mysticism. The other way is indicated by Azikri in his alternative interpretation: "or else, he was so expert in the spiritual practice of solitude that even when he was among men they did not distract him, for they were as non-existent in his eyes.... One who is among men is like unto one that has fallen into the sea, who is drowned unless he swims; but if he flees from them and practises solitude,... than he is [like unto one] in a boat, he is saved and cleaves to God...."

The use made here of the image of the sea is extremely significant. For whereas in mystical literature generally the metaphor signifies the Divine Infinite in which the individual soul (the "drop") loses itself, it here means the world i.e. society that threatens to swallow the contemplative unless he isolates himself "in a boat", that is strengthens his solitary individuality as a condition for entering into communion with God. But solitude is more than withdrawal from society; it is also withdrawal from one's body. The rabbinic rule to pray, if possible, standing before a wall is interpreted by Azikri as signifying that nothing should intervene between man and the Presence of God, that is "that he should remove all thought - evil or other - from his heart. Another explanation is: 'nothing should intervene' - that is the body which should be as non-existent, and his soul should cleave to the [divine] soul as a magnet to iron." In spite of the strong social motives characteristic of rabbinic Judaism in general and of the kabbalistic brotherhood in Safed in particular, the mystic was not allowed to forget that he was always monos pro monon: "How can you fail to practise solitude! Behold you are alone most of the time: alone in your mother's womb, alone when you sleep; the body is solitary in the grave and the soul is solitary in Paradise. Therefore hearken unto my voice and walk with him always and do not separate yourself from him even for a moment...." It is significant that this terrific exhortation knows of no expectation of life eternal in the happy company of saints (whose counterpart in rabbinic eschatology is eternal study in the celestial academy in the company of all the prophets and rabbis) but the utter solitude of the soul, transmuted by the bliss of solitude fulfilled in the presence of the Beloved "for when I and He are alone together.... than even if I am in the midst of the people.... the creatures cannot interrupt [the consciousness of communion].... for they are all as nothing.... and I and He are all alone...."

The opposite pole is represented by the Lurianic practice of *daveneth* as expounded in Hayyim Vital's *Gates of Holiness*. We may ignore, for our present purpose, the complicated and confusing ontology and anthropology that furnishes the background of Vital's theory and technique of meditation. Suffice it to say that man's ideal nature is such that contact with the highest divine sphere is possible and even necessary if man is to fulfill his proper function and purpose in the cosmic household. The *analogia entis* is more than mere analogy. From the celestial *anthropos* down to man the same structure infinitely repeats itself. It is easy to see how man is, in principle, fit to attain the state of prophecy, provided he purges himself of matter and the passions, sanctifies his soul by strict observance of the divine commandments, acquires perfect humility and constant joy, and practises contemplative *daveneth*. Vital sets out to teach his readers the "paths of life..... the way wherein they must walk and the work that they must do..... to cleave to God, who is Eternal Perfection, like the prophets who cleaved to God all their lives...." Here the cat is quietly let out of the bag in the apparently harmless association of the practice of *daveneth* with prophecy. It appears that *daveneth* and prophecy are the same; the mystical practice of the former, of necessity results in the infusion of higher knowledge. Here the intellectualistic leniency comes to the fore again. Although the idea of higher (visionary and inspired) knowledge as a result of communion with God goes back to Maimonides and neo-platonic Aristotelianism in general, it is only in Lurianic kabbalism that it developed into full-fledged and almost *idealtypische* magic.

The specifically magical element of Vital's theory of contemplation inheres in his refusal to admit that inspiration automatically follows *daveneth*, let alone that it is a free and unpredictable gift of grace. Between the attainment of *daveneth* and the influx of the Holy Spirit, there intervenes a specific magico-meditative activity whose effect is
to "trigger off", as it were, the downward movement of the divine influx. The rough outline of Vital's scala contemplationis looks somewhat like this:

1) Ascetic purification and sanctification, preparatory to devebhu.
2) Actual meditation preceded by complete withdrawal of the mind from all bodily and material things and sensations, and by absolute mental vacuity due to the absence of sense impressions. In this connection it is important to note that for Vital the soul does not leave the body behind (except in the lowest form of inspiration: dreams). There is no real ascent of the soul comparable to the Himmeleinsicht of earlier mystics. The ascensus is purely imaginary, brought about by a technique of "as if". By abstracting or withdrawing the mind from worldly mental contents, the imaginative faculty, which continues to function, can now exercise itself on more spiritual realities.

3) A purely imaginative ascent to the soul's individual "root" or source in the supernal worlds. (The decisive role attributed here to the imaginative faculty is clearly dependent on Maimonides's theory of prophecy). What makes this imaginative ascent "as if" as seriously real as the less sophisticated actual Himmeleinsicht is the underlying doctrine of the 'magical' power of all acts of meditation and concentration, particularly when supported by the right formulae. The meditative ascent, though taking place in the imagination only, thus makes the same real impact on the higher worlds and on the soul as would have been the case if the soul had ecstatically left the body.

4) In his imaginative ascent the mystic contemplates the ten seforah, i.e. the Deity in its manifest aspects, and, opening himself to their irradiation, exalts them to the highest sphere of En Sof, the utter divine Nothingness. From this highest point the supernal light is then reflected and flows back again. The mystic who draws the light in the reverse direction down on his own supernal soul-root, thereby also irradiates the seforah. He then proceeds to draw up this conducted light further downward through the various "worlds" and "stages" of the Lurianic cosmos, down to his rational soul and from there to his animal soul which is the seat of the imaginative faculty and therefore the locus where the prophetic, i.e. spiritual-imaginative experience takes place. Occasionally the imaginative faculty may even externalize or project the effects of this "light", so that the experience becomes one of external sense impressions (e.g. appearance of angelic messengers, heavenly voices etc.).

The crucial point, as far as the magical character of this meditation is concerned, is the transition from the contemplative ascent to the reverse movement of drawing the divine influx and light down to the soul. This all-important reversal can only be effected by special intense meditations and formulae (so-called yikudim). But the use of formulae and Divine Names is a dangerous matter which can be risked with impunity only in a state of perfect purity; otherwise the adept lets himself in with the demonic powers and is lost. Vital urgently warns against the use of magic formulae, or hashba'oth, yet he emphasizes the important and even indispensable function of yikudim. It is important, therefore, to realize the difference between the two. Hashba'oth (lit. Beschworungen) are discouraged because they are means to promote or even force the ascensus; it behoves the adept to sanctify himself to such a degree that he can ascend to the divine sphere and pass all "gates" and celestial guardians without resorting to magic formulae. If he cannot, he had better desist from the exercise. But once arrived at the highest point — whether by means of hashba'oth or not — the mystic still has to meditate, to raise the lights to En Sof, and finally to reverse their direction so that they flow downward. The rejection of hashba'oth therefore only means that formulae exercising power over angels and ministering spirits should be excluded from mystical practice, and that the initial ascent should be effected solely by means of ascetic discipline, piety and contemplative devebhu. But whatever the technique of ascent, in the end we have to fall back on yikudim in order to make the divine light flow down and produce prophecy, inspiration and illumination.

Our cursory review has not covered all the varieties of mystical theory and practice current in the remarkable kabbalistic community of 16th century Safed. Yet it should be sufficient to show how diversified mystical life can be even in an apparently homogeneous and narrowly circumscribed spiritual group.
SYMPOSIUM
Plenary Sessions
I – V
SESSION I

Themes
a) The Characteristics of Oriental Culture
b) The Characteristics of Occidental Culture

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF EASTERN CULTURE

BY
RAMACHANDRA N. DANDEKAR

It would, indeed, be convenient if I began by defining, to a certain extent, the implications of the terms, "Eastern", "Culture", and "Characteristics" so far as my present paper was concerned. It has now become almost trite to say that the categorization of thought and culture as 'Eastern' and 'Western' is not at all scientific. There are, as we all know, great and fundamental differences between the various ideologies that have originated and grown in the geographical East. The cultural matrix of China, Japan, Indonesia, India, and Asian Russia can by no means be regarded as a single entity which may be analyzed and studied as such. Similarly the differences between the Latin and the Germanic cultures as also between the cultures of the European continent on the one hand and those of the Americas on the other cannot be certainly overlooked. Further it has been often pointed out that there is hardly anything in the so-called Oriental thought which cannot be found in the wide range of Occidental thought, and, conversely, there is nothing in the traditional Western thought which has not found expression in the Orient. Notwithstanding all this, in view of the fact that the ways of life and thought of peoples are invariably conditioned by their anthropo-geographical situation and the course of their history, and mainly as a convenient point of departure for a comparative study of their thought and culture, it may not be altogether unwarranted to speak in terms of the Eastern tradition and the Western tradition. It would, however, be advisable to remind ourselves, in this connection, that we might divide in order to distinguish if we did not distinguish in order to divide.
In the present context, I have used the terms - Eastern tradition and Western tradition - rather deliberately. In recent years, the world has shrunk considerably from the points of view of both time and space. This has naturally tended to produce in the East and the West a sort of uniformity of atmosphere, uniformity of the pattern of life, uniformity of problems, and uniformity of ways in which those problems are sought to be solved. This means that the distinctive features of the cultures and civilizations of the East and the West are now vanishing in a lesser or greater degree. One can, therefore, appropriately speak of the characteristics only of the traditional ways of life and thought in the East and the West.

At this stage, I must make another point clear. For the purpose of the present paper, I have limited the connotation of the term Eastern tradition to mean mainly the Indian tradition. This limitation is, no doubt, occasioned by the limitedness of my own knowledge of Eastern traditions. I may, however, claim that the Indian tradition is, in more senses than one, typical of the East. Broadly speaking, the Eastern tradition comprises three main traditions - the Islamic tradition of Western Asia or the Near East, the Indian tradition, and the Far Eastern tradition. As has been pointed out by Becker and Dickinson among others, the Near East is more akin to the West in attitude and thought, and has less in common with the Indian and the Far Eastern cultures than with orthodox Christianity and Western cultures. As for the Far Eastern tradition, it may be said to represent, at least in some of its later layers, an extension of the Indian tradition. On the other hand, the Indian tradition has assimilated within itself various ethnic and cultural elements from different regions of the East and thus cumulatively exhibits most of the characteristics of the East. In this connection, one may also not forget the remarkable continuity and the strong survival of direct inheritance from the remote past, which distinguish the Indian tradition. Today, even under the impact of new conditions - spiritual as well as material - the Indian tradition is, to use the words of Arthur Lyall, determined to live though doomed to die. India may, accordingly, be said to symbolize the struggle of the Eastern way of life and thought to survive the present world-crisis.

Speaking of the way of life and the way of thought, attention needs to be drawn to the fact that, in the West, it is usual sharply to demarcate the two. Indeed, it is sometimes averred that the characteristics of Western life and culture ought not to be confused with the characteristics of Western philosophy. Here, then, is one of the basic differences between India and the West. The Indian does not usually speak and think in terms of such mutually exclusive compartments as religion, philosophy, and culture. For him, these three together constitute an integrated whole. He aims, as far as possible, at translating into actual life what he thinks, knows and believes. Since, however, the term culture is usually understood in a very wide sense, I may restrict the scope of my paper to the consideration of the religio-philosophical culture or the spiritual traditions of India.

The totality of India's religio-philosophical culture, no doubt, comprehends a variety of precepts and practices and a wide range of views and varieties. But what concerns us today is only such of these as may be characterized as unique, basic, dominant, constant and pervasive. In other words, we want to find out those features of the Indian tradition which most emphatically reflect its spirit. And one would be fully justified in speaking of the spirit of the Indian tradition. For, in India, the spirit and the substance have generally remained the same though the forms have changed, while in the West the form has remained constant but the spirit and the substance have changed frequently. It is then such characteristics of India's religio-philosophical culture that I shall attempt to state here in brief. I shall do so under three broad headings, namely, attitude, approach, and achievement.

Even a causal student of the history of Indian culture will be struck by what Toynbee calls the religious penchant of that culture. With a view to off-setting this penchant, one may as well contrast it with the mechanical penchant of the modern Western civilization or the aesthetic penchant of the Hellenic civilization. This religious penchant or the spiritual attitude of the Indian finds a very striking expression in the motivation of Indian philosophy. Indian philosophy, as has been often rightly emphasized, springs from the unrest of the soul rather than from any metaphysical curiosity. In the West, philosophy is a kind of scholastic occupation or academic game; it is often isolated from life and consists of purely theoretical speculations. As against this the Indians have sought to give a practical orientation to their philosophical thought. They aim at spiritually realizing what is intellectually known. After the three stages in one's progress on the path of philosophy, namely, śrāvana (knowledge derived through study), manana (cogitation), and nididhyāsā (constant and repeated meditation), sādhāraṇā (direct realization), is invariably mentioned as the final goal. Knowledge is barren unless it is transformed into vision (darsāna). This pragmatic view of philosophy has resulted in the so-called systems of Indian philosophy subordinating their theo-
tical differences to the ultimate spiritual or religious goal. Philosophy
is after all a means to an end and not an end in itself.

And this leads us to another significant attitude of the Indian,
nameiy, tolerance. Philosophy and religion not being regarded as ends
in themselves, there is in India no scope for philosophical or religious
dogma. There are various roads which can take one to the ultimate
goal of spiritual realization, and any talk of exclusiveness or absolutism
in this regard is generally repulsive to the Indian mind. In the course
of her long history India has, accordingly, welcomed different races
and religious cults without having ever entertained the thought of
aggressively covering them to any specific way of life and thought.
This hospitality, this elementary good manners in matters of spirit, to
use Radakrishnan's felicitous phrase, has characterized the Indian
tradition through the centuries.

But the non-individualistic attitude must perhaps be regarded
as the most basic attitude of the Indian. The genesis of this attitude
has of course to be discovered in his cosmic Weltanschauung. The
western thought is essentially anthropo-centric. 'Man is the measure
of all things.' This dictum of Protagoras has oriented the entire
outlook of the West. As against this, in India, man is regarded as just
a part of the cosmic whole as much as an animal or a tree. Co-ordina-
tion (or setting side by side, of the various aspects of creation, including
man, and not subordination to man of other things) is the guiding
principle of the Indian thought. No unique position is ascribed to
man in the cosmic scheme of things. The Indian man, therefore, never
assumes any domineering attitude in life. On the contrary, he is ever
seeking to sink his individuality in the ocean of cosmic totality.
Humility of surrender before reality comes naturally to the Indian.
Life; he realizes, is, after all, disintegration or standing apart; he, there-
fore, seeks to achieve re-integration through Yoga and mysticism.

It is on account of this non-individualistic attitude that India has
failed to produce any real work of history as we understand it today.
That is also why, in India, one speaks not in terms of individual
philosophers but of schools of philosophy. All 'interest is concentrated
on ideas and not on individuals, on principles and not on personalities.
In India, individuality has, indeed, been never regarded as a problem
worthy of serious consideration. As against this, the West has con-
sistently rejected the rejection of individuality. However, in recent
times, Western individualism has been stoutly challenged by the new
ideals of collectivism and socialization. And therein we see one aspect
of the present crisis in the West.

A natural consequence of the Indian non-individualism is Indian
non-activism. Individualistic West is aggressively activist. The
Western man has been trying to understand nature with a view to
ultimately being able to control and direct her forces. And the success
that he has so far achieved in his endeavour has prompted him to
further activism. While 'detachment' is the watchword of the Indian's
behaviour, the Westerner takes deep interest in this life and seeks to
make it more and more happy and useful. The Indian transcends all
this-worldly values; he regards them as being merely subservient to
the values of another better world. He sees no salvation in the ex-
cessively humanistic ideal of the West—in its anxiety to remodel human
society or to reform the state. While the West believes that if anything
is to be perfected it is this life and this world with all its complexities,
the Indian is convinced that there is nothing permanent—either physical
or psychological—in this temporal world, nothing enduring, and that,
therefore, instead of striving to change this world one would do well
to aspire for another better world.

The non-activistic and essentially contemplative Indian has con-
sequently lagged far behind the West in the matter of scientific
knowledge and material progress. But, thereby, India and the East
may be said to have escaped, to a large extent, another aspect of crisis
which the West is now facing. On the one hand, the West is feeling
frustrated at the thought that, with all its knowledge and equipment,
it has not succeeded in bringing peace and prosperity to this world,
where, on the contrary, tension is growing day by day in every sphere
of life; and, on the other, instead of remaining the master of its
activistic impulse, the West has become almost its slave. The means
of production and the products have, for instance, tended to dominate
the producer. The economics of the non-activistic India would preach
the desirability of reducing the needs rather than of increasing the
production.

I have spoken above of detachment and religiosity as the distinctive
features of the Indian way of life and thought. Paradoxical as it may
seem, Indian tradition is by no means devoid of literature characterized
by carefree, sensual abandon and of religions glorifying orgiastic
rites. Indeed, this polarity itself must be mentioned as a characteristic
Indian attitude. Of course, this polar attitude is not to be viewed as being
the result of Indian ideology being primitive in basis and highly cultured
in development. Rather the two poles—'attachment' and 'detachment',
'abandon' and 'asceticism'—are to be regarded as a natural conse-
quence of the cosmic-magic world-view of the Indians. When he regards
himself as an essential component in the cosmic process, man claims esteem for himself; but when he views himself as just a part—along with other aspects of being—of the cosmic whole, he realizes his position as being of no special account. In cosmic-magic ideology, the extremest often meet. In India’s thought-complex, Siva, who is by far the most preeminent among Yogins and ascetics, is ever united with his spouse Sakī who is the centre of religious orgies.

Turning now to the way of approach to the problems of life and reality, it may be, at the very outset, pointed out that the Western approach is intellectualistic, analytic, and regulative, while the Indian approach is intuitive, synoptic, and contemplative. The Western man believes that there can be no knowledge which cannot be expressed by means of verbal and logical symbols. Knowledge, according to him, is a body of strict concepts, and categories of reason necessarily coincide with those of reality. He revels in setting forth all knowledge in a systematic framework. To him reason is the only test of reality; formal logic is his very god. On the other hand, in conformity with his general attitude, the Indian regards nyaya (logic) as subservient to religion. The aim of logic is not so much epistemological as religious. The Indian has also fully realized the limitations of logic. He, no doubt, accepts the validity of reason, but he positively believes that the ultimate reality is beyond the reach of discursive and demonstrative logic. He is naturally unwilling to accept the absoluteness of any system of thought; for, according to him, truth manifests itself in many ways, and dogma is but the reflection of intellectual vanity. Further, the Indian believes that, in the ultimate analysis, all logical systems are based on the relativities and uncertainties of human experience.

Like the individualism and the activism of the West, its uncompromising intellectualism also has caused a major crisis in Western life. Logical positivism has collapsed before relativity, and the undeniable evidence of the irrational, produced by modern psychology, has brought about the fall of reason from its high pedestal. India has sought to overcome this inevitable intellectual indeterminateness by postulating sādha (scriptural authority) as a valid source of knowledge. The Indian has deep faith in the scriptures, which, according to him, embody the results of the supra-rational perception and intuitive experience of the ancient sages. Sensual perception (pratyaksha) and logical inference (anumāna) are necessarily limited in scope, for, the capacity of human senses and of human intellect is obviously limited. But, at this stage, the Indian exhibits a remarkable epistemological optimism. He firmly believes that where pure intellectualism fails, faith often functions effectively. In this connection, it may also be pointed out that, for his progress on the path to the direct realization of reality, the Indian takes the aid of such non-intellectualistic disciplines as Yoga. As against this, the Westerner is critical of everything; he has no faith in anything; for him nothing is sacred. Therefore, he suffers from a terrible intellectual frustration.

The attitudes of the Indian and his way of approach to the problems of life and reality have inevitably influenced his thought and practices. Indian cosmology, for instance, accepts the essential oneness of all aspects of being. There is no qualitative difference between one entity and another. According to one phase of early Vedic thought, the same magical potency, āsū, permeates through everyone and everything — god, man, animal, trees, etc. — and the apparent manifoldness of form and type is due to quantitative differences. The later doctrine of advaita is but the metaphysical expression of this original cosmic-magic view. It is further believed that the universe, vast and complex as it is, is by no means chaotic; it is governed and regulated by an all-pervasive universal law, Rta. Nothing is higher than this cosmic law. Even gods are subservient to it and cannot outgrow it.

Indian metaphysics cannot be defined in the usual terms of idealism, materialism, or realism. The manifold phenomenal manifestations are apparent, transitory and contingent; they are not altogether rejected, but it is certainly claimed that they do not have any metaphysical status. The ultimate reality, on the other hand, is one and indivisible. It cannot be subjected to any kind of rational investigation; it is logically indeterminate and qualitatively non-characterizable. It is to be intuitively apprehended and one’s identity with it is to be mystically realized.

Indian ethics is based on the concepts of bondage and deliverance. The word, rta, is derived from a root which means ‘to bind’. Rta binds together all parts of the cosmic whole so that they all together contribute towards the proper functioning of the cosmic process. The ethical norm, according to the Indian tradition, is neither obedience to a god who stands outside in isolation nor conformity to man-made custom. It is, as the Gita puts it, yajña-cabra-pravartana — the keeping of the wheel of cosmic sacrifice ever rotating. The doctrine of Karma, which is a distinctive feature of Indian thought, is but another aspect of rta. In a sense, it is the inexorable universal law of causality expressed in terms of cosmic ethics. Dharma (from a root meaning ‘to hold’) is that which holds together, maintaining a proper balance
between the spiritual and the material, the individual and the society, the part and the whole. When, however, individuality is annihilated in the bosom of cosmic totality, one transcends Dharma, Karma and Rta, and there is deliverance.

It will be seen that in Indian cosmology, or metaphysics, or ethics god has really no active part to play. Indian tradition, which denies that god stands apart from and can interfere with the affairs of the man and the world and which asserts that god neither creates nor controls the laws of Rta and Karma, is, really speaking, godless and atheistic. India is religious not in the sense that she glorifies any religion which emphasizes the dualism between the creator and the created, between spirit and matter, between god and man (as religions are normally understood to do). India is religious in the sense that her entire way of life and thought is determined by the Yearnings of the soul rather than by the quest of the mind or the needs of the body.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WESTERN CULTURE

BY

ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH

I have been asked to discuss the characteristics of Western civilization, obviously with reference to problems of religion. In the Congress just closed we have dealt with religious philosophy, symbolism, ritual. Here it would seem appropriate to discuss the public and social importance of religion, East and West. As we meet from all parts of the world, the inevitability of closer organization of the peoples of the world seems very real, and we may well consider together what part our various religions may play in such world organization, what part we as religious leaders and thinkers would like them to play. Will they, we anxiously ask ourselves, really help to unite us, or will they create hot points of friction, volcanoes of bitterness? Clashes of religions in the past, especially in the West and Near East, have been among our most disastrous features. That we are all brothers under God so that we have learned from God a basic ethic of love and tolerance can be held only by the sentimental. History has taught us that God and religions have by no means brought the nations lovingly together in the past, or, let us be frank, are at all obviously thou bringing them together in the present.

Religions may be classified in various ways, but for our immediate purpose we may speak of the religious attitude of inclusion, what we technically call syncretism, as over against exclusion. The religious attitude of inclusion basically dominates the East, as contrasted with the Western attitude of exclusion. The difference will appear as I continue.

The civilization of the ancient world in the West was united by religious inclusion. Men went from temple to temple, sacrificed to various gods, with a sense that the names of the gods, and their myths, had only relative importance. Men had to observe the sanctity of the family worship, the ancestors, but each man had his own ancestors to revere, and what mattered was that the continuity of society be guaranteed by every family's scrupulous sense of its heritage. The state had its gods, the civilization had its temples, and this too was important,
but no one outside the state was expected to worship those gods any more than a man would expect his friends to share in his own family devotions. To a large extent this continues still in the East, where, if religions do not seem inadmissibly interchangable, at least they rarely seem mutually exclusive. One man is a Hindu, another a Buddhist; but when Coomaraswamy wrote to minimize the differences between them, he pleased both Buddhists and Hindus. The great mass of people, of course, did not read Coomaraswamy. For the masses (and it is with the masses we must reckon in the One World) religion is not philosophy or metaphysics, but myth and ritual; not the general principle but the minute details of food, manners, symbols, and acts. Still in the East, however, as in the ancient West, even for the masses, the attitude of reverence, the seeking of union with a higher reality, are more important than the name of rite of any one god.

In the medieval and modern West, on the contrary, differences of religious creeds and rites have often provoked massacres and protracted wars. For the spirit of ancient Roman religions was conquered in the West by the spirit of Judaism, which was the only religion I know in the ancient West based upon the principle of exclusion. According to this principle there is one God, creator and ruler of the universe, judge of all men. But there are certain specific rites by which alone he may be approached, certain peculiar revelations which must be recognized as unique and authoritative. By the teachings of Judaism and its descendants other revelations and rites are not, as in the East and the ancient West, simply less good, but wrong, scandalous, blasphemous. Christianity and Islam are both, as descendants of Judaism, exclusive religions. Not only do no people in the West call themselves simultaneously Jews, Catholics and Moslems, but they do not call themselves simultaneously Protestants and Catholics within Christianity itself. So as the world grows smaller, it is not the eastern religions that make frictions, but the western. Books like Coomaraswamy's that minimize differences, and are well received by the religious leaders of the East, are not written with the approval of the religious leaders of the West. A book pointing out that the real differences between Catholics and Protestants, Jews and Moslems are unessential would be well received by a very few Westerners, but would shock the leaders of any of these faiths, as well as the mass of followers. Are religions under western impact, than, to pull as indefinitely apart?

The western principle of exclusion has unfortunately been carried into political organizations, so that most western states have their state churches or religions. Some of these have come of late years to give tolerance freely to other faiths, as does England; some still do so less freely, as do Spain, Israel, and most Moslem countries. Some, like Russia, express Western intolerance by suppressing all religions teaching except a sort of metaphysical materialism. If a world's taste is ever formed, it can follow none of these models. The varieties of religious customs and orientations of different countries exclude the possibility that men the world over can ever unite under a state oriented to defend any particular faith. The western spirit of exclusion, although I personally deplore it, can just as little accept the eastern spirit of inclusion. But that we can ever stop the traditional religious practices of men, as a wet sponge wipes chalk from the blackboard, seems equally incredible. We can, as little unite under a vague allegiance or acknowledgment of God if, as of course it must, the New World State is to include Russia. Can we hope, then, the religious competition will ever allow the formation of a world state?

Western civilization has in places had to face this problem, and one experience may still be helpful. The United States at its founding faced a very similar problem, and for the first time clearly defined two novel principles for the relation of the state and religion. One which as a formulation was new, but which seems deeply similar to traditional Eastern practice. In the combination of these two principles, as built into the basic law of America, I believe, there is more hope than in any other.

The original colonies of the United States were founded for the most part by religious refugees from Europe. A few were Catholics, as in Maryland, but most of the followed various types of Protestantism. No group, however, came over with any but the most intense religious intolerance. Even the Protestant sects of the various colonies regarded one another with horror: my Puritan ancestors drove Baptists and Quakers out into the wild forests to perish. Then after a century and a half the colonists found themselves in a such a situation that, in the old American phrase, if they did not hang together they would hang separately. Dire necessity forced them to find a way to live together on the American continent as it is increasingly forcing us to do on a world scale. The Americans solved the problem by founding the first really secular state (with the possible exception of Switzerland). The two principles on which they got together were first that the state would protect the right of any man to worship God as he pleased, or to scorn religious exercises of any kind if that suited him better. It drew the line against extreme observances such as religious worship using dangerous vipers, or systematically breaking the universal
Christian taboo against polygamy. But, in general, temples for any forms of worship, or edifices for the inculcation of atheism, are equally protected by the law in America.

The second principle was that no form of religion was to be recognized or inculcated by the state itself. Our public education was to teach the arts and sciences, but Jew, Catholic, Protestant, Hindu, Moslem, and militant atheist were all to feel safe in sending their children to school, since no religious attitudes would be part of the teaching. A candidate for public office was theoretically to stand as an individual, not as a representative of a religious group. These have been infringements of this, I regret to say, and our legislatures open with prayer by a chaplain, our courts give oaths on the Bible (but do not require it). But these exceptions only prove the secular rule which in general has been carefully enforced by our judges and policemen alike, and respected by the citizens.

I am not imaginative enough to suggest a better solution for the problem of religion in the World State of the future. Translated into world terms it would mean that each member nation in the world state could take any attitude toward religion it pleased within its own borders, although when a country was divided on religious matters we would suggest to it that it too become a secular state. Some would want to remain Catholic, or Moslem, Jewish, Hindu, or atheist, just as some of the new American states long had an official state church. But the world state which included all others would respect the fact that men through the ages have lived quite as much on their religious formulations and observances as on material sustenance, and that spiritual aspiration is apparently an inherent part of human nature. In this we would protect all men. And as each national group demanded that the world state tolerate its own religious practices and beliefs, so it would be ready to tolerate others. For the safety of each could exist only by the security of all, and this can occur only in a state which is itself committed to none; a state which protects all religious, or antireligious, sensitivities, but instills none. Fortunately The United Nations has implicitly begun to work on this principle, but in my opinion it would be much strengthened if it would positively announce it. This it could not do without the support of the religious leaders of the world. As an individual I could wish that westerners could learn to be more inclusive in their sympathies and appreciations, but as a historian I know the amazing persistence of traditional religious attitudes. In any case religious leaders can do most for world peace by taking the lead in keeping religion out of world politics and in-
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WESTERN CULTURE

BY

H. LUDIN JANSEN

The basic character of the culture of the West is intellectual, while that of the East is mainly intuitive. The philosophy of life characteristic of ancient Greece tends to demonstrate this assertion. For the Greek attitude of life has once and for ever stamped European thinking and to such a degree that the new and divergent impulses mainly introduced by Christianity, have never managed to change the main direction of the European attitude of life.

Greek philosophy is, as we know, from the very beginning a philosophy of nature. We speak of the Ionic philosophers of nature, the great thinkers of the 6th century such as Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes from Milet and Heraclitus from Ephesus. These men concentrated their attention on cosmological questions, and in their studies they made it clear that everything is governed by law. The observation of this eternal, lawbound regularity, caught the attention of these men to such a degree than, as Platon says, they were completely ignorant of what happened in their immediate surroundings. The lawbound structure of nature made them see the world as eternal and indestructible. Heraclitus says: "This world has always been, and is, and shall be an eternally flaming fire, which intermittently blazes up and again extinguishes." What happens, is repeated eternally. The world has no final goal for which it is striving. The power which moves everything, is fate, moira, a kind of half material, half spiritual impersonal being which acts completely mechanically bound as it is by law. In this philosophy the separate happenings are chained together in that stream which constitutes existence as a whole. They have no independent existence, but are conditioned by the law which produces everything that takes place, and confirms the validity of this law before our eyes. This view was confirmed in the 4th century and carried further by the greatest Greek natural scientist, Aristotle, the founder of natural science in Europe. To him, too, it was of primary importance to demonstrate the laws which determine that which happens. He, too, was satisfied by the conviction that all things are

repeated eternally: "Things happen not once or twice or some few times, but infinitely many times," he says.

The same scientifically based attitude towards nature as that of the Greek philosophers, were adopted by the Greek historians towards history, despite the fact that history according to its basic character is completely different from natural science. For while the natural scientist directs his attention to what is common, general, to the laws, the historian directs his attention to the individual case, „das Einmalige", as the German Heinrich Rickert so strikingly expresses it. Now let us turn to the historian of the Peloponnesian Wars, Thucydides. In all his thinking he is determined by the basic philosophy of natural science. One may very well say that he makes history into a form of natural science. He wants to get, as he says, "a true insight into what, according to the usual routine of human life, will happen again in the future in a corresponding and similar way." In other words he wants to make a prognosis, so that man may know beforehand what will happen if such and such conditions are present. For things must occur again, because, among other things, human nature is constant and subject to the same mechanical laws which govern the dead nature in man's surroundings. He describes "the things that usually happen and which will always happen as long as the human nature is the same," as he expresses it. (III, 82)

These points of view are not so clearly pronounced by the "father of history", Herodotus, but is easily seen in his history, first of all in his choice of substance. He especially emphasises natural-scientific phenomena, particularly geography and ethnography where he can make comparisons and demonstrate similarities and connection, while, in the case of purely historic substance, he renounces his scientific attitude, his exactness and his criticism. This theoretical view or existence in order to find governing laws led to, as already suggested above, a consideration of man as one part of great mechanical connection, a view which we find even in Homer, e.g. in the 6th song of the Iliad, where man's lot is compared with the fate allotted to nature. Just as the trees change their leaves, so does mankind change its individuals. As the fields dress in flowers and the flowers in their turn wither and die, so man follows man in an eternal endless stream. Man's lot is nature's lot. The laws which govern nature, also govern the life of man, but in comparison with nature as a whole, man is miniature and insignificant. Even in the Greek drama man's fate is not in the foreground, but the idea of the mechanical, favorable consequences of his actions, and even among the gods do
we find the idea of a supreme law of fate. This is seen particularly in Homer. For even Zeus must in the end subject himself to the inexorable Fate which cannot be changed.

If we compare the Greek attitude of life with the Israelitish-Jewish one, the peculiar character of the Greek—and thus also of the European—way of thinking stands out clearly. Let us for a moment consider their philosophy of history. The Jewish philosophy of history is clear and definite: At the back of history is Jahwe, Israel's God, the one and supreme commander of the world. He led the people of Israel through all dangers. He decided and decides the fate of every people. When Cyrus entered Babylon and the metropolis was conquered, this was the will of Jahwe who interfered and punished the haughty Babylonians. For Jahwe leads history towards a fixed goal: the institution of God's kingdom on earth. This kingdom is to be the end of everything that happens, the extreme, final point, beyond which there is nothing else, nothing more. Thus, this view excludes any such idea as the eternal recurrence of things. What happens, happens because it is the will of a personal God standing at the back of things. The idea of laws governing history is thus out of question. Here events are mainly separate, detached happenings, not demonstrations of a system of inexorably governing laws. Thus man's position in the universe is totally different from what Greek philosophers held it to be. Man is detached from nature and its laws. He is something independent, unique, with a personal, individual value, as the object of God's personal care and plan. Man is no unimportant nonentity, but high and costly, in reality the highest and most costly of all because God has a plan with him, a plan which otherwise the whole world serves. With this view, stamped as it is by his philosophy of history, the Israelite turns to nature. Therefore he sees what happens in nature as one-time happenings similar to what happens in history. Nature's renewal in spring and its dying away during the dry season, are looked upon as God's active interference in man's fate, an interference which takes place again each time nature changes. Thus, while the Greeks make history into natural science, the Israelite makes natural science into history. The knowledge of nature of the Israelite makes his picture of God more complete. Thus, in the Ethiopic Book of Enoch is included a considerable amount of astronomical and cosmologic material. But there is no objective treatment of the material here, no evaluation of facts, only intuitive experience of an actively operating god. It is there as an expression of God's will with man. Israelitish sources do not know an objective, impersonal observation of nature with a view to finding laws.

When Christianity came to Europe, the scientific attitude to existence which was founded by the Greeks, was modified in the direction of the oriental one, i.e. the Israelitish-Jewish view. In antiquity and the Middle Ages, even right up in modern times, the philosophy of history, for example, was stamped by the Israelitish one but when in modern times the natural-scientific method of research won the ground, the view on history and man in particular, was changed more and more in the direction of the ancient Greek conception. Western thinking today and accordingly also its practical shaping, what we call formal culture, has decidedly been stamped by the naturalistic view which we have inherited from the Greeks. This, I believe, explains why the interest in natural phenomena have come to predominate over the interest in man, and why historic research and the arts live a secluded existence among us, while natural science is blooming as never before. According to its basic character European culture is not humanistic but natural-scientific. In its thinking the East is directed by intuitive experience of nature and history and the fate-determining power behind these. Therefore the East has a higher evaluation of man and is more clearly convinced that life has a goal and a meaning.
SESSION II

Themes
a) The Influence of Occidental Thought on the Orient
b) The Influence of Christianity on the Orient

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SO CALLED YOUNGER CHURCHES AND OF CHRISTIANITY IN GENERAL IN THE EAST

BY

HENRY CLAVIER

Christianity first spread from East to West, from Asia to Europe and to Africa. This is a fact which no one ought never to forget when observing that in the later centuries, the movement has mostly been from West to East. Mostly, but not exclusively, for when American missionaries cross the Pacific Ocean in order to evangelize what Europeans call the Far East, Christianity thus moves from a further Far East to a nearer Far East, i.e. as in the beginning from East to West.

Let us then give up what might soon appear to be a joke or a geographical puzzle of East and West, and turn to some symbolical meaning of the two terms. I fear that even there, we shall not be able to reach any definite agreement, for the religious, philosophical, and even cultural interpretations of East and West are neither identical nor evident.

Furthermore, if we endeavour to recur to original Christianity and to its sources which are in the Bible, we shall soon realize that from the beginning Christianity presents various features of two worlds which had already met before, coming from East and West. This happened in a well known historical frame which is called “Helllenism”. However it is plain that in the case of Christianity, especially at its sources, Jerusalem holds a stronger position than Athens. This means an evident predominance of East on West. In the typical case of Biblical anthropology, for instance, it is easy to note how St. Paul has introduced the analytical mind of Greece in the synthetical and semitic conception.

A careful study of terms and expressions as: NOS, EXODUS, ESSEX ANTHROPOIS etc. makes it evident.

Concluding this short introduction, we shall remove any prejudice on East and West, any theoretical and perhaps mythetical view on the one or the other. We shall confine ourselves to facts with their closest implications and consequences.


Christianity which originated in Asia, was almost eradicated from its native soil by the Muslimian conquest. However, Christianity still exists in that part of the world where various Churches are to be found, some very old, others very young.

Historical circumstances did often compel the older Churches: Greek Orthodox, Syrian, Armenian, Coptic and others, to live a reduced, and often underground life during more than 10 centuries. One must not wonder that they appear sometimes to be slumbering, but rather marvel at their very existence and at the maintenance by them of a Christian heritage under such trying conditions. Besides, a few decades of ecumenical contacts have already been sufficient to awaken them and to remind them of forgotten ways which they are now following or will follow, in so far as they are left free to do so. For the yoke which was inflicted upon them during centuries may still impede them with other names and other names under any totalitarian trademark labelled on some new or renewed idoltry of a Nation, a State, a Class or a Party. Let the older Churches go the way of renaissance, let them go from outside, and from inside, and I doubt not that some of them will prove more than that the French free thinker and well known historian and philosopher Hippolyte Taine was right when he wrote: “Christianity is always young and still remains the great pair of wings which enables humanity to soar above itself.”

Some 25 years ago, when I was the travelling Secretary of the ecumenical movements, before they joined in the ecumenical Council, I had many contacts with the older Churches in the East, and the privilege of gaining the adhesion of the Coptic patriarch, the Amba Johannes to the common effort of reunion or federation of all Christian forces. I noted at that time how much the European or American Churches had worked together in awakening and stirring up the possessors of so antique and precious traditions, either in the leading clergy or even more in the younger laity. This last feature, a young and dynamic laity in some older Churches, may be considered as a link between them and the so called younger Churches which are the result.
of the Christian mission in the East and especially in the Far East, since more or less than one century.

Broadly speaking, the difference was such a few decades ago: the older Churches had managed wonderfully to maintain a Christian tradition in the course of centuries, and under trying circumstances but without much apparent life, whilst the younger Churches had started in a rush of dynamic life, but still without tradition. It is not possible, on one side, that tradition when reduced almost to a skeleton, is threatened by consumption may easily collapse. The experience of missionary work, including home mission as well as mission abroad, shows that the most encouraging and exalting conversions may be followed by abashing and painful falls as long as a patient work of education and organization has not linked strongly to a Christian tradition, or started it. This is true in a special way for many Protestant missions with much faith, but little order. They do not offer to newcomers the solid frame in which they are set and shaped under Roman Catholic authority. But it is better that such firmness and continuity come from inside as with a skeleton, than from outside as with a coat or carapace. Protestant methods may regain sincerely what they lose outwardly.

If we now care for numbers, the following one might be cautiously advanced on the approximative basis of statistics which were given at the Conference of the Churches in Asia which met in Bangkok at the end of 1949:

Setting apart Russian territories, the population of Asia might amount presently to 10 or 12 hundred millions of souls. Less than 60 and perhaps only 50% to take an example at home, of those hardly 5% of Asia's population, 2 thirds must be rated as Roman Catholic. The other third (not even 20 millions), ought to be divided between the older Eastern Churches (about 2 millions), and the younger Protestant missionary Churches (somewhat more than 15 millions), provided we are allowed to rate as Protestant all the non-Roman and non-Orthodox denominations which is rather uncertain.

We are touching here the weak point of Protestant Christianity, and the main motive of many failures, in spite of some real advantages which may afford an appreciated counterpart. Ecumenism which has proved to be so favourable to the renaissance and revigoration of the older Churches, had previously acted as an efficient remedy for healing the protestant disease of extreme individualism and atomism. The younger Churches have contributed a great deal to such efficiency. One must even recognize that one of the master-roots of Ecumenism has been the missionary care for the younger Churches scandalized by such disunity and by so many divisions. Although other historical factors of Ecumenism are plain, one of the main ones has surely been that care answering a claim of the younger Churches as it was heard the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference in 1910. The various movements towards reunion, in whatever mood and order it has been achieved, in South India, in North India, in Ceylon, without excluding the Church Federations elsewhere, all are answers to the same need and to the same claim.

I have been able to follow some recoveries from sectarianism and atomistic disunity, when at work in Ecumenism. The benefit of certain proceedings of reunion seems to me out of doubt, and their acceleration to be wished and helped, as far as the variety of religious natures is respected in the process. After 20 years of ecumenical personal cooperation, I strongly believe and believe still in a movement which I should like to be yet more opened to all Christian denominations. I am convinced that spiritual atoms ought to enter into the one or the other most congenial organism, that sects ought to merge into the one or the other of the few great Christian families which, after my opinion, have the right and duty to live their own life, provided that they bebrotherly cooperate for their mutual benefit, for the welfare and promotion of Christendom at large, and for the good of mankind.

II Significance.

According to numbers, Christianity in Asia might perhaps be held as insignificant. But significance is not a mere arithmetical problem of quantities. If I am allowed to quote as an example at home, I shall refer to French Protestantism. According to various historians, it amounted to one fourth, or even one third of the population of France before the dreadful and methodical persecution which almost rooted it out in the course of two centuries. It recovered entire freedom with the Great Revolution, but had declined meanwhile to remnants in a few provinces. Nowadays, it cannot claim more than the 29th or 30th part of the people of France. Nevertheless, its actual significance is far higher than what an insignificant percentage, about 5%, would suggest, and it is considered as one of the main spiritual families in France.

With a different and shorter history, several younger Churches in Asia seem to have gained an influence out of proportion with their small numbers. If I am well informed, this would be typically the case in this very country of which we are presently the grateful guests.
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Broadly speaking, the difference was such a few decades ago: the older Churches had managed wonderfully to maintain a Christian tradition in the course of centuries, and under trying circumstances but without much apparent life, whilst the younger Churches had started in a rush of dynamic life, but still without tradition. It is not able, on one side, that tradition when reduced almost to a skeleton, is threatened by consumption may easily collapse. The experience of missionary work, including home mission as well as mission abroad, shows that the most encouraging and exciting conversions may be followed by abasing and painful falls as long as a patient work of education and organisation has not linked strongly the converts to a Christian tradition, or started it. This is true in a special way for many Protestant missions with much faith, but little order. They do not offer to newcomers the solid frame in which they are set and shaped under Roman Catholic authority. But it is better that such firmness and continuity come from inside as with a skeleton, than from outside as with a cover or carapace. Protestant methods may regain innerly what they lose outwardly.

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I have heard of an important choice of Japanese Christians belonging to various Churches, or even to no special Church, as Uchimura Kanzō and the promoters of Mükoyokai, and who have taken an important part in the social, educational, scientific or literary life of Japan, although the total numbers of Christians would not exceed all together 1% of the population.

The significance of the so-called younger Churches or of Christians in general may be considered from various standpoints. Some factors of significance are external although they may be more or less permeated by Christian influences. Others do more directly pertain to the very essence of Christianity. A bird's eye view on the first and most apparent ones will be sufficient. A more careful study of the essential ones would be required; but other requirements, those of the time table will prevent us from entering into many details.

10 External factors of Significance.

A minority, even small and insignificant in numbers, may gain occasionally and temporarily some influence in a country under certain political, economical, financial, social or cultural circumstances. Christianity and the younger Churches have surely been considered at times as the vehicle of various advantages which some eastern people or their government were eager to draw from the West. Confusions did thus arise which often led on the long run to a total wreck of the Christian effort and to no good for the people. Such confusions must be dissipated in the interest of all. There seems to be no specifically Christian economy, finance, policy nor culture. Nevertheless, it may happen that such external and concrete complexes be related in a certain way to internal and spiritual realities as we find at the core of many great religious movements.

Any student of economics, for instance, aware of Max Weber's curious thesis that modern capitalism originated in puritanism sprung from Calvinism. As it was presented by the German scholar, such a thesis is paradoxical and inadequate. But it remains that the spirit of self control and self restraint, the conception of work as due to God and blessed by Him, the dynamical faith in God's universal and personal leadership, the conviction of being elected, all those common natures of Calvinism and of puritanism at its best have acted a great deal in the building of a wealth thus preserved from various weaknesses: irresolution, laziness, aholiness, prodigalities or prodigalities. It remains that a certain conception of work and action may have something to do with Calvinism and perhaps with essential Christianity, provided that its main lesson is not forgotten, i.e. self surrender to God and to His order where egoism has no place, where all is given by God and due to Him, for His service and the service of men. From that standpoint the excesses of capitalism are violently opposed to the very essence of Christianity and to its golden rule: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, -- and thy neighbour as thyself" (Lev. 10: 27). And one remembers that the neighbour as Jesus presents him to his Jewish audience is a Samaritan, i.e. a stranger generally despised or hated.

Similar instances might be chosen in other fields where Christian elements, if they are to be found, must be carefully analysed and disentangled from others. This does not mean necessarily a discrimination between good and evil, as if all that is good ought to be rated for Christianity exclusively. In the case of modern culture, for instance, it is plain that some very good things, as methodical research, careful analysis, scientific and technical study have more to do originally with Athens than with Jerusalem. One might even add, after a more careful examination that such good elements and others are to be found in principle, or somewhat developed, elsewhere and that neither West nor East nor East has a right to claim special merits for what belongs after all to human nature and to God's creation. Such widening of the problem does not amount to deprive any culture from its particular worth, but helps us to avoid a double danger: 1) The pretension on whatever part to monopolize what belongs to the whole. 2) The instinctive diffidence at welcoming what seems foreign (and perhaps is not) even if it is good.

20 Essential significance.

The essential significance of the Churches in any part of the world depends primarily of the essential significance of Christianity, as far as those Churches are Christian. The problem of the essentials in Christianity has often been set. The solution is not simple, for many principles and interests are at stake. Comparative religion and theology will make it easier. There are several possible approaches to the problem. Without giving too much importance to the choice, we shall start from the world and conclude with God. The following observations cannot but have a very schematic appearance and are nothing more than glimpses on essentials worthy to fill up a whole mind and a whole life. A strong motive for choosing that special approach and following that way lies in the fact that a conception of the world holds a great place in Hinduism and Buddhism which have
contributed in a high measure to shape the largest part of mankind in the Far East. Although their metaphysical basis is not the same and shifts with Buddhism from substantialism to phenomenonism, i.e. from one philosophical pole to the other, they hold in common a doctrine of Maya which does not allow the believer to set any confidence in an illusory world.

Islam with its millions is of course different, since it states that Allah has created the world. But Allah is pure will and he does what he likes. He has not to furnish any account any reason for his choices which may appear sometimes as fancies. I then doubt that Muhammadanism has much altered the feeling of Maya of the great illusion which has penetrated most of the Far East. It would be fair to mention other influences, especially in China, with a far more realistic view of the world in antique “Sinism” and Confucianism. But already Taoism, and later on Buddhism cooperated in weakening that strong realism which may have found in the last years a renascence with Marxism. As a result of those various factors, I suppose that “Maya” remains altogether one of the keys to what one might call, broadly and somewhat abusively speaking, “the far-eastern mind.”

Facing such difference, with its feelings of cheat and insecurity, the Christian believes in the reality and trustfulness of the world as God created it and preserves it fundamentally from the lies of evil and sin. Such confidence is based essentially on the faith that God who is not merely will, but wisdom, truth and love. The most remarkable philosophical expression of that belief, whatever its convincing power may or may not be, is the well known appeal to God’s trustfulness, “la vérité divine,” as Descartes puts it, in order to exercise the spell of the great illusion. It seems doubtless that such a faith may have acted powerfully in the scientific quest for truth which has brought the western schools so far ahead in basal findings and in their technical applications. There is a link, and a strong one between a certain religion of Truth and these essentials of Christianity. The conflict which did sometimes rage between Science and Christianity has generally been a painful mistake on both sides. One of the Anglican members of the International Missionary Council at the Jerusalem World’s Conference in 1928, Canon Oliver C. Quick, went so far as to say in one of the sessions: “It was the Church’s fault that secular science in this sense (the disinterested quest for truth) should be its enemy. The Church has been unwilling to interpret self-sacrifice intellectually. Intellectual self-sacrifice involved the fearful willingness to fact the weather of fact. Men had to learn how to carry the Cross into the

sphere of the intellect” (Cf. Report I of the International Missionary Council-Jerusalem Meeting, 1928. The Christian Life and Message in relation to Non-Christian Systems, p. 412). To carry the Cross in the sphere of the intellect as in other spheres, this brings us back to one of the essentials in Christianity. To the Psalm’s assertion: “The Lord reigns and the earth is firm,” the Gospel has added: “For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting Life.”

(John 3:16)

Whosoever: this means man. Man is part of the world. Any fundamental difference, with a certain despise for the world may easily produce like feelings towards man. Isn’t it very often the case under the influences which have pervaded most of the East and especially the Far-East? Is it possible to deny the link between such feelings and a certain political, social or economical stage of things?

The Biblical faith, from the Old Testament to the New where it culminates, implies special regard, special respect for man as God’s choice creation and love. Where man is a sinner, and he is since he fell, God has a plan to save him. The very biblical notion of sin and guilt implies a responsibility and a dignity of man which vanish when man is doomed to a blind fate of misery, suffering and death in which he has no insight and no part. Christian essential Humanism is not weakened by the conscience of sin, for it preserves a participation of man to his own salvation in preserving his share of responsibility, of freedom and of worthiness by God’s will and through His grace. To such notions of the world and of man corresponds an adequate notion of life. Life is not a sweet and poetical dream, but not more a nightmare from which man would escape by all means. Life as God made it, created it, life is real and good. Life in man is a personal life, the life of a person at the image and at the resemblance of God, as the Bible puts it, of a person who is called to grow in consciousness, intensity and holiness of life. Such life is worth being lived now and for evermore. Eternity is not a void, but “the fulness of Him that filleth all in all” (Eph. 1:23).

One easily guesses many consequences in various directions of such doctrines when they are truly held and applied: a real world and a true life; a true and secure truth, a valuable and respected human personality, respected, as Jesus claims, not merely in those higher spheres of dignified men who do not feel in want of such support, but also, and even more in the lower classes, amongst those “little ones,” those minor persons whose essential worth before Christ, before God, is so
much the more to be preserved and helped that they are more in
danger to be scandalized, despised and crushed (Cf. Matth. 18: 6,
10 and par.).

One has already noted how those various features, those essentiales
of Christianity, to which others might be added, are all in directin
of God as well as they derive from Him, the God of Jesus Christ. Such
God is no blind fate, no unconditioned will, no capricious tyrant, but
a wise, true, faithful and holy God. God is the perfect person who
created persons and who orders to respect them as He does Himself
in all types, races or classes of humanity. The God of Jesus Christ is the
Heavenly Father who loves all men, the Father who does not wait in
His sovereign dignity an official repentance of the prodigal son, but
moves to encounter him and forgive him in love and joy.

And at last, but not least in essential Christianity, Jesus Christ,
the Mediator of such graces and salvation, Jesus Christ is not a
mythical appearance, but an incarnate, real, historical personality.
As he is presented in the Gospel, under various titles: Son of Man,
Son of God or others, he came essentially "not to be served, but to
serve, and to give Himself a ransom for many" (Mk. 10: 45). He is
the Redeemer of men, and of all men, His aim, as St. Paul puts it, is to
renew any man, from whatever extraction, "at the image of Him that
created him" (Eph. 3: 10), and the apostle chants: "There is neither
Jew nor Greeks, Scythian or Barbarian, there is neither bond nor free,
there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Jesus Christ"
(Gal. 3: 28; Eph. 3: 11).

Coming to Christ means conversion and a break from other con­
ceptions of God, of man, of life and of the world, as well as a renewal
and a new birth. It means to follow in His steps, to deny one's own
self as He did, to serve in the spirit of His service and of His sacrifice
on the Cross: a really social and holy service for God, the Father, and
for the promotion of human brotherhood.

Does not such a message, as Christians more or less faithfully hold
it and live it, keep its significance for any race, nation and man, either
in the east or in the West?

INFLUENCE OF WESTERN CULTURE
ON THE EAST

BY
RAMACHANDRA N. DANDKEAR

Let me, at the very outset, define the scope of my paper. An
attempt has been made in this paper to present a brief, objective,
historical survey of the intercourse between India and the West, and to
indicate, in a broad manner, the influence of Western culture on some
aspects of Indian life.

Normally two extreme views are held on this subject. On the one
hand, it has been suggested that, in the course of history, Indians have
lived and evolved their civilization almost in isolation. It is averred
either that there have been no substantial contacts with foreign coun­
tries; or that, even if there have been some such contacts, those
contacts have not influenced India's cultural development in any signi­
ficant way. The other view is that the basic indigenous culture of
India was poor and primitive and that whatever is rich, noble and
exalted in Indian culture is borrowed from the West. The real Indian
civilization is regarded just as a byproduct of the Macedonian and
Achaemenian contact. Both these views are patently unacceptable.

History shows that there has been a more or less uninterrupted
intercourse between India and the West from very early times, and that
Indian culture and Western culture have very often come in contact
with each other. Cultures, it should be remembered, are like living
organisms; and when they come in contact, they are bound to act
and react upon each other in a significant way. It has been rightly
pointed out that "Unchanging East" is a myth, and that, though
superficially East may appear static, on the deeper fundamental plane
it has proved to be remarkably dynamic. As for the second view, it
is necessarily partial and tendentious. Many European historians and
others who had come under their influence believed that Europe, being
the scene of the origin and growth of real culture, could alone be a
proper subject of history. They, therefore, deliberately refused to
study the history of Eastern civilizations. The erstwhile popular
assumption of Hellenistic origin of Indain drama, art, medicine, etc.,
for instance, was but an ego-centric illusion of the Western mind. The

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correct view would be that, in the course of history, Indian and Western cultures had influenced each other in several ways. How can the existence, nature and extent of the influence of one culture upon another be determined? Direct, specific and unequivocal evidence in this regard is obviously not always possible. We have often to depend on the evidence which is circumstantial and inferential. It is also not possible to state in very precise terms the nature and extent of such influence. One point needs to be specially emphasized in this connection. Similarities or resemblances between two cultures, however striking, are not always a sure test of the influence of one culture upon the other. Similarities may be accidental. Side-shoots, sprouting out from two different stems, are, not unfrequently, seen to approximate one another as a matter of course. Similar ideologies and practices may also evolve independently in two different areas. Similar problems faced by human intellect on similar background may independently produce similar results. Such similar-looking cultural growths are really 'parallel'. It is further not unlikely that influence from a common third source, and not mutual contact, is the cause of some resemblances. Some resemblances may, again, be only apparent and superficial. The apparently similar concepts may actually have been derived from entirely different contexts and on entirely different planes. Cosmic non-individualism of India, for instance, cannot by any means be regarded as similar to collectivist or socialist anti-individualism of the modern West. Similarly, the claim that the sages of ancient India had anticipated in their speculations some of the results of modern science (e.g. enormous number of years from the beginning of the creation to the present age; infinite number of worlds existing outside our own; presence of worlds even in the space of an atom; etc.) must be regarded as untenable. Lastly, it must be pointed out that partial resemblances are always deceptive.

We may, however, put forth some workable criteria for our present purpose. The Indian way of life and thought is essentially traditional in character. It is seen that even original thinkers have been chary of affirming the originality of their contributions; they have always tried to fit in their contributions into the traditional pattern. Whatever, therefore, seems not to belong to the traditional pattern may be regarded as the result of foreign influence. So too, whatever is peculiar to a particular author or school – whatever is generally not known or accepted before or after that author or school – may be the result of foreign influence. It might be further assumed that normally borrowing would happen in those spheres of life and thought in which India had not made sufficient advance. Generally speaking, no foreign borrowing or influence might be expected in connection with philosophy, religion, literature, etc. It has also to be remembered that the influence of one culture upon another may either be general and of a more or less permanent character, or it may be limited to a particular sphere of life and to a particular historical period. In many cases, Western ideas and ideals, being exotic, have failed to strike root in traditional India. What is, however, perhaps most important is that it should be possible to account for the phenomenon of influence rationally and in conformity with the history and cultural development of India.

The first principal landmark in the history of the intercourse between India and the West must be said to be represented by the obvious relationship between the Indus valley civilization and the contemporary cultures of Western Asia. A more or less uniform culture-complex is believed to have extended from the Mediterranean to the Indus in the third and the fourth millennia B.C. A little later Indo-European-speaking tribes from the West and the North migrated into the North-Western region of India. These people, popularly known as Vedic Aryans, had brought with them their own language, religion, and culture, which, in course of time, proved to be some of the most fundamental factors in the evolution of Indian culture. Words of Babylonian and Chaldean origin occurring in the Veda, rare as they are, have also to be understood as implying some contact between India on the one hand and Babylon and Chaldean on the other. Similarly, early Dravidian language and culture show unmistakable affinities with the prehistoric cultures of Anatolia, Armenia, and Iran. The Lycians of Asia Minor, in their inscriptions, called themselves Trimmlai, which word is presumably related to dramila or Tamil. A large number of ancient place-names in that region are shown to conform to Dravidian forms. The Hurrian and the Kassite languages also show great affinity with the Dravidian. These linguistic affinities between Western Asia and South India are clearly confirmed by cultural affinities. A more direct evidence is available of vigorous trade going on between the Phoenicians of the Levant and the merchants of Southern and Western India round about 975 B.C.

More significant, however, from our present point of view is perhaps the period of the contacts between India and Greece. It must be pointed out that in this connection Greece has to be understood in a wider sense as comprising Greece and Greek colonies in Asia Minor, Egypt, Italy and Sicily, while India has to be understood in a far too restricted sense as being coextensive only with the region of the Indus.
The connecting link between India and Greece in this early period was the Persian empire. There is a historical reference that Darius sent a Greek mercenary, called Scylax, to sail down the river Indus to its mouth, in about 510 B.C. It is not unlikely that Herodotus (born 484 B.C.), who gives several significant details about India, has utilized the accounts of Scylax's adventures. Ctesias (401 B.C.), another Greek who had travelled in India, wrote quite a lot about that country but his descriptions are rather uncritical. But even before the times of Darius, India seems to have heard and known of the Greeks. The great grammarian of Sanskrit, Panini (cir. 7th cent. B.C.), for instance, refers to the script of the Yavanas (Ionians). A mention may also be made here of the interesting tradition, which Eusebius attributes to Aristoxenus (330 B.C.) namely, that an Indian Pandit actually visited Athens and conversed with Socrates. The Indian Pandit, it is said, asked Soveots what he had been occupied with. On being told by Socrates that his work consisted in enquiring about the life of man, the Indian Pandit smilingly retorted that none could understand things human who had not understood things divine. It is generally believed that Alexander's raid on the Indus region (4th cent. B.C.) facilitated deeper and more extensive contacts between India and the West. But the raid itself did not make any mark in the history of Indian culture. The Hellenistic intrusion into India must be said to have really begun with Demetrius, the Greek King of Bactria, who crossed the Hindu Kush in 190 B.C. And, even after the Greek principalities in that region had come to an end, the Hellenistic influence on India continued through the "Philhellenic" Sakas, Parthians, and Kushanas (2nd cent. B.C. to 1st cent. A.D.).

During the first centuries A.D., Alexandria proved to be a great cosmopolitan cultural centre. According to a tradition, the Alexandrians honoured a Buddhist monk from Bhrigukaccha and listened to him with as much attention as to Saint Paul. There is also evidence of brisk trade and other contacts between South India and the Roman empire. Some Indian rulers are known to have dispatched embassies to the Roman court, and Roman colonies are said to have been established at Cannanore, Madura, etc. Christianity also made its way into India in the course of this period, though it does not seem to have then influenced the Indian way of life and thought in any significant way. Marco Polo's accounts of his Indian travels are historically important, but on the whole, there was, in the medieval period, a comparative lull in the cultural intercourse between India and the West.

On 20th May, 1498, the Portuguese Vasco de Gama sailed into Calicut, and there began what may be called the modern period in the history of the intercourse between India and the West. Of course, in this period we are more particularly concerned with the India-British contacts.

Out of the above-mentioned four periods in the history of the intercourse between India and the West, for the purpose of this paper, I have taken into account only the last three.

So far as Hellenistic contacts with India are concerned, broadly speaking, before Alexander's campaign, thought seems to have travelled mainly and quite understandably – from the East towards the West. Though positive evidence in this connection is mostly lacking, there is strong probability of Indian thought having influenced Greek philosophers. Chronology and historically demonstrable contacts would seem to support the assumption of such influence. Thales, the father of Greek philosophy, postulated water as the basic element. It is not impossible that in this he was influenced by the Vedic concept of primeval waters. Similarly the Upanisadic theory of one single Reality underlying the phenomenal manifoldness may be presumed to have been the source of the speculations of the Eleatic school. The entire body of the religio-philosophical and mathematical teachings of Pythagoras had been known in India already in the 6th century B.C., and the biographer of Pythagoras tells us that the latter had travelled extensively and had thereby become familiar with the thought of the Brahmans among others. The affinities between the Orphic school and India's transcendental philosophy are self-evident, and if any influence is to be presumed, India must be regarded as the source of that influence. The same thing may be said in connection with Neoplatonism on the one hand and Vedanta, Yoga and Buddhism on the other. In this context, one may usefully refer to the verdict of Clement of Alexandria who proclaimed that the Greeks had stolen their philosophy from the barbarians. According to Lucianus (2nd cent. A.D.) also, philosophy had been first cultivated in India before it came to Greece. Further, it is well known that gnosticism is often characterized as "Orientalism in Hellenic Mask."

As suggested above, the flow of culture definitely changed its course from the times of Alexander onwards. It was Western thought and culture which now began to influence the East. Some aspects of this influences, so far as it worked on India's cultural development, may be noted here.

The polity of the Mauryan age (4th century B.C.), as reflected in
the Arthasastra of Kautilya, exhibits certain features which are alien to the traditional political thought of India. According to the traditional view, the highest sanction in social and political matters belonged to Dharma. In the Indian theory of government, both Brahma, the spiritual authority (normally symbolized by the Brahmana Purohita), and Ksatra, the temporal power (normally symbolized by the Ksatra King), were, in the ultimate analysis, always subordinated to Dharma. Indeed, Sacerdotium and regnum were both regarded as but instruments of Dharma. As against this, according to the Arthasastra of Kautilya, from among the four sources of authority, namely, Dharma, civil and criminal law, custom, and royal edict, each succeeding one is superior in validity to each preceding one. This kind of absolute exaltation of the king’s authority was unknown to ancient Indian tradition. Nor can it be said to have been generally accepted in the post-Mauryan periods. It clearly marks a deviation from the cosmic non-individualistic ideology of India. It may, therefore, be presumed that Kautilya derived this concept of royal absolutism from the political ideas and ideals of the Persians and the Greeks. The intercourse between India and the West had become closer and the interchange of ideas more active and vigorous in the period immediately following Alexander’s Indian Campaign. And it is, indeed, not unlikely that, when Kautilya says that he has formulated his political theories on the basis of traditional sciences (śāstra) and actual practices (prayogas), the practices intended by him are the political practices obtaining in the Persian and the Greek empires. Incidentally, a reference may be made in this connection to the view of Stein that the chapter in Kautilya’s Arthasastra, which deals with the above-mentioned subject, bears a composite appearance and shows signs of having been remodelled in the light of Roman Imperial letters of a later time.

Another teaching of Kautilya, which does not seem to fit in well into the pattern of India’s traditional polity, relates to the vast bureaucratic governmental machinery with centralized control, and this the Mauryan state, which sought to plan, control and direct the entire social and economic life of the nation, departed fundamentally from the traditional practice of not interfering actively in the daily avocations of the people. In this matter, Kautilya must have obviously received inspiration from the Hellenistic concept of the State. As Rostovzeff says, through such radical centralization of government, Candragupta and Kautilya did more to Hellenise India than Demetrius and Menander.

Another field in which Hellenistic influence becomes perfectly evident is art. In Gandhara art, which is also significantly called Graeco-Buddhist art, the subject is Buddhist, while the style of execution is undeniably Hellenistic. This art was actually sponsored only after the direct Greek domination in the North-Western region had ended and was patronized mainly by the Sakas and the Kushanas who continued the tradition of their Hellenistic predecessors. The traditional cosmic non-individualistic outlook of the Indians did not encourage the sculptures of individuals, isolated figures. It must have been the contact with the anthropocentric West which had inspired the sculpture of the figures of the Buddha. Indeed, the religious penchant of Indian culture united with the aesthetic penchant of Hellenistic culture produced one of the most sublime and creative schools of art. It must, however, be pointed out that the later specimens of the Gandhara art were characterized by a lack of sympathy, sincerity, and spontaneity. The artists tended to indulge in a kind of mechanical mass-production of sculptural figures. Such mechanical approach and attitude were unknown in India, and their origin also has to be traced to Western influence.

The Western influence on ancient Indian coinage is equally conspicuous. A type of coins previously unknown to India came to be introduced by the Bactrian Greeks. These coins had the names and portraits of the rulers inscribed upon them. This may be presumed to have been the result of the influence of the anthropo-centric West. The earlier Indian coins had been mostly punch-marked. The Hellenistic character of this new coinage becomes evident from two facts: first, instead of the figures of the rulers, these coins sometimes show figures of divinities belonging to the Greek pantheon. And second, the names, Dinara and Brahma, given to some of these coins are obviously Indian forms of Greek Dinarius and Drachma. The standardization of the new coinage in respect of form, character, and weight was also something which had been unknown in India in the earlier periods, and must, therefore, be presumed to have been due to foreign influence.

Astronomy may be mentioned as still another sphere in which Indian thought was influenced by Greek and Roman theories. In this connection, the view expressed by Varahamihira is highly significant. This distinguished Indian writer on astronomy of the 6th century A.D. says: “The science of astronomy is well-established among the Yavanas (Ionians). Therefore, though they are barbarians, they must be respected like our own ancient sages.” Alberuni refers to another writer, earlier than Varahamihira, who records high praise of Greek
The contacts between India and the West, which, in the earlier periods of history, had been more or less occasional and brief, have tended to become steady and permanent in recent years. Consequently, the influence of the West on this Indian way of life and thought, in modern times, has proved to be comparatively wider and deeper. It is but natural that, in this context, one thinks primarily of the Indo-British intercourse during the last two hundred years or so. A few characteristics of the Indo-British impact may be usefully stated here. To begin with, it would be seen that the British influence began to be introduced into India from above downwards. The large masses of the Indians remained almost unaffected by that influence, at least in the initial stages of the intercourse between the British and the Indians. Whatever influence there had been was, accordingly, only superficial. Attention must also be drawn to the attitude of the early Europeans who came to India. They were all inspired by a purely mercenary and adventurist spirit. They looked upon India as colonies d'exploitation and not as colonies de peuplement. In this respect, they differed fundamentally from the ancient Indians who had colonised in the different regions of South-East Asia. By way of contrast, two features of this ancient Indian colonization need to be particularly emphasized. Firstly, these colonies had little or no political connection with the metropolitan India; and secondly, these colonies never entertained the idea of economically exploiting those various regions for the sake of the mother-country. On the other hand, those regions themselves became independent Indias in miniature.

The dealings with the Indians of the early British officers were actuated by a sense of racial superiority and scorn for everything Indian. Their ignorance of the heritage of India and of the East was colossal. Macaulay was perhaps the most shining example of this kind of racial and cultural arrogance. When such an attitude is in evidence, the process of cultural give-and-take is necessarily retarded. A tribute must, however, be paid, at this stage, to the great service rendered by the European Orientalists in India and in the West to the cause of the wider and fuller appreciation of India's art, philosophy and literature. But, in actual practice, the influence of the Orientalists was quite limited in extent. On the whole, therefore, the early intercourse between the English and the Indians may be said to have proved sterile. As a matter of fact, neither then nor later did the English make any attempt—though they were in a position to do so—to develop a new form of civilization, a sort of Indo-British civilization, in India. Whatever influence India has received from the West, during this period, is mostly due to the initiative of the Indians themselves. While considering the impact of the English on India, one must also not forget that Indian civilization and Western civilization are essentially different in ethos. As indicated elsewhere, the attitude of the Indians and their approach to the various problems of life were quite distinct from those of the West. Many features of the Western civilization failed to be appreciated by the Indian mind; they were exotic and did not strike root in the Indian soil.

The reaction of the Indians to the impact of Western culture in modern times may be said to have been fourfold. There were some Indians who had been completely swayed by Western way of life and thought. Their entire outlook was westernized so much so that they were dominated by a sense of revolt against Indian tradition. Indeed, as converts to the new ideology they exhibited greater fanaticism than the Westerners themselves. The other extreme was represented by the people who wanted to repudiate everything that was foreign. These people believed that there could be nothing richer and nobler than the traditional Indian culture and that those who were even slightly inclined towards Western way of life and thought were paving the way to perdition for India. Their reaction to the impact of the West often bordered on obscurantism. Even at the remotest hint of anything foreign they withdrew themselves into the closed shell of ancient traditions. The third kind of reaction was resignation to the new situation. There was a class of people—and the majority of people belonged to this class—who passively accepted the things as they came. They did not bother themselves about either the mending or the ending of the new dispensation. The thought-leaders from among the newly educated middle class, however, saw the possibility of a fruitful blending of Eastern and Western cultures. They might have differed from one another in respect of the emphasis in the new synthesis on one culture or the other. But they generally aimed at evolving a new culture which would be essentially Indian in spirit though Western in form and expression. They also hoped that, as the result of this dynamic synthesis, they would be able to fight away the Western conquerors by means of the very weapons which the latter had made available to them.
Some of the actual results of the influence of the English on Indian life may now be briefly stated here. With the foundation in 1857, under the auspices of the English, of the three Universities at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, the doors of knowledge may be said to have been, for the first time, opened to all Indians irrespective of sex, class or creed. For instance, the study of the real language of Indian culture, namely, Sanskrit, which had till then been restricted to a particular class, could now be pursued by anybody in the Universities and the secondary schools. This was, indeed, a tremendous experiment to universalize education—at least in theory. The content and methodology of the new education were also mostly derived from the English pattern. Education, it was realized, must inculcate among the students a spirit of inquiry as against the traditional spirit of acceptance. Mere line-by-line study of ancient texts, intensive as it had been, was found to be static and non-productive. An attempt was, therefore, made, under Western inspiration, to make the study of any subject dynamic and broad-based by adopting critical, comparative, and historical methods. As a result, the new scientific literature was not restricted to being merely interpretative; it also tended to become creative. The aim of education, it came to be reiterated, was not, as formerly understood, only the conservation of ancient knowledge; it was also the acquisition—and more particularly the creation—of new knowledge. The scope of study in schools and universities was, accordingly, considerably enlarged by the addition of new subjects.

In the field of public administration, several centuries after the Mauryas, the British again sponsored a vast bureaucracy with centralized control. However, their two most remarkable contributions in this sphere must be said to be the setting up of all-India services and the insistence on the absolute authority and universality of law. These two went a long way in integrating India into a politically homogeneous unit.

India has had and continues to have an agrarian economy. But the industrial revolution, which the country has witnessed during recent years, is, without doubt, wholly due to the impact of the West. The impact of the West and the world-situation generally have rudely shocked India out of her traditional non-activism. The Indians have now realized that they will not survive the new global struggle for existence unless they industrialize their country and that they cannot industrialize their country unless they learn the sciences and technology of the West. Contrary to her traditional spirit, India is now aiming at raising the material standard of living of her people.

As for the influence of the West in the sphere of religion, I do not want to refer, in this paper, to the proselytizing activities of the Christian missionaries in India. Nor do I want to say anything about the ineffective attempts of the Portuguese to evolve a sort of an Indian-Christian civilization. I want to mention quite another kind of influence. Though the traditional religious life of India seems to be generally unaffected by the impact of the West, Western thought has influenced the religious ideology of modern India—at least at certain levels—in various subtle ways. This influence has worked in four main directions—rationalization, liberalization, universalization and activisation. Modern Indian thinkers have sought to reinterpret India's religious-philosophical ideas and ideals in terms of modern knowledge and aspirations and thereby to appeal to the rational propensities of the Western and Western-educated Indian intellectuals. They have tried to dispel the general misunderstanding that Indian religions are crude conglomerations of superstitious beliefs and primitive practices. India's religious-philosophical culture, they claim, would provide an effective answer both to the metaphysical curiosity as well as the spiritual quest of the modern world. This was, indeed, what Swami Vivekananda did—obviously under Western influence; and this is what Radhakrishnan is doing now. Attempts were also made, again under the influence of Western thought, through movements like the Brahmo Samaj, to rid Hindu religion of its exclusive character. Caste distinctions and worship of specific gods, which had been the hallmark of this exclusiveness, were discarded, and all persons, irrespective of sex, caste and creed, were brought together within, the larger brotherhood of bhakti in respect of a universal godhead. In some cases, Indian theology was sought to be actually brought close to Western theology. Indians have been traditionally actuated by a spirit of tolerance in the field of both thought and practice. They were generally always willing to sacrifice the petty superficial differences in creed and cult at the altar of the ultimate spiritual goal. It was, therefore, by no means difficult to emphasise the liberal outlook and universal aspect of Hinduism so as to suit the new situation. But perhaps the most significant change which Western impact brought about in the religious sphere was the social value with which religion came to be so emphatically reinvested. Religion, it was asserted, must not aim merely at individual salvation. Service to society was as much a religious duty as service to god. Religion and social reforms must not be regarded as antithetical. Indeed, the humanistic aspect of religion must be allowed to dominate over its denominational aspect. Such views definitely reactivated and re-vitalised
Indian religion and a new missionary zeal became evident in the sphere of religion, as exemplified by the Rammakrishna Mission and the Arya-Samaj.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that, even in their recent struggle for independence, the Indians received their main inspiration from the West. For one thing, the contact with the West helped India to regain her lost individuality. A new sense of nationalism and social solidarity was engendered among the Indians and spurred them on in their freedom struggle. Whether that struggle took the form of constitutional agitation or of secret revolutionary insurrection or of moral non-violent resistance, the leaders of the struggle invariably derived the impetus from the writings and doings of Westerners like Rousseau, Mill, Mazzini, Tolstoy, Thoreau and Ruskin. Of course, in order to be able effectively to appeal to the patriotic instinct of their followers the leaders had to fall back on the teachings of the Gita and the Buddha and on the heroic examples from the Epics and history of India.

What is the prospect of the influence of the West which has been working in India in recent years? As indicated above, a new form of social compromise seems to be evolving out of this Western impact. The Indians are avidly experimenting with the various economic, political and social systems and thought-patterns of the West, but they are also becoming keenly aware of the serious crises which the individualistic, intellectualistic, and activistic West is facing today. They realize that, if they do not become divorced from the essential spirit of what may be called Indianism, they will still be able to avoid those crises. A new society with Western equipment seems inevitable, but in order that this new society should be enabled to survive the crisis of the modern age it must have an Indian soul.

Gandhiji, indeed, sounded a timely note of warning to his compatriots when he told them that they might allow winds from many quarters to blow over them but that they must not allow themselves to be swept off their feet by those winds.

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THE WESTERN INFLUENCE ON SIR MUHAMMAD IQBAL'S THOUGHT

BY

ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL

It happens only a few times in a century, and perhaps even less, that a great personality either from East or from West tries to combine the most characteristic features of both Eastern and Western culture. One of these outstanding personalities in our century is the late Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the spiritual father of Pakistan, a man whose work has interested Western scholars more than that of any other contemporary oriental thinker. In him "East and West met though it would be too much to say that they were united". (R.A. Nicholson)

Iqbal was born in 1873 in the Panjab, in NW India where, then, the first attempts had been made to reconcile Islamic thought with Western civilisation. He had the great luck to find a teacher like the famous Orientalist Sir Thomas Arnold who introduced him in both Eastern and Western thought, and gave him - who had already shown his skill as a poet in his native tongue, Urdu - the opportunity of finishing his studies in Europe. Iqbal, whose first lyrical poetry contains inter alia translations from Longfellow, Emerson, and Tennyson, became, in 1905, a student of the Hegelian philosopher McTaggart in Cambridge, and became deeply submerged in Hegelian thought which he, nevertheless, criticised in the later period of his life as the produce of artificial reasonment - Hegel is characterized in the Peyam-i Mashriq (1923) as "a hen that by dint of enthusiasm lays eggs without assistance from the cock." - After finishing his studies in England, Iqbal went to Munich where he was graduated with a thesis on the Development of Metaphysics in Persia, in 1908, a work which shows not only a deep knowledge of important, and in the West hitherto almost unknown Muslim thinkers, but also an astonishing insight into Christian theology from Thomas Aquinas up to Harnack, as well as into the problems of the History of Religions. - It must be confessed that Iqbal, after the great spiritual conversion which took place after 1908, at last in 1911, changed his view in many a point completely; but the solid knowledge of European thought was useful for him in all his later poietical and philosophical work. It is especially the Vitalist philosophy which
seems to have impressed him most. In the *Asrār-i Ḵūdā* (Secrets of the Self) which appeared in 1915 and caused an immense shock among devout Muslims and pseudo-mystics, Iqbal shows for the first time his Philosophy of the Ego, of the Self which is not, as pantheistic mystics want, to be extinguished in the ocean of the Absolute Being, but is to be developed by means of love, working, and restless striving. In the beautiful Persian couplets of this work as well as in his following Persian and Urdu poetry, until the last verses published after the poet's death in 1938, the influence of Vitalist philosophy is clearly to be seen. Not the Being, but the Becoming is the ideal of Iqbal; not an Absolute Neuter Godhead but a personal God who answers man's prayers; not a man who is bound by the strings of blind predetermination but who is a coworker with God, able to change his own destiny. We meet here as well as in the amous *Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* which were given in 1928—ideas of Eucken and Lotze, and even of Friedrich von Hügel, though I do not know whether Iqbal has studied the work of the famous Catholic writer, or whether the affinity is only an accidental one. Bergson is the favorite philosopher of Iqbal who, in a very ingenious way, has tried to explain by means of the Bergsonian idea of the two levels of time the outwardly incompatible words of the Koran who says in one verse that the world has been created in a single moment (i.e. non-serial Divine time), and in another verse that it has been come into existence in 6 days (human serial time).

The greatest affinity, however, which often has been exaggerated, shows Iqbal with Nietzsche, “the mad-man in the European chinsashop’ as he calls him. The anti-Christian as well as the anticlassical attitude of Nietzsche was quite sympathetic to the Indian Muslim who had even, at the end of his life, intended to write a book in the style of Nietzsche’s *Also sprach Zarathustra*, called *The Book of an unknown (or forgotten) Prophet*. But as much as he admired the German philosopher—who he locates in the Heavenly journey pictured in the *Javidname* (1932) beyond the Saturnic sphere of Heaven—so much condemned he his anti-religiosity in itself. Neither the idea of the Eternal Return (as opposite to his own teleologic view of history) nor the will to Power can satisfy Iqbal’s idealism. Will to power must be, according to Iqbal’s later philosophy, will to love, and to the unfolding of the good potencies of the Self. The Nietzschean Übermensch is only for a certain moment an ideal for Inbal; but Superman’s denial of God is not tolerable for the Muslim thinker. The superman he wants to see is the Perfect Man of Islamic mysticism, personified once in the Prophet Muhammad; and the highest rank this Perfect Man can reach is that of *abdullhu, slave of God”, that means, that he is always acting in complete harmony with his Creator, and never forgets the Divine command. Nietzsche, as well as the Russians after the revolution, has remained, as Iqbal expresses it, in the 1a, the negation of God, without reaching the *illa* (the affirmation of God’s being in the second half of the Islamic Šeido. Whatever Iqbal’s criticism of Nietzsche may be, it is very interesting to see that quite similar ideas (only devoid of the Islamic framework) have been recently expressed by Rudolf Pannwitz, no doubt the best interpreter of Nietzsche in our time.

But even a deeper influence of Nietzsche—though outwardly not as visible as his—was that of Goethe on Iqbal. In his first lyrics, the poet has praised Goethe, and the *Peyam-i Mashriq* (published in 1923) was thought as an answer of the East to the *West-Ostlicher Divan*, similar to him in its form, containing even a very free rendering of the Goethean *Mahomets Gesang* into Persian verse. Goethe is, just like Iqbal’s Eastern spiritual guide, Maulana Rumi, “not a prophet but has a book”—i.e. the *Faust*, this drame of striving, longing, and love. It is perhaps that Faust which was admired most in European literature by Iqbal, who found his own ideas of love and development in it. Its *Prologue in Heaven* has been imitated in the *Prologue in Heaven of the Javidname*, the opus magnum of Iqbal (1932), and in this work, which was thought to be an oriental Divina Commedia and shows some traces of Dante’s influence, the poet takes the nom-de-plume “Zinderud”, Living Stream—no doubt an allusion to the symbolism of Mahomet Gesang where the prophetical spirit is compared to a living stream. Not to forget that the personality of Satan who plays an utmost important role in Iqbal’s work shows traces of Goethe’s Mephistopheles.

In Satan, the fallen angel, the dynamic force in life, we can also see the influence of Milton whose *Paradise Lost* was deeply admired by Iqbal who even intended to write a similar work. The idea that the Fall of Adam enabled him to work in this world, and was the cause for man’s development, leading him from paradisical innocence to real life and strife, is both Miltonian and Koranic. The Koran attests that Adam is the khalifa of God, his vicegerent on earth who has to work as well as possible in order to give back the property of God to its owner in a good estate—an idea which has often been forgotten in Islam because of quietistic currents, and which was emphasized by Iqbal who never got tired in preaching the Gospel of everlasting activity which he found both in Western philosophy and in the right interpretation.
It is astonishing how he was able to use for his goal even the results of modern science. He was a great admirer of Einstein whose theory of Relativity and the idea the Universe is limitless but finite were found to agree completely with the Koranic teaching.

But all those deep Western influence did not blind Iqbal's eye to the dangers of a complete surrender to Western civilization. On the contrary, his work is filled with sharp criticism of Western thought, and more that that, Western politics. We must confess that some of his political views are one-sided, and belong to a passed historical situation. For Iqbal, the West is, in its present situation, the personification of intellectualism, without the spark of Divine love, and therefore dangerous, satanic. East knows the Divine love but is submerged in sweet dreams, and is not aware of the dangers of Western infiltration. It is inclined to an imitation of the outward form of Western life without understanding its inner meaning. The outbursts of the poet against modern Turkey and Iran must be understood from this point of view. He himself acknowledged gratefully the methodical work of Western thinkers, and the education he had received there. But the fact that the West "crucifies the spirit of Christ every day" by unsocial behaviour and colonisatory methods - this fact, expressed in the javidname by the spirit of Tolstoy, has caused the bitterest attacks of the poet-philosopher.

And on the other hand, Iqbal was not acquainted very well with "the humanistic foundations of European culture," and his criticism of Plato and Platonism is "sometimes lacking in breadth." He is, faithful to the essentially dynamic and completely anticlassical spirit of the Koran, far away from Greek philosophy. Perhaps it was this radical one-sidedness of Iqbal in this fundamental point of view which gave him the possibility to open new ways for the development of Islam which had, under the influence of even that philosophical spirit, forgotten its orginal dynamic character, and forgotten also the word of the Koran (Sura 13, verse 11) "Verily God does not change the destiny of a people unless it does not change itself." Iqbal has used all the life-giving forces he found in East and West for the changing of the destiny of his people, just as he sings in the Peyam-i Mashriq:

Open thine eyes, if thou hast eyes to see!
Life is the building of the world to be!

SESSION III

Themes

a) The Influence of Oriental Culture on the Occident
b) The Influence of Oriental Religions on the Occident

THE INFLUENCE OF THE EASTERN RELIGIONS ON THE EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL AND SPIRITUAL LIFE

BY

FRIEDRICH HEILER

The Eastern religions had a considerable influence on the European spiritual and intellectual life, though not on the Christian Churches and - in the whole - on the theological systems. It is mostly an Elite of broad-minded intellects to whom the greatness and depth of the Eastern religious world was revealed. In the main, the West was influenced by three religious groups: Chinese wisdom, Indian mysticism and, Buddhism which resulted from it and Islamic Sufism.

1. Chinese religion first was propagated in the Occident by the Jesuie China-missionaries. They instilled their own enthusiasm into the circles of the enlightened. In a book edited by four Jesuite Fathers 1687 in Paris, K'ung fu-tzu ist praised in such terms as "the wisest above all others", "the Master of moral philosophy as well as of politics"; in their opinion, there never was a European philosopher of such authority as K'ung-fu-tzu possessed; they do not consider him to be in contradiction to the doctrine of the Gospel. Leibniz, frequently exchanging letters with the Jesuite China-Missionaries, expressed the desire that Chinese missionaries might be sent to the West, who "could instruct it concerning the value and the practice of natural theology", as well as Western missionaries for the revealed religion had to be sent to the East. Out of this mutual exchange was to come the "great harmony" of a peaceful world-wide empire. In the same tenor was Christian Wolff's famous Academic-speach "De Sinarum Philosophia practica." (1721) He praised "the very virtuous and learned Confucius" as the "restorer of the Chinese world-wisdom" who "had come as
a gift from the divine Providence to the Chinese," "to save China from ruin." A demonstration of his high wisdom was found by Wolff, especially in the fact that his doctrines were in concordance with the natural intellect. Wolff ascribes it to Providence, that we came to know the word-wisdom of the Chinese just now, when it is a regrettable fact that most of those calling themselves Christians are very far from Christian virtue." Voltaire, too, joined those who admired Confucian ethics and Chinese culture in general "The greatest of our Saints did never formulate a more heavenly principle than Confucius, when he wrote: "Heaven has gifted me with Virtue, Man can not hurt me," K'ung-fu-tzu's morality is, in the eyes of Voltaire "as pure, as severe, and, at the same time, as human as that of Epicet." He found with K'ung-fu-tzu especially that what he missed in the Christian Church, i.e. religion and ethics based on reason, without revelation, mystery, and miracle. During the period of Encyclopaedism, French intellectual life was greatly influenced by the Chinese wisdom of life; as well as at the time of the enlightenment, German intellectual life was under the influence of Chinese poetry. To the Occidental rationalists, K'ung-fu-tzu with Socrates and Muhammad became a model of natural and reasonable religion. Such predilection for Chinese ideals and ideas became the use, that one was justified in speaking of quite a "Chinoiserie" in literature; the reaction did not fail to come. The ageing Goethe was deeply attracted by the deeper mystic side of the Chinese spirit. The fact is proved by his reproduction "From the Chinese" and his poems "Chinese-German Seasons and Times of the day."

Only in the nineteenth century Lao-tzu's Tao-te-ching, a book of deepest mystic wisdom, was made available to the Occident, then lost in admiration. In a lecture in a Parisian Academy, Abel Rémusat had stated that Lao-tzu was related to Pythagoras and Platon. Later on, one translation chased the other in the Western World, and soon there followed numerous reproductions. The translators were not thrifty with words of highest admiration. The American scholar P. Carus characterized Lao-Tzu as being "one of the most astonishing thinkers of Mankind." His book bears "comparison with the holy scriptures of Buddhism and the New Testament": even: "the likeness of Lao-tzu's, Buddha's and Christ's doctrines renders the book indispensable to every person interested in religion." Others compared the idea of Lao-tzu with those of Meister Eckhart. One of the latest translators, Erwin Rouissele, having spent many years in China and studied the wisdom of the Chinese, calls the Tao-te-ching "a unique book the spiritual history of Mankind" and states: "This book is one of the few books of Mankind, where the Deity takes off her veils and reveals herself to those willing to listen — and only to those." "Because it is valid beyond the limits of time and space, the spirit of Lao-tzu will manifest itself even in centuries still to come." Even Christian theologians admiringly bow before the greatness of this mystic. The Roman catholic systematist Herman Schell confessed: "Among all the writings, the domain of the inspiration of the Old and New Testament excepted, where Mankind deposited the painstakingly obtained results of religious research and left them as a legacy for future generations, there probably could not be found a single one worthy to contend for the prime with Lao-tzu's booklet. The Protestant Professor of Old Testament, Julius Grill, because of his profound knowledge of the language one of the best Western interpreters of the Tao-te-ching, perceived the fact that we are in what concerns Lao-tzu "confronted with one of the most remarkable facts in the history of the human intellect." "He is outstanding among the misjudged great personalities in the history of mankind." In Grill's opinion, Chinese mysticism as manifested in Lao-tzu did rise above the legislation and prophecy of the Old Testament to attain the clear summits where the ethical conception of the New Testament stands. Grill was convinced that he could prove the fact "that in the work of Lao-tzu we encounter a strange anticipation of the ethical fundamental ideas of Christ." He discovered 81 parallels to the New Testament and thus was brought to the conviction, that this booklet was apt to "induce the theologians to a renewed examination of the idea of revelation."

The loneliness of Lao-tzu proved itself to be, as Grill says, "an integral part of his power." "The fact that he never has been completely understood in his time, might signify that his time is still coming, that he is not a man and a name of the past, but a present and future power. He is more modern than modern people and more full of life than is a lot of living persons."

2. To a far greater extent has the Western intellectual world come under the magnetic influence of the Indian religion. The French adventurer Anquetil Duperron (1731-1805), having entered the British colonial army in order to make himself acquainted with the wisdom of the parsees, brought back to Europe a Persian translation of the Vedic Upanishads. This translation had been made by order of the Mogul prince Dārā-Shikoh in 1656; because of it, he was ordered to be beheaded by his own brother, Aurangzab, 1801. He translated the characteristic title Upanekat (spoiled, or Upanishad) id est secretum tegendum, opus ipsa in India rarissimum
that the true, the real has forever been in existence and only intelligit, Deus fít. This translation was for Schopenhauer a prayer book—foreveryday use. He praised it as a “production of the highest human wisdom.” “How the Oupnek’at is breathing the holy spirit of the Vedes! How one is moved to the depths of one’s whole being by this spirit, as soon as one has become acquainted with the Persian Latin of this unique book! On every page one is confronted with deep, original and sublime thoughts while high and holy earnest is radiating from the whole book. It is the most gratifying, the most soul-lifting reading (the original texts excepted) to be found all over the world. It has been the consolation of my life and will console me in the hour of my death.” In the same way, the philosopher Paul Deussen (kiel) understood the Upanishads. He detected in the Upanishads “if not the most scientific, but the most intimate and most direct instruction concerning the deepest secret of existence,” “philosophical conceptions, which could not meet their counterpart in India nor probably anywhere else.” He put the Upanishads on the same level with the New Testament, he was convinced of the fact, that “these two highest manifestations of religious consciousness in no way contradict each other, but complete each other in a most beautiful way.” Malvida von Meysenburg, too, influenced by Schopenhauer and Deussen, made use of the Upanishads as Prayerbook. Every night in giving the benediction to Olga, a girl she had taken to her home as a daughter, she uttered the “Great Word” Tat tvam asi. She, too, praised the Upanishads in hymnal words: “We are granted a look into a deep, wonderful revelation of the mysteries of existence—that the true, the real has forever been in existence and only manifests itself restlessly and under always changing forms.” If the mysticism of Old India were widely spread, she hoped for a moral rebirth of the whole occidental world. “If only there were made room for the conviction that we are all one, that Brahma is in every being, black, white or yellow, that it is in every animal, in every plant, in shot in the whole creation—the results would be immense, I strongly believe.”

Houston Stewart Chamberlain praised the vedantic wisdom. It seemed to him so “beautiful and full of unity” because there was no discrepancy between Religion and Philosophy.

The Bhagavadgītā was likewise enthusiastically received by great German scholars. August Wilhelm Schlegel edited the original version together with a Latin translation. In the prologue, he greeted the unknown poet with exalted words: “Foremost, I greet thee, worthy of adoration, holiest seer and prophet of the divine! By means of whose oracular words of revelation the mind is uplifted to all that is sublime, eternal and divine, experiencing a feeling of inexpressible bliss I always shall adore the imprints of thy feet.”

Wilhelm von Humboldt, himself an expert in Sanscrit, wrote a dissertation for an academy on this holy poem. He confessed to a friend, “It probably is the most and deepest sublime humanity has to offer.” “I did read the Indian poem for the first time, and, in reading it, felt incessantly grateful to destiny, for having let me live to know this work.”

Another German translator, Fr. Lorinser, thought himself to be able to prove that the author of the Bhagavadgītā was indebted for “his purest and most highly praised doctrines” to the New Testament. He characterizes it as “the most beautiful and sublime didactic poem; it might be considered as one of the noblest flowers of pagan wisdom.” The French author Simone Weill confessed: “When I did read these beautiful words sounding so very Christian, it happened to me that I was overcome by the feeling that we were owing to religious truth much more than the applause we usually give to a beautiful work of poetry.”

Besides these two great documents of Indian wisdom, other mystical works of Indian origin were enthusiastically interpreted in the occident: the Gitagovinda by Friedrich Rückert and, lately, the Bhagavatapurāṇa by Walter Eidlitz, who, during a stay of several years in India and under the spiritual guidance of a guru originating from Germany, became an enthusiasical herald of the Kṛṣṇa-Mysticism. There, too, ought to be mentioned other poetical works, likewise impregnated with the pious spirit of India. When they were known in Europe, a storm of enthusiasm broke loose among the greatest German poets: the tragedy Sakuntalā by Kalidāsa was praised by Herder, Schiller, Goethe and Wilhelm von Humboldt, Kalidāsa’s poem Meghadūta (The messenger of the clouds) by Goethe.

Great Indian personalities of the dying nineteenth and the present century were enthusiastically received in the West: Ramakṛṣṇa was presented in a congenial way by Max Müller and Romain Rolland. The literary, dramatic and philosophical works of Rabindranath Tagore in the occidental translation did find an immense number of enthusiastic readers. Romain Rolland and a number of other writers made Mahātmā Gāndhī accessible to the western mind. The American John Haynes Holmes confesses: “If I believed in re-birth, I should—I mention
Wilhelm Hauer, who strived for an indogermanic Religion, combining Farquhar.

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the Iridian poet and the man of politics:

be able to throw upon

singularly partial and

convinced I become that the light which the Indian religious genius will

in due respect—see in Mahātmā Gāndhi the Christ returned to our

world.”

In the finishing lines of his work Romain Rolland apostrophes both the Indian poet and the man of politics: “O Tagore, Gandhi, your streams of India, encircling in a double embrace the Orient and the Occident—the one a tragedy of heroic action, the other a dream of light—both an emanation of the grace of God towards the earth ‘

the earth broken up by the ploughshare of brutal force, o spread it, the divine seed.”

Not only the “Free thinkers” of the West, but even occidental India missionaries have been deeply touched by the Indian piety. Some of them became interpreters and heralds of it, see Pope, Macnicol, Farquhar. Others were totally taken in by its influence, namely Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, who strived for an indogermanic Religion, combining the elements of Indian and German mysticism. Others believed less in a mission from the Christian Occident for India, and more in a mission from the religious India for the occident. The Anglican missionary J.C. Winslow declared:

“Rather it is true to say that we of the West cannot do without India; and the more I understand of India, the more profoundly convinced I become that the light which the Indian religious genius will be able to throw upon Christian thought and life will be almost revolutionary in character, and reveal our present understanding of them as singularly partial and inadequate.”

A similar mission for India was stated by a learned Hindu at the “World Congress for Liberal Christianity and Religions Progress” in Berlin 1910:

“India as it is to-day has a message for the world and for the Occident: the triple message of the direct union with the self-revealing mind, of the synthesis of the world religions, which combines Yoga or subjective fellowship with the Gospel of all great prophets, and of the fraternity of mankind, which has to be considered as being of the Son of God.” (Vasvani)

Buddhism has had no less importance for the Occident. It was at first introduced to Christian countries in the form of a saintly legend. The legend of Barlaam and Joasaph is nothing but the legend of the Buddha; it migrated—with the addition of a faint Christian coloring—via Persia, Syria an Byzantium so the occident. Under the name of Joasaph (Bodhisattva, adapted to the Syrian language) the Buddha became a Christian Saint, whose memory is celebrated every year, as well in the Menologion of the Greek Church as in the Martyrologium Romanum. Indeed, the likeness between the Christian and the Buddhistic ideal of a Saint is so strong, that the medieval Venetian traveller of Asia, Marco Polo, to whom the occident is indebted for its first precise knowledge of Buddhism, could justly declare: “If Buddha had been a Christian, he would have become a great Saint of our Lord Jesus Christ; because his life has been so pure and saintly.” In recent days, an important number of great occidental minds have been deeply impressed by the personality and the doctrine of Buddha. The “first apostle of Buddhism in Germany” was Schopenhauer; in the belief that the Buddha and he himself were teaching the same doctrines, he put a Tibetan Buddha-statuette on his desk. Under the influence of Schopenhauer, Richard Wanger felt himself to be drawn towards the Buddha; to Mathilde Wesendonck he made the confession that, unvoluntarily, he had become a Buddhist. “Buddhism”, he says, “presents a conception of the world compared with which every other dogm must appear paltry and narrow.” Though he dropped his plan to write a musical tragedy about Buddha, to be entitled “The Victorious”, buddhistic motives are to be found in “Tristan und Isolde” and in “Parsifal”. Even Nietzsche’s book “Umwertung aller Werte” contains a hymn in praise of Buddhism. He found it to be “a hundred times more realistic than Christianity.” Anatole France saw in the Buddha “the best adviser and sweetest comforter of suffering mankind,” Leopold Ziegler characterized him as the prototype of the Protestant. To the Philosopher Hans Driesch (Leipzig), “Buddhism as a religion and metaphysics, and Christianity are standing side by side, being of equal value.” To the Germanist Bruno Pertzold “the pure water of the Mahayana can still fortify and refresh Mankind.”

When the 19th century came to an end, an regular campaign to propagate Buddhism in the Occident was started; at first by individuals like Präsidualrat Theodor Schulz, who saw in Buddhism a possible ferment for a future regeneration of the religious consciousness in the realms of European culture, the English married couple T.W. and Caroline Rhys Davids (they were well-known scholars who constituted the Pali-Text-Society and, thus, did much to make the Theravada-Buddhism known), the Berlin medical Doctor Paul Dahlke, the Landgerichtsrat Georg Grimm (Munich), the Bacteriologist Hans Much (Hamburg), the congenial translator of the Sutta-Pitakam Karl Eugen Neumann, the Danish author of buddhistic novels Karl Gjellerup and others. Some Germans entered as buddhistic monks a Ceylonese monastery. Its administrator was Bhikku Nyautlioka (A. Gueth), who had edited a translation of canonic Palitexts. Buddhist societies constituted
themsevles; the Mahabodhi Society, working from its center in Calcutta not only for a restoration of Buddhism in India, but aiming to spread Buddhistic ideas in Western countries, the Buddhist Society in England and the Society “Les amis du Bouddhisme”, founded by the American Constant Loundsberry, with its Journal “La pensee bouddhique”, and the American Society “Fellowship following Buddha.” A Buddhist monastery was established in London, and in Berlin-Frohnau was founded a home for Buddhistic exercises. In England as well as in Germany there exist organized Buddhistic communities. The most important of them is the “Altbuddhistische Gemeinde” with its journal “Yana”. Maya Keller-Grimm, the daughter of George Grimm, is its leader, a really saintly woman. Besides the Theraváda-communities there are others, adhering to the Mahayana, for instance the “Order of the Arya Maitreya Mandala.” This order wants to proclaim in the West the fact that the Buddha is inhabiting every human being.

Even Islamic Sufism has influenced German intellectual life at the end of the 18th and in the first part of the 19th century. The “Westöstlicher Divan” of Goethe’s has become the magna charta of Oriental search and Oriental enthusiasm. But although Goethe has received certain mystical ideas of Sufism this influence has been more an ethical and poetical one than a religious one. The same statement has to be obliged to the great oriental scholar and poet Friedrich Rückert.

But what Goethe has said with regard to the Persina poetry we have to say in our days regarding oriental religion as well as philosophy and poetry:

Gottes ist der Orient,
All the East belongs to God,
Gottes ist der Oekzident,
All the West belongs to God,
Nord- und südliches Gelände
Northern and all southern lands
ruhn im Frieden seiner Hände.
Are reposing in his hands.

**THE INFLUENCE OF EASTERN CULTURE**

**ON THE WEST**

**BY**

**HAJIME NAKAMURA**

Before Eastern culture came to be known to the West through direct contact in modern times, the influence of Eastern culture on the West was more or less an archaeological one. That an interchange of culture actually occurred, may be seen from the relations between Mesopotamia and the Indus civilization. With regard to the period before Alexander’s invasion of India, however, there is little evidence of the influence of Eastern culture upon the West, in so far as literary documents are concerned.

It is still a matter of controversy whether John Burnet was right when he said that the attitude of indifference and non-attachment of Pyrrhon of Elis (c. 360–270 B.C.), which he showed towards his drowning teacher Anaxarkhos, derived from his knowledge of the Buddhist ideal of the Arhat. Historical investigations have shown that many Greeks or other Europeans, living in the Middle East in the Hellenistic period after the invasion of India by Alexander the Great in 327 B.C., professed Buddhist or Hindu faith. It is well known that king Milinda, whose name is found in the title of the celebrated book in Pali literature called “The Questions of King Milinda” was identified with Menandros, the Greek king, who ruled Western and Northern India in the latter part of the second century B.C. The book concludes with the statement that he became a Buddhist monk at the end of his life. No official documents have been preserved as to whether he professed Buddhism or not, but he may have been a devout Buddhist because, according to the Parallel lives by Plutarch, the relics of the king were distributed for worship among eight tribes who seem to have observed Buddhist customs.

Apollonios of Tyana, a Neo-Pythagorean who lived in the first century A.D., is said to have made a peregrination in search of the wisdom of the Brahmins. He has recently been identified by M. Hiriyanna and others, with Apalînaya, mentioned as a Buddhist in a book written by a Vedanta philosopher, Sadāśiva Brahmenendra. Some scholars say that Plotinus himself was influenced by the teachings of Buddhism.
Quite apart from historical argumentations, there are many similarities between the philosophy of Neo-Platonism and that of Mahayana Buddhism. Donald A. Mackenzie once set forth the assumption that Buddhism had spread to the islands of Britain before the introduction of Christianity. According to him, Origenes wrote in his commentary on Ezekiel that there lived some Buddhists in pre-Christian Britain. Some images of the Celtic Cernunnos are very much like those of the Indian Virüpäksa. A sitting statue of it is said to resemble Siva. It is a well-known fact that the conception of the transmigration of souls was not foreign to the Druids. Quite recently British archaeologists officially reported that some Buddhist sculptures of Gandhara style were discovered in the ruins of ancient Roman cantonments in England. It is highly probable that King Asoka's foreign missions left some footprints in the West, and that their influence reached the farthest isles in the life-stories given in apocryphal gospels are modifications of the life of Buddha. It is held an idea of transmigration of souls in Buddhist sense. Recently Prof. E. Benz published a learned monograph “Indische Einflüsse auf die frühchristliche Theologie”, in which he traces Buddhist influence in the philosophy of Manichaeism, Pantaen, Bardesanes, Clemens, Origenes, Philostratos, and Ammonios. It seems that the first European philosopher who expressly referred to Buddhism was Clemens of Alexandria, who died 215 A.D. He says in the Stromateis that some Indians worship Bouza, i.e., Buddha. The pyramid-worship he refers to in this connection apparently refers to the Stupa-worship prevalent among the Indian Buddhists.

It was probably in the sixth or seventh century somewhere in Eastern Iran or Turkestan that the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat originated. Barlaam is a corruption of the Sanskrit word bhagaván, an epithet of Buddha, which means the ‘World-honoured One’. Josaphat derives from the Sanskrit word bodhisattva. According to the legend, Josaphat was born the crown prince of a country in India. Seeing the babe, a Chaldean astrologer prophesied that he would be a great sage. The king built a beautiful palace for him in order to seclude him from the outside world. When grown up, the prince saw deformed, sick, old people, and the dead. He sought a way out of suffering, and one day a recluse, Barlaam disguised as a jeweler, appeared before him. Barlaam converted the prince to Christianity. When the astonished father learned this, he asked a magician to make his son change his mind. The magician sent a beautiful woman to stop him, but in vain. Afterwards, the magician and the king were also converted. Josaphat lived for thirty-five years after his conversion.

There is little doubt that this legend is a copy of the life of the Buddha made by some Christian missionaries for the purpose of facilitating Christian propaganda among people living in Buddhist countries. This story came to be very popular in the Mediaeval West. It is interesting to note that both Barlaam and Josaphat are venerated as saints in the Catholic Church.

Some of the Jataka tales, parables and other stories given in Buddhist sutras find their counterparts in the Western world in more or less revised forms. Lafcadio Hearn says that without exaggeration it is believed that most of the legends of the “Old World” can be traced back to Buddhist literature.

After Vasco da Gama came to India, the way for direct contact between East and West was opened. Eastern languages and literatures came to be directly known to Europeans. In the West many specialists of Eastern culture have been trained, and scientific research has been carried on systematically. A great many Eastern literary works have been translated directly from the original into Western languages. The findings of archaeological excavations have also come to be known to
be known to the West. The influence of Eastern culture on the West in modern times due to direct contact between East and West has been so multifarious that it is not easy to summarize it in a limited space. Only some important facts will be mentioned. The ancient Indians were good in linguistic observation and speculation. They completed the elaborate system of Sanskrit grammar. Stimulated by it, Western philologists established a new branch of science called 'comparative philology' which was a new starting-point for modern linguistics.

Utilising the materials supplied by philologists, Western scholars established 'comparative mythology', 'comparative religion', 'comparative ethnology', etc.; 'comparative philosophy' is now in the making. (The problem of 'comparative religion' will be discussed by another speaker, Prof. Heiler and the present speaker wants to omit it.) Various kinds of comparative studies resulted in the eclipse of the consciousness of superiority on the part of the Westerners, and the assertion of equality on the part of the Eastern peoples. Formerly the Westerners regarded themselves as people of a race completely different from that of the East. Due to comparative studies, they have come to know that they are of the same origin as Indians and Iranians. All of them are now generally called Caucasians, or Indo-Europeans. The consciousness of man as such among various peoples will be the basis of unity and collaboration of all humankind in the future.

It is an admitted fact that the philosophy of the enlightenment was strongly influenced by Chinese philosophy. Voltaire, Wolff and Leibniz nostalgically admired the practical and rationalistic wisdom of the ancient Chinese. Schopenhauer expressly identified the essence of his philosophy with that of the Upanishads and Buddhism, as well as that of Plato and Kant. Since then, the influence of Eastern philosophy on the West has come to be conspicuous; at least in the case of some thinkers.

Schopenhauer’s admirer, Paul Deussen (1845-1919), devoted his whole life to the studies of Eastern philosophy, especially Vedānta. He was the first scholar who ventured to write a comprehensive history of philosophy, Eastern and Western. In his Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen, Hermann Keyserling (1880-1946) strongly drew the attention of Westerners to the East. He says that only the bodhisattva ideal will save the whole world from confusion and destruction. George Santayana (1863-1952), who is of completely Western lineage of thought, recognizes the ethical value of Buddhism. Against the egoistic thought of Nietzsche, Bertrand Russell (1872- ) supports the feeling of Buddha that man can not be completely happy so long as any living being is suffering. Russell stresses that the universal sympathy in which the ethics of Buddhism has its emotional basis is 'the motive power to all that he desires as regards the world'.

Eastern philosophy was introduced into America by Emerson, whose transcendentalism was highly influenced by the philosophy of Brahman in the Upanishads. Thoreau wanted to live like a Yogan. O. W. Holmes (1809-94) followed suit. Aldous Huxley (1894- ) expresses many Vedantic ideas in his writings; the standpoint of Charles Morris is somewhat similar to that of Early Buddhism, as he says. Irving Babbit translated the dhammapada with great devotion to Buddhism, humorously criticizing the contemporary civilization. The increasing interest in Eastern philosophy on the part of Western thinkers gave rise to 'comparative philosophy'. Masson-Oursel was probably the first scholar who used the term. The East-West Philosophers’ Conference was held twice, in 1939 and 1949, at the University of Hawaii, and Philosophy East and West, specifically meant for this kind of studies, has been published under the editorship of Prof. Charles A. Moore. In America, many eminent philosophers are engaged in studies of comparative philosophy, e.g. Professors Hocking, Northrop, Ames, Bahm, Kaplan, Burtt, etc. Prof. Georg Misch wrote, Der Weg in die Philosophie from a comparative viewpoint. Such specialists of Oriental studies as professors Glasenapp, Brown, Ingalls, Ruben and Regamee and others have come to publish works along this line also. Italian scholars have been publishing East and West with Prof. Tucci as editor. All these scholars agree that Western philosophy is not the only philosophy of mankind, and that any philosophy which will develop in the future must also take Eastern philosophy into consideration.

In the field of literature, Goethe admired Kālidāsa's drama, Sakuntalā. The brothers Schlegel, leaders of German Romanticism, nostalgically cherished the wisdom and literature of the Indians; Wilhelm von Humboldt was strongly inspired by the spirit of the Bhagavadgītā. The flourishing German studies concerning the East owe much to their leadership. Many German writers, such as Richard Wagner (1813-1883), Eduard Grisebach (1845-1906), Josef Viktor Widmann (1842-1911), Ferdinand von Hornstein, Max Vogrich, Karl Gjellerup (1857-1919), Fritz Mauthner (1849-1923), Hans Much (1880-1932), Albrecht Schaeffer, Ludwig Deihard, Karl Bleibtreu (1859-1927), Hermann Hesse, Adolf Vogl and many others, wrote novels, poems, and dramas, being strongly influenced by Buddhist or Eastern Weltanschaung. The Light of Asia and the Song Celestial by Sir Edwin Arnold are even
now widely read not only in England, but also in America and South Asiatic countries. Yeats, Kipling, T.S. Eliot, the English poets, also were moved by the spirit of India. Romain Rolland was a devoted admirer of the spiritual leaders of modern India. His works on Ramakrishna, Vivekananda and Gandhi have been very influential among French-reading intellectuals.

The tendency to appreciate Indian civilization, which is the rage among some highly Westernized Japanese intellectuals is chiefly due to the influence of Romain Rolland.

The activities of the Ramakrishna Mission established by Vivekananda have been carried on, not only in India and South Asiatic countries, but also in America and Europe. In London, Paris, and the principal cities of America, are centers of the Mission. The “Vedanta in America” claims to teach (1) that man’s real nature is divine, (2) that it is the aim of man’s life on earth to unfold and manifest this Godhead, (3) that truth is universal; Vedanta accepts all the religions of the world. These teachings are something new to Westerners, and are welcomed by some intellectuals. The thought of Aurobindo Ghosh is now propagated by the American Academy for Asian Studies group in San Francisco and Prof. Herbert in Switzerland. Formerly a Buddhist temple was established in Berlin by Paul Dahlke (1865–1928); in London, there is the Buddhist Society. Many Buddhist churches in America are mostly supported by Americans and Canadians of Japanese parentage, but their influence is spreading among others. The Gospel of Buddha by Paul Carus, 1894, has been warmly welcomed in America as a good introduction to the Buddhist faith. Zen Buddhism has come to be well known to Westerners through the works of Dr. D. T. Suzuki and other Japanese scholars and priests. Some Americans welcome the practical and non-metaphysical character of Zen.

With regard to studies on the influence of Eastern culture on the West at the present time, bibliography alone would fill a bulky volume. Researches in this respect are now being made an important problem in the study of human thought, and not merely confined to a small number of specialists.

SESSION IV

Theme
The Common Concern: The Problem of an Emerging World Civilization

THE CREATION OF UNIVERSAL INSTITUTION

BY
MAX HAROLD FISCH

The problem of our time is the creation of a world community. Philosophers and prophets, men of state and men of arms, have long dreamed of such a community, but never until now has it been even a physical possibility. Now it is a physical possibility. Is it a cultural or spiritual possibility? That is in large part a question of institutions. What existing institutions conduce to world community? What others are obstacles to it? What institutions must be destroyed or changed, and what new ones must be created?

Our present condition is one of nearly complete ignorance. It may be that world community is possible only under conditions that are intolerable, or less tolerable than nuclear warfare, destruction of civilization, and lapse into a new barbarism, the barbarism of irradiation.

In some sense and in some degree, every religion has constituted what Mohammed called “one community over against mankind”, and this has often entailed a dual citizenship in which the religious citizenship has taken precedence over the secular in cases of conflict. Will a reversal of precedence be required? If there is to be a world community, must we attach a higher value to the humanity we share with all men than to the faith we share with some men only? We do not know.

We do not know whether a world community is possible without a universal language and without a universal religion. We do not know whether the universal language, if there is ever to be one, will be one of the existing natural languages (and, if so, whether it will be English or Russian or Chinese or Spanish or some other) or whether
it will be an artificial one devised for the purpose. If there were a universal language, would diversity of local languages continue indefinitely? Is it conceivable that, in some similar fashion, there should be a universal religion and continuing diversity of local religions so that we should become bi- or poly-religious as well as bi- or polylingual? (Perhaps it is easier for our Japanese hosts than for their non-Japanese guests to conceive this, since Japan has been at least bi-religious for a millennium.)

Or will automatic translating machines make a universal language unnecessary by solving the more pressing problems arising from the diversity of language and desensitizing us to the problems it does not solve? And is it conceivable that the problems arising from the diversity of religions will also eventually be solved by mechanical brains that will translate dogma and ritual from religion to religion and persuade us that the non-equivalent is unreal or invalid?

Again, do we know the relative importance of military conquest, peaceful conversion, and differential rates of biological reproduction in the past growth of religions, and have we any clear idea what we may safely extrapolate into the future and what not? It may be that we have more to fear from continuing and increasing overpopulation than from atomic weapons. Until now, the chief single effect of modern science has been to accelerate the increase of population. Is it conceivable that the great religions should cooperate in reducing the birth rate, or, if that problem is solved, must it be in spite of continuing opposition of religion?

Can the United Nations and the institutions associated with it serve as the political foundation of a world community? Not without great changes in Russia and China, and perhaps also in western countries, and in any case probable not in the present form of these international institutions. Can they be gradually transformed into suitable institutions, or must they be superseded by others whose form we have not yet imagined?

If we agree that a totalitarian world-state is even less desirable than totalitarian national states and international anarchy, how can we avoid it and yet have a world community? Only, I believe, by a multiplication and proliferation of universal non-governmental institutions, and a gradual diminution in the relative importance of governmental institutions. Beyond certain minimal requirements, the role of international or world government, like that of government at other levels, should be permissive and protective, or if necessary regulative, but not dictatorial or directive.

If so, what we need is free projection of institutions and of institutional changes, free discussion of such projects, and free experimentation, in the expectation that there will be many failures, and that the changes most efficacious for the development of a world community may be such as are not yet dreamed of.

Though the United Nations and UNESCO may play important interim roles in encouraging the development of universal institutions independent of themselves, it is not desirable that these should remain dependent upon the United Nations or upon UNESCO, and it is desirable that even their initiation should come increasingly from non-governmental, non-political sources.

But obviously the projection and trial of institutions requires free risk capital. In western societies risk capital for non-economic cultural institutions is increasingly concentrated in foundations. Some such foundations have committed themselves to the policy of allocating their funds not to the continued support of what is already proven but to the support for a trial period only of what has not yet been tried. This policy needs to be more widely adopted and more fully honored in the observance.

One great change is still to come in the Orient. For several generations it has been engaged in a partial assimilation of western institutions. The questions have been, what new western institutions shall we adopt, what old institutions of our own shall we retain, and how shall the new and the old be reconciled? But a world community cannot be constructed in this way. The Orient must participate on a footing of cultural equality in the creation of institutions that will be as new to the West as to the East.

In the light of considerations such as these, it becomes a matter of great moment to what extent the major religions of the world conduce to, or merely tolerate, or aggressively oppose, such and experimental attitude toward institutions of all kinds. There are no investigators more competent to answer this question than those who are here assembled, and there can be few questions which call more urgently for their investigation.
THE COMMON CONCERN: THE PROBLEMATICS OF AN EMERGING WORLD CIVILIZATION

BY

WALTER LIEBENTHAL

Is that World Civilization, we are hoping for, to be brought about by levelling down existing differences, or should these differences be left untouched, perhaps even be encouraged? This problem is inherent in all administration from communal to national, and will be foremost whenever the problems of an emerging world civilization will be considered.

Unification is found in armies, in modern industry, and to a lesser degree in all organized work. It is most characteristic of modern mechanization. It appears as part of the political programme of certain regimes, most often those strongly centralized, but it seems to me that decentralized regimes, democracies in the Western understanding of the word, are not for that reason free from the tendency to equalize individual differences of behaviour and thought. It is only that in the centralized regimes this equalization is achieved on purpose, often by methods which we feel are not in accord with our ideas of the dignity of man, while in the other type of regimes it arrives almost automatically, unnoticed, together with mechanization. The old type of monarchies were strongly centralized but they were rather opposed to equalization. Human relationships, of kinship, friendship, and all sort of loyalties played a large part in the careers of single individuals while modern standardization achieved by way of objective tests, examinations, records, etc. was more or less absent. People were born into their positions and were allowed to stay there without much regard to their actual qualifications. Thus it seems that equalization comes in the wake of the machine, independent from the type of government where the machine is set up.

We all feel a danger lurking in this development which, however, seems to be unavoidable if we want what we call modern civilization. We need the things machines can make but we also feel that they cannot replace ancient values especially of the social kind. An ancient court was much more colourful than an office building of to-day can be. We regret that life is drying up and would like to retain both, standardization in technical field, differentiation in the cultural sphere, reason in science, and imagery in art and literature. We want to separate both worlds which were united when life was still played. Imagery is, we feel, permissible only on the stage. But, and here we get to our main thesis, is it actually confinable to the stage?

I should like to introduce a new term into the discussion and instead of "imagery" say "interpretation". Imagery implies something of little importance, depreciating to some extent, while interpretation refers to something basic, not easily accessible and dangerous when unrecognized. It determines all our decisions and actions, all goal-setting and programming. Interpretation cannot be streamlined without damage to our most personal freedom, our freedom to grow spiritually.

Interpretations or world interpretations are mental patterns or pictures to which we refer when roused emotionally. They are both, conscious and unconscious. We love and hate, and acting upon this feeling we build defenses or open doors; we show contempt or respect; we are loyal or not; we set us goals and dream of final happiness when the goal will be reached and our love or hate will be satisfied. The international literature is almost silent on this subject. Professor Jung speaks of archetypes, American scholars, as Talcot Parsons, of cultural patterns, value patterns, etc., but, as much as I can see, none of them has grasped the true significance of the term. There are in our minds not only vague feelings, "climates", as they have been called but definite pictures which can be described and compared. I shall give two examples: one from the religious, one from the social sphere of life.

A man who believes in an eternal figure, say a cosmic ruler, teacher, or friend, or in a state of cosmic harmony or purity, with whom or which he hopes to unite in the end, will strive towards that ideal and follow the rules which this belief implies. Another man who believes in forces such as the stars, or in only two principles which alternate, such as yang and yin of Chinese Taoism, will have nothing to strive for. His interpretation of the world will contain no way and no goal, indeed his whole feeling will be essentially different from the first type. I shall call the first type religious, the second magic. The religious type, working with his idea, will distinguish between those advanced and those backward in relation to the goal and hierarchies will be created in his mind. The magic type will see himself together with everybody else in flight before inescapable Fate which he will try to dodge. He may, in contrast to the religious type, appear selfish as

He has no reason to make sacrifices. In any case, his reaction to, for instance, an accident will be completely different; the religious type will search for his own guilt, the magic type will study the heavens in order to be better prepared when the same should happen again.

Interpretation is not confined to the religious sphere but is underlying our behavior everywhere also in our time. An industrial worker, for instance, may interpret himself as servant or as craftsman-businessman. A servant works for what he is given by the master whom he trusts. He may be given only the essentials of livelihood, but he is cared for as long as he belongs to the household, and, taking part in the life of the great man whom he serves, he is rewarded not in money but in prestige. When this man is transferred to a factory he feels frustrated inspite of the larger income. He feels that he is not treated with the understanding and sympathy he deserves and will exhibit a tendency to plead and fight for rights which he himself is unable to define exactly—simply because he feels unhappy. A Western worker will feel otherwise. As craftsman-businessman he will not plead but bargain. He will not feel lonely and frustrated in the factory but rather elated, and quite happy because in the factory he can make more money than in an independent occupation of his own. He will be proud of being given the use of powerful machinery which he himself could not afford to buy. In short, his reaction to the industrial surrounding in which he is placed will be essentially different from that of, the servant type of worker.

These examples must suffice to make clear what is meant here by interpretation. Now, I believe that always whenever we act emotionally, that is, when we act upon our likes and dislikes, we refer to interpretative patterns. These are often, though not always, of a religious nature. In some countries people are proud of being wealthy, in others they are proud of being poor. In the background of these evaluations there is, probably, religion. But this cannot mean that people when acting upon these interpretations refer to religious prescriptions as they are outlined in their respective holy scriptures. World interpretations are neither dogmas nor theories. If we want them isolated in their pure forms we have to extract them from all kind of material not only that extant in writing. Besides, it is quite possible that several interpretations coexist in our mind. A worker, for instance, may bargain with the factory owner who thereby is placed in the position of a business partner, and yet he may in personal contact show that respect which is due to a person of higher social standing. We play many roles, dress in many garments. Public opinions change.

Conventions form anew in very small circles and spread. There does not exist anymore that rigidity of world interpretation as it existed, for instance, in ancient Egypt or in China.

We now come back to our original problem: should emerging world civilization be unified or not? My answer would be that in all technical scientific and administrative matters standardization is desirable. But our religious, scholarly and artistic aspirations, in short our thought whenever it is creative, should be left untouched and no attempt should be made of unification.

There is no danger in diversity of thought if we are open to the fact that we are different. The study of interpretations should thereby be fostered by all means at our disposal. Emotional stresses are caused by lack of understanding. If we understand each other's interpretation it is easy to find ways to agreement. If we do not, then there is only one other way open, namely, that of breaking the pride of our opponent by force. And in the end we shall be so much poorer for our victory because we have lost a potential friend.

Besides some kind of unification will come naturally in the course of time. This needs no streamlined education. History shows that world interpretations assimilate other world interpretations occasionally. This is a slow and gradual process. Dissimilation works simultaneously. Both features belong to all growth. No attempt should be made to interfere with them. Eternal goals, valid for everybody, do not exist. Eternal is only our search for new goals and values. We shall never abandon this search, for we are hungry for new thing to love. Life, as Buddhists say, is rise and decay. Nothing can last forever but the stones.
SESSION V

Theme
The Contribution of Oriental and Occidental Religions to Cultural Understanding

CONTRIBUTIONS OF OCCIDENTAL RELIGIONS TO CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

BY

JAMES LUTHER ADAMS

Any brief characterization of the religions of the Occident as well as of the Orient necessarily demands selection from a welter of data. The constructive exposition offered here will be recognized as presenting in the main a liberal Protestant orientation. It deals first with general attitudes toward culture and history, and then with certain more specific contributions to cultural understanding.

Judaism and Christianity, the characteristic religions of the West (which originated in the Near East), are "historical" religions. They do not claim to issue primarily from an analysis of the psyche or from inner illumination. They are oriented to history, and they interpret history by means of historical and not of naturistic categories. Thus they see their origins in certain unique historical events which are viewed as providential and revelatory. Revelation issued from God when "called out" a community covenanted to obedience to His righteous will; response to revelation is the grateful acceptance of the "vocation" not only of the individual but also of the covenanted community to manifest the divine power of righteousness, mercy and love. In Judaism the initial revelatory event is God's liberation of His people from bondage, His giving of the Law and the covenant, and (later) His sending of the prophets. In Christianity, which broke with Judaism as a total culture and law, the fulfilling revelatory event is the life and death of Jesus Christ (the Suffering Servant reconciling man to God), the promise of the Kingdom of God already at hand, and the formation of the new eschatological community. The world, including what calls itself piety and religion, can distort and manipulate the divine gift of life. Hence, the process of salvation is a tragic struggle in face of idolatry, alienation from God, merely external performance, and social injustice. The present life, individual and social, therefore stands under dynamic, prophetic criticism. In the End, however, persons and institutions will be brought into obedience to Christ.

Although Judeo-Christianity is a "historical" religion providing an interpretation of group existence, it assigns a special place to the individual in his direct confrontation with God. The individual person is no mere function of the community. Moreover, the community is judged by its effect on the human person. On the one hand, the individual shares alienation and guilt with the community in its defection from the covenant. On the other, the individual possesses an integrity that must be protected.

In the context of this outlook one must understand the Christian doctrines of creation, fall, and redemption. The doctrine of creation implies that humanity is one; nature and history, ultimately dependent upon God, are essentially good; creation is not to be identified with the Creator (that would be idolatry); man is commanded to love and care for nature, including the human body, and to love the neighbor "as thyself." The doctrine of the fall implies that men, abusing their divinely given freedom, rebel against the Creator; humanity is one in its rebellion, a rebellion that is social and institutional as well as individual; sin is the perversion of divinely given powers and not the consequence of materiality and temporality. The doctrine of redemption implies that salvation or re-creation, like creation, is from God; this transformation does not negate but rather fulfills nature and history; yet it is never to be completely fulfilled in history, for every temporal fulfilment is provisional and ambiguous. In principle, Christianity, like Judaism, is "materialistic" and not ascetic. The Kingdom of God is not of the world, but it is in and for the world.

In sum, then, God is the Lord of history. Salvation is in and through time, matter, and history; it is individual and social, and requires the righteous and merciful appropriation and sharing of divinely given resources, natural and human. As a "historical" faith, Christianity combines inwardness of piety with responsibility for the social environment. It joins also a this-worldly attachment and seriousness with an "other-worldly" detachment and criticism. At the same time it aims to promote the freedom and variety required by personal integrity. The picture presented here is of course not an account of anything that has been consistently put into practice; it aims rather to be a statement of Jewish and Christian conceptions of religiousness.
Implicit here is a theology of culture. “Religion” as a historical phenomenon is a cultural expression, though it points beyond itself to the divine Origin and End. As response to the divine power, it is ambiguous; it is at the same time the working of God and in some respects an expression of alienation from God. From the point of view of faith, all culture participates in and is separated from the divine creativity. The Lord of history holds both “religion” and culture under His sovereignty and judgement. Faith in the Lord of history places its confidence in the power of God which forms and transforms “religion,” culture, and community. It struggles against the idolizing of any creature, whether the creature be “religion,” the words of Scripture, tradition, doctrinal formulations, the church, the social system, race, or nation. All of these creatures may become presumptuously self-sufficient, distended, demonic; they may become empty through nihilism or self-exhaustion. They may be also vessels of the divine power, vessels pointing beyond themselves. Since society and culture are judged by their effect on human persons in community, persons as children of God must be enabled to become creative and critical. Only through the protection of individuality can the divine fecundity find expression. The fundamental problem is that of achieving unity in the midst of the diversities of freedom.

Before entering upon the final section dealing with some specific contributions of Western religions, we should reiterate what has been said again and again in this Congress. Judaism and Christianity indifferent ways, and partly as a consequence of the notion of being a chosen people, have shown themselves to be arrogantly exclusive, all too often resorting of fanaticism and coercion. This arrogance issues from a demonic attachment to particular forms of culture and “religion,” and from the blasphemous identification of the “faith” with an established culture. In some measure Western communism has inherited this fanaticism from Judaism and Christianity. One can readily understand why some people in the East see in the atom-bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima a belated expression of Western “Christian” demonic pretensions. In the present stage of history it has become urgent for both East and West to find new ways of achieving unity amidst diversity. I would like to mention three specific contributions that have been made to cultural understanding by Western religions.

1. Jewish and Christian conceptions of Natural Law. In the Old Testament little indication is ever given that Israel accredited to other nations any positive religious or moral significance. But in Rabinic Judaism during the earliest period of the Christian era, a doctrine of natural law was set forth: remembering the assertion of the unity of mankind in the myth of creation, the rabbis asserted that the unity of mankind resides, in a common moral law which is known apart from God’s covenant with His people. In Christianity, beginning with St. Paul, a doctrine of natural law has been asserted again and again. The doctrine bears affinity to, and later came to depend upon, pagan conceptions. It has been a principal means whereby Christians have recognized a common moral nature in man. Man in his conscience, it was said, knows what is fundamentally good and what is fundamentally evil. Moreover, there is a structure in reality with which man must come to terms if he is to survive and if his life is to be meaningful. The doctrine has assumed a variety of formulations; and in some quarters of Protestantism it has been rejected on the found of the sinfulness of unregenerate man. One must grant that often too much has been claimed for natural law; its content all too often reflects merely local, provincial tradition. Moreover, it has been used in conservative and in radically progressive fashion. Yet, in its various forms the doctrine reasserts something implicit in the doctrine of creation, namely, that there is a value structure inherent in the nature of reality itself, and also that all men have some apprehension of this value structure. In the Christian formulations, moreover, there has been evident the intention to recognize a moral soundness in human nature, a participation in the creation that comes from God. One need not claim, and certainly Christians have not claimed, that natural law embraces the highest ethic. On the other hand, natural law doctrine at least has pointed to the limits with which viable social existence is possible, limits that preserve some sort of mutuality among human beings. It may be that natural law is better stated negatively rather than positively. This seems to have been the conviction of Socrates. In any event, there are in Eastern religions analogues to the Western doctrines of natural law. Would it not be desirable for the religions of East and West to explore the possibilities of achieving common cultural understanding in terms of their respective traditions with respect to natural law? The doctrine of natural law found its first effective formulations in the post-Alexandrian period of antiquity when there arose a new sense of the unity of mankind. We have again reached a point in history when the recognition of this unity is to be preserved amidst diversity.

2. Religious pluralism. In the modern Western world a major, decisive concern for the problem of the one and the many, of the achievement of unity in diversity, appeared in the Radical Protestant
Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In face of
the coercive authoritarianism of Roman Catholicism and in face of the
demand for uniformity in “Right Wing” Protestantism, the aggressive
sects rejected the previously prevalent assumption that religious uni-
formity is required for social order. They insisted that the true church
is one in which the Spirit may blow where it listeth. Therefore, they
rejected coercion in religion; they also rejected the demand for univer-
sal conformity. They held that the power of God works most freely where
men are protected in their freedom. Hence, they demanded the separa-
tion of church and state, they asserted that the church is a laymen’s
church, they promoted the priesthood and prophethood of all believers,
they gave fundamental religious significance to discussion, and they
demanded a plurality of churches relying upon the working of the
Spirit to effect unity. The pattern of the democratic society is analogous
to this pattern of the churches of the free Spirit. Indeed, the United
States from the beginning adopted the pattern of pluralism. The
pattern, without doubt, has pertinence today for the relations between
the cultures and between the religions.

3. The Enlightenment and universality. Christian groups in
the period of the Enlightenment, partly dependent upon earlier patristic
and medieval pathos for rationality and in part shifting the emphasis
from inner light to inner reason, recognized the validity of reason as
itself coming from God. Associated with this emphasis on the
universality of reason was the recognition of the universality of
religiousness. Taken together, universal reason and universal religious-
ness became the sanction for a widespread attack on magic, on in-
tolerance, and on superstition. As a consequence, most of Protestant-
ism as well as of Judaism today must be spoken of as post-Enlighten-
ment. In this post-Enlightenment Judaism and Christianity, there
has been a recognition that science, so far from being considered the
enemy of religion, must be protected in its freedom. Accordingly, the
scientific attitude has made signal contributions to our understanding of
the facts about the religions of the world. From the point of view of
modern Protestantism, the scientific attitude can itself contribute to
the understanding of human needs. Other concerns of the Enlighten-
ment are also kept alive in Protestantism and Judaism, for example,
the concern to understand Judeo-Christian religiousness in relation to
other forms of it. The alternative to this outlook, according to
Friedrich Schleiermacher (the father of modern Protestant theology),
is that Christianity shall become allied with barbarism and with ignorant
superstition. There is always the danger that the Enlightenment

will develop its own superstitions and its own fanaticism. In the name
of universal reason and of science, the unique insights of cultural and
religious traditions can thus be threatened. Yet, can there be any
doubt that an important unity of cultural understanding for the religions
of East and West can emerge from their severally promoting critically
the spirit of Enlightenment as it is already present among them? At its best it can enable us to demythologize outdated formulations of
religious faith, and it can with the use of imagination enable us to
preserve the enduring truths resident in the religious traditions.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE RELIGION OF ISLAM TO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

BY

M. HOBALLAH

Due to the immensity of the literature related to our topic of today, and due to the short span of time allowed for my talk, I shall, with your permission, limit myself to the exposition of a few passages from the holy Quran, which deal directly with the subject under consideration. Such a procedure ought to give us a precise perspective of the nature of our topic, as the Quran is the fundamental source from which all Islamic laws and rules of conduct can be drawn.

It is not my intention, however, to lead you to a theological discussion on highly abstract ideas; my sole aim is to contemplate with you some aspects of the religion, particularly those which pertain to our practical life and regulates our relation to one another as human beings—the moral standards and ethical codes as ordained through the injunction of the Quran. It is relevant to our purpose, however, to keep in mind that religions and spiritual values have been the most effective instrument in keeping a life the human race; they have been the savior of humanity and its civilization from utter destruction, and the major force which allowed it to continue and prosper; partly through their endeavor to cultivate in every soul the emotion of sympathy, kindness, and love; and partly through the enactment of moral standards and ethical codes, which man, in his relation to the external world, must observe with a religious care.

The validity of such standards and codes, and their values can be sought and found in the codes and standards themselves, they are Heavenly standards, and cannot, therefore, be measured by anything else, such as expediency, utility, pleasure, happiness and extra. They are to be realized and adhered to for their own sake, and not for any extrinsic purpose. Now, if such objective standards have a strong hold upon the minds of the individuals and the communities; if all do sincerely cherish the notion that the world of ours is a moral universe governed by a designed system of objective moral standards, all human struggles, though will never cease to exist, for this would mean the end of existence, would be ultimately turned towards the service and benefit of humanity as a whole, regardless of the different creeds and ideologies which may coexist.

Thus, the conceptions that the universe is a moral universe, with objective moral standards, which have their intrinsic values, and that man is an end in himself, are conceptions, prerequisite for any real mutual understanding in both national and international relations. Once our men and women become aware of and rigorously adherents to such values, no human danger will ever emanate from any struggle, however severe it may appear to be. To my mind, the barriers which separate one man from another and one nation from another are an artificial barriers; they are the outcome of ignorance, and of an acquired mental attitude. Change that attitude, and the atmosphere would become brotherly pleasant, with a strong will and desire to coexist with others and appreciate one another's right and dignity.

The antidote for our ills and sorrows lies, therefore, within the sphere of men of religion and education. If the boys and girls are taught to respect and honour humanity, wherever it be found, regardless of the form which it happen to take, or the creed which it may accept, our desirable end would be achieved; and that is the line which the religion of Islam has taken and put forward fourteen hundred years ago, and here are the passages which I proposed to expose:

"O you who believe! be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness for the sake of God, thought it may be against your own selves, your parents, or near relatives." (S. 4. V. 135)

"And let not hatred of a people, because they hindered you from the sacred Mosque, seduce you to transgress; but help ye one another in goodness and piety, and do not help one another in sin and aggression." (S. 5.V. 2.)

"And if one of the idolators seeks your protection grant to him protection, so that he may hear the Word of God, and they convey him to his place of safety. That is because they are a folk who known not." (S.9.V.6.)

"Invite into the Way of the Lord by wisdom and mild exhortation, and dispute with them in the most condescending manner, ... and if you make reprisal then make it proportionate to the injuries inflicted on you; but if you patiently endure, it will be best for those who are patiently enduring. Endure then with patience, but your patient endurance must be sought in none but God; and do not be grieved about them (the idolators) nor be troubled for that which they subtly devise, for God is with those who fear him and do good deeds." (S.16. V.125–128.)

It is evident, as you may notice, that such passages are precise
and manifest expressions of the objective philosophy and human attitude above disclosed: they categorically declare that justice must be maintained and must prevail for the sake of God and not for any other end: likewise truth must be said, even though the foe may be benefited thereby, and the friends, relatives may become the victim of such a truth. Transgression is unconditionally forbidden; patience and forgiveness are strongly recommended; propagation of the faith takes no form except that of a mild talk and friendly discourse—only through words of wisdom—not harsh wisdom or bitter truth; but wisdom attired in the most mild and condescending expressions.

In their deadly struggle against Islam, the idolators themselves were no exception of that generous attitude. They were to be protected, when they see, protection, and remain so, till they reach their place of safety, even though they may, afterward, wage war against Islam. The last passage is an explicit evident of that humane attitude, as it refers in particular to the belligerent idolators. If such a people are to be treated with patience and endurance, and with absolute justice in case of reprisal, the none belligerent must, likewise, be treated at least in the same manner. Yet the religion has gone a step further in this direction, as a practical demonstration of its sincere endeavour to help create a community of brothers based upon tender and kind relations between man and man as such, regardless of all other consideration, and announces: "God does not forbid you to be generous and to deal tenderly with those who have not, on account of your religion, waged war against you and have not driven you out of your homes." (S.60. V.9.)

One may then conclude that, within the frame work of Islam, the natural relations between man and man are not states of war and hostility, but of a brotherly cooperation; as human beings are but one race and one family; they differ not in nature, but in localities, yet they have been distributed into different lands, communities and nations, so that everyone of them would acquire, through the particular environment, different talents and develop different cultures; and with joint effort, they together can make use of their different endowments, for the benefit of mankind. But they are not so distributed in order to fight one another or claim superiority one to the other. (S.49. V.13.) From its very inception, the religion of Islam has made it evident to its adherents that the diversity of opinions, of ideologies and creeds are natural to mankind; they are the result of their different methods of education and upbringing, and of their reasoning power. So the Muslims are made to believe: do not let such a kind of diversity interfere, in no way, with the just dealing and kind treatment which man ought to give to his brother in humanity. Listen to the Quran in this respect when it says:

"And if your God had pleased all people on earth would have become believers; do you therefore, forcefully compel men to become true believers?" (S.10. V.98.)

"There is no compulsion in religion." (S.2. V.256.)

"Verily, you cannot make whom you like rightly directed, but God can make whom He pleases, rightly directed." (S.28. V.25.)

Those and similar instruction are not designed to illustrate natural phenomena, but to teach Muslims to look upon diversity of opinions and creeds as something natural, and cannot be avoided; So, and by the injunction of thier religion, they must grow accustomed to see and to deal justly with different ideologies and beliefs, and make themselves adaptable to all circumstances, how different from their ideology they may be. In short, they are required to endeavour to cultivate in themselves an international character and attitude, with readiness to accept as a friend and good neighbour any and all human beings.

The principles underlying this discourse of ours can be thus summarized:

1. God is the Lord, Creator, Sustainer, and tenderly Nourisher of all beings; and His mercy is extended to all.

2. Human beings are substantially the same. Everyone is to be respected and honoured by force of his humanity, and irrespective of his colour, race, status and extra." Verily, we have honoured the children of Adam." (S.17. V.70.)

3. Justice, equity, and the Codes of others are universal in their application, with no obligation upon non-Muslims to abide by the laws of Islam, except the obligation which springs from their inner selves, through their own volition and free will.

4. The kind and tender attitude, the benevolent character, which is left to the discretion of man to exercise, are to be extended to all beings—human or none, Muslims or non-Muslims.

Thus, we conclude by affirming that the religion of Islam has, from its very inception, stretched out the hands of cooperation, brotherhood and respect of human dignity, to all; and shall remain, forever, so stretching such hands—as that is a coherent and an indispensable part of its integral system—to all human beings, so long as they are sincerely willing to cooperate as equal brothers in building up a moral universe, where objective justice, objective truth fraternity and freedom prevail and be enjoyed by all.
West-East relations, in so far as they have been constructive in the past or may be fruitful in the future, involve something more than simple assimilation. India has reacted in the past and must continue to respond to the West in terms of her own inner genius and tradition.

Professor Schimmel illustrated the nature and the limits of Western influence upon Eastern thought, selecting Muhammed Iqbal as a classical type of creative response. While exhibiting the stimulus of Bergsonian metaphysics along with certain aspects of the European Romantic movement found in Nietzsche and Goethe, Iqbal appears to have exercised a selectivity and interest determined largely by the perspectives and issues of Quranic theology. For his doctrine of man, which he believed to be rooted in the Quran and the main currents of Moslem tradition, he did find support and suggestions of new patterns of expression in Western philosophy and literature, but his sources of spiritual nurture and theological loyalty continued to be the Prophet and the Book.

Professor Clavier spoke briefly of the younger Christian Churches in the East, indicating their crucial significance as centers of Christian impact upon Asian culture. He emphasized several areas in which the relevance of the Christian doctrines of God, man and the world to contemporary Eastern thought is at its sharpest focus. He observed that the mission and message of Jesus will continue to be a constructive stimulant in the religious thought of the East because the Gospel speaks directly to the problems of Eastern anthropology and soteriology.

Professor N. Tajima directed the attention of the Symposium (in his role as discussant) to specific areas of Christian influence upon Japanese life and culture. He stressed particularly the evidences of this influence in literature, education, political theory, and the structure of the Japanese family.

Professor Nakazawa of Tokyo Christian University raised the question of the place of non-sectarian Christianity in Japan and quoted in translation a recent confession of this Christian group indicating its vitality.

Professor M. Hoballah called attention to Professor Clavier's statement describing Allah as pure will. He asked that this assertion be corrected, pointing out the fact that the Quran does not directly support this limitation of Allah. Will, he insisted is only one (though an important one) attribute of Allah along with many others such as wisdom, truth, power, love and mercy. Professor Clavier referred to corroboration of his statement in authoritative commentary upon the Quran. The issue was not resolved in discussion.
Dr. Falk directed several questions to Professor Dandekar relating to the connection of Sumerian and Vedic cultures. Methodological issues were also raised by Miss Falk. Dr. Dandeker suggested some recent literature relating to her questions which he believed might be of help to her.

SESSION III

The findings of the discussion groups of September 2nd were read by their secretaries: E.D. Saunders, F. Cassard, E. Kaneko, and W.P. Woodward.

Professor Nakamura of Tokyo University and Professor Heiler of Marburg University read the papers mentioned above.

Professor A. Hoffman of Marburg said that Professor Nakamura’s paper illustrates well the processes of influence, which could have been traced out in many additional aspects of western life: for instance, in European gardens of the 18th century, in the chinaware of Delft and Meissen, and on the painting of Van Gogh. But generally the stimuli from the orient were shortlived or affected only a few people, and on the whole did not work any fundamental changes in western life. What are the necessary preconditions for the acceptance of a broad and deep intercultural influence? The history of eastern influence in the west provides the materials for such a study. Professor Nakamura accepted Professor Hoffman’s additions, which had not been included in his paper merely because of lack of space, and spoke of the paradox whereby wide circles of westerners have accepted eastern thought, but have not made their acceptance active and effective because of the fact that they live in an industrial society.

Professor M. Eliade of Chicago regreted particularly that no single great western philospher of the past 60 or 70 years exhibits any significant knowledge of eastern philosophical texts. Nowhere save perhaps in Jung do we see any creative oriental influence at work. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands of occidentals are absorbing at second-hand a flood of hybrid or pseudo-eastern ideas filtered to the west through agencies of theosophical type.

These filtered influences reach a public that is large and enthusiastic but not creative. There is a huge “eastern literature” called, but it does not fertilize the western spirit.

Professor S.S. Shin of Soule University, Korea, said that the theories mentioned by Professor Nakamura, that the accounts of the life and teachings of Jesus in the New Testament were borrowings from Buddhism, had been disproved.

Professor M. Block of Columbia University added what she described as a “postscript” to the papers, emphasizing the importance of the recent oriental influences which manifest themselves in Jung, who was greatly influenced by the Sinologist Richard Wilhelm and by the Indologists Wilhelm Hauer, Heinrich Zimmer, and Frederic Spiegelberg.

Professor Yuto Ito rose and remarked that Yoga, Zen, and Judo specialists employ their art in treatment of neuroses. He asked Professor Heiler his view of the relation between religion and the cure of neuroses. (Because of “acoustical” difficulties, this question was not answered.) Professor Ito disagreed with Professor Nakamura’s statement that in America certain philosophers are interested in Zen for its non-metaphysical attitude. Professor Nakamura acknowledged that certain american thinkers may be attracted by Zen metaphysics, but said that others whom he could name were drawn by Zen practice only.

Professor H. Dumoulin spoke of the need for appreciation of Eastern values, adding that in his opinion, in this new stage of human history when a common principle for the guidance of our evolution is necessary, the traditional western conceptions of the totality of humanity and of the destiny of humanity in the Kingdom of God have special significance for the east also. Professor Heiler agreed that the idea of the Kingdom of God will be an important contribution of western Christianity to eastern religions, but held that it can be brought into a harmonization with the central ideas of eastern religions in a synthesis of eastern and western religions such as was conceived by Bishop Soderblom and Professor Radhakrishnan.

The chairman observed in closing that western interest in eastern religions seems to have increased with the decrease of Christianity’s impact on western culture. It is not an accident that the penetration of eastern religions began in the eighteenth century with a man like Voltaire.

SESSION IV

of an Emerging Civilization," sharp differences of opinion were expressed.

Professor Hook contended that cultural and religious differences are to be preserved, and not merged in a world civilization. A Universal religion is impossible, and there can be no such thing as a world civilization. We should aim at a world order, and to such an aim religion is wholly irrelevant. Man must be equal before the law; equality before God is not enough. Equality in freedom,—not in bondage,—should be our aim. Religion has supported all sorts of undesirable social practices such as slavery, suttee, witch-burning, etc., and cannot be trusted to support freedom.

A religion of ethical culture might contribute to our aims, but ethical principles, not dogmas, must predominate. It is not necessary to agree on the source of these principles; they must be judged by their results in practice. It is quite obvious that truth is better than falsehood, love better than hate, etc.; there is no need of divine sanctions.

The United Nation's declaration of human rights is a good basis to start with. We have no need of religion in formulating ethical principles; what we need is reason, based on scientific enquiry. The quest for concrete means of combatting evil requires no guilt feelings.

In religions we find the least agreement; in science, the widest agreement. Traditional religions have failed to solve the problems of world order. They can't ever unify themselves, much less the world.

The "religion of democracy" is such an ethical religion, but it must be enforced, and for this a United Nation's police force is a necessity. Understanding each others' interpretations is not enough to bring about agreement.

There is no need of a universal religion or a universal language. We must learn to live with differences.

Religion is a personal matter; it is, as Whitehead says, "what a man does with his solitude." It should not speak in the parliaments of man.

In his criticism of Liebenthal's paper, Professor Husaini stated that unification by mechanization is too shallow. We must distinguish between uniformity and unification. In industrial societies people are standardized instead of being really unified.

We must protect individual interpretations in art, literature, and religion and combat uniformity.

He disagreed with Professor Liebenthal's contrast between the attitudes of factory works in the East and the West, and contended that similar conditions produce similar reactions. He also disagreed with the notion that unification should be advocated in the realm of science and technology, but not other realms, because life is a whole, and no aspect can be separated from religious foundations. Religion itself produces diversity and creativeness. Co-operation and synthesis of civilization is better than unification.

In his reply to Professor Hook, Professor Fisch agreed that secular ethics is a real challenge to religion, but maintained that the spirit of enquiry is itself dependent on a spiritual context. However, no existing religion really meets the challenge of secular ethics.

Professor Liebenthal's reply to Professor Hook maintained that religion has been one of the most important historical forces for development, but that religions today find it hard to adapt to modern circumstances. Interpretation is therefore necessary. They cannot deal with industrial problems without re-interpretations. But science can not replace religion, because it does not furnish emotional values. We live in two worlds, physical and human. Political patterns are based on interpretations of religious concepts, for example, the ancient Chinese concept of an imperial hierarchy on earth, in imitation of a celestial hierarchy. But religion must develop new interpretations to meet new political conditions. Professor Hook is wrong; religions must speak in the parliaments of man, because they must set goals. Science does not set goals for human life.

In the questions from the floor several points were brought out, including the matter of a universal language, or a universal terminology, such as the Greek of the Hellenistic Age; the conservative tendency in religion, as respect for continuity and proven values; the necessity for religionists and non-religionists to co-operate; the desirability or possibility of a World Council of Religions; the need for religious values in scientific enquiry, in such matters as atomic energy, biology (artificial insemination, etc.); the need for nongovernmental institutions to supplement the United Nations.

The General drift of the discussion seems to be a cleavage between those who believe that science is in need of religious direction, and those who believe that religion itself is much in need of genuine scientific enquiry.

SESSION V

Reported by JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA

The theme of the 5th plenary session, held Thursday morning, Sept. 4, 1958, was: "The Contribution of Oriental and Occidental
Religions to Cultural Understanding." The session was chaired by Dr. Ishaq Musa Husaini of American University in Cairo, with Dr. Joseph M. Kitagawa of the University of Chicago as secretary. The first reader was Dr. James Luther Adams of Harvard Divinity School, U.S.A. He offered a clear exposition of Jewish and Christian attitudes toward culture and history. Although both Judaism and Christianity often attach themselves too much to particular historic forms of culture and religion, Dr. Adams nevertheless felt that the "Western" religions can make contributions to cultural understanding in terms of (1) Jewish and Christian conceptions of Natural Law, (2) Religious Pluralism and (3) the Enlightenment and Universality. The second reader was Dr. M. Hoballah, Dean of Al Azhar University, Cairo. He emphasized the contribution of Islam to mutual cultural understanding, based on the Quaranic principle that the universe is a moral universe, with objective moral standards, and that man is an end in himself. Thus, he stressed the importance of religion and education as correctives to the brokenness of humanity today.

There were two discussants. The first was Dr. R. P. Kramers of the Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion, Hong Kong. While recognizing the definite role which religion plays in cultural understanding, he cautioned against the use of religion for ulterior motives. He said: "Let us in our different religions build up our faith and be true to it, testifying to it in word and deed. All the rest will be given." The second discussant was Dr. R. J. Zwi Werblowsky of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. He made a distinction between religious and humanistic approaches to the problem of cultural or intercultural understanding, and suggested, among other things, that religion should cope with the humanistic values of pluralism. He also observed that religion could be a menace to mutual understanding. In his view, one of the crucial problems is: "To what extent can religions educate their own adherents to socio-political understanding and tolerance?" Several interesting and pertinent questions were raised from the floor, but the time was too short to follow up on them.
GROUP SESSIONS

SESSION I
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND INTOLERANCE: THEIR EFFECT ON EAST-WEST CULTURAL CONTACTS.

Reported by E. DALE SAUNDERS

In a consideration of religious tolerance and intolerance and their effect on East-West cultural contacts, there is general agreement that religious intolerance has been more prevalent in the West than in the East. Fears of many different kinds, depending on various non-religious factors, produce religious intolerances. The first speaker, Dr. Hook, brought out that such intolerance is especially strong within a specific religion. Here sanctions are stronger against members of the religion than against those who are not members. Moreover, history would seem to show that religion is itself not sufficient to prevent religious persecution as religious wars have shown. Two questions proposed by Dr. Hook for the consideration of the members of the panel. To what extent dogma is a source of intolerance and to what extent intolerance is the inability to solve various non-religious problem (i.e., social, political, or financial). The second speaker, Dr. Rochedieu, emphasized the individual, psychological aspects of intolerance which he characterized as a kind of fear or uncertainty on the part of the believer. In discussion it became apparent that what is tolerated would seem to depend a good deal on points of view. What may be tolerance in one area may easily be the opposite in another. This leads to the realization of the fact that it is easier to establish universal understanding through ethics rather than by religion. There may be cooperation in action even the beliefs differ. Certainly it is necessary in any discussion of religious tolerance and intolerance to recognize the primacy of the ethical, for there is no "absolute" universal religious freedom and there will never will be as long as different countries maintain different ethical ideals. Perhaps, as Dr. Hook suggests, tolerance can be explained as being the freedom to practice whatever faith one wishes within the framework of a common ethical area. Most to be feared are those who claim to have absolute truth.

Dr. Hook, in summing up, reemphasized the above mentioned
idea that tolerance is not indifference. Many Asians, he noted, have tended to believe that to be tolerant means that they must be tolerant of intolerance. Rather, there is the duty of drawing the line of demarcation in their own countries and of combating intolerance.

SESSION II

ISLAM AND ITS RELATION TO EASTERN AND WESTERN CULTURE

Reported by FRANCES CASSARD

It was suggested that we avoid the terms "Eastern" and "Western" and discuss the relations of specific areas of Islam with the parts of the world they have influenced, and the ways they have been influenced. The major areas of the Islamic world are: Arab-African, Turkish (which includes Eastern Europe, South Soviet Provinces, Afghanistan and Sinkiang), Pakistan – India, Indonesia, and China. There are more than 400,000,000 Muslims, with more than half of them east of Iran.

Dr. Schimmel pointed out that the European and American areas have little accurate knowledge of Islam. Old medieval literature spoke of the purity and sincerity of the Muslims, but after the 13th century the relation between the Turkish-Arab Muslims and the Christians showed little understanding. After the 12th century mysticism became influential in Islam and it is through a mutual appreciation of mystical elements that there was some mutual appreciation between Muslims and Christians. Even today, the mystical element in Islam is strong and a contributing factor in the appreciation of Islam by non-Muslims.

Dr. Halepota pointed out that the Quran is the basis of Islam and the Unity of God is the fundamental teaching of the Quran. God is One and He alone is to be worshiped. Humanity is God's creation, with no men superior to others. God has revealed His will through many Prophets, some of whom are mentioned in the Quran. Of the many Islamic contributions to the rest of the world, the chief are the emphasis on the Unity of God, the brotherhood of all men, and the identity of the secular and sacred. Holiness should be cultivated in every aspect of life.

The discussion of mysticism in Islam raised the question as to whether it has been influenced by other religions – Hinduism or Christianity. It was agreed that there seems to have been parallel development of mysticism in the religions – any the parallel strains of mysticism have sometimes encouraged mutual appreciation – but the mysticism of Islam stems from its emphasis on the supremacy of God and man's complete dependence on God.

It was asked if the Muslim generation of saints was a form of popular mysticism, possibly duplacting similar generation in other religions. Some such generation may be classed as superstition, but for most Muslims the generation takes the form of a prayer to God for the saint's consolation. There can be no mediators in Islam.

Concerning prophets, it was asked if Chinese Muslims are correct in regarding the Buddha and Confucius as prophets since they were not mentioned in the Quran. The Quran mentions some prophets and says there are many more. Therefore, the Buddha and Confucius may be prophets, but we cannot say fore sure since the Quran did not mention them specifically.

In answer to the question as to whether an emphasis on mysticism might help to draw the various Muslims are brought together by the realization that God is One and all men are brothers because that is the way God made us.

The Muslims recognize and respect Christ, for He is mentioned in the Quran, while Christians do not show the same regard for Mohammad since their Scriptures do not speak of him. Muslims wish that the followers of all religions would try to understand Islam, not from books and commentaries but, starting from zero, by studying objectively and without prejudice Islam as it is taught and practiced by Muslims.

Scholars of all religions were urged to seek accurate knowledge of Islam, for it is through a sound knowledge of all religions that we can lay the basis for mutual understanding throughout the world.

SESSION III

SOME ASPECTS OF MODERNIZATION, WESTERNIZATION AND CHRISTIANIZATION IN THE ORIENT.

Reported by ERIKA KANEXO

In his opening address Professor H. Clavier of Strassbourg University (France) defined the three terms implied. Modernization
according to him suggests science and technique and dates back to the Renaissance. The Greek spirit is therefore at the root of Modernization. Westernization on the other hand must be associated with Rome which added juridical sense to the Greek spirit. Functionally related but not to be confused with them is finally Christianization, which may be understood on different levels. A superficial one which helped to accelerate Modernization and Westernization and the ultimate one of conversion. Prof. J. Campbell of the Sarah Lawrence College, New York (U.S.A.) suggested on the contrary to identify Westernization with Greco-Roman and Modernization with the machine age. He pointed out that although machines were in India generally associated with the West, the Japanese attitude was that the West had merely announced a principle which could be applied by everybody. This view was endorsed by Prof. C.P. Fitzgerald of the National University of Australia who pointed out that in China Modernization implied merely introduction of industrialization, its roots in European history being generally disregarded. The Chinese attitude is positive towards Modernization, but negative towards Westernization, but both are quite divorced from Christianization. The same situation was reported for India by Prof. A. Pazzalli of the Ministry of Education, Rome (Italy). Prof. Fisch of the University of Illinois raised the question of whether it is possible to detach machinery from its associated social and economic institutions. He answered in the negative, stressing that economic institutions are international. Prof. Saki emphasized the interrelation of the three terms and their further connection with economics, whereas Prof. R.J.Z. Werblowsky, Hebrew University, Jerusalem (Israel) pronounced economics to be not necessarily decisive. Culture as a functional integrated whole should rather be kept in mind. Thus the effect of Modernization has been Westernization and Christianization. Modernization itself has a purely mechanical aspect and a spiritual one, implying a change of attitude. A serious problem is presented when change of attitude lags behind outward change. Lastly, Modernization and Christianization are in the West diametrically opposed. Gradually also the East has learned to distinguish between them and the same will happen to Westernization and Christianization. Prof. Campbell added that Christianity has actually fought science at every step, so that there is no actual connection between them. At this point Prof. P. Peachy suggested the introduction of the term "secularization" to which Prof. Werblowsky added the provision that the impetus for secularization had also originated in the West. He therefore defined secularization as (a) an imminent development and (b) as introduced by the West. He furthermore held that the East must needs succumb to the impact of the West, whereas the West adopted Eastern concepts (Zen-Buddhism) merely in order to enrich itself.

Prof. Clavier once again stressed the importance of realizing the Greek sources of Modernization and warned against the dangers of isolating the outward aspects of Modernization from their spiritual foundations.

In his address Prof. C. Hartshorne of Emory University, Atlanta (U.S.A.) enlarged on this subject. He particularly recommended some aspects of Western religion to be profitably taken over by the East. Although no religious tradition as it stands is adequate to our needs, the aspect of love as creativity is emphasized as essence of Western religion. Science is pronounced to be the central fact of our life and defined as love of the specific form of reality, love of nature in depth. Only science loves nature underneath the surface and as she specifically is. Science makes man a creator of alternatively, would make him a destroyer. The imminent dangers are war, tyranny and population increase. The last aspect being generally neglected, is given special consideration and it is asked whether any religion faced this problem in a loving and creative way. Hartshorne advocated to retain the faith of the East in metaphysics and likewise preserve the faith of the West in the positive value of the specific and concrete. The latter is the soul of science, the former the only way to escape the dangers of divorcing rational knowledge from spiritual value.

Prof. K. Yamamoto (Ibaragi Christian College) demonstrated changes of emphasis in Christianity by Japanese history since the Meiji Restoration. In its initial stages Christianity was associated with various emancipation and charitable movements and therefore highly suspicious to the authorities. Suppression was successfully fought by pioneers like Uchimura Kanzo, who at the time of the Russo-Japanese war recommended an imposition of Christianity on Bushido. However, since then the spiritual influence of Christianity has been steadily declining, Marxism taking the front-stage in solving social problems. Therefore a combination of Christianity and oriental culture should present a very positive power from which much was to be expected.

Prof. Miyazaki, Tokyo University remained the meeting that so far only terminology and no facts had been debated and the subject of Westernization, in the sense of yielding responsibility to the individual was introduced by Prof. Campbell.*

* He observed that whereas the Orient was eager to accept the machine
and modernization it feared and resisted the Western spiritual principle of individualism, to which Professor Saki replied that the Orient was afraid this Western attitude would block the communist effort to give for instance the Chinese coolie an economic basis for the development of his ego.

SESSION IV
EASTERNIZATION OF CHRISTIANITY: INFLUENCE OF ORIENTAL CULTURE ON CHRISTIANITY IN ASIA

Reported by WILLIAM G. WOODARD

Dr. H. Dumoulin of Sophia University, Tokyo, opened the discussion with a thoughtful comments on the theme in which he emphasized the fact that religion and culture are not identical and that there is an interplay of forces in which the one influences the other. This, the speaker pointed out, takes two forms: the conscious adaptation or accommodation of Christianity to the local culture, and the subtle influence of the local culture on Christianity. Christianity, said Dr. Dumoulin, has not yet found its eastern form without which adoption by the country is not possible. In respect to elements in the Zen which could contribute to the development of the Christian faith in Japan three elements were suggested: silent meditation, enlightenment and religious symbolism, especially in respect to nature.

Dr. G. M. Reichelt of Hong Kong followed with comments on some of the specific ways in which adaptation is taking place in China, especially in respect to Buddhist elements. Special reference was made to such things as use of a cross rising from a lotus, Chinese architecture, liturgy, the three-fold refuge, festivals, and the development of Chinese hymnology.

Following these speakers there was active participation by all members of the group but with few exceptions the comments were concerned with theoretical problems regarding the advisability and necessity of Christianity incorporating certain elements of the local culture in order to spread rather than a discussion of the extent to which easternization had taken place. Significant remarks concerned the necessity of syncretism the fact that some forty Buddhist missionaries from India brought about a revolting charge.

SESSION V
THE BLIND SPOTS OF OCCIDENT IN ITS APPRECIATION OF ORIENTAL CULTURES

Reported by ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL

The blind spots on the Occident in its Appreciation of Oriental Culture, and, also in the East in its relation to the West, can result, as both the speakers—Dr. Hirai and Dr. Ramachandra—and the discussants stressed, either from ignorance or from the difference of the way of thinking. The second reason—difference of way of thinking—was discussed, but all participants agreed that the first one, ignorance, was to be overcome by two means: the way of reason, and the vital way.

The first way implies the careful study of foreign languages—for without understanding the fundamental truths of religions as expressed in its own terms, no real understanding is possible, and this study should also involve the careful study of Philosophy, History and Art of the East. The first way implies further the approach to unknown cultures with the help of sociological and psychological research without being blinded by religious prejudices, as it was the fault of many fundamentalist Christians who used to judge non-Christian religions by the picture the Bible gives of so-called Heathendom, without studying religions in a scientific way in order to discover their real value (an attitude which is especially to be seen in the history of Islamic studies).

Power too is a corrupting force—because supreme power is no conducive to careful study, and to the humility which is needed for real understanding and learning.

Among the Orientals, the acceptance of Western outward ways of life may often blind their eyes to the values of their own traditional culture. The vital way which may help to overcome the difficulties of mutual understanding means: to live in close contact with the representatives of an other culture, and to partake at their life and prayer. Prophetic power in East and West must be known to each other, for religion is not a immovable force but becomes dramatic when it challenges power. It is to be hoped that, by the ways indicated here, a slowly progress towards mutual understanding will be made.
SESSION VI
THE CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS IN ORIENTAL AND OCCIDENTAL RELIGIOUS THOUGHTS

Reported by RAYMOND J. HAMMELY

The subject for group discussion was criticized on two counts. There were those who discounted the sharp definitive line between orient and occident, suggesting that the common description of Indian thought as ‘other-worldly’ and of Western thought as ‘this-worldly’ was a gross oversimplification. A Burmese Buddhist, almost echoing Robert Burns, said that human nature is essentially one. The second objection was that the subject was over-defining, limiting the discussion to religious happiness, but, whilst some discussants entered upon general fields, it was felt advisable to limit the main discussion to happiness, as understood within a religious context, although religious presuppositions, where seriously accepted, would influence the total world view. For example, it was suggested that the concept of happiness was dependent upon the concept of God. In the Judaic-Christian traditions, predominant in the west, as well as in Islam, where faith in a personal God was emphasized, happiness would naturally be conceived as communion with God. The fact that sin mars that fellowship means a stress not only upon divine forgiveness, but also upon an eschaton, where ‘happiness’ is to be fulfilled. The fact that Christ had spoken of ‘the abundance of life’ meant that the west tended to emphasize self-fulfilment over against an eastern emphasis on self-denial (which was not, however, considered as an end in itself). But the fact that Christianity also spoke of gaining life through losing life meant that this contrast could not be fully maintained, but some differences were noted between east and west in their attitude to material things, with the east showing to a much greater degree a spirit of detachment, whereas the Christian tradition pointed to happiness achieved through a right use of things. In the west change through human effort and the happiness achieved through successful effort were to be noted, whereas the Indian acceptance of Karma tended towards the denial of any material element within true happiness. The west was ready to see a sacramental relationship between the material and the spiritual, which the east tended to disregard, and here Islamic thought sided with the occident.

In so far as east and west alike seek ‘liberation’ or ‘salvation’, there is a close parallel, but Buddhism, in accepting the possibility of Buddhahood in this world, regarded both sensational happiness and the happiness beyond sensation as attainable in this world, although this present world is basically unhappy, and happiness, apart from Buddhahood, is either elusive or, at best, transitory. In Japanese thought and tradition, it was felt that the material loomed much larger, although the paradox of hedonism seemed to be worked out, in that the happiness did not come from a lust for happiness. Basic Japanese world-affirmation appeared to have influenced Japanese Buddhism, in that Japanese Buddhism appeared less ready to advocate an escape from the phenomenal world and held that truth was to be sought ‘where we are.’

The subject of suffering emerged, and it was felt that the east tended to look upon it as essentially evil, although Confucianism did not see happiness as escapism, but rather as basic harmony between heaven and earth. (This emphasis seemed akin to the Judaic-Christian and Islamic stress upon conformity with the will of God as the road to true happiness. Some Protestant Christianity might appear to avoid the goal of happiness as something unworthy, but the idea of the glorification of God and the enjoyment of Him for ever, as man’s ‘chief end’ pointed to a coupling of service and happiness.) Escape from suffering should not be considered as an end in itself; love and creativity, emphasized in the western tradition, were presented as the true goal of human existence—a creativity which involves suffering. It was posited, that the link between creativity and happiness was a new emphasis in western thought, perhaps influenced by scientific and technological development.

Indian thought also regarded happiness as ‘fearlessness’ which comes from the resolving of the tension of duality. Where there is ‘the other’, there is fear. Christian thought, however, had its parallel to this in the link it creates between happiness and love, and the emphasis that the love which unites man with God and man with man ‘casts out fear.’

SESSION VII
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL RELIGIONS IN INTERCULTURAL CONTACTS

Reported by FRANCES CASSARD

Dr. Fisch, our Chairman, reminded us of discussion points. Prof. Hori, our first speaker gave us several questions to consider:
1) Identification of the role of national religions and consideration
2) Association between nationalism and religion which is bound up with the state but not exclusively that of the people.

3) Nationalism itself as a national religion.

He gave as examples of the origin of national religions the primitive day forms of early Judaism, Egyptian religion and Japanese state Shinto. He mentioned as examples of the characteristics of national religions the frequently existing polytheism and its hierarchical nature, myth, localized god, and political coloring of the teaching, ritual and purpose. As methods of cultural influence, whether morally tenable or not, he listed the ancient imperialistic approach, (Alexander the Great or King Ashoka), the forced “conversion” of pagans by both Christian and Moslem movements, and missionary “colonialism” by Western powers in Asia and Africa. He ended by raising the question of self-conscious nationalism in Asia and the role of inter-cultural contacts among national and universal religions.

Dr. Lanczkowski, our second speaker, also traced historical examples of national religions, mentioning especially the ancient Egyptian Kingdom period and its influence on the Nubians, the wars of the Assyrians in the name of their national god, and the Old Persian empire of Darius formed under the sanction of their god, Ahura Mazda.

Other participants further defined national religion of the present day as:

1) exclusively identified with a special cultural heritage (e.g. State Shinto, early Judaism) and

2) an official national expression of an international faith (e.g. a) Roman Catholic as both a state church in some lands as well as a universal church in reference to Papal authority

b) Church of England)

Shinto was discussed as an outstanding example of a national religion. But it was remarked that as far as contribution to intercultural relations is concerned, a national religion is an obstacle rather than a contribution. Shinto even fought against intercultural relations. Only since the war has it had any outreach toward an international outlook. Before that it had little role as an international religion insofar as it was enslaved to the state.

Dr. S. Ono of the Kokugakuin Shinto Univ. spoke on this point saying that a national religion may have two aspects:

1) national and indigenous as the nation develops and

2) a gradual consciousness of itself as an outreaching international religion.

If a good organizer could be found for present day Shinto, we would see interesting manifestations of international development, and the mentioned the example of Tenrikyo. He said that because of its intensely Japanese content, Shrine Shinto could not ever be international, although the peace of the world is their sincere prayer, but State Shinto could become universal.

To the question concerning the emperor’s Imperial Rescript of Jan. 1, 1946, it was brought out by Mr. Woodard of the International Institute for the Study of Religions, that the emperor did not renounce his ancestry, but said that the relationship between the Japanese people and himself did not depend on the interpretation of his origin and that of his family, but rested on a much more solid basis than that.

Our Chairman, Dr. Fisch summed up our session and pointed up the significant points out of a very complicated meeting. The negative summary was the statement that by definition a national religion is an obstacle to intercultural relations. But a positive contribution can be made by national religions:

They may serve as a medium of interpretation to foreigners of the indigenous culture (e.g. we foreigners can learn much about Japan through Shinto).

A participant added at the end that a religion such as Christianity or Buddhism considered in its national sense (not State), because of its nationalism can reach out in a sympathetic approach to people of other national ties and be a means of bringing them together. An example of this, though far from perfect, is the World Fellowship of Buddhists, which brings together people of different nationalities because of its basic control.

SESSION VIII
THE RELATIVE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD CIVILIZATION

Reported by PAUL PEACHEY

Professor Eklund indicated that religion is commonly regarded in the modern view as irrational, and hence a more segment of life. Hence it is difficult for us to see how in the past it could shape culture or how it will be able to do so in the future. We can be helped on this
point, he suggested, if we recall that all thinking relates to "distinct reality", and that logical and empirically thinking men always so regarded religion. Further, we need to take the historical point seriously, recognizing thereby that an absolute religion has never existed. Finally, Professor Eklund, indicated, intellectual and technical refinement is needed in our work, and on this religion has still much to learn from science.

Professor Antweiler proposed that man relates himself to his surrounding beings and things by faith, knowledge and action, to which correspond religion, science and technology. From there he commented on the relationship of religion to the other two domains, and on the particular contributions which religion has to make. Religion, he felt, both limits and gives confidence to the consequences of truth. Hence religion may restrict science, but it may also widen its boundaries. But there is also much common ground between science and religion, since both accept the principles of imperfection and perfectibility, both accept mind and will, and both seek the unknown. With regard to technology, religion protects man against himself; it points to that which is beyond both science and technology, which cannot be ends in themselves. Religion thus carries special responsibility, particularly for the sense of community.

The discussion indicated the great difficulties we still face in bringing together our unique convictions with the need to cooperate with other faith and culture systems, for the unique conviction appears to the one holding it to entail precisely the universal and hence the really valid basis for a world order.

Mr. Suryaphongs first explained the compatibility of religion and science in Buddhism, indicating that science merely prolongs the range of the five senses, but provides no answers on questions of origin, destiny, purpose or suffering; nor can it bring lasting happiness. It is with these that the Buddha was concerned, teaching that the senses can touch only relative realities, while only by training the mind in immediate insight can we arrive at truth.

Mr. Ames could agree with Prof. Eklund that we need more emphasis on science, but questions the observation of Prof. Antweiler that science cannot give ultimate answers. He objects, too, to the identification of science and materialism. Has not science enriched our living, not for one ultimate aim merely, but for many purposes? Admittedly there has been excess and perhaps we must learn tranquility from the Buddhists.

Mr. Basu, while not having heard the two original speakers, felt that religion should not be defined as belief but as discovery, and that hence it has the same objective as science. Conflict between religion and science arose in the West only, because there religion meant dogma, with which science then came in conflict. More recently, however, now that science has disproved dogma, the opposite tendency appears, namely the defacement of science. Basically, dichotomization of science and religion is false. It means dichotomization of personality. Only yoga, not as dogma but as an element in all religions, can bring harmony of inner and outer (hence religion and science).

Mr. Hook then expressed his indebtedness to the congress participants from the East, and indicated his readiness to reconstruct his thinking, if need be. He felt, however, discussion so far seemed to violate fundamental logic. For if it is “values” we have in mind, we have the discipline, ethics; if discovery of facts, science; and if “inner knowledge”, metaphysics. Now we are being told they are all one. To clarify things he proposes that there is no knowledge but scientific knowledge, and that examples be given of other types of supposed knowledge. Can absolute truth be won otherwise? For you still have conflicting claims of various supposed absolute truths, this can be settled only by scientific reasonableness.

Mr. Shin proposed that whereas formerly religion persecuted science, science now persecutes religion. He restated the view that science deals with the realities of the phenomenal world while religion deals with ultimate reality. All truth originates in one God, otherwise it is inaccessible. No ethics are possible without theological roots, (faith is the root of religion and ethics its fruit) to which Mr. Hook replied that our ethics derive from practical needs, that in his categorical imperative Kant proved the autonomy of morality (from religion). But Mr. Shin felt that his previous distinction obtains, that science deals with Wahrscheinlichkeit while religion deals with Gewissheit.

At this point the chairman reminded the group that we should assume that we know the difference between a clergyman and scientist, and should proceed from here to examine what each can contribute.

Mr. Hook continued in reply to those who hold science can give no values, or who decry the destruction of science in, e.g., atomic bombs, that the blame really rests on the bad moralists (religionists, politicians), and maintained that science provides the material basis for happiness, gives room for all the diverse religions.

Mr. Shin replied that Kant held none the less that to have moral law, there must be a lawgiver, that what he, Shin, is trying to do is not to dissociate science and religion but harmonize them.
Once more a reminder from the chairman.

Prof. Eklund now commented on Prof. Antweiler's paper, a point which the secretary failed to grasp. He indicated that theologians are prone to distinguish between the rational and the irrational in a censorious way. If religion is discovery of facts, this must be knowledge, hence cannot say there is no knowledge except scientific knowledge.

Mr. Suriyaphongs stated his agreement with Mr. Hook's distinction between ethics and religion, and explained further how this distinction is worked out in Buddhism.

Mr. Peretti, in commenting on the respective contributions of science and religion to world civilization, stated that the ultimate goal is happiness and that neither science nor religion fulfill their purpose if they do not contribute to this. He reminded that if religion has hindered science, it must not be forgotten that science has often hindered religion. He then showed how, in the Catholic approach, there is an ascending scale which leads from science to metaphysics to God, hence science being a unique way to God.

Mr. Saki (tr. Inada) felt that religion and science must work hand in hand. All religion is relative in the sense that each man has his own religion, and that all religion is dogmatic in the sense that each takes his stand at a certain point (not dogmatic in bad sense, necessarily).

Mr. Hook asked whether all religions are true if they contradict each other?

Mr. Saki felt they are all true as art is true.

Mr. Inada disagrees with the assumption that religion needs an absolute, since Buddha, e.g., does not postulate an absolute. Furthermore right and wrong did not occur to him in the usual sense, but rather only as pertaining philosophically to the Dharma. To determine what is best in a practical way (? - uncertain, secretary) is the task of science.

Mr. Shin replied to Mr. Saki that science deals with the relative, religion with the absolute, that at the end Kant postulate a religion of humanity; Mr. Shin denies further that there are no ethical absolutes.

Mr. Saki states he is happy with no faith, that Mr. Shin is dogmatic.

Mr. Basu returned to the comments of Mr. Hook, says we must look at real intent of religion, not at what is made of it. Science and religion both have led us to see the unity of personality, but science must deal with practical matters and religion and metaphysics with values.

Mr. Morgan now questioned whether there is such a thing a developing world civilization. He disagrees on this point with people like Hocking and Toynbee. He does not believe that there is a coming world civilization. At any event, believes we must clarify what we mean.

Mr. Hook—What is meant here is a world order, can't remove the various religions and civilizations. (Morgan concurs.) But these various civilizations now impinge upon each other for the first time, therefore urgent tasks, such as, e.g., science turning salt water into fresh or devising population pills, thus solving some of the basic problems which always lead to conflict.

Mr. Masunaga notes, all civilization must have a spiritual foundation.

Miss Falk also comments on misunderstandings in the discussion. It presupposes a fundamental divorce which doesn’t exist, if we see it in the perspective of time. It is merely a "historical accident" that such is the case, mid-20th century, but is confident, this will disappear.

Mr. Ito comments that the scientific study (dissection) of religion will destroy it.

Mr. Saki says our hope lies in humanism broadly conceived, points for proof to fact that hundreds of millions live without religion, happily.

SESSION IX
THE CONTRIBUTION OF RELIGIONS TO INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING, ESPECIALLY IN EDUCATION.

Reported by ROBERT P. KRAMEERS

The first speaker advocated that UNESCO, for the realization of its project of promoting intercultural understanding, should recommend the introduction of the great results of the studies on civilizations and religions as constituent facts of a clear presentation of all peoples on earth, on the level of general pre-specialized education (Secondary school education). The advocated this on the academic principle that it is possible to make man the object of scholarly discipline is the same way as it is possible to do this with exact sciences.
The second speaker commented on the difficulty of implementing such a teaching programme, which requires a thorough training for teachers and preparation of unbiased textbooks. The danger lies in the premature introduction of value judgements. Yet he wholeheartedly agrees that a pre-university teaching on other religions is urgently necessary for the promotion of better intercultural understanding.

The ensuing lively discussion revealed in the main two standpoints regarding such a secondary school teaching programme. On the one hand it was held that foreign religions cannot be taught without introducing an objective standard of value-judgement, for the alternative is the unconscious introduction of relativism and scepticism in the pupils, this being a highly undesirable by-product of such teaching.

On the other hand there was a belief in the possibility of a fair presentation of other religions in their essence and history, with sympathetic understanding as a keynote rather than value-judgement. Education is a means whereby the pupil is better enabled to come to his own value-judgements. A teaching course as proposed would a) rouse genuine interest among more pupils, thus preparing them more adequately for further study, and b) teach the pupils respect for the spiritual achievements in other cultures, which might also lead to a deeper understanding of their own religion.

SESSION X
THE CONTRIBUTION OF RELIGIONS TO INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING, ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO WORLD PEACE.

Reported by ARABINDA BASU

The discussion was most interesting and fruitful. Concrete suggestions were made by more than one speaker regarding ways in which the great religions could contribute to international understanding to further world peace.

The first speaker, Dr. Nakagawa, pointed out that the peoples in the world have different cultures. The question of a common religious basis of world peace had to be approached from more than one angle. There was the viewpoint held by the followers of the different religions that their own particular religion was the truest and the best and could provide the much needed basis of world peace. There was, however, in fact much antagonism between the different faiths and even between the various sects of the same religion. There was not yet a common, transcendent basis. The task of the group was to enquire whether there was such a basis and if possible, find one.

Dr. Fehl, the second speaker, maintained that the most important task of the religions was to find a new means of applying their dynamic to the problems of modern urban and technological civilization. All religions are individualistic and other-worldly, though, said the speaker, there were other tendencies found in them. A new religious ethic must be developed. Religious education needed to be more broad-based. For instance, the study of any religions would require that of many others which were related to it historically.

One Christian speaker said that tolerance of other religions could be of two kinds. First, it could be the result of a relativistic approach to spiritual truth, viz., that all religions had some truth in them but that none contained the whole truth. The speaker could not as a Christian accept this position. Secondly, one should be able to listen to the viewpoint of another faith without necessarily accepting it or even treating as being as true as one's own beliefs in spiritual matters. He said that he would be himself willing to practise this kind of tolerance.

Two Buddhist speakers thought that Buddhism could provide the required basis of world peace. One of the main reasons for world tensions was that some individuals and nations wanted more of the good things of the world than they were prepared to allow others to have. Contentment was very important, the speakers said, and if everyone of us could find peace within ourselves, then world peace would be achieved.

The secretary pointed out that the first thing to ask was what contribution the religions could make to the understanding of the cultures of the followers of other religions. In doing so it must be found out how much of the culture of a people was determined by its religious intuitions and institutions. Some cultures like the Indian, the pre-Communist Chinese and the Japanese were predominantly religious in character. Followers of other faiths should bear that in mind when trying to study the life and ideas of these nations. Secondly, we must change our ideas of the most important things about religion, think less of dogmas, rites and institutions as the essence of religion than of direct experience of Truth as being the core of a faith. The recognition of the reality of different approaches to Truth
was most important. And this can not be unless intuition and experience are regarded as being the very soul and life of a religion. But even if we accepted that each religion had a basis in experience of its outlook on life and its cultural expressions, it would not be possible to arrive at an understanding of different cultures sufficient to provide a basis of world peace. For religious experience itself is limited and partial for the simple reason that the faculty in man of spiritual intuition and experience is not capable of the integral realization of Truth. Man must go beyond the present constitution of his consciousness and evolve a new power of realizing the many-aspected Truth of the ultimate Reality of which the different religions have seen different aspects only.

The Chairman remarked that spiritual Truth was infinite and universal and that accordingly not only there was no defect in the relativistic approach to religious wisdom but that was the only approach one could take. At the same time the sentiment of love and compassion was universally present in all religions and it was the practise of this fellow feeling and brotherly love that would enable men of different faiths to understand the culture of other people.

SESSION XI
THE FUTURE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE ORIENT AND OCCIDENT

Reported by ERROL F. RHODES

First we should remember that the future is in any case unknown to us, and that the subject of this discussion as phased calls for a genius of the prophetic order. The views expressed in our discussion are more in the nature of personal suggestions and must accordingly be treated with caution.

It has been suggested that a common base for understanding between religions may be found in Natural Theology, but religions claim to derive from divine revelation, and hence are characterized by a certain exclusiveness. This makes it necessary for each religion to exercise a degree of restraint and tolerance in its attitudes and relationship to other traditions. While this spirit of tolerance may be easily achieved from the relative distance of the academician's research study, yet it may be observed, paradoxically enough, that it is among the missionaries of a religion that one may observe the most earnest efforts made to understand the backgrounds and attitudes of members of other faiths. Further, the contrast of tolerance and intolerance (commonly associated with the East and the West respectively as devoted to non-exclusivist and exclusivist traditions) does not really follow East-West lines: one of the recent examples of such a conflict is found in the East, in the India-Pakistan case.

While in the past religion has frequently played an unfortunate, negative role in inter-cultural understanding, this has been due in great measure to two factors: 1) the attitude of arrogance associated with the spirit of colonialism, and 2) an ignorance of the backgrounds and traditions of peoples of a different faith. Intercultural exchange occurs today in almost every field of interest other than the area of religion: e.g., art, sports, science, commerce, etc. But no real cultural intercommunication can occur without a deep understanding of the thought, life and religion of different cultures. This points to the urgent necessity in our day for mutual religious understanding between cultures.

While it is recognized that there are the differences between religions which are significant, of undeniable reality on both the personal (individual) and institutional levels, we suggest that often what are recognized as differences may be differences of expression and orientation, which will yeild before a more profound, penetrating consideration and understanding of the problems and experiences which are expressed in different ways. Differences of languages, lack of personal communication, present an obstacle (difficult but not insurmountable) here.

It is the concensus of our discussion that the role of each religion in promoting intercultural understanding may best be fulfilled by each religion seeking to understand itself profoundly and fulfilling its own faith. In this way areas of common understanding and effort will appear, and a positive mutual relationship may be achieved. The ethical standards in the major religious traditions have much in common; theological discussion may not be as important as fulfilling a common responsibility toward human needs.
SESSION XII
ROLE OF COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF RELIGIONS IN
CLARIFYING CHARACTERISTICS OF ORIENTAL
AND OCCIDENTAL CULTURES AND ENHANCING
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

Reported by JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA

The first speaker was Prof. H. C. Puech, with Mr. Banmate acting as his interpreter. He discussed the nature and historical development of the discipline of the History of Religions. Some of the highlights of his speech were as follows:

1. That the History of Religions was originally motivated by apologetic and missionary objectives, but that in recent years, it began to be concerned with the sociological, phenomenological and psychological facts involved in various religions.

2. That it aims at the understanding of our own religion as well as other religions, i.e., similarities and uniquenesses. In the 19th Century, many scholars of the History of Religions were preoccupied with similarities, while today, they are concerned with specificities of each religion in the context of general similarities.

3. That the Comparative Study of Religions can contribute to the mutual understanding between Eastern and Western religions by delivering the structure of historic forms of religions. In this task psychological, sociological or phenomenological methods of inquiry have proven to be very useful.

The second speaker was Prof. R.J.Z. Werblowsky. He attempted, first of all, to distinguish the scholarly and the religious tasks in the study of religion. He asserted that the liberal humanistic values of tolerance and co-existence among various religions are not necessarily religious virtue and that the Comparative Study of Religions aims at “understanding”. Real “Verstehen” (Dilthey) is more than study of external forms of religions. A phenomenologist is the subject and religion is the object. But he is concerned with existential problems. A phenomenologist of religion must have the capacity to say “no” and also “face” religious phenomena simultaneously. The double understanding of “erleben” and detachment enables the historian of religions to engage in mutual understanding. His task is understanding, and not mutual understanding. Thus, sympathetic effort to understand other religions does not imply “Applied Comparative Study of Religions.” However, comparative study has an ultimate implication of mutual understanding among various peoples.

Many stimulating questions were asked from the floor. The meeting adjourned at 12:45 p.m.
Public Lectures
SOME PARALLELS IN THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION, WESTERN AND JAPANESE

BY

RAFAELE PETTAZZONI

The subject of this talk, a most provocative one, has been attracting the attention of scholars both Western and Eastern. Exactly 50 years ago the III International Congress for the History of Religions was held in Oxford. A group of outstanding Japanese scholars took part, and Teitaro Suzuki, Masaharu Anesaki and Zenkai Omori presented on that occasion some interesting contributions to the understanding of Japanese Religions. Anesaki, speaking about the renewal of Buddhism by the Pure Land School, founded by Honen in 1174, started his speech in this way: "The development of religious faith in the thirteenth century exhibits some remarkable parallelism in Japan and Italy. Just as St. Francis of Assisi marked an epoch-making phase of Christian religion in Europe, so our sage Honen is the man representative of the change worked out in Japanese Buddhism in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries" (Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions, Vol. 1, p. 122).

And in a second speech the same Anesaki, apropos of Kuya, a precursor of Honen in the tenth century (ibid., p. 156) said, "His faith in Amita, the Redeemer in the Western Land of Bliss, was expressed in singing songs in praise of the Buddha, very similar to the practice of the Italian Disciplinati di Gesù (these men were the members of a religious confraternity of Umbria in the XII-XIII century who went about the streets singing the praise of Jesus Christ).

While resuming this subject again in the modest form of a lecture, I think it convenient to make first a remark of a general character. From a rigorously historical point of view, any parallelism is purely conventional. History does not repeat itself; it goes on with ever new and original formations. However in the infinite variety of historical formations our mind finds relations of similarity and difference without which our speech would be reduced to a mere catalog.
of unconnected and insignificant facts. But however suggestive they may be, similarities should never make us lose sight of the manifold diversities which are ever found defining and specifying cultural structures in the development of history. It is well known how much Buddhism and Christianity differ in their doctrines. It is enough to recall that the idea of a unique God, creator of the world and humanity, which is a central idea of Christian doctrine does not find any place in Buddhism. Another central point of Christianity is the conception of an individual immortal soul; this concept is not found in genuine Buddhistic doctrines.

In spite of these and other deep differences in their ideologies, Buddhism and Christianity present an important parallelism of a functional order. Both Buddhism and Christianity effect a radical revolution in opposition to a preexisting world. Christianity was born as a reaction against the religious tradition of Judaism, and Buddhism was born as a reaction against the religious tradition of Brahmanism. To the paganism of the Greco-Roman world in which Christianity was propagated corresponds an Asiatic paganism in those countries where Buddhism was spread. Buddhism as well as Christianity realizes a religious ideal which destroys all frontiers among nations and surmounts all boundaries of countries. Buddhism and Christianity mark the starting point of a new form of religion; both mark the change from a national religion to a new supernational one. Therefore, in this aspect, in spite of their deep doctrinal differences, a similarity, a functional parallelism does exist.

But it is also necessary to add that this parallel function does not exist without an important difference. The difference lies in the way Christianity and Buddhism respectively react in their contacts with the pre-existent national religions, which they met in their respective fields of penetration. Namely, the national pagan religions which Christianity met in its way, the Greek and Roman religions in the Mediterranean world and later the religions of the Celtic-Germanic-Slavic peoples in barbarian Europe, all disappeared before the surging spread of Christianity. In Asia, on the contrary, the national pagan religions of those countries outside India to which Buddhism spread did not disappear; they are still alive today.

However not even in Europe was the destruction of the pre-Christian world complete. If the law that states that nothing is created or destroyed is true in the natural sciences, then it holds true even in the world of spiritual things. With this exception: in the West, the pre-Christian world did not survive with its proper name but only under the Christian name, in Christian vestments, more or less incorporated and assimilated by Christianity. On the contrary, in Asia the national and traditional religions survived as they were side by side with Buddhism: this was the case in China of Taoism and the state religion; this was the case in Japan with Shintoism, while in India the resistance offered by Brahmanism and Hinduism was so strong that it forced Buddhism to emigrate from its place of origin. This difference between Christianity and Buddhism worked out a completely different course in the whole religious history of the Western and Eastern Worlds. But even in this diversity we can still find a few interesting points of parallelism. They appear peculiarly evident in the religious history of Japan if it is compared with that of the West.

In the frame of universal history we could say that the Chinese Empire corresponds to the Roman Empire. From this relation another relation is derived, i.e., that Japan placed at the extremities of China corresponds to the barbaric Europe, placed at the boundaries of the Roman Empire. The respective positions are parallel not only geographically, but also in their historic-cultural aspect. Between China and Japan existed a cultural disparity similar to that which existed between the Roman Empire and the Celtic-Germanic-Slavic Europe. The first penetration of Christianity in the Roman world was realized through missionary and apostolic means, as the same means were used in the penetration of Buddhism in China through Chinese pilgrims. On the contrary the penetration of Christianity in barbaric Europe, as well as the penetration of Buddhism in Japan was a cultural phenomenon more than a religious one. Christianity penetrated barbaric Europe not directly from Palestine, but mediately through the Roman Empire. Analogically Buddhism was not spread throughout Japan directly from India, but from China, through Korea.

In the Celtic-Germanic-Slavic Europe, Christianity first conquers the courts, precisely because the courts, relatively more advanced in culture, are more sensitive to the influences of the superior Roman culture, and therefore also to religion. The conversion of the rulers was followed by the conversion of the masses of the respective peoples. In the same way the Japanese court, open to the influence of whatever was Chinese, was first in adopting the Buddhism which came from China. The great mass of the Japanese people remained for a long time estranged from Buddhism, attached as they were to the traditional Shintoistic religion. The masses will be conquered only through the equation of the “Kami” with the “Batsu” and the “Hotoke”, that is to say with Buddha and the Bodhisattvas. The adaptation, although
nominal, of Buddhism to Shintoism according to the syncretistic formulas of Sannō and of Ryōbu-Shintō of Dengyō and Kōbō in the ninth century ended in an alteration of the genuine Buddhistic doctrines; in a somewhat similar way the incorporation of ancient pagan elements produced in the original forms of Christianity different religious developments. And in the same way as the West that it would react to these alterations by going back to Evangelical Christianity, so also in Japan there was a reaction to that Buddhism, more or less reformed, which prevailed in the Nara and Heian periods. This reaction consisted in returning to the genuine Chinese Buddhism through the schools of the Kamakura period. One of these sects, Shinshū, founded by Shinran in 1224, has been called the Buddhistic sect of "sola fide", for its faith in Amida Butsu (Buddha Amitabha) alone as sufficient condition for salvation. From the ranks of Shinshū again in the 15th century came the first translation into Japanese of the sacred books of Buddhism. Until then the canonical and ecclesiastical language had been Chinese, as in the West Latin had been the official language of the Church until the German translation of the Bible was made by Luther.

But the parallelism does not include only the above mentioned aspects. In the West the return to the Christian origins is accompanied by the "Renaissance" of the values of the ancient pagan world. And this period is followed by the "Romantic" evaluation of the medieval barbaric world. So also in Japan, after the return to genuine Buddhism, there can be found a certain parallel of "Renaissance" and "Romanticism", the first being the new influence from the classical Chinese world (Neo-Confucianism of the Samurai in the XVII century), and the second being the new strength of traditional national values which reached a climax in the "restoration of pure Shintō" in the Meiji Era.

TOLERANZ UND WAHRHEIT IN DER RELIGION

VON

GUSTAV MENSCHING


Zweitens: wir wollen uns vielmehr mit der prinzipiellen Stellungnahme zu den jeweils fremden Religionen befassen. Diese prinzipielle Stellungnahme kann entweder die der Toleranz oder der Intoleranz sein. Um zu verstehen, was Toleranz und Intoleranz bedeuten, wollen wir zunächst diese beiden Begriffe klären. Ich unterscheide zwei Formen von Toleranz und Intoleranz: es gibt eine formale Toleranz und Intoleranz und andererseits eine inhaltliche Toleranz und Intoleranz. Damit ist folgendes gemeint: formale Toleranz bedeutet das bloße Nichtantasten der fremden Religion. Diese Haltung ist nicht auf den Inhalt bezogen. Der Staat, der Glaubensfreiheit gewährt, übt formale Toleranz. Wenn indessen distolerierte Religion"den formalen Rahmen des Staates auf irgendeine Weise sprengt und die Einheit gefährdet, dann achätgt diese Toleranz in eine formale Intoleranz um. Das war beispielsweise der Fall im alten Rom, wo man einerseits viele fremde Religionen duldet, die Christen aber verfolgte, weil sie durch Verweiß-
ernannte die israelitische Kirche Jesus; denn auch er erschien den, welche nicht an Gott und an den jüngsten Tag glauben und... welche


Im wesentlichen kann man zwei Wahrheitsbegriffe in der Religionsgeschichte unterscheiden: einerseits kann man Wahrheit als Richtigkeit religiöser Lehren auffassen. Es fragt sich aber, ob diese Auffassung dem entspricht, was die Religionen eigentlich meinen. Ich glaube vielmehr, daß der echte religiöse und ursprüngliche Wahrheitsbegriff eine andere Art von Wahrheit meint, nämlich Wahrheit als religiöse Wirklichkeit. Um zu illustrieren, was hier gemeint ist, erinnere ich an das schöne Bild, das der Zen-Buddhismus gebraucht, wenn er vom Monde der Wahrheit spricht, der sich in klaren und tiefen, aber auch in flachen und schmutzigen Gewässern. Immer ist es derselbe Mond der Wahrheit, also der göttliche Wirklichkeit, die in den verschiedenen Religionen sich auf verschiedene Weise bezeugt. Das nennt ich inhaltliche Toleranz.


Während also, wie wir gesehen haben, die prophetische Religion zu einer intoleranten Stellungnahme fremden Religionen gegenüber neigt, kann man sagen, daß der Mystik Toleranz sozusagen im Blute liegt. Ohne eine erschöpfende Definition des vielgestaltigen Wesens der Mystik geben zu können, sei nur festgestellt, daß das Ziel aller Mystik irgendwie das Eingehen in das göttliche Absolute ist, wobei die Persönlichkeit ausgelöscht wird. Die notwendige Konsequenz aus dieser Grundhaltung ist inhaltliche Toleranz, wie sie uns alle auch allenhalben in der Welt der Mystik begegnet. Dafür einige geschichtliche Beispiele.


Auch im indischen Hinduismus finden sich von frühen Zeiten an wichtige Motive der Toleranz. Wenn es z.B. in einem frühen Texte heißt: „Was nur das Eine ist, das bezeichnen die Seher mit verschiedenen Namen, sie nennen es Indra, Agni, Varuna, Mitra...“, so ist in diesen Worten die Überzeugung ausgesprochen, daß die verschiedenen Göttennamen nur verschiedene Benennungen des einen, allem zu Grunde liegenden Göttlichen sind. Ganz den gleichen Gedanken spricht die Bhagavadgita aus, wenn Gott Vishnus dort (IX, 23) sagt: „Jene, welche anderen Götern anhängend, von Glauben erfüllt, ihnen opfern..., auch diese... opfern nur mir.“ Das bedeutet...

Ganz im gleichen Sinne der Mystik, für die alle rationalen Aussagen über die Gottheit nur relative Gültigkeit haben, sag Radhakrishnan: „Die überpersönliche und die persönliche Auffassung des Wirklichen stellen den absoluten und den relativen Weg dar, die eine Wirklichkeit auszudrücken. Wenn wir den Nachdruck auf das Wesen der Wirklichkeit legen, reden wir vom absoluten Brahman, wenn wir ihr Verhältnis zu uns betonen wollen, dann sprechen wir vom persönlichen Bhagaven.“ Auch Mahatma Gandhi lehnte jede Dogmatisierung und Absolutsetzung einer Religion mit Entschiedenheit ab: „Ich glaube nicht an die alleinige Göttlichkeit der Veden. Ich glaube, daß die Bibel, der Koran und Zendavesta in gleicher Weise göttlich inspiriert sind wie die Veden... Der Hinduismus ist nicht eine Religion, die alle rationalen Aussagen über die Gottheit nur relative Gültigkeit haben, sagt Radhakrishnan: „Die überpersönliche und die persönliche Auffassung des Wirklichen stellen den absoluten und den relativen Weg dar, die eine Wirklichkeit auszudrücken. Wenn wir den Nachdruck auf das Wesen der Wirklichkeit legen, reden wir vom absoluten Brahman, wenn wir ihr Verhältnis zu uns betonen wollen, dann sprechen wir vom persönlichen Bhagaven.“

Auch Jakob Böhme wandte sich wie Buddha gegen die Verbindlichkeit religiöser Lehren, die er – unter dem Namen „Meinungen“ bezeichnet, von denen er sagt: „Der Teufel ist schuld, daß die Völker auf Erden sind uneins geworden und sind in Meinungen geraten... und sind mit den Meinungen von Gott fortgegangen.“ Diese Meinungen sind auch für Böhme nur ein Werkzeug. Wesentlich ist nicht das in diesen Meinungen angeblich enthaltene Wissen, sondern die religiöse Grundhaltung: „Was zanken wir viel um das Wissen? Ist doch das Wissen nicht allein der Weg zur Seligkeit. Der Teufel weiß mehr als wir... Daß ich viel weiß, gibt mir nicht Freude, sondern daß ich nach Gott begehre.“

Von dieser Einstellung aus ist es nur konsequent, wenn Böhme auch fremden Religionen gegenüber inhaltliche Toleranz fordert und selbst übt. Er bedient sich des von der Orthodoxie verwendeten und summatisch alle Nichtchristen zusammenfassenden Wortes „Heiden“, um dann aber diesen abwertenden Begriff aufzuheben: „Viele Heiden, die deine (theologische) Wissenschaft nicht haben, und dennoch wider das Böse streiten, werden vor dir das Himmelreich besitzen. Wer will sie richten, wenn ihr Herz mit Gott übereinstimmt. Ob sie gleich diesen (christlichen) Gott nicht kennen, arbeiten sie doch in seinem Geist.“

Und darum vertritt Böhme zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, der auch ein Religionskrieg zwischen christlichen Kofessionen war, die These: „Es kann ein Heide selig werden, wenn er sich zu dem lebendigen Gott wendet und in rechter Zuversicht sich in Gottes Willen ergibt.“


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Daher ahnten in religiöser Intuition, daß in der Tiefe aller Religionen eine letzte Einheit liegt. Die moderne Religionswissenschaft hat diese Ahnung zur Gewißheit gemacht, indem sie in zahlreichen Einzeluntersuchungen nachgewiesen hat, daß es quer durch die Welt

So läßt sich also die von den Mystik von Haus aus geübte und geforderte Haltung der inhaltlichen Toleranz heute geradezu wissenschaftlich begründen, so daß die noch heute weithin intoleranten prophetischen Religionen nicht umhin kommen, diese Erkenntnisse zur Kenntnis zu nehmen und ihre starre Absolutsetzung der eigenen Religion zu korrigieren.


„Du bist der Dinge tiefer Inbegriff, deines Wesens letztes Wort verschweigt, den dich der anderen immer anders zeigt: Dem Schrift als Kiste und dem Land als Schiff.“

Die andere Seite ist die vom Menschen aus sich ergebende Stellungnahme zum Phänomen der Vielheit der Religionen. Zwei indische Persönlichkeiten mögen hier aussprechen, was zu sagen ist: Rabindranath Tagore schrieb: „Können die verschiedenen Religionen nicht ihr verschiedenes Licht für die einzelnen Welten von Seele leuchten lassen, die es brauchen?“ Und im gleichen Sinne betont Mahatma Gandhi, daß die Verschiedenheit der Religionen der Verschiedenheit der Menschen und ihrer Bedürfnisse entspricht, wenn er sagt: „Die Religionen sind verschiedene Wege, die zu dem einen und gleichen Ziele führen.“


Mit dieser hier vertretenen und begründeten Haltung der inhaltlichen Toleranz soll nun aber keineswegs einer religiösen Standpunktlosig-

Das hat Goethe gemeint, wenn er in einem Bildwort treffend sagt:

„Frage nicht, durch welche Pforte
Du in Gottes Stadt gekommen,
Sondern bleib am stillen Orte,
Wo du einmal Platz genommen.“
COMMITTEES
### EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

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**President, Science Council of Japan**
- Kankuro Kaneshige

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- **Secretary**: S. Hanayama
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**Israel**
- H. Wagenvoort

**Japan**
- Honorary Treasurer: W. Lamere
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GENERAL REPORT
At the Eighth International Congress for the History of Religion held in Rome in April 1955, Japan was represented by Professor Shōson Miyamoto and Enkichi Kan sent by the Science Council of Japan. The Japanese representatives informed the Executive Committee of the International Association for the History of Religions that, if the Association wished to hold its next International Congress in Japan, the Japanese societies concerned would undertake to make the necessary arrangements. These negotiations crystallized in the proposal to hold an international meeting in 1958, instead of the regular congress convened every five years, and it was finally agreed to call it the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions. The General Assembly then decided to hold the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions in Japan.

At the Seventh Congress held in Amsterdam in 1950, which Professor Furuno attended as representative of the Science Council of Japan, the possibility of convening a meeting in Japan had already been discussed, and spurred on by these considerations, a preparatory committee supported chiefly by the Japanese Association for Religious Studies had been formed in 1952 in order to promote the idea of such a meeting. In the same year, a National Committee for the History of Religions was set up inside the Science Council of Japan. Together, these two committees worked out a plan for the congress, but later on the suggestion was advanced that it would be more appropriate to hold the International Congress for the History of Religions under the sponsorship of the Science Council of Japan and in November 1956, the Management Committee of the Science Council agreed to this proposal. Following this decision, the preparatory committee established chiefly through the efforts of the Japanese Association for Religious Studies, in collaboration with the secretariat of the Science Council, assumed the responsibility of making the preliminary arrangements at home and abroad and of formulating the necessary plans. In August 1957, the Japanese cabinet formally decided that Japan would sponsor the congress; and in September of that year, the Japanese Organizing Committee for the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions was set up inside the Science Council of Japan which continued the work done up to then by the preparatory committee. The organizing committee was made up of 45 members, comprising outstanding scholars in all fields of the science of religion and the history of religions as well as representatives of the government agencies concerned. The first meeting of the organizing committee was held towards the end of September. Professor Ishizu was elected chairman, Professor Kishimoto executive secretary, and secretaries Professor Hanayama, Professor Masutani and Mr. Honda, secretary-general of the Science Council of Japan. In order to execute the actual business of the organizing committee, an arrangements committee was set up comprising 53 scholars and representatives of government agencies. Professor Ishizu, chairman of the organizing committee, also doubled as chairman of this committee.

The offices of these two committees were located in the secretariat of the Science Council of Japan. The organizing committee later met three times, while the arrangements committee, since its inception in December 1957, held six sessions. With the Progress of deliberations, a steering committee of 19 members was formed inside the arrangements committee, which was entrusted with expediting various practical matters. Upon further deliberation, a five-man committee of young scholars was organized in January 1958 which was put in charge of all practical business. This committee met once every week from January to March and worked out the concrete programme of the whole congress. On the other hand, the executive board, of the organizing committee carried on negotiation with the secretariat of International Association for the History of Religions and UNESCO headquarters on the system of the congress and the invitation of overseas scholars.

In March of that year, five special committees were formed inside the arrangements committee. They were the programme committee (chairman Professor Kishimoto), the fund-raising committee (chairman Professor Masutani), the finance committee (chairman Professor Hanayama), the selection committee (chairman Professor Ohata), and the Kansai district committee (chairman Professor Nagao).

The programme committee had already been organized under the same name inside the preparatory committee in March 1957. The so-called committee of five, headed by Professor Kishimoto and including Professors Toda, Akashi, Wakimoto, Mr. Watanabe and Mr. Matsumoto, did most of the work and took care of all preparations at home and abroad. In April 1958, the programme committee set up a number of subcommittees besides the committee of five, viz., on national participants, congress, symposium, research tours, guidebooks, editing, information, meeting places, receptions, science and activities. All these subcommittees carried out their respective tasks in systematic coordination with each other and in complete integration.

Since the government subsidy appropriated in the national budget for the congress left part of the expenses uncovered, it became imperative to form an association of patrons in order to secure financial backing for
the congress. This was the work allotted to the fund-raising committee. This committee, too, had already been set up under the same name in the above-mentioned preparatory committee in March 1957. Its central figure was Professor Masutani, its chairman, and he was ably supported by the President of Ryōkoku University, Dr. Morikawa, and the other members of the committee. Later, in February 1958, the Organization of Patrons of the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions was founded. This organization was made possible through the cooperation of leading personages from religious and financial circles who acted as patrons. These patrons were:

Keizō Shibusawa (representative of the patrons)

Patrons from financial circles:
Kōgorō Uemura, Benzaburō Katō, Šōshirō Kudō, Kyōnosuke Sakai, Michisuke Sugi

Patrons from religious circles:
Ken Ishihara, Takashi Oizumi, Rōsen Takashina, Nobusuke Takatsukasa, Tokuchika Miki, Tadaaki Yoshimura

With the cooperation of these sponsors and through the efforts of the fund-raising committee, the endorsement and assistance of religious and financial circles could be secured and contributions near to the original goal could be collected. In addition, the Asia and Ford foundations kindly supported our preparations, and financial aid from UNESCO and the Rockefeller, Asia, and Ford foundations was of no little help in covering the travel expenses of the foreign participants.

The finance committee under its chairman Professor Hanayama was in charge of administering the funds collected through the patrons' organization and the financial contributions from other sources.

March 15, 1958, had been set as deadline for applications by Japanese participants who intended to present scientific papers to the congress. Since the organizing committee found it necessary to select those who were to read their papers, a selection committee was formed. It was composed of twenty members with Professor Ohata as chairman; and in its four meetings held since March, it selected the Japanese participants who were to read their communications to the congress.

The committee's selection was then approved by the arrangements committee. During the month of May, the selection of papers by foreign participants was taken under consideration and approved by the arrangements committee.

At first, plans for research to be carried out in the Kansai area had been left in charge of the members of the organizing and arrangements committees residing in that area; but in March, a special Kansai district committee with Professor Nagao as chairman was formally established and entrusted with the preparations for all activities in the Kansai area. This committee worked in close collaboration with all other committees set up inside the arrangements committee in making the necessary preparations.

At first, plans for research to be carried out in the Kansai area had been left in charge of the members of the organizing and arrangements committees residing in that area; but in March, a special Kansai district committee with Professor Nagao as chairman was formally established and entrusted with the preparations for all activities in the Kansai area. This committee worked in close collaboration with all other committees set up inside the arrangements committee in making the necessary preparations. It made arrangements for the public lecture meeting and the closing ceremony in Kyoto, for the field trips studying the history and actual conditions in the Kyoto, Nara, and Tenri areas, and the study of religious institutions in the prefectures of the Kyoto-Osaka district for those who wanted to take part in these research projects after the close of the congress. Arrangements for all field trips in the Kantō area, strictly speaking, up to the end of the trip to Ise and the arrival at Sakurai, were made by the field trip officer of the programme committee, while all following field trips were in charge of the Kansai district committee.

The organizing committee sent out its first circular in the beginning of October 1957, mailing about 1,000 copies to foreign organizations and scholars. The second circular was dispatched around the middle of March 1958 to all those from whom replies had been received; and in April, formal invitations were extended to all foreign organizations and to those who had expressed their intention of participating in the congress. In the beginning of August, the third circular went out to all who had sent in their applications and to some others.

Towards the end of February 1958, the first communication concerning the congress was sent out to the members of seven Japanese organizations directly concerned with the subject: the Japanese Association for Religious Studies, the Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, the Nippon Buddhist Research Association, the Japanese Association for the Study of Shinto, the Japanese Association for the Study of Christianity, the Japanese Association for the Study of Taoism, and the Association for Oriental Studies; it was also sent to universities and other research associations. The second communication was circularized in the beginning of August.

Preparations for the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions took the course described above; and it was in the middle of August of 1958 that the programme of the congress was finally decided upon. Just about that time, the General Secretary of the International Association for the History of Religions, Professor C.J. Bleeker, complying with a request on the part of the Japanese, arrived in Japan from Amsterdam. He took part in various consultations and his inva-
able cooperation made a significant contribution to the success of the congress. On August 26, the Programme, the List of Participants, excerpts of the papers and all other materials were ready and all other preparations completed. At that time, foreign participants were already arriving in Tokyo. In the afternoon, registration opened in Sankei Hall, the meeting place of the congress; and in the evening, an informal gathering of congress members created an atmosphere of friendship between those who met for the first time and those who were old acquaintances.

Concerning the date of the congress, the initial plan had been to hold it during the middle of September, but in order to make it possible for the foreign participants to be back home for the beginning of the new term, the date was moved up to a time which, in view of Japan's climate, was far from ideal. As regards the site of the congress, it was first proposed to split the sessions between Tokyo and Kyoto; but preparations for two meeting places met with great difficulties and Tokyo became the chief site of the congress. There was also several proposals concerning the meeting hall. Since the congress was held under the auspices of the Science Council of Japan, it was thought appropriate to convene it in Tokyo University, but in view of the facilities for meetings and the convenience of communications the choice fell on Sankei Hall.

There were 123 foreigners and 354 Japanese who formally registered as members of the congress and another 114 who participated as associate members, altogether an impressive 591. The system of associate members was adopted in order to accommodate young Japanese researchers like graduate students and those who could not file their applications in time.

Among the foreign participants were about thirty residing in Japan; altogether, participants belonged to thirty different nationalities, and besides one international organization, UNESCO, the following 26 foreign countries were represented: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, France, Germany, Hongkong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Korea, Laos, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.

As a matter of fact, in the beginning, there were quite a few misgivings in the arrangements committee concerning the congress. In the first place, doubts were voiced on just how many participants could be expected from overseas and whether really outstanding scholars would take part in the congress. These uncertainties, however, were dispelled in the course of the preparations. Many representative scholars, including Dr. R. Pettazzoni, President of the International Association for the History of Religions, announced their participation, and the impressive number of foreign participants, which greatly exceeded initial estimates, was a cause for rejoicing. And this was, of course, owing to the kindly help of secretariat of International Association for the History of Religions and UNESCO headquarters. Moreover, the devoted efforts of all members of the various committees inside the organizing committee and the generous cooperation received from everybody in Japan were extremely gratifying. Particularly welcome was the active interest of H. I. H. Prince Mikasa, who graciously agreed to assume the burden of Honorary President of the congress.

So the scene was set for the opening session of the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions, which took place at 9.30 a.m. on Thursday, August 28, in the International Hall of Sankei Kaikan in Tokyo. About 600 persons, including representatives of the Japanese Government, the diplomatic corps, academic, religious, and economic circles as well as the participants and other guests, attended the ceremony over which Dr. Kishimoto, the executive secretary of the organizing committee, presided. It started with a koto recital by student volunteers from the Tokyo University of Arts, so that the ceremony opened in a quiet and serene and typically Japanese atmosphere. Dr. Kaneshige, President of the Science Council of Japan, delivered the opening address; then Prince Mikasa, Honorary President of the congress, and Dr. Pettazzoni, President of the International Association for the History of Religions. His Excellency Hirokichi Nadao, Minister of Education, transmitted the felicitations of the Government of Japan, and Dr. Erwin R. Goodenough, Professor at Yale University, expressed the congratulations of the foreign participants, and Dr. C. J. Bleeker, General Secretary of the International Association for the History of Religions, made some announcements and read the congratulatory messages received from abroad. At 10.40 a.m., the session entered into a short recess.

After reconvening, another koto recital was presented; then, Dr. Miyamoto, member of the executive committee of the International Association for the History of Religions, introduced Dr. Friedrich Heller, Professor at Marburg University, who delivered a special lecture on the subject: "The History of Religions as a Way to Unity of Religions." The discourse deeply impressed the audience, particularly his colleagues in the field of the science of religion.
III

In the afternoon of the same day, the congress entered into its working sessions; but before the sessions started, the chairman of the congress meetings were elected by adopting the proposal of the Japanese organizing committee which had recommended the following members: I. Hori, E. Kan, T. Ariga, F. H. Ross, M. Eliade, H. L. Jansen, J. Filliozat, A. L. Dupont-Sommer, C. J. Bleeker, A. W. J. Halepota, R.N. Dandekar, E. Rochedieu, M. Hoballah, C. E. Blacker, C. M. Edsman, R. J. Z. Werblowsky.

In addition, the Japanese had recommended the nomination of vice-chairmen who would assist and substitute for the chairmen. They were:


The Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions had been divided into three principal parts; the first was the congress, the second the symposium, and the third the research tours. This was thought to give each branch of learning in the field an opportunity of displaying its peculiar features. For the sake of convenience, however, the field trips in the Kanto area foreseen in the third part had been scheduled to take place after the first part had come to a close.

The central theme of the congress was "Oriental Religions Past and Present"; but communications by the participants were not restricted to this subject. During the sessions on the three days from the afternoon of August 28 to August 30, papers were presented by 61 foreign participants, including 9 whose applications were received after the deadline, and 40 Japanese, a total of 101. There were four who had submitted their applications but later withdrew them, viz., S. Nachiketa, S. Menderson, Y. Saeki, and J. Johnson.

The congress was organized into sectional meetings and plenary session, and in each of them, communications were read. Conference languages were English, French, German, and Japanese, but the wish had been expressed to use English as much as possible. No interpretation was provided, but English summarise of the papers prepared in advance by their authors had been printed and were in the hands of the participants. For the convenience of the Japanese participants, the summaries in western languages had been translated into Japanese and distributed. Moreover, interpreters were available in each section to help with the discussions.

The sections were organized according to four special fields, and with the exception of the papers read at the plenary session, all communications were read in one of the following four sections:

1. Primitive Religions
2. Religions in Antiquity
3. Living Religions (other than Primitive Religions)
4. Science of Religion in General

The second section on Religions in Antiquity comprised not only extinct religions like those of the old Egypt or Babylonia, but also historical studies on religions like Christianity and Buddhism. The third section on Living Religions dealt with historical facts as well as with today's living faith or its sources. The difference between the subjects of these two sections may appear somewhat subtle, but a certain difference in scientific interest was unmistakably discernible, and the above division of the sections proved to be a success. The fourth section dealing with the Science of Religion in General took up topics related to the phenomenology of religion, psychology of religion, sociology of religion, philosophy of religion, methodology, etc. The idea of arranging all communications into four comprehensive categories was a completely new scheme and quite a departure from the system used in the Amsterdam and Rome congresses, where 10 to 15 different sections were organized.

After distributing the communications approved by the selection committee from among the applications to the different sections, a great difference in numbers appeared for the various sections. The first section drew the smallest number with only six papers, while those in the third section exceed 40. The first section (Room A), therefore, came to an end after the first day, whereas from the second day on, the third section was split into two subsections meeting in rooms C 1 and C 2, so that there were always four meetings going on at the same time. Communications dealing with the common subject of "Religion in the East" numbered 40; while most of these papers were read in sectional meetings, six were chosen for presentation in a plenary session, so as to bring into relief the common topic of the congress.

For each section, papers had been so arranged as to cover one subject in each morning or afternoon session. If was arranged as follows.

First Section (Room A)
28th afternoon, Primitive Religions
Second Section (Room B)
28th afternoon, Religions in Ancient India
29th morning, Religions in Ancient Greek, China and Japan
29th afternoon, Religions in Ancient Egypt and Iran
the chairmanship of Professor Kan. At the outset, Professor Bleeker, chairman of the discussion leaders, gave a forceful exposition of the meaning of the conference and explained the concrete working of the proceedings. Then followed addresses by Tamon Maeda, chairman of the Japanese National Committee for UNESCO, and Dr. Bammate, head of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies at UNESCO headquarters in Paris. Finally, the chairman of the discussion groups and the members of the drafting committee were introduced and the opening session came to an end. The 17 chairmen of the discussion groups were: H. Kishimoto, J. Leclant, K. Löwith, J. L. Adams, I. M. Husaini, C. H. Hamilton, K. W. Morgan, E. Kan, T. Ariga, J. M. Kitagawa, R. N. Dandekar, M. H. Fisch, J. Campbell, F. H. Ross, F. Heiler, E. R. Goodenough, V. M. Ames. In this way, the curtain rose on the symposium, which rolled off through three days exactly according to schedule.

The symposium was divided into plenary sessions and group meetings (round-table discussions), the both kinds of meetings were held daily.

The plenary sessions were devoted to the central problem mentioned above, and in five sessions, the following eight subjects were expounded:

1. The Characteristics of Oriental Culture
2. The Characteristics of Occidental Culture
3. The Influence of Occidental Thought on the Orient
4. The Influence of Christianity on the Orient
5. The Influence of Oriental Cultures on the Occident
6. The Influence of Oriental Religions on the Occident
7. The Common Concern: The Problems of an Emerging World Civilization
8. The Contribution of Oriental and Occidental Religions to Cultural Understanding

Plenary sessions were held in the mornings of all three days and in the afternoon of the third.

Two or three speakers had been invited beforehand to state their views on a particular subject and each was allotted 15 minutes to present his ideas. Then, one or two discussants, who had also been chosen in advance, were given about five minutes for their comments; after that, a general debate was opened in which the ordinary participants could join.

Round-table discussions were held in the afternoons of the first two days and in the morning of the third. In the course of the three days, the following twelve subjects were discussed. They were connected with the topics dealt with in the plenary sessions and centered on some special aspects:
1. Religious Tolerance and Intolerance: their Effect on Eastern and Western Cultural Contacts
2. Islam and Its Relation to Eastern and Western Cultures
3. Some Aspects of Modernization, Westernization, and Christianization in the Orient
4. Easternization of Christianity: Influence of Oriental Culture on Christianity in Asia
5. The Blind Soths of the Occident in Its Appreciation of Oriental Cultures
6. The Concept of Happiness in Oriental and Occidental Religious Thought
7. The Role of National Religions in Intercultural Contacts
8. The Relative Role of Science and Religion in the Developing World Civilization
9. The Contribution of Religions to Intercultural Understanding, Especially in Education
10. The Contribution of Religions to Intercultural Understanding, Especially in Regard to World Peace
11. Future Role of Religion in the Intercultural Understanding of the Orient and Occident
12. Role of Comparative Studies of Religions in Clarifying Characteristic of Oriental and Occidental Cultures and Enhancing Mutual Understanding

Every day, four group discussion meetings were held simultaneously in four different rooms. Each group had been assigned a chairman and two speakers prior to the sessions, and about 20 or 30 speakers took part in the discussions. Besides the reports of the secretaries chosen by the foreign and Japanese participants, tape recordings and stenographic minutes were kept for the plenary sessions. With the help of the secretaries, the chairman of each discussion group submitted a condensed five-minute report of the proceedings in the beginning of the plenary session on the following morning. According to the custom of UNESCO, English and French were conference languages, with interpretation from French into English.

In the past, the language problem had caused considerable difficulties in international conferences held in Japan. The congress was the first large-scale international conference in the field of humanities, and in the nature of the subject, the difficulties and problems were considerably greater than in conferences in the field of natural sciences. The word "God", v.g., may express a very different content, and if it is simply translated by "kami", it may lead to a superficial understanding but also to a fundamental misunderstanding. Particularly in the free discussions by numerous speakers during the symposium, these difficulties were keenly felt.

In the afternoon of September 4, a plenary session was held under the chairmanship of professor Bleeker. After the reports on the discussion meetings of that day had been presented, the draft of the recommendations to be submitted to UNESCO and the International Association for the History of Religions was put before the assembly. This draft had been worked out by the above-mentioned drafting committee.

The members of the drafting committee were: R. N. Dandekar (chairman), J. L. Adams, N. Bammate, C. J. Bleeker, E. R. Goodenough, F. Heiler, T. Ishizu, H. Kishimoto, R. Pettazzoni, A. Schimmel.

Various amendments were proposed from the floor, and after some discussion the draft of the recommendations was unanimously adopted (see for the contents of the recommendations). During the congress, scholars coming from Afro-Asian countries and researchers interested in this area had advanced the idea of organizing an Afro-Asian regional conference under the auspices of the International Association for the History of Religions. Those interested in the project gathered for a special meeting, and the matter was taken up by the drafting committee. In the course of the deliberations of the group of supporters, the plan was proposed to form a national association for the study of religion in each country of the region, in order to prepare for this Afro-Asian regional conference, and the suggestion was made to entrust the Japanese Association for Religious Studies with the arrangements for such a regional conference. This plan found the unanimous approval of the plenary session. The chairman of the organizing committee, Dr. Ishizu, immediately handed the recommendations over to the UNESCO representative, Dr. Bammate, and to the president of the International Association for the History of Religions. In his turn, Dr. Bammate promised to forward the recommendations to UNESCO and to try his best to have UNESCO act upon the suggestions of the International Association for the History of Religions. He also expressed his appreciation of the splendid results achieved by the symposium which UNESCO had subsidized. Finally, Professor Bleeker, too, conveyed his congratulations on the success of the symposium and finished his closing address by stating his readiness to work for the implementation of the recommendations adopted by the congress. Thus, the curtain fell on the successful three-day symposium.
Together with the congress and the symposium, the research tours formed an integral part of the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions. These field trips were not merely visits to historical sites or just sight-seeing tours, they were intended to study the extremely numerous and multiform religions, sects and denominations which have been in existence in Japan since ancient times or which have sprung up only recently, and the on-the-spot studies comprised their history and traditions as well as their present institutions, organs, functions and forms. We hoped to show to the participants the undisguised reality of Japan's actual religious situation. A proverb says: "Hyakubun ikken ni shikazu" (lit.: "A hundred tales fall short of one look;" there is nothing like seeing for oneself). Convinced that this was, from the point of view of research as well as personal experience, a unique opportunity for many of the foreign scholars in the field, much thought and labor had been spent on these plans. The religious organizations of the various districts, shrines, temples and churches but also the prefectural and municipal authorities lent their active cooperation. Those of the Japanese participants who undertook to act as guides prepared in advance numerous scientific monographs. In addition, on-the-spot discussion meetings were arranged, in which experts played a leading role. In these meetings, the Japanese scholars were asked many questions which they had not anticipated and these discussions proved also very fruitful to the Japanese participants.

The trips to Nikko, Tokyo and its environments and Kamakura, which formed part of the research tour programme, took place, as mentioned above, between the first and the second parts of the programme for geographical reasons. The field trips which started on the morning of September 5, covered the Kansai area. The weather was favorable for the tour, although the scorching heat raised some fears concerning the health of the participants. It was certainly fortunante that we had not a single casualty. The tour included the Ise, Nara, Tenri and Kyoto areas and lasted four days (see Schedule and Report). Moreover, after the close of the congress, field trips were arranged for those of the participants who were interested, which gave them an opportunity to see the Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines of Kyoto, to study the Buddhism of Koyasan and the "new religions" in Tokyo's suburbs (see the reports of the post congress tour).

As part of the proceedings of the congress, a public lecture meeting was held at 7.30 p.m. on September 8 in the Kansai Denryoku Hall in Kyoto. It attracted a very large audience. With Dr. Ariga in the chair, Dr. R. Pettazzoni, President of the International Association for the History of Religions, delivered a lecture in Italian on "Certain Parallel Phenomena in the Historical Development of Historical Religion in Europe and Japan," for which Professor Nogami acted as interpreter; then, Professor Dr. G. Mensching of Bonn University spoke in German on the subject "Tolerance and Truth in Religion" (interpretation by Professor Nishitani). Both lectures dealt with very important problems in the history of religions in a very understandable way while maintaining a very high scientific standard and made a profound impression on the audience.

The goodwill of all circles showed itself in the receptions given in honor of the foreign participants during the congress. They were intended to afford some relaxation to the weary participants who had come from distant lands beyond the sea, but they were also instrumental in deepening the mutual understanding and friendship among all participants. Our guests from abroad seemed to take a particularly keen interest in Japanese gadgets.

The chief receptions were the following:

The closing ceremony of the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions was held at 10.30 a.m. on Tuesday, September 9, at Kyoto University. Dr. Nagao, chairman of the Kansai district committee, presided over the meeting, in which first Dr. Dandekar, Director of the Bhandarker Oriental Research Institute, Poona, India, then, Professor Eliade of the University of Chicago, and Professor
Jansen of Oslo University gave very sympathetic but also extremely penetrating accounts of their impressions of Japan. Thereupon, the General Secretary of the International Association for the History of Religions, Professor Bleeker, the President of the Association, Professor Pettazzoni, and Dr. Bammate, UNESCO representative, addressed the assembly. Finally, the chairman of the organizing committee, Professor Ishizu, delivered the closing address.

The official programme of the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions which, from Part One to Part Three, had lasted for nearly two weeks since registration started on August 27, had come to an end, but there still followed the reception given in the afternoon by the President of Kyoto University mentioned above, and when this was over, a party climbed Mt. Hiei and assisted at a "goma" service celebrated in the Komponchūdō of Enryakuji, where they were entranced by the mystical atmosphere. While they were starting out for some other sanctuaries, their eyes were dazzled and their ears deafened by the thunder and lightning which seemed to strike them the very next moment, while a torrential rain pelted against their cars. The spectacle made a very deep impression on the minds of men still absorbed in the thought that the end of the congress had come. When they came down from the mountain, the participants who had shared two weeks of experiences reluctantly took leave of each other, not without promising to meet again. It was 6 o'clock.

Teruji Ishizu

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PROGRAMME
THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS FOR
THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS
August 27—September 9, 1958

PROGRAMME

CONGRESS

Sankei Kaikan

August 27, Wednesday
13:00—17:00 Registration
17:00—19:00 Informal gathering of Congress members

August 28, Thursday
9:30—12:00 Opening Session

Opening Address
Hideo Kishimoto

Executive Secretary, Organizing Committee

Kankuro Kaneshige
President, Science Council of Japan

Teruji Ishizu
Chairman, Organizing Committee

Prince Takahito Mikasa

Greetings
Raffaele Pettazzoni
President, I.A.H.R.

Teruji Ishizu
Honorary President, Organizing Committee

GREETINGS

Introduction of Chairmen of the Congress

Fifteen Minutes Intermission

Introduction of Dr. Heiler

Shoson Miyamoto
Member, Executive Committee, I.A.H.R.

Friedrich Heiler
Professor, Marburg University

The history of religions as a way to unity of religions

14:00—17:00 Sectional Meetings

First Section (Primitive Religions)

Chairman I. Hori

Edsman, C-M.

Bear rites among the Scandinavian Lapps

(808)

Mabuchi, T.

Two types of kinship rituals among Malaya-Polynesian people

Kaneko, E.

Some aspects of atayal religion and their impact on Atayal culture

Tanase, J.

Historical relation between the ideas of the life after death and the burial customs in Oceania

Koppers, W.

Prophecytism and messianic beliefs as a problem of ethnology and world history

Second Section (Religions of Antiquity I)

Room B

Chairman H.L. Jansen

Hein, N.

Krśnaite mystery plays at Mathura in ancient India

Kimura, H.

The plants found in Buddhist Sanskrit literature — On Bodhivṛkṣa and Asoka in Asvaghosa's works

Nakamura, H.

The deification of Gotama the Man

Ueda, Y.

Asvaghosa was an Eka-amasā (or bhaga) — Vādin

Tsukamoto, Z.

The so-called King Udayana image of Śākyamuni Buddha of Sandal-Wood in China and Japan

Third Section (Living Religions other than Primitive Religions I)

Room C

Chairman J. Filliozat

Ariga, T.

The basic structure of christian thought

Fehl, N. E.

A comparative study of the roots of natural law theory

Halepota, A. W. J.

Psychology of Islamic belief in god

Kraners, R. P.

Some aspects of Confucianism in its adaptation to the modern world

Reichelt, G. M.

Chinese Buddhism today

Massignon, L.

Cases of "transmissive" psychosomatic compassion

Fourth Section (General 1)

Room D

Chairman E. Kan

Adams, J.L.

The uses of analogy in religious social thought

Ishizu, T.

The fundamental structure of religious experience

Antweiler, A.

The concept of religion
Block, M. B.
Kishimoto, H.
Campbell, J.

FACES OF GOD: A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS IMAGERY
The role of the mountain in the religious life of the Japanese people (with illustrations)

Oriental philosophy and Occidental psychoanalysis

18:00 – 20:00 Reception by the President of the Science Council of Japan and the Chairman of the Japanese Organizing Committee

August 29, Friday

9:00 – 12:00 Sectional Meetings

Second Section (Religions of Antiquity II) Room B
Chairman C.J. Bleeker

Severyns, A.
Fukui, K.
Ikeda, S.
Moroto, S.
Eder, M.
The human in the Greek mythology
Some problems in connection with Tao-Chiao and Zen
Ancestor worship and nature worship in ancient China
Ancestor worship in China
The change of the Japanese religion in the pre-classic period

Third Section (Living Religions other than Primitive Religions II-a) Room C-1
Chairman A. W. J. Halepota,

Miyamoto, S.
Dumoulin, H.
Masunaga, R.
Hartshorne, C.
Liebenthal, W.
Aung Than
On the middle way
Natural mysticism in Zen
The standpoint of Dōgen in Zen Buddhism
The Buddhist-Whiteheadian view of the self and the religious traditions
New light on the Mahāyāna-sraddhopāda Śūtra
A brief survey of the relationship between the Sangha and the state and the laity in Burma

Third Section (Living Religions other than Primitive Religions II-b) Room C-2
Chairman C.-M. Edsman

Anzu, M.
Harada, T.
Hirai, N.
About Kami
Symbols of deity and social life
The fundamental problems of present Shinto

Iwamoto, T.
Saunders, E. D.
Kubo, N.

Shinto ceremonies connected with foreigner’s entry into Japan
Kōshin; An example of taoist ideas in Japan
The transmission of Taoism to Japan, with particular reference to the “San-shih”

Fourth Section (General II) Room D
Chairman E. Rochedieu

Eklund, H. O.
Marukawa, H.
Ellade, M.
Masutani, F.
Fisch, M. H.
Moroi, Y.
Suriabongs, L.

About the description of religious faith
On sacred conception
The structure of the religious symbolism
On three myths concerning the beginning of the world
The idea of insitution on the major religions
The types of religious absolute experiences
The need for religiousness

14:00 – 17:00 Sectional Meetings

Second Section (Religions of Antiquity III) Room B
Chairman M. Hoballah

Bleeker, C.J.
Kasugai, S.
Lanczkowski, F.
Leclant, J.
Puech, H.-C.
Hoffmann, H.

The mother-goddess in the religions of antiquity
Ancient Iranian religion as it appears in Buddhist Text—its Polyandry and religious practices
Eschatology in ancient Egyptian religion
The sucking of Pharaoh as part of the Pharaonic coronation Rites
Islam and Minichaemism in the Kalacakra Tantra

Third Section (Living Religions other than Primitive Religions III-a) Room C-1
Chairman R.N. Dandekar,

Nishi, G.
Sakamoto, Y.
Pezzali, A.
Yamada, R.

The theory that the mind is inherently pure as a motive force in Mahāyāna Buddhism
On the “attainment of Buddhahood by trees and plants”
Santideva, a mystic of Buddhism
The logic of crisis—an examination of certain problems in the history of Buddhism in India,
PROGRAMME

Naga, Thera, B.  China and Japan
Bouquet, A.C.  A short history of Buddhism in Viet-Nam
On, Pe.  Recent observation on institutional Hinduism
A chapter in the history of Buddhism in Burma

Third Section (Living Religions other than Primitive Religions III-b) Room C-2

Chairman  C.J. Bleeker

Nakayama, S.  The missionary spirit of the Tenrikyo Foundation as seen through her "Ofudesaki"
Nishitunoi, M.  About religious music and religious drama in Japan
Oguchi, I.  Founder and organizer of religious group—A problem of religious authority in Japan
Ono, M.  The contributions of shrine Shinto in Japan
Tagita, K.  One phase of the Japanese-Christian acculturation
Takezono, K.  Syncretism of Shinto and Buddhism
Pettazzoni, R.  Alleged monotheism in Japan

Fourth Section (General III) Room D

Chairman  E. Kan

Goodenough, E.R.  The evaluation of symbols in history
Niyeda, R.  The Japanese religious consciousness
Kitagawa, M.  The Samgha and the Ecclesia
Nomura, N.  A study of Japanese protestant pastors perception
Rochefieu, E.  The collective and the individual in religion: myths, symbols, rites and archetypes in the theory of C. G. Jung
Ross, F.H.  The revaluation of myth as a step toward understanding the religious consciousness

August 30, Saturday

9:00 - 12:00 Sectional Meetings

Second Section (Religions of Antiquity IV) Room B

Chairman  F. Werblowski

Ohata, K.  The idea of god in Old Testament
Jansen, R.L.  Gnostic interpretation in Pistis Sophia
Kruse, H.  Buddhist influence on Essenesm

Third Section (Living Religions other than Primitive Religions IV-a) Room C-1

Chairman  Religions of the Tamils, past and present
Ramachandra, K.  The make-up of the consciousness of evil in Mahāyāna Buddhism
Yuki, R.  Hindusim and Bhagavad-āt
Dandeškar, R.H.  Buddhist ethics, Buddhist psychology and Buddhist philosophy from Buddha-Patanā
Hpe, Aung  The religion of the Dasyus
Tamaki, K.  The pursuit of the absolute in modern India
Ali, A.M.  Some consideration of spread of Islam in Indonesia
Basu, A.  The mysticism of Sri Auro Bindo

Third Section (Living Religions other than Primitive Religions IV-b) Room C-2

Chairman  A.L. Dupont-Sommer

Kan, E.  A problem of Christianity in a non-Christian culture
Cassard, F.  Comparative mysticism of Zen Buddhist, Hindu and Christian systems
Clavier, H.F.E.  Faith and works in East and West
Kawada, K.  On the fundamental difference between Buddhism and Christianity
Shin, S.S.  The main forces threatening the modern man, world and civilization

Fourth Section (General IV) Room D

Chairman  P.H. Ross

Ames, V.M.  Eastern features in the religious philosophy of the Chicago School
Hook, S.  Two types of existentialist religion and ethics
Keilbach, W.  Empirical psychology of religion as basis for philosophy of religion
Löwith, K.  Atheism as a philosophical problem
Nishitani, K.  Religious existence
Slater, R.H.L.  World religions and world order
**Programme**

14:00 – 17:00  **Plenary Session**  **Main Hall**
Chairman E. Kan

Dupont-Sommer, A.L.  A Greek-Aramaic inscription from King Asoka recently discovered in Afghanistan

Hamilton, C.H. Universal elements in Mahayanist thought

Hanayama, S. Concerning the distinctive character of Japanese Buddhism

Hussaini, I.M. Christ in Quran and in modern Arabic literature

Mensching, G. The phenomenon of criticism in the history of religions

Werblowsky, R. J. Zwi. Methods of contemplation in 16th century Kabbalah

18:00 – 20:00  **Reception by Prince Mikasa**  Kôrinkaku

**August 31, Sunday**

Research Tour of Nikko (Tour A)
(See below)

**September 1, Monday**

Research Tour of Tokyo (Tour B—1) and Kamakura (Tour B—2)
(See below)

**Symposium**  Sankei Kakan

**September 2, Tuesday**

9:00 – 9:40  **Opening Session**  **Main Hall**
Chairman E. Kan  **Presiding**
Member, International Committee, I.A.H.R.

Address C. J. Bleeker  General Secretary I.A.H.R.

Greetings N. Bammate  Head of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, UNESCO

Greetings T. Maeda  President, Japanese National Committee for UNESCO

Introduction of Chairmen of the Sessions and Members of the Drafting Committee

9:50 – 11:10  **Plenary Session I**  **Main Hall**
Chairman H. Kishimoto

Themes  a) The characteristics of Oriental culture

11:25 – 12:45  **Plenary Session II**  **Main Hall**
Chairman J. Leclant

Themes  a) The influence of Occidental thought on the Orient
b) The influence of Christianity on the Orient

14:30 – 16:00  **Round-table Discussion Groups**  **Room A B C D**

Group I. Religious tolerance and intolerance: their effect on East-West cultural contacts
Chairman N. Bammate

Group II. Islam and its relation to Eastern and Western Cultures
Chairman K.W. Mogan

Group III. Some aspects of modernization, westernization and christianization in the Orient
Chairman E. Kan

Group IV. Easternization of Christianity: Influence of Oriental culture on Christianity in Asia
Chairman T. Ariga

18:00 – 19:00  **Reception by the Prime Minister**  **Prime Minister’s Official Residence**

**September 3, Wednesday**

9:00 – 9:30  **Plenary Session**  **Main Hall**
Chairman C.J. Bleeker

Reports of the previous day’s discussion by the chairmen of Groups I–IV

9:40 – 10:55  **Plenary Session III**  **Main Hall**
Chairman K. Löwith

Themes  a) The influence of Oriental Cultures on the Occident
b) The influence of Oriental religions on the Occident

11:10 – 12:25  **Plenary Session IV**  **Main Hall**
Chairman J.L. Adams

Theme  The common concern: The problems of an emerging world civilization

14:30 – 16:00  **Round-table Discussion Groups**
**Room A B C D**

**Group V.** The blind spots of the Occident in its appreciation of Oriental cultures  
Chairman J.M. Kitagawa

**Group VI.** The concept of happiness in Oriental and Occidental religious thoughts  
Chairman R.N. Dandekar

**Groups VII.** The role of national religions in intercultural contacts  
Chairman M.H. Fisch

**Group VIII.** The relative role of science and religion in the developing world civilization  
Chairman J. Campbell

18:00 – 19:00 Reception by the Minister of Education  
Akasaka Prince Hotel

**September 4, Thursday**

9:00 – 9:30  **Plenary Session Main Hall**  
Chairman C.J. Bleeker  
Reports of the previous day’s discussion by the chairmen of Groups V–VIII

9:40 – 10:55  **Plenary Session V Main Hall**  
Chairman I.M. Husaini  
The contribution of Oriental and Occidental religions to cultural understanding

11:10 – 12:40  **Round-table Discussion Groups Room A B C D**

**Group IX.** The contribution of religions to intercultural understanding, especially in education  
Chairman F.H. Ross

**Group X.** The contribution of religions to intercultural understanding, especially in regard to world peace  
Chairman F. Heiler

**Group XI.** Future role of religion in the intercultural understanding of the Orient and Occident  
Chairman E.R. Goodenough

**Group XII.** Role of comparative studies of religions in clarifying characteristics of Oriental and Occidental cultures and enhancing Mutual understanding  
Chairman V.M. Ames

**13:00 – 14:30**  **Meeting of the Drafting Committee**: Drafting of Recommendations to UNESCO

**15:30 – 16:30**  **Plenary Session Main Hall**  
Chairman C.J. Bleeker
Adoption of Recommendations to UNESCO & I.A.H.R.

Greetings  
T. Ishizu  
Chairman, Japanese Organizing Committee

**Closing Session Main Hall**  
Chairman C.J. Bleeker

Greetings  
N. Bammate  
Head of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, UNESCO

Closing Address C. J. Bleeker  
General Secretary, I.A.H.R.

**RESEARCH TOURS**

**August 31, Sunday**  **Research Tour of Nikko (Tour A)**

11:30 – 13:30  **Discussion Meeting**  
Lake-Side Hotel  
Chairman H. Kishimoto  
Reporter H. Ikegami, Y. Kondo, K. Fukui, S. Mori

14:00 – 16:00  **Researches**  
Rinnōji Temple, Toshōgū Shrine, Futaranas Shrine, Taiyūin, Nikko Museum.

**September 1, Monday**  **Research Tour of Tokyo (Tour B-1)**

9:00 – 10:00  **Discussion Meeting**  
Room D Sankei Kaikan  
Chairman I. Hori  

10:10 – 17:20  **Researches**  

**September 1, Monday**  **Research Tour of Kamakura (Tour B-2)**

9:00 – 10:00  **Discussion Meeting**  
Room B Sankei Kaikan  
Chairman, H. Kishimoto.  
13:30 – 16:50 Researches
Daibutsu, great Image of Buddha, Tsurugaoka Hachiman Shrine, Engakuji Temple, Sōji Temple

September 5, Friday  Research Tour of Ise (Tour C)
8:50 Leave Tokyo
16:20 Arrive at Uji-Yamada Station
16:30 – 17:20 Researches
Gekū of the Grand Shrine of Ise.
20:00 – 21:00 Discussion Meeting Futami Kan Hall
Chairman H. Kishimoto
Reporter Y. Okada, T. Harada

September 6, Saturday  Research Tour of Ise and Nara (Tour C)
9:00 – 11:00 Researches
Naikū of the Grand Shrine of Ise
11:40 Leave Ise.
13:10 Arrive at Sakurai Station
13:30 – 18:00 Researches
Miwa Shrine, Hōryūji Temple, Chūgūji Temple
The Main Sanctuary of Tenrikyo, The Sanctuary of the Foundress
18:00 – 19:00 Discussion Meeting
Chairman, T. Ishizu
Reporter, Y. Ueda, Y. Nakayama
19:00 – 21:00 Reception by Shinbashira, the Patriarch of Tenrikyo

September 7, Sunday  Research Tour of Tenri and Nara (Tour C)
9:00 – 10:50 Researches
Tenri Museum, Tenri University Library
10:50 – 11:50 Discussion Meeting (Continued)
Tenri University Library
Chairman, H. Kishimoto
Reporter Y. Ueda, Y. Nakayama
13:30 – 19:00 Researches
Tōdaiji Temple, Kasuga Shrine, Nara National Museum, Byōdōin Temple, Fushimi Inari Shrine

September 8, Monday  Research Tour of Kyoto (Tour D)
9:00 – 12:00 Researches
Higashihonganji Temple, Nishihonganji Temple, Yasaka Shrine, Chion Temple, Heian Shrine
14:00 – 19:00 Researches
Myōshinji Temple, Tenryūji Temple, Kitano Shrine, Ryōanji Temple
19:30 – 21:30 Public Lecture (see below)

September 9, Tuesday  Research Tour of Kyoto (Tour D)
9:00 – 10:00 Researches
Kyoto Gosho
10:30 – 12:00 Closing Session (see below)
12:00 – 14:00 Reception by the President of Kyoto University
Miyako Hotel
15:00 – 18:00 Researches
Mt. Hiei, Enryakuji Temple

September 8, Monday
19:30 – 21:00 Public Lectures
Pettazzoni, R. Some Parallels in the Historical Development of Religion, Western and Japanese Mensching, G. Toleranz und Wahrheit in der Religion

September 9, Tuesday
10:30 – 12:00 Closing Session
Kyoto University
G. Nagao Presiding
Member, Organizing Committee
Impression of Japan
R. Dandekar
M. Eliade
H. Jansen
Address
C. J. Bleeker
General Secretary, I.A.H.R.
M. Bammate
Head of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, UNESCO
Closing Address
T. Ishizu
Chairman, Organizing Committee

POST CONGRESS RESEARCH TOURS

September 10, Wednesday

Course I  Buddhism in Kyoto:
Nishihonganji Temple, Higashihonganji Temple,
Daitokuji Temple, Nanzenji Temple

Course II  Shintoism in Kyoto:
Yasaka Shrine, Kamo-Miyoa Shrine, Kamo-
Wakeikazuchi Shrine, Iwashimizu-Hachiman
Shrine

September 11, Thursday

Course III  Classical Arts in Kyoto
Course IV  Christian Missions in Kyoto

September 12—13, Friday—Saturday

Course V  Mt. Kōya
Kongōbuji Temple, University Library and others
Congress
Opening Session

Opening Address

By

KANKURO KANESHIGE
President, Science Council of Japan

It is a great honour to me to declare the opening of the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions, and to greet you all and express my sincere welcome to the scholars who are assembled here from different parts of the world on behalf of the Science Council of Japan, which is the host to the present Congress.

It is due not only to the support of our Government and the assistance rendered by the religious as well as industrial circles in this country but largely to the cooperation of such overseas organizations as UNESCO, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation as well as of the Governments and academic societies of the countries concerned that we have been enabled to organize the present Congress. I wish hereby to express my heartfelt gratitude to the authorities of these organizations for their invaluable assistance and cooperation.

We have had seven international scientific conferences organized in Japan under our Council since 1953. In the field of humanistic and social sciences, however, the present Congress is the first one ever held. I firmly believe that the Congress, the purpose of which is to discuss the results of historical and scientific studies of religions that are most deeply related to human life, will contribute not only to the further development of this particular field of study but towards the peace of the world through promotion of international understanding and friendship, and hope that the Congress will achieve a great success.

Address

By

TERUJI ISHIZU
Chairman, Organizing Committee

On behalf of the Japanese Organizing Committee of the Ninth
Address

BY

PRINCE TAKAHITO MIKASA
Honorary President, Organizing Committee

It is indeed a great honour and privilege for the people of Japan that the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions is being held in their country. For my part, I am profoundly grateful for the supreme honour of having been elected honorary president of this most distinguished and significant conference.

My personal view is that the holding of the International Congress for the History of Religions in Japan has special significance. This is because, as you are probably already aware, our country presents itself as a living laboratory and a living museum to those who are interested in the study of the history of religions. It is therefore my sincere wish that you, who have studied widely the various religions of the world, avail yourselves of the opportunity afforded by this conference to make a very special study of the religions and cults of Japan. In the connection I should like, with your permission, to express a few thoughts of my own regarding the religions of our country.

You will, during your stay, hear a great deal about Japanese religions; and you will undoubtedly come up against the English word "god" or "gods" used as a makeshift translation of the term "kami", the object of worship in the cult that is uniquely Japanese. You will also perceive in all probability that the Japanese "kami" and "God" are entirely different in essential nature.

The object of worship of the Japanese Buddhist is "hotoke", and in so far as Buddhism is an imported religion, it would be logical to presume that "hotoke" and "kami" must be quite different. Nevertheless, it has become quite customary for the Japanese to link the two, and the term "kamihotoke" is in common usage. Not only is there no contradiction sensed in this combination of what theoretically should be two separate concepts, there are any number of Japanese who can pray, without the slightest compunction, simultaneously to both "kami" and "hotoke". This I believe can be explained in part by the psychology of the Japanese, which tends to favour the emotional rather than the rational. The Japanese take pleasure in sensing the atmosphere, so they tend rather easily to be swayed by environment.

There is an ancient Japanese poem which in very free translation says: "Unknown to me what resideth here, tears flow from a sense of unworthiness and gratitude."

These lines, it is said, were composed when their author was worshipping at the Grand Shrine of Ise; and I feel that they aptly reflect the religious feeling of many Japanese. You will note, of course, that this emotional approach is basically unlike the Christian attitude which has its philosophical roots in Greek thought. From the standpoint of Christian theology there can be no such thing as "God" in Japanese religion, and by this line of reasoning it could be asserted that religion strictly speaking, does not exist in Japan. This, of course, would be going too far; and I am sure that while you are here you will discover for yourselves the religion of the Japanese.

In addition to the numerous religious organizations accorded official recognition as legal entities, you will find many secular beliefs and cults which from ages past have exercised a strong hold on the minds of the Japanese people. Together with these cults you will also find existing in various forms those beliefs that can be classed as superstition. It is because we have this wide range of religions, cults, beliefs, and superstitions prevailing among our people, that we are able to say that Japan is a living laboratory and a living museum for the study of the history of religions.

I therefore hope that you will make the most and the best of your stay with us, and that when the time comes for your homeward journey you will each carry with you many pleasant memories of Japan and the Japanese.

I thank you.

Greetings

BY

RAFFAELE PETTAZZONI
President, I.A.H.R.

When, at Rome in April 1955, Prof. Miyamoto and Prof. Kan, speaking on behalf of the University of Tokyo, of The Japanese Society for Religious Studies, and of The Science Council of Japan, formally proposed that the International Congress of the History of Religions should meet at Tokyo in the near future, I and the other members of
understandable perplexities were quickly and satisfactorily overcome, and today, thanks to the efforts of our Japanese colleagues, we are happy to congratulate them upon the full realization of their, and our, project.

This is the first time that the International Congress of the History of Religions has taken place outside Europe. This innovation marks an important stage along the path of our studies and is worthy of appreciation as such. It is not merely a casual and fortuitous fact, due simply to the modern possibilities of giving an ever larger scope to the organization of learning in general and to international meetings between the specialists of particular subjects. In our case it is something more than that. It is a notable step forward in our field, a further integration of that ecumenical vocation which the study of religious history bears, as it were, in its blood, and is almost a reflection of a spirit that is really that of religion itself, of that impulse by which religion has, more than once in the course of its development, overcome in the name of a universal human ideal the barriers between peoples and the boundaries between nations.

For the historians of religion it is not a matter of indifference whether they meet in Europe or in Asia. In Greater Asia, Asia Maior, one breathes a religious spirit profoundly different from that of the Western world. Here we inhale a different atmosphere and have an immediate awareness of this diversity which appears to gravitate in a way, upon the two greatest centres of historical-religious development, Buddhism and Christianity. But it is in fact older than Christianity, older than Buddhism, because its origins are deeply rooted in layers of a millenary cultural humus of remote prehistoric formation.

Religion itself, as a constituent element of civilization, is conditioned by its historical circumstances. Even the study of religions is historically conditioned. Our science of religions is a product of Western thought. It was born in Europe, in that part of Europe where, as a result of the Reformation, the coexistence of differing confessions and churches led to their mutual knowledge and stimulated discussion and controversy, thus creating the conditions necessary for the development of religious science. Today in the West the study of religions is still more advanced in countries which are both evangelical and catholic, than in countries of a single catholic or orthodox confession.

But with all this we still remain in the incubatory period of the study of religions. A diversity of confessions was its necessary condition, and not a sufficient condition. A scientific study of religions in the true sense of the words could scarcely have developed out of a mere theological controversy.

It was necessary that religious thought should emerge from the closed circle of the Christian world and open itself to the knowledge of other religious worlds for it to be able to pass from the theological to the scientific stage. And in this respect the knowledge of Asiatic religions was helpful in the first place.

In Asia too there exists a diversity of confessions, especially within Buddhism. We have only to think of the two great Buddhist “churches”, of the Small Vehicle and the Great Vehicle, and further of the numerous schools of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism within the great Vehicle itself. But in Asia there is not only a diversity of confessions but also a diversity of religions. One thinks, above all, of the national religions of India, China and Japan, which were not destroyed by the advent and expansion of Buddhism, and have survived until today. This is in contrast with what occurred in the West where the ancient pagan religions disappeared with the triumph of Christianity.

If this plurality of religions and confessions did not suffice to give life to an independent scientific study of religions in Asia, it did create a situation favourable to the implantation in the more advanced countries of the Asiatic world of the Western scientific study of religions, when this was introduced following the great penetration of Western civilization which has taken place there in modern times.

Our Congress has a place in this line of development. The Western scientific study of religions is knocking now, not for the first time but certainly more strongly than ever, at the gates of Japan, sure of finding in this country a soil already tilled and prepared to receive it. The Western science of religions is present here today, at the furthest extreme of Greater Asia, with its organization and its schemes of research, with its different schools of thought and some of its most representative men. Everything that Western science has been able to achieve during a century of active and intense study of religions is now at the disposal of you, our Japanese and Asiatic friends. Our methodology, elaborated and practised by our schools, more or less in conformity with the principles of a coherent scientific thought, is in no way absolute or definitive. It is a precious, but perfectible, instrument which can, or rather must, be even better moulded so that it may adapt itself to the manifold variety of religious life.

But we have come not so much to give as to receive. In offering
to you the outlines of our systems, the complexity of our problems, the techniques of our scientific work, we ask in exchange — and it is no small request — to be allowed to enter into your religious world, which is so different from our own in the West.

For us Western scholars our presence in Japan is not only an exceptional touristic adventure, rich in unforgettable impressions; it is, above all, a direct contact with a religious reality which is well suited to enrich our own experience, with a religious ideology which can enlarge our own concept of religion, with a religious history of exceptional scientific interest.

It will not, perhaps, be given to us, during our stay, to meet even one of the eighty or eight hundred myriads of divinities which hover over this enchanting land. But, nevertheless, these invisible divinities are present in spirit. Here, in a country so culturally advanced and an atmosphere so historically evolved, a naturalistic and polytheistic form of religion has survives, which for centuries and centuries before Christianity was also the religious form of the West, it has survived until today — or until yesterday.

It is true that even in Europe not a few elements of ancient Greek and Roman, as well as of Celtic, German and Slav, paganism have come down to us embodied in Christianity. The saints have had to do away with the Gods in order to become their successors. In Japan on the other hand, the Bodhisatva have not suppressed the Kamis; on the contrary they have incorporated them in forms and structures which have made it possible for Buddhism to penetrate the soul of the Japanese people on a large scale.

While apparently swept away, the Kamis always remained alive in Buddhism; so alive that when the time was ripe for a great revival of genuine traditional values they easily freed themselves from the secular disguise of Shinto-Buddhist syncretism, and in step with the political restoration of Imperial authority marched the religious restoration of the “pure Shinto.” And then, when Shintoism ceased officially to be a religion and took it place above religions as a common national faith and a spiritual link between all Japanese, this did not prevent those religious ferments which it bore with it from surviving in the new autonomous forms of the Shintoism of the sects (Shūka Shinto).

It is this variety of religious experience, this vitality of archaic forms and of innovating aspirations, this millenary process of action and reaction between the indigenous national religion and the imported supernational religion which gives to the religious history of Japan its characteristic imprint.

I have always felt a particular interest for this singular religious world; and this induced me, as an outsider, almost thirty years ago, to publish for the first time in Italian (through translations in other European languages) the first two books of the Kojiki, in order to extend in my own country a knowledge of the national religion and mythology of Japan. That was in 1929; but my sympathy for Japanese religion is even older.

If, relying upon your indulgence, I may allow myself to conclude this address with a memory of my own youth, I should like to tell you that my first publication on a historical-religious subject was actually dedicated to Japan. It was in 1904, when I was twenty-one years old and a student at the University of Bologna. It was the time of the Russo-Japanese war, and I was curious to know something of Japanese religion. From this interest emerged an article, which was by no means a masterpiece but which, to my great satisfaction, was accepted and published by a daily paper of my city (“Il resto del Carlino”. 29 Feb. 1904).

I could not, of course, have suspected that one day I would enjoy the honour and pleasure of visiting the Land of the Eight Isles, and of attending an International Congress of the History of Religions in this charming city of Tokyo, which was then for me a city of dreams.

Greetings

BY

KOKICHI NANDAO
Minister of Education

It is indeed a great honour to me to have an opportunity of presenting to you my greetings at the Opening Session of the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions.

The International Congress for the History of Religions met in the past chiefly in Europe, and this is the first time that it held outside Europe, especially in the Orient. Since the official decision was made last year by the Government about inviting this Congress to Japan, not only our academic circles but also the whole people of Japan have been looking forward to the Congress. The preparations have smoothly progressed, and this historical event has just started today with a large
number of scholars participating from Europe, America and Africa as well as from various countries in the Orient, besides a great many researchers in Japan.

I believe that this Congress is especially significant in view of the current situation in which the necessity for mutual appreciation of the Eastern and Western cultures is being keenly felt and the study of religions as the basis for these cultures is acutely demanded throughout the world. It is therefore more than I can rejoice for the advancement of this field of study that it is now meeting here.

I wish, at the same time, to express my deep gratitude to the International Association for the History of Religions and UNESCO for extending valuable support and assistance in organizing this Congress, and my heartfelt welcome to those scholars who have come a long way from abroad for attending the Congress.

Believing that this Congress will not only render great contributions to the academic field all over the world and play an important role in further exchange of the Eastern and Western cultures, but also will contribute to the peace of the world, by deepening mutual understanding and amity among nations of the world, I look forward with great expectations to the result of the Congress. I hope that all of you will spend fruitful days during the period of the Congress and achieve the purpose of the Congress, and especially that those scholars and researchers from abroad will avail themselves of this opportunity to widen their knowledge about Japan and will work actively for the academic circles as well as for international friendship.

Finally may I express my best wishes for excellent health of you all.

Greetings

BY

ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH
Professor, Yale University, U.S.A.

The honor has been given me of trying to express for the members of the Congress the great pleasure we all feel at being here in Tokyo on this occasion. We have come from all parts of the earth in the hope of better understanding one another. We have brought papers to read, and we each believe our own papers, at least, are excellent. We all know, however, that we could easily have published the papers, and that they could have been read in our various studies with a fraction of the effort of both guests and hosts in order that they could be read aloud to one another in Tokyo.

We will listen to the papers carefully. But we have more especially been invited, and have come, that we may learn to know one another personally. One of the reasons, I am sure, that prompted our hosts to ask us strangers was the belief that Japanese scholars would benefit by meeting us and talking with us. I trust that we will not disappoint them. But we who have come from foreign lands quite reverse this motive: we have come to meet the scholars of Japan. Here I have no doubt whatever. We shall return immeasurably enriched by having seen beautiful Japan, by having participated in the noble reverence at the shrines and temples we shall visit, and by having learned to know personally the scholars of this country.

Men now recognize that physical science has no national boundaries. We who study the History of Religions know that for all the localisms of images, rites, creeds, divine names, and philosophies, the religious impulses of people all over the world are deeply alike. We shall illuminate one another on the differences in our papers; in our conversations we must find the common denominators of the heart.

So in the names of all guests of the Congress I say this brief word of gratitude to our hosts who have made possible what we are about to receive.
ideas, which has always animated me, is the conviction that the oriental students of the history of religions should be drawn into I.A.H.R. in order to give to this organization a really international, that means worldwide character. As matters stand at the moment, the I.A.H.R. is chiefly an European-American affair, because the majority of its member-groups are located in Europe and in the States. In the closing address of the Amsterdam-congress in 1950 I have already drawn the attention of my audience to this point, which I called one of the weaknesses that should be mended. If I may quote myself I should like to read the passage from my speech relevant to this issue: “Secondly there is a sensible lack of scholars from the oriental world. In the past it was primarily western scholars who explored the untrodden fields of the history of the oriental religions. It may be foreseen that the spirit of the rising selfconsciousness in the East will stimulate many scholars there to study their spiritual heritage. So the second point is: a next congress should include a well chosen delegation from the East.” At that time even in my wildest dreams I could not foresee what would happen in 1958. For thanks to the initiative, the untiring zeal and the generous hospitality of our Japanese friends we are now assembled at the 9th congress of the I.A.H.R. in Tokyo. My vision has been realized in a marvellous way. For a general secretary who cares for his organization this is a source of great happiness and deep satisfaction. I am thankful but not wholly content. Since there are here assembled so many distinguished scholars from different oriental countries I think we should use this unique and precious opportunity to consider the possibilities of establishing more permanent contacts. So the announcement I have to make come down to this: all the representatives from oriental countries are kindly invited to attend the meeting, which will be held August 30th, Saturday during lunchtime.

I am not exaggerating when I say that I have the feeling that we have come to a turning-point in the history of the I.A.H.R., perhaps in the study of the history of religions. We are going to speak on the question what can be done to kindle the interest for the history of religions in the East and how we could prepare the formation of national groups in the oriental countries.

So this will be a kind of an Asian-African conference of students of the history of religions, a new Asian-African group, this time convened and temporarily presided over by me as Dutchman. There is no harm in this. Holland is a tiny and nowadays politically unimportant country. Nevertheless even the smallest nations can be
Closing Session

IMPRESSION OF JAPAN

BY

RAMACHANDRA N. DANDEKAR

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am asked to speak about my impressions of Japan. But the schedule of the Congress, the symposium and the research tours arranged by the Japanese Organizing Committee was so heavily and tight that there is hardly left any time for us to gather any impression of Japan. Our impressions of Japan, therefore, are naturally limited to our impressions of the 9th International Congress for the History of Religions. So, with your permission Mr. Chairman, I shall make a few general observations on the Congress itself. The 9th International Congress for the History of Religions was unique in many respects. Firstly, as we all know, this was the first international congress which was organized in the East. In Indian universities, to one of which I belong, history of religions is not taught as an independent subject. I think that is the case with many universities in East Asia. It is hoped that this 9th International Congress for the History of Religions will give an impetus to the study of the history of religions in the universities of the countries in the East. It must be remembered that religion is a very vital factor in the cultural makeup of the East. Religion has played no less a significant part in the Western civilization. Without a proper understanding and appreciation of the religions in the East and the West, therefore, it is hardly possible to understand and appreciate adequately the histories of the peoples of the East and the West. As I said, I earnestly hope that this subject will be properly developed and cultivated in the universities of the East, and I also hope that national associations for the history of religions will come into existence in the several countries of the East.

The second unique feature of this Congress was the symposium on the East and the West, organized under the auspices of UNESCO, in conjunction with this Congress. It is very encouraging indeed that UNESCO has now recognized that the study of religion is very important for the promotion of its Major East-West Project. The Symposium with its plenary sessions and discussion groups has convinced us in ample measure that an objective historical approach to religion is possible. Not only that, the present approach to the study of the history of religions helps mutual understanding between the East and the West which I am sure is the goal of the Major East-West Project of UNESCO.

The third unique feature to which I want to make a reference is the research tours. The research tours have been so interesting; and we were able to gather such a rich experience during the last four or five days. In this Congress we have discussed religion not only in theory but we have been able to observe religion in practice. And I am quite sure that the various sects: Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, Shintoism Tenrikyo and other religious sects which we observed will help us in our future study of the history of religions, particularly in Japan.

And lastly I must not forget to refer to the excellent organization of this Congress. All those who were responsible directly or indirectly for the organization of this Congress have made efforts to make our stay in Japan enjoyable, comfortable and, may I add, fruitful. The proverbial efficiency and courtesy of Japan was in evidence at every stage. It is, I know, invidious to make any reference to individuals. But I can not help referring to three persons. I must first make a reference to Prince Mikasa, the Honorary President of this Congress. By means of his genial nature, and democratic behaviour, Prince Mikasa has endeared himself with all those with whom he has come into contact. And I am sure he has come into contact with everyone of us. Professor Ishizu, the Chairman of the Organizing Committee was behind the curtain but his hands of experience were evident in every case. And who will forget the indefatigable Professor Kishimoto with his endless announcements? But our complaint to make: The Japanese Organizing Committee has set up such a high standard that Professor Bleeker will find it very difficult to find hosts for future congresses, because it will be impossible to reach that standard of efficiency and courtesy. Everyone, as I said, who was connected with this Congress helped to make it the grand success that it has been. Every member of the Organizing Committee, indeed all Japanese men and women,—they
There are two specific traits in Japanese religious life which from the beginning struck the visiting observers. The first is the cosmic dimension of the Japanese religious experience. The fact that the sacred and divine manifest themselves through nature or, more exactly, through the beauties of nature. The shrines and temples are not separated from nature. They are an integral part of the natural environments. They add a new majesty to the beauty of the hills, the forests and the streams. Here in this fortunate Japanese land, there is no break between the divine, the human and the world of nature. The sacred is manifested by the cosmic creations as well as by the most noble spiritual experiences. It would be impudent to speak of naturalism here, because this is not a natural cult in the usual sense of the word, but is the veneration of the divine work or the sign of the presence of the divinity. In any case, it is greatly moving for us to find here in Japan a state of affairs that Europe has lost since the magical days of the archaic Greek, sanctuaries integrated in the cosmic landscape, the works of the human religious sentiment complementing the divine works per excellence, the nature itself.

The second specific trait of Japanese religious life is more difficult to define in a few words. It has to do with the fact that the archaic element of religion coexists with the most recent, and that they coexist sometimes in symbiosis, sometimes apart. It is for this reason that I spoke a moment ago of the living laboratory of the history of religions represented like Japan. Not being a specialist, I do not know whether any religious element has disappeared from the scene in the course of centuries, but what is certain is that here in Japan, one finds still living and creating religious forces that have long been extinguished in other parts of the world. At the side of Buddhism and Christianity one finds astonishingly alive religious forms which made the first appearance in the neolithic. And in the north of this country among the Ainu, there are still living the religious concepts of the paleolithic conquest. This presents to the history of religion an important problem and it is not the least merit of the Congress to have revealed to us the problem which for many of us at least, will become perhaps the point of departure of a new research.

I should like to conclude this brief impression with a few words of thanks. But how should one thank all those who have organized this Congress and have contributed to its extraordinary success. From the moment of our arrival at the Tokyo Air-port, or of the opening of the Plenary Conference in the Sankei Kaikan, or again of our first research tour to Nikko, right up to now, in this magnificent building in Kyoto,
we have enjoyed everywhere the same cordial reception, the same
perfect efficiency, the same spontaneous friendliness full of charm.
I speak for all the participants when I thank the President of the
Japanese Organizing Committee of the 9th International Congress for
the History of Religions, and when beg him to convey to all his collabora-
tors our most sincere thanks, and beg him also to say to all those who
have contributed to the success of this Congress, our thanks for their
devotion and energy. We have not only discovered this beautiful
country and met most charming colleagues but have also found every-
where friends. Thank you.

IMPRESSION OF JAPAN

BY

HERMAN L. JANSEN

Your Highnesses, Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Unfortunately the hour for taking leave has come. And I just
would like to sum up in a few words on the impressions I got during my
stay in Japan, although they certainly are too fresh for giving a full
picture.

First of all, what has this Congress given us? In this connection,
I would like to mention that we have got a great deal of new material
for studies, especially of the religions of the East. To us Westerners,
it will really mean very much when we have had the opportunity to
listen to our Asiatic colleagues when they told us about their own
religion. One can only understand thoroughly one’s own religion.
Those who belong to a certain religion can tell what others never can
realize, even if they know well to read and translate the holy books
and, in partly in a scholarly way, the text itself. Furthermore you have
got a rich personal contact. ‘Most of you, I think, share my opinion
that this personal contact perhaps is the most important result of a
Congress. And so also of this one. The East has come closer to us
during the stay here, and the problems of the East have through this
contact become more or less problems of our own. This feeling of
coming in closer contact was especially deeper during the symposium.

We, working with theoretical problems, were reminded of the fact
that even this kind of work aims at promoting mutual understanding.
Leaving for home, we now carry with us a stronger feeling of being
obliged to take part in the work of better understanding between
different religious and national groups, the work which is going on the
world over. As to the administration of this Congress: I must say
that I am deeply impressed by the administrative ability of our Japanese
friends. If I have showed anything to do with the next Congress, I
certainly should feel very nervous. It is not necessary to have been
a member of the Organizing Committee to understand what an enormous
work has been done beforehand, and what an admirable administrative
capacity has been shown by our Japanese colleagues during the
Congress. I really have nothing to do besides. I understand the
motivation when they draw us to such an extensive excursion
programme. They wanted us to see as much as possible of their great
monuments and of their beautiful country. Japan is a very beautiful
land, indeed. Having travelled myself in a lot of countries, my opinion
is that few of them are comparable with Japan. Although there has
been little time for studying the people outside this religious circle of
ours, I have got an impression which seems to be a reliable one, for an
industrious, hard working and, before all, polite population in this
country. We, coming from the West, certainly have much to learn
from our Japaense friends in that respect. As a member of the Executive
Committee of the International Association for the History of
Religions, I would like to direct these final words to those who have
been in charge of the 9th Congress for the History of Religions, namely,
the Japanese Organizing Committee for the Tokyo Meeting. Having
met so much hospitality and kindness, we feel in great debt to you all.
You have opened your institutions to us. You have arranged private
meetings, receptions and parties for us. And in many other ways, not
to be mentioned here, you have shown a unique and cordial hospitality.
I think we all really look forward to meeting you and other Japanese
colleagues and friends in our own countries, in our own homes, and thus
be able to express this thankfulness in a more concrete way.

Not only this single member of this Congress but the International
Association for the History of Religions as a whole is in debt to you,
for our Organization has become richer and stronger through this
Congress. This means a promise for a future life for our Organization.
We certainly will keep the memory of these days with you in mind
forever. Your hospitality, your kindness, your friendship will forever
be a model to us all. Thank you.
Your Highnesses, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I feel honoured by the request of my Japanese friends that I should deliver this closing address. You have heard many good papers from eminent scholars. I am not intending to lengthen this series by another one. Nor shall I try to summarize the ideological contents of all lectures given at the Congress and at the Symposium. I shall rather venture to throw out a few simple ideas, in a light, playful way. Ultimately truth is very simple, and never tiresome and refreshing as a cool drink on a very hot summer day in Japan. I do not pretend that I can attain the truth, but a modest attempt might be made. The title of this short address could be: Reconception of Religion: a way to mutual understanding between East and West.

The world over, religion is nowadays a subject of much discussion and debate. In the East, religion, though still claiming and even possessing unshaken authority is in a process of transformation caused by the influence of the West which has brought Eastern society into a state of ferment. New forms are being sought for the inherited traditional truth. In the West, religion, which already for several centuries has been criticized and even despised and neglected, again is the topic of the day. The attitude of polite indifference which our grandfathers took towards religion has disappeared. Whether religion is accepted or rejected, it is at least taken serious. People clearly understand that religion is the fundamental problem in life which should be solved, either in the positive or in the negative way. Both in the East and in the West religion is still considered to be a vital issue or perhaps a crucial question in life of the individual and of society.

Nevertheless, it is a fact that many people are questioning the value of religion. It is a recurrent complaint that religious people by their behaviour deny the truth which they confess with their lips. Such and other critical remarks are partly true, partly unjust, because they are more prompted by hatred and aversion than by a thorough acquaintance with the religion in question. However, they should be taken serious. They should be understood as an incitement to reconsider and restore religion, that means to seek for a renewal and a reformation of religion, or rather to undertake what I would call a reconception of religion. In my opinion this would at the same time be the best way of fostering mutual understanding between East and West.

The idea of the reconception of religion is not my own invention, though it answers to what always has been my innermost conviction. I borrowed this notion from the American philosopher W.E. Hocking, who in his highly interesting book called “Living Religions and a World Faith” tackles the intricate question of the relation between Christianity and the non-Christian religions. He makes it clear that there are three methods of solving this problem, namely: 1) the way of radical displacement, 2) the way of synthesis, and 3) the way of reconception (of religion). The way of radical displacement obviously gives no solution, because you will never win people's love and sympathy by brutally uprooting their ethical and religious standards. The way of synthesis is practised by persons of a liberal and tolerant mind, who are prepared to adopt from another religion whatever seems peculiarly expressive in its language and significant in its ideas and to incorporate these elements with their own religion. But this may lead to a superficial, purely romantic admiration of what is not sufficiently examined in its real essence. Toleration may have its weakness, namely that in being kind to what is not one's own, one is subtly disloyal to one's own. Real synthesis cannot be achieved by putting together elements at random. It is a product of long and slow growth. In my opinion reconception is the most preferable method. Reconception means that you re-think, re-state your own religion, not only with your intellect, but also with your heart. Only when you have understood from experience what the intrinsic deeper meaning is of the old well-known words of religious truth, only then can you say that you understand your religion throughout. And this means that at the same time you become mild and far-seeing in your judgment on other religions. In proportion as any religion grows in self-understanding through grasping its own essence, it grasps the essence of all religions, gains in power to interpret its various forms and furthers mutual understanding. We should become better Shintoists, better Buddhists, better Christians, better Moslims, better Jews.
I am fully aware of the fact that reconception of religion is a task which partly lies outside the scope of scientific deliberation and investigation. That means, this is a task which individual man has to accomplish in his personal life. On the other hand the history of religions and comparative religion are certainly qualified to render valuable services. This they can do by clarifying the structure of the different religions. And more particularly it is a new science which is called phenomenology of religions which today replace comparative religion in Europe which can share new elements of religion, because it shows that every religion in its innermost core is logical and that to understand, for instance, Shintoism or Buddhism, we should make an approach from that science. To make this clear to you, may I try to show you something of the structure of religion as I see it myself by pointing out four essential points, namely:

1) the symbol of the bridge. Nobody will contradict that the bridge is one of humanity’s most ingenious inventions that I speak to Japanese and also to the Dutch people in particular. A bridge enables people to cross stormy rivers without any danger for their life or safety. Bridges create commerce between people from different parts of a country that otherwise would have been separated from each other. The bridge has therefore got a spiritual value and even a symbolic meaning. Some old myths tell us that there is a bridge between heaven and earth, used both by the gods and by men. I was captured by this idea and I saw at Nikko the sacred bridge which is not used by human beings and which thereby works as a symbol. I consider it to be one of the key notions of religion as such. Whether this symbol is articulated or not, you may be sure that it is one of the basic notions of every true religion. Religious people all over the world are convinced that there is intercourse going on between their earthly existence and a higher world. Divine truth, God’s word comes down to them and they are allowed to enter a higher sphere of reality. There is a bridge between heaven and earth.

2) the idea of worship. Nathan Söderblom, the famous Swedish student of the history of religions has once formulated the essence of religion like this: he says, religious is that man who acknowledges something as holy. This is perhaps the most inclusive definition of religion to be found. It underlines at any rate the significance of worship. For, everyone who meets the Holy will venerate it. Whatever form this worship may take, whether it is elaborated into complicated rites or it consists of a simple act of adoration of the deity it is evident that no religion can be kept alive when its adherents do not realize that worship is essential because it possesses regenerating power.

3) rapture or enthusiasm. Men is constantly assailed by two contradictory forces. On the one hand he is afflicted by pain, doubt and distress, at the other side his heart longs for happiness. In order to evade the misery of his life and to acquire the tranquillity of heart which he desires he makes use of the liberating forces of religion. That means that religious people all over the world have tried by all sorts of means, by drugs by dances and music, by spiritual exercise and technique, by meditation, by mystic ecstasy, by simple faith, they have tried to attain a higher world and to live a richer and more beautiful life. If we put the cruder forms of this method of self-transcendence aside, then we retain idea which is essential, namely the truth that religion is identical with rapture or enthusiasm.

4) confidence in future. Humanity has perhaps never before realised so sharply as in the atomic age in which we live that life on earth is constantly threatened by suffering and by the danger of extinction. However the historian knows that also in previous centuries life was precarious. If man looks at his existence in an objective and unbiased way he has never had much reason to be all too optimistic about his perspectives. It is only religion that can and actually does give him confidence in the future, because religion tells him that ultimately his life is safe. Religious people may differ in their conception of the future, however, they are one in the conviction that there is no reason for anxiety or distrust, as no force whatever can destroy the liberty of the heart that has found its peace in divine truth.

Well; this is the lesson of phenomenology of religion can teach us. Now take it as you like it. It may be the truth or perhaps not. It does not matter. For, why do we scientific people talk so much, why have we talked so much at the Congress and the Symposium? The reason is as a Latin author says: not that we have to say so much of importance, but because we are forbidden to keep silent. However, science never is allowed to enter the holy of holiest of religion. It can only allude to the secret, the divine mystery to which all religions bear an eloquent testimony. Thank you.
May I have a few words in order to underline the importance of the Tokyo Congress. You know the history of all Congresses of general history of religions may be divided into two epochs. The first epoch begins in the year 1919 when the first Congress was held in Paris, second epoch begins with the Amsterdam in the year 1950, then, the International Association for the History of Religions was founded. The Tokyo Congress marks an important step on the second epoch. Tokyo Congress has opened a new perspective to the International Association which is expected to extend itself to other countries in Asia and Africa. The Tokyo Congress taught us many things. From a strictly technical point of view, it has introduced an important innovation. The older scheme comprehending eight or ten sections has been replaced by the new mode of organisational structure which is concentrated into four sections; general problems, primitive religions, ancient religions, living religions. These structure which I propose for the organization of the next Marlbourg Congress as being applied from now at the Tokyo Congress. The experience has been successful. I think we can be satisfied and we can follow this example confidently for the future Congress.

There was another innovation in this Congress. It was the active, constant and steady participation of all the honorary presidents. Prince Mikasa did not only attend the Opening and the Closing Ceremonies but he was as much diligent to our work as our effective President Professor Ishizu and our Secretary-General Professor Kishimoto. Prince Mikasa has worked always with us and among us. If I can dare to suggest the historical parallel more for which I ask the indulgence of Mr. Highness, I would say that Prince Mikasa has been a Prince Shôtoku of our Congress.

And now, dear friends, the time is come to say goodbye, and we remember of some verse which was composed by a poet in occasion of living in Japan several years ago. We have read this verse in a pamphlet of our Congress:

\[\text{Soon, from the ship farewell I'll call,} \\
\text{When linger here no more I can,}\]

But then I know the force I shall
Leave half by half in fair Japan.
no photograph which could have taken the beautiful pose which is beyond. Well, in a very prosaic way I should like to think of that today when I remembered the course of this Congress and Symposium. I feel that this natural ease which comes from perfection and which goes beyond excellence was shown in a very concrete and positive and everyday-life way that this is also very Japanese in the organization of this Congress and this Symposium.

We, UNESCO who see dozens of conferences sometimes in a year are perhaps in a full position to know how much effort, how much cared attention it deserves to prepare such a meeting as the one I attended. But at the same time our experience is that the excellence of the preparation is to be felt by the ease with which everything is flowing, by the fact which you don’t notice any strange. And now, for the ease with which it was done and also for the effort which we know our behind, I wish also on behalf of UNESCO like to extend not only appreciation but admiration for the way in which the Japanese Organizing Committee, those who took the leadership of this enterprise and those who implemented it, especially his Imperial Highness Prince Mikasa, Professor Ishizu, Professor Kishimoto and all those and they are innumerable and many of them we don’t see in our everyday life of course, I want to say how much I admire their work.

A farther point about the spirit of this Meeting. Yesterday, we were at Ryuanji. So many things have been said and really nothing should be said about this garden, and to say about it is exactly the proof that you have not worthy of speaking about it. And you can only make some hints at some glimpse of it, and I would dare to venture something which I think is somewhat related to our experience of last days. When you go around the garden, among many other things, you noticed while there were fifteen stones you can never see them all at the same time, there is always one stone which is hidden somewhere, and it is never the same one. But precisely, because of that one stone which is beyond sight, which is immaterial, walking around, precisely because of that, walking around an movement is possible. If you could see everything at a single glance, you will have to remain in one point of view and see the garden from the invisible angle, but since one stone is always disappearing, the general sight is never open, never goes to pieces; it is always one, it is always new.

Now looking at this garden I was brought to think of a question which was asked to us on the very first day by his Highness Prince Mikasa. He asked that whether Japan is religious or not. Well, I will with great modesty venture to make an attempt towards an element of reply to this. It seems to me that spirituality of religion in Japan is like this fifteen stones. It is discreet, it is immaterial, it is the still point, that it is as T.S. Elliot said, “The still point without which there would be no dance and there is only the dance,” the still point which permit the movement and creation. And I think the Japanese religion and the Japanese traditional cultural value as a whole, even if it is free, even if it is discreet is still far revolving point which has permitted Japan to live at the same time in the movement as in the garden in its tradition in eternity and also in modern creative life.

And now I am thinking at this very moment of two friends of mine, two French workers, very simple people who have done what Professor Eliade has just mentioned. Professor Eliade said that one of his friends wrote a letter saying, “Try everything, do not eat so much, do not even smoke so much, and save in order to come to Japan.” Where in presence of qualified philosophers and historians, I would like to mention these two simple people, my friends who are arriving in Yokohama in three days, and who have so everything they have that they have renounced their job and possession and coming empty-handed to Japan, just because they know that Japan is going to bring something which is beyond what they can handle, which is spiritual experience of what they are. And they are going to land in three days and I would like to have seen them on this very last day.

What has Japan to contribute which is so powerful that people are ready to cut every link and to come here? When a century ago perhaps in a romantic period, what was expected from the oriental culture? One example: it was romanticism, it was realism, it was anything which could make us forget ourselves, and get into enchanted realm of imagination. But now when question has become more crucial, and has become more vital. What is sought from the orientals is on the contrary, not to make us forget what we are but make us realize more fully and integrate more deeply in our life and combat what we really are. This is why I think Japan has been a growing interest in the field of oriental studies in the last years. It is not by chance that the utmost modern building which we have now in Paris for UNESCO is centred around the Japanese garden. It is not by mere chance that modern painting would not be what it is without Japanese influence, that modern architecture uses the structures and divisions of space of Japanese houses. It is because Japan has perhaps something great which is purity, simplicity, efficiency to European simplicity, something direct which does not to ourselves, from ourselves in a kind of dream, but on the contrary like one of those mirrors.
we have seen in Shinto shrine reverse ourselves to an innermost being and make us concentrate ourselves on what is essential and on what is held in German in us, and more especially, to us orientals. I have been asked by some of my dear friends here to say a few words in behalf of these who are not Westerners and who are not Japanese but orientals who are perhaps very directly concerned with what is happening in Japan today. To us, I think, now I am speaking personally but I know that many share this view, it is the comfort and encouragement to feel that the same country has been able to preserve some of the values which we share, which are essential to us, and which are also spiritual and religious and traditional values but, at the same time and probably because of that, they are able to bring a powerful contribution to twentieth century modern life. I would even venture to say in many aspects I have a feeling that Japan is already one of the very few countries which are aware of the twenty-first century and already beginning to live in.

Now I have spoken about Japan which is very dear and near to me, but when finishing I would like to say a word to the Director of International Association for the History of Religions. You may know perhaps that in the cultural field, UNESCO does not believe in direct administration. It believes that freedom is inseparable from culture. Therefore, it works through academies, through institute, through universities like one we are in. And it has an opportunity towards a federation of academic and scholarly institutions which is called International Council for Philosophic and Humanistic Studies. This Congress and this Symposium was the first one to make very spontaneously, very boldly, but now we know, most respectfully this experience, and here I would like to extend my special thanks to Professor Pettazzoni, to Professor Bleeker and to members of Executive Board who in sometimes difficult conditions, I know, have had the initiative, the faith and perseverance to bring us here today. And my last word will be about the follow-up of this Congress. I said the other day that the recommendations which you made are going to be studied and to be followed as an inspiration by our various governing bodies. But they will also go beyond that. And this I forgot to mention last time. There are all kind of cultural institutions, all kind of promotors of international conferences who are looking forwards towards the results of your meeting to have encouragement and also advice therefrom.

For instance, next year there will be a meeting of East-West philosophers which is sponsored by the National Commission of the United States of America, and which is going to be held in the University of Hawaii which has already a long tradition of pioneer work in that field. In a few days I am going to contact those who are organizing this meeting. But I will contact them enriched by the experience derived from your meeting, and I shall bring them some of the results so that there will be constant chain of initiative and actions each taking up from the other, now in the East, now in the West, and all contributing to the major aim which we have for mutual appreciation and also respect between oriental and western cultures.

I would like to finish with a quotation, and if you permit me it will be from a sacred book from a religious text which I think is apt for this circumstance, and naturally being a Moslem it will be from the Koran. It is a passage which says that light, spiritual light when it is achieved is lit at the fire which comes from a tree which is neither from the East nor from the West but which is both East and West at the same time while transcending them, and therefore light took over another realm of light.

Thank you.

Closing Address

BY

TERUZI ISHIZU
Chairman, Organizing Committee

Your Highness, Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am rather sad to have to say goodbyes to you at this very last moment of this Congress. Reflecting back the two weeks we had together, I cannot help admiring your strong spirit as well as sound health which made this Congress in Asia so successful. You have encouraged us so much by your presence and you have given us a great hope for the future by your very cooperations and smiles, Western and Orient. By our meeting of mind three things have been accomplished, I believe. First, in the field of study there has been the exchange of knowledge in the history of religions among more than seven hundred scholars from the thirty countries. Secondly, in the far greater dimension of culture East has met with West to discard the verse of the Kipling’s poem made in colonial days. Thirdly, our friendship crossing the border-lines of countries, races and faces have been confirmed so tightly by our living together. To the above-mentioned
three points I should like to add another point of concrete nature; namely the formation of Afro-Asian sub-division of the I.A.H.R., which might become the integral part of the mother Association as just referred by Dr. Bleeker.

I hope everyone of you could enjoy the rest of your stay in Japan and have a nice return trip with good impressions of Japan. Concluding my address, I should like to express our heartly gratitude to people who made this Congress successful, especially Dr. Pettazzoni, Dr. Bleeker and other officers of this Congress on the one hand, and UNESCO and D.: Bammate, one of the most brilliant representatives on the other hand.

Well, let us be united one in the name of I.A.H.R, in the name of truth which is our common concern and final goal of our study. Goodbye, till we meet again perhaps at Marlbourg in 1960. And sayonara! Thank you.
Opening Session

Address

BY

CLAAS J. BLEEKER
General Secretary, I.A.H.R.

Your Highness, Dr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

This short address, not prepared long before, is written in the score of the moments, therefore is not an address which you are requested to take as a plan which may serve to inform you about the significance of the Symposium and about the procedures to be followed so that the series of plenary sessions and of round-table discussions which are on the programme become a real success. In my opinion, no time should be lost in dealing with the programme itself. In my opinion, if I may take for granted that you all have studied it and are familiar with its structure, the first thing you ought to know is that this symposium is part of UNESCO’S Major Project East-West. That means that it is sponsored by UNESCO, not only morally but also actually in this and that UNESCO grant has enabled the International Association for the History of Religions to select nine distinguished scholars from Europe, Middle East and India who are going to deliver a short paper and who are expected to stimulate thereby the discussions. I am sure to express your feelings when I say that we are extremely thankful for UNESCO’S generous gesture, and I gladly take this opportunity that Mr. Bammate, Head of Division of International Cultural Exchanges, is present. Mr. Bammate who personally is keenly interested in this undertaking and who has rendered us valuable services to ask him to convey to the authorities of UNESCO our high appreciation of support given to realize this lofty idea.

Like UNESCO’S Major Project East-West itself, this symposium is both an endeavour of noble character and a risky experiments. Nobody can deny that at present it is of paramount importance to increase and to deepen mutual understanding between the East and the West. We all remember Kipling’s famous saying: “East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet.” Though this saying is one-sided and therefore controversial, it nevertheless contains part of the truth. There have been and there still exist many misunderstandings and reasons for conflict between the East and the West. And therefore it is no wonder that many people are sceptical about the results of a meeting like this symposium. Nobody can predict that it will become a success. I repeat it is a high endeavour and a risky experiment. But there is one guarantee that the amount of work which has been invested into the preparations will not be in vain. Our discussions will take place on a level where people from the East and from the West can meet and understand each other mainly on the level of religion which is common ground to all of us. Religion surely still is a vital issue for millions of people both in the East and in the West. I am convinced that there is no better way of fostering mutual understanding than by making people really know and honestly appreciate each others deepest religious convictions. Thus it will appear that we have much more in common than we ever could dream of. But please let us beware of the danger and the temptation of speaking too sentimentally about the many points of resemblance between the religions of the East and of the West. Let us be realistic and never forget that though we can reach and understand each other both humanly and religiously, then actually we are in the field of politics and of economics where there are many questions which divide the East from the West and which at any given unfortunate moment may raise high feelings of hatred and distrust. We are not going to talk in this connection about politics and economics. But we would be silly and blue-eyed idealists if we did not realize which is the hidden background of our discussions. This knowledge can on the other hand increase our feeling of responsibility and strengthen our determined will show and make understandable to the world that religion is one of the most effective means to create peace and goodwill among the nations.

All these considerations lead to the conclusion that the attitude which the participants of the symposium have to take difference considerably from the mental approach which the numbers of congress for the history of religions have made towards the series of lectures which was offered to them. You may be captured or bored by these scientific expositions which drove over historic value and do not touch your heart. To the opposite the subjects of the symposium are directly related to the present situation in which we live and we have an existential value as the philosophers nowadays say; that means that we are not assembled here to listen to a series of monologues, but that we are expected and even have the obligation to start discussion which
leads into the core of the problems and which can clarify the relation between the East and the West. Let us be conscious of the fact that this symposium offers us a rare and precious chance to exchange views and thoughts about the burning problems of our generation. We should try to get the full profit of this unique opportunity.

The last remark reminds me of the fact that I have to say a few words about the procedure which should be followed. You can easily understand that this symposium will become a complete failure if we do not obey strict rules. The first and most important regulation is that we strictly stick to the time, schedule. This will be the task of the chairman both of the plenary sessions and of the round-table discussion groups to lead the discussion in an effective way but with a strong hand.

Secondly you will have observed that there is a difference between the plenary sessions and the round-table discussion groups. The first, the plenary sessions are so to say located on a more or less scholarly level. They take the form of a panel discussion between the official lecturers, the discussants and some experts. All members of the congress are cordially welcome at these plenary sessions to lead into the core of the problems and which can clarify the relation of another meeting which was opened two years ago at this very place, in this very Sankei Kaikan, and which was organized by the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO. It was a morning like this, and you were the Chairman, Mr. Maeda, and some of those who are attending the present Opening Session were already present two years ago. The meeting convened by the Japanese National Commission was a gathering of representatives of Member States of UNESCO in Asia, and the purpose of the meeting was precisely to examine the possibilities of the Major Project aiming towards better understanding of Eastern and Western cultural values. This meeting was the first which outlined various possibilities and defined various projects which should be included in that activity. I am thinking of that day which seems so near especially when I recall the evolution from the time of the mere imagination we had here at the Sankei Kaikan in 1956 to the present Session which is the fulfilment of those hopes and implementation of some of the projects which were imagined then. In fact, Japan has been one of the leading countries to take initiative and to promote the East-West Major Project of UNESCO. And this meeting of 1956 held at the Sankei Kaikan was perhaps one of the best chances for tasks...
in shaping up this project. In fact, a few months later, at the General Conference of UNESCO which was held in New Delhi the project was unanimously adopted to be one of the priority tasks of UNESCO during the ten coming years. The first thing which might be said about this East-West Major Project of UNESCO is that it is a spontaneous achievement. This was not achieved by abstract planning of any secretariat. This was indeed the result of the felt need and of the expressed demand formulated by the Member States, by people of interested countries in the East as well as in the West. For many years those who have been heard that UNESCO had concentrated part of its activities on some priority tasks which could be an essential value to the present world situation. Inquiries and consultations have been made, and we were very much struck by the unanimity and by the spontaneity with which National Commissions, governments and non-governmental organizations all stressed that one of the main tasks of UNESCO should be to contribute in making Oriental cultures better known and appreciated in the world. Thereby it was first recognized that Oriental countries have become once again, as they have been many times in history, an essential and leading factor in the world community, and that ignoring or underrating of this fact would be one of the main causes of international tension and misunderstanding. On the other hand, when adopting this as a Major Project, the General Conference of UNESCO recognized also that Oriental cultures had at the present junction of the world history an essential contribution to bring to mankind, that there are some traditional values, that there are some problems of meeting these traditional values and the present world situation, which are of an essential value not only to the Eastern countries themselves but to the whole world community.

This Major Project of UNESCO is being developed now at the three different levels and aims at three different kinds of objects: first, it is the co-ordination of efforts and tasks of specialists, of research workers or professors. This is the "creative" research part of the Major Project. The second part or second level is education. This covers revision of textbooks, improvement of curricula. In fact, in this very town of Tokyo next month, we have an important meeting for the revision of textbooks and curricula in order to promote the appreciation between Eastern and Western cultures. And thirdly, the Major Project is aiming at the general public through mass communication media; film, radio, newspapers, travelling exhibitions and so on. The meeting which is opened today falls in the first category. It is a meeting for research, it is a meeting of scholars. Thereby, it should be considered as one of those activities which are created in formulating the aims and tasks of the Major Project, and in setting up some criteria for its implementation.

There have been already some international symposia held within the Major Project. And in fact, many of them have already been held in Japan. There was last year a meeting on history of cultural relations which was organized in Tokyo by the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO. The P.E.N. Club during its meeting last year discussed the literary aspects of East and West mutual contacts. But now we are probably coming to one of the most substantial and most difficult points in these relations. And so after having tried to set up this conference within the general framework of the East-West Major Project of UNESCO, I should like to say a few words about the specific characters of the present symposium.

First, religion. It did not have such an important part in the beginning of the planning of this East-West Major Project. But since the first stage of the project's planning, there have been heard repeatedly, again and again, in the various leading bodies of UNESCO, in its Executive Board, in the special Advisory Committee which has been set up for the implementation of the Orient-Occident Major Project, of which Mr. Tamon Maeda is a member, repeatedly, there have been requests for inclusion of study of religion as an essential part of this UNESCO's East-West Major Project. As you know, UNESCO has no philosophy nor doctrine of its own; it believes in the freedom of Member States and non-governmental organizations which are cooperating with it, it is just a gathering for it. And this is why UNESCO is so much cautious in its approach of a religious problem. But it was stressed again and again that it is useless even to attempt an approach of the understanding of the Oriental culture without taking due account of the religious factor. In a moment, in one of the first papers that I would like to listen to, that has been prepared by Professor Dandekar, you will see how everyday life and actions are permeated by spiritual influences, how everyday acts are signs of spiritual reality. Being an Oriental myself and a Moslem, I also know by personal experience that any action, giving food to a guest as well as praying, can be done Ismalia in the name of God, and thereby attracts its full, its transcendental value. Of course, it is not fair in Japan or it is unnecessary to stress how everyday humble, simple custom can be connected with some of the deepest reality of the conscience. How the way of writing a character, how the way to arrange things can be at the same time the technically right action but also an originally important acquisition,
I am thinking of a certain Latin word, which means that an action is at the same time done for right or wrong but which also means that it is done in a ritual or unritual way. We have also this feeling and I think many of us have experienced it already in our days here in Japan that the same words in Japanese meaning at the same time the technical skill of doing something but also the right inward approach to some spiritual and mental realities. Therefore after having stressed the religious importance of research within the East-West Major Project, it has been stressed also by the fate, if you are advocating an approach to the religious problem, that UNESCO should not deal with theology, should not discuss dogmas or problems of fate, that what is going to be studied, this is exactly I think what is going to be done in this discussion, is not a religion as regards theology or personal convictions but it will be cultural aspects of religion, the way in which religion has shaped up culture and also everyday life personal experience in Oriental civilizations. And this is the second characteristics of this meeting. It is a meeting about religion, but religion considered as essential element in a broader, socially broader framework of culture. The third element which has to be stressed, although it has already been mentioned happily by Dr. Bleeker, is that this is a meeting of scholars. And this should be a very important fact to be stressed, I think, on the opening of the symposium. When one is speaking of international understanding, of meetings of thoughts, one is perhaps likely to loose one's certain sentimentality and expressions of goodwill but what UNESCO is expecting from you is the approach you have in your everyday work as scholars, the critical approach, the sedate, calm approach of people who were used to criticize texts to appreciate documents and facts, to weigh them and compare them each other. And some of discoveries are unpleasant or minimized value of some of our hopes. Let us face it. So, that is the third characteristic of this meeting to be a meeting of scholars. And this is why also we felt that we could start approach of religion in the East-West Major Project by applying to the International Association for the History of Religions because we are sure that you will have this kind of approach. Now two other characters which I would like to mention briefly: this is a symposium on history but on recent history. It may touch perhaps, some difficult points. But considering what I have just said that it is a meeting on culture and that it is a meeting of scholars, it was proposed to focus and concentrate on the last century because we could not forget that the Major Project is not only the assessment of the past achievement of culture, but it is also a practical project aiming at a better mutual understanding and co-operation between peoples. And the last characteristic of the symposium which I should like to mention now is its reciprocal, its mutual nature. During the congress, we had lectures which are describing a specific culture, discussing one aspect of one culture. What we are expecting from the debates in the symposium is an analysis of mutual influence, a study of interconnections and research on the points where too many cultures meet so that we are not expecting the friction of any particulars culture but rather an analysis of what happened or what happens when two different cultures or many different cultural traditions meet together. So, these are a few of the characters which I want to mention: religion but through cultural approach, scholarly approach, inter-connection of culture and present problems.

And to face words, I should also like to say after having tried to characterize some aspects of the symposium, a few words about the methods. Here I should like to repeat what has been so well said by Dr. Bleeker. But I wish once more to say that what we are expecting most from your meeting were very free and lively discussion. I think freedom is the first word which will come as characterizing the matter. It is not a series of academic speeches or monologues which we are expecting but a common thinking again of question and response, exchange of ideas with very brief short statements. And this is why the discussion should not really handicapped. The second point about the method is freedom and this also has not to be stressed when one is used to be in Japan. The freedom in creative activity can not be achieved unless it is faced on the long and stern preparation and disciplines. And therefore, there is still that freedom of meeting with some kind of discipline. First, the meetings after the opening papers or the opening statement in working groups are to be followed by some interventions, two or three according to circumstances, in which some of the participants, chosen in advance, and we have already time to read papers and to discuss them with a speakers, will launch discussion or set a discussion on its purpose so that forced intervention do not sway us away from the main points in discussion or so that it might be purposed right on the start.

The second kind of discipline is the report. From time to time, every morning we shall gather and assess the result of the previous day's working group and this makes the task of the reporters a very important one. And thirdly there will be at the end of the meeting a series of recommendations to be prepared by working groups and which will be presented to you in the plenary assembly. We are, and
Religion and Thought in the Orient and UNESCO
to speak to you on behalf of the Japanese National
Your Imperial Highnesses, Ladies and Gentlemen,
progress for these last days, they will be important.
apply in your meetings with great interest and it will be expecting and also your technical recommendations on the methods which we should apply not only as a follow-up of this meeting but throughout the implementation of the Major Project. It has been said—I have been much impressed by Professor Heller at the beginning of this meeting of the first day that overcoming of political, racial, economical, social tension is not enough, that the debate has to be carried in what is essential. We feel that here with this discussion on the religious aspects of culture, we are coming to something essential. It is a difficult but is also an important task. We would like to hear not only your inspiration but also your technical recommendations on the methods which we should apply in UNESCO in developing this action in future. UNESCO will be failing your meetings with great interest and it will be expecting and is going to consider with the utmost care the recommendations which you are going to make. It is once again a strenuous and essential task. Whatever those are, may I trust that after having listened to the congress for these last days, they will be important.

Let me on behalf of Director-General of UNESCO and of the organization I serve express you my warmest thanks.

Greetings

BY
TAMON MAEDA
President, National Committee of Japan, UNESCO

Your Imperial Highnesses, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives me a great honour and privilege to be given an opportunity to speak to you on behalf of the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO at the opening session of this important symposium on “the Religion and Thought in the Orient and the Occident – A Century of Cultural Exchanges.” Furthermore I should like to express on this occasion, my heartfelt gratitude to very kind words said by my friend, Mr. Bammate, reminding us of what happened in the past year in our Asian Regional Conference of National Commissions for UNESCO which had made some humble contributions to initiating this sort of things.

First of all, I wish to express my heartfelt welcome to the distinguished participants who have travelled far across the oceans to take part in the symposium which is about to begin here within the framework of the Major Project on Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values that UNESCO started in 1957 for a period of ten years, to which as you are aware, we the Japanese National commission attaches great importance.

In the first decade of UNESCO’s operation, UNESCO seems to have consciously refrained from taking up the question of religion, because the very nature of religion made it extremely difficult for an international organization like UNESCO to concern itself with religion, and some apprehension of being too much involved in the controversial matters. Thus the result was that the most important factor in the cultural life of mankind was eliminated from our deliberation. However, since the inauguration of the East-West major project the study of cultural aspects of religion has come to be included in its programme. I am in full support of this development of the UNESCO’s programme, because I firmly believe that, each culture having its religious background in some way or other, if mutual understanding of cultural values is to be achieved most properly, we should not disregard the religious element. Of course, UNESCO is not authorized to take any position, whatsoever, with regard to religion itself, but as far as religion is an important element in the development of cultural values, it is most appropriate that UNESCO should undertake studies of cultural aspects of religion. The present symposium is extremely significant in that it is the first of the UNESCO projects directly dealing with religious element of culture. I hope the symposium will provide excellent opportunity to make a comparative study of different religions which have essential bearing upon various cultural traditions of the world.

History shows us that the Japanese have been rather tolerant toward religion. Because of this fact, various religions have been flourishing in this country, which is perhaps a phenomenon of very few equivalence in other countries.

In this sense I think it is most opportune to hold such a symposium in Japan. I confidently believe that the discussion at this symposium will lead us to fruitful results and contribute greatly to the promotion
of the mutual understanding of different cultures with which UNESCO is greatly concerned.

Before concluding, I should like to pay my great respect and warm thanks to Professor Raffaele Pettazzoni, President of the International Association for the History of Religions, and his staff who have exerted strenuous efforts in the organizing of this meeting, as well as to those people of the Science Council of Japan who have devoted themselves to the time-consuming work of preparations for the symposium.

My thanks is also due to Dr. Luther H. Evans, Director-General of UNESCO who has made the meeting possible by extending financial and technical assistance and sent Mr. Bammate as his representative whose presence here greatly honours the meeting.

May I wish most sincerely that this significant meeting will prove a great success, and mark a new epoch in this kind of symposium. Thank you.

Closing Session

Greetings

BY

N. BAMMATE
Head of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, UNESCO

Your Highness, Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

First, I wish to thank Mr. Ishizu and the whole congress for extreme kindness and friendliness with which they have received representatives of UNESCO. Second, I want to say that I have been falling in these meetings in a double capacity. Thirdly, first and above all, as a servant of an organization which has had for many years now close relations with International Association for History of Religions, and which is also counting Japan as one of its most active and creative member-states. On the other hand, I could not refrain from being very directly, personally, intimately touched with your discussions and by the questions you considered.

Being an oriental and a Moslem, I am to a great extent necessarily and I was deeply touched by many of the things you said here. And the first impression I want to say before saying in a few words as a representative of UNESCO will be personal. But, being an oriental in an oriental country, I shall not make a speech nor dialectics. I shall use a parable, a short history with a moral. It is a Buddhist story and it is also a personal experience.

When I was in Japan for the first time some years ago, I remained for sometime in a Buddhist monastery. And here I had to visit my friend who was also teaching in Paris. He visited me there and asked me a series of questions to the habit of monastery. And those questions were extremely dialectical ones. It was full of "why" and "because" trying to cease the causes and consequences. The friend listened for a long time in silence, and then he just said, "professor," he named the name, "who are you." Then the professor was taking a back and he made a rather long and intricate speech to try and explain who he was. Another silence ensued. And the friend said, "you'll probably return to see me, but you will return when you will know not only
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**Closing Session**

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what you have studied, read, or experienced, but when you know
who you are simply and without anything added to it."

Now I was thinking of this many times when listening to the
proceedings. Yours is one certainly of the essential, of the most
difficult fields in humanistic studies, because it deals not only with
attributes with circumstances, with what in around the soul of man
with economic, social, psychological conditions.

It also deals with these, but it is going as an answer to a challenge
on some of its essential questions of what man is. It touches at
the same time some of the deeply rooted beliefs and also the signs of some
of the most transcendent realities.

It is of course, a dangerous ground, a risky ground. I was admiring
how many of you were able to deal with these problems. At the same
time, with sympathy, and also judging from outside, being at the same
time participant and also judges. At the beginning, at the opening
session, I said that we UNESCO have been embarassed for a long time,
because we felt, the more the problem was essential, the more it touched
with some of the essential values of man, the more it has to be also
by our general conference which will be meeting soon.

Thereby, this meeting will not really close this afternoon. It will
remain with us in Paris, at headquarters for many and many years
to come.

On this last day, I want to remember many and many years which
we spent in correspondence, shaking up hopes and projects. Though
it will be, I trust, as many years as a full-up of this meeting when your
recommendations whether they will take care or whether they were
uttered by word in plenary, or in a working group, an inspiration which
you gave will tell us in our everyday work in UNESCO.

We have just be inaugurating a new building for UNESCO, it is
a very modern architecture, but inside this building there is a Japanese
garden with approached in a rigorous, scholarly way.

And this is, what was evident by so many of you during the
discussions which we have been listening, attending to, these last days.

Now, in this very last moment of discussion, you have handed
over a series of recommendations. Even at this last minute we saw
this critical and analytical and scholarly approached evidence when
many amendments were offered, and I think that was the last very
characteristic and living evidence of the way these debates were con­
ducted.

I shall transmit them to the general organization, and they will be
studied by some of our directing bodies, by our executive board, by a
special advisory committee for the East-West Major Project and
stones and trees brought from Japan. And I may show you that they harmonize and they are planted wonderfully.

Here you have been able to harmonize deep sympathy for the
religious feelings which characterize so many cultures and also the
sternest and most rigorous scholarly approach. This will be considered
by our directing bodies, and it will be probably, eventually lead to an­
other meeting.

This is one of your recommendations. It is probably the one
which will be examined with the closest attention, and, therefore, at
this last minute of our meeting, I shall formulate, at the same time,
thanks for the contribution which you have brought to the information
of the UNESCO East-West Major Project. And also at the same
time, express a hope for further cooperation so that UNESCO may in
years to come benefit from your advice in guide.

Thank you.

Closing Address
BY
CLAAS J. BLEEKER
General Secretary, I.A.H.R.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Now I am going to address you in order to thank Professor Ishizu,
the head and president of organizing committees, and the real president
of this congress. But I don’t know who is who. That means I don’t
know from which mouth I may speak. From the mouth of the secretary
general, or from the mouth of the chairman of the symposium, let me
first speak as a secretary general, and then I can assure you that I, on
the one hand, am very happy about these recommendations.

That is, of course, my hope and my best aspirations.

On the other hand, I feel I am staggering when I am thinking of its
task you had given us, but let me not think about it at this moment.

It gives a new perspective, a new future avenue, anything that is
best in life that it has a task and to be chosen to go to develop for a
great ideal.

And now, I should like to close this meeting with few words. That is very hard to believe that we really have gone to it. And of it, you are happy through this discussion and exchange of ideas and opinions and a frank intercourse.

That is hard to believe that it goes too quick in our feelings, and especially since that we will not meet again together, because many Japanese and French will not partake in excursion.

I think I may express it that we have appreciated highly that such a great amount of Japanese scholars have shown their interest in our communications in such a modest way in general. So, now I thank you Japanese friends.

But later on, there will be an opportunity to add others to thank, but I would like to say that it was impossible to evaluate this overwhelming experiences. But I would like to add some characteristics of this congress in spite of the fact that it is impossible to summarise what has happened in symposium.

In the first place, that has been very-well organized. I thank Professor Kishimoto, as I am a general secretary. Although I have organized two conferences, I have sought about a new bit of it, but I feel absent.

And the second place, I would like to speak a little bit about the congress. At the beginning, I had a feeling that a spirit of openness and of frankness was full, and nobody had looked stubborn. Not even that I had looked that, otherwise if you are authorizing yourself, you will get nervous. I see a sign that is marvellous. That is the second.

Then, there is a very interesting and very fruitful combination of balance between scientific research on the one hand and critical. You had many people of outstanding and best of all scholars both European and American. On the other hand, we have had confrontations, direct confrontations living in Japan. And we have learned much that is in the confrontation which was very impressive of religion. That struck me great deal as the spirit of this congress, and then, thanks of many of us all. That it is a unique experience of meeting people of other continent for other religions. We should stretch our understanding to think face to face. Then they will speak memories for life.

And lastly, I think the congress was a very valuable contribution to mutual understanding.

I again use this phrase, that is not a "phrase", it is now for us a "reality", and let us not be sentimental about that it an understanding in the small circle, but should begin with the scholars, with intel-
RECOMMENDATION
RECOMMENDATION

THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS FOR THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS TO UNESCO

In connection with the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions, organized under the auspices of the International Association for the History of Religions by the Science Council of Japan and held in Tokyo from August 27 to 31, 1958, a symposium concerning the relations between East and West from the point of view of religion in its different aspects was arranged within the framework of UNESCO's Major Project for mutual appreciation of Eastern and Western cultural values (Religion and Thought in the Orient and Occident; A Century of Cultural Exchange) September 2 – 4.

The scholars from 29 countries who discussed the problem of mutual influences of Eastern and Western religions tried to characterize the peculiarities of the various types of culture. In five Plenary Sessions and twelve special Round Table Discussions the great importance of a thorough knowledge of different religions as a means for better understanding of the present cultural situation in the East and the West was clearly shown.

Therefore, the participants in the Tokyo International Symposium “Religion and Thought in the Orient and Occident: A Century of Cultural Exchange”:

Inspired by the spirit of friendliness which characterized the Symposium;

Recognizing that mutual international understanding and appreciation, especially between the Orient and the Occident, is an urgent need;

Convinced that the study of religions is an essential factor in creating such understanding and appreciation;

Realizing the important action taken by UNESCO when it adopted its major project for mutual appreciation of Eastern and Western cultural values.

Recommend that:

1. The study of the history of religions should be encouraged and incorporated within the framework of the East-West major project of UNESCO, especially since without the study of the religions it would hardly be possible to understand the Orient. On the other hand, it
appears necessary to emphasize that in certain essential respects Western civilization is informed by religious values.

Moreover, the study of the history of religions should be encouraged, since it is a powerful means of fostering mutual appreciation and respect between religiously minded people;

2. The study of religions should be interpreted here not as dogmatics or as the expression of peculiar churches or sects, nor should it encroach upon any faith or belief; yet, religion itself should be considered to be an essential factor of a great many cultural manifestations, giving them a typical character, and determining ways of thinking, living and creating values, in both individuals and peoples.

3. Religion should therefore be approached within the East-West major project, not in a dogmatic way but with the aim of promoting the knowledge of its cultural aspects, by scientific study of the history of religions in its different branches. That such a scholarly approach is possible is shown by the result of the Congress and Symposium held in Tokyo.

4. Both similarities and differences between religions should be fairly pointed out in order to enable responsible individuals and institutions to promote fruitful co-operation, taking into due account the specific character of the religious background of various cultures.

5. Attention should be paid by various departments of UNESCO, under the East-West major project, to the religious factors in social and cultural phenomena.

6. UNESCO should recommend to the educational authorities of its member states that they introduce into the general instruction given to students, before they specialize, the main results of humanistic studies regarding the comparison of cultures and religions, since these constitute essential factors to be taken into account in the appreciation of other peoples.

7. For the implementation of activities under the East-West major project, connected with the study of religions, UNESCO should mainly work through various organizations whose aim includes the promotion of mutual understanding through the study of religions. It should be understood that these organizations guarantee full freedom and complete tolerance and demonstrate a genuine scholarly approach to the history of religions.

8. The possibility of giving assistance to another similar symposium, perhaps in connection with a future Session of ICHR, should be considered.

9. The East-West major project of UNESCO should not only stimulate research and study and promote international meetings and symposia in the history of religions, but should also encourage publications in that field.

For instance, some aid towards the publication of the proceedings of this Symposium would be helpful.

Similarly, special attention should be given to the problem of scholarly translations of religious literature both Eastern and Western. Analytical works on religion written by both Western and Oriental scholars might also be encouraged.

THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS FOR THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

The Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions and the Symposium on "Religion and Thought in the Orient and the Occident: A Century of Cultural Exchange" held at Tokyo, August 27 - Sept. 4.

Considering the growing interest in the study of history of religions evidenced by Eastern scholars during their discussions in Tokyo, and having received advice from the meeting of delegates from Asian and African countries held on August 30, recommend that:

1. The 11th Congress for the History of Religions, and possibly a second East-West Symposium, should be held in the East, for instance in India.

2. The international character of the IAHR should be extended. The Oriental countries, following the example of Japan, should form their own national groups. This does not imply a splitting of the IAHR into two independent wings, but merely an expansion of its work, under the condition that scholarly standards must be the same in the East and the West. Where this condition cannot yet be fulfilled, the foundation of small provisional national committee is recommended, in order that the foundation of regular groups may result later. The participants in the meeting held on August 30 have undertaken to stimulate the constitution of such groups in their respective countries. These regular national groups may be affiliated as member-groups to IAHR. An ad hoc committee, consisting of Japan, India, United Arab Republic, Burma, Pakistan, and Korea,
RECOMMENDATION

will give its first report on the geographical extension of their work at the Congress to be held at Marburg in 1960.

3. IAHR should give still greater emphasis to the study and research of Oriental Religions and their relations to the West.

4. IAHR should stimulate both scholarly and popular publications in the field of History of Religions, since such publications will promote mutual understanding between East and West.

RESEARCH TOUR REPORTS
FIELD TRIPS

1. FIELD TRIPS TO THE KANTO AND ISE DISTRICTS

I Objectives and Methods

The districts which have preserved Japan's religious culture also rank high among Japan's tourist attractions. Naturally, these places always appear on the itinerary when the participants in international conferences are taken on a tour of the country. For the scholars who attended the Ninth International Congress for the History of Religions and who were interested in a positive and inductive study of religious phenomena, these same tourist attractions became objects of scientific research.

There may be cultural treasures boasting of a centuries old tradition which, however, seem to be lacking in strong religious practices. Others may have adapted themselves to postwar trends and show a vigorous activity. Still others may have found new expressions for their old traditions and continue to live with a fresh breath of life. Religious features like these undoubtedly characterize Japan's religious situation.

How to efficiently organize field work centering on institutional religions grown up in the spiritual soil of Japan, particularly in the short time available, was no easy problem. The following points were considered significant for the method used in this research project:

1) In order to facilitate the investigations, an objective and scientific description of the religious institutions to be visited had been compiled in advance for each area. These explanatory descriptions were called "Guide Books."

2) Another set of papers discussed selected problems of Japan's religious history which had some direct or indirect bearing on the religious institutions in question or religious phenomena connected with them. Together with these central subjects, these dissertations dealt with a wide field of comparable identical or analogous religious phenomena. These treatises on an extended range of related topics were called "Research Tour Papers."

3) For each research district, a discussion meeting based on the

Yoshio Toda: Assistant Professor, Kokugakuin University (879)
II Execution of the Program

A. Nikko

Saturday, August 31. Total number of participants 177, including 89 foreign scholars; 4 groups.

Departure at 7.40 a.m. by special express from Asakusa Kaminarimon. The weather was cloudy and unpropitious. When we arrived at Seibu Nikko Station, light rain was falling. In front of the station, representatives of the prefectural government of Tochigi, of the city of Nikko, of Toshogu, Rinnōji and Futaran Jinja1 visited and welcomed the party which boarded four buses and drove on to Chuzenji Lake. The rain had stopped but visibility was practically nil and Nikko National Park lay sleeping under a shroud of mist. Before lunch, we split into two groups and visited Chūgūji and Tachiki Kannon. At 12.30 p.m., after a buffet-style lunch in the main hall of Lakeside Hotel, a discussion meeting was held. The topics of the “Research Tour Papers” and their authors were as follows: Hiromasa Ikegami (Shōwa Medical College), The Worship at Futarasan Shrine; Yoshihiro Kondō (Member of the Cultural Properties Protection Committee).

Nikkōsan—The Significance of Tōshō Gongen in the History of Religion; Kōjun Fukui (Waseda University), The Character of Rinnōji Temple and its Faith; Seizō Mori ( Nikko National Treasures Conservation Work Office), The Main Hall of the Rinnōji Monastery as an Institution of Esoteric Buddhism.

Chairman of the meeting was Professor Hideo Kishimoto of Tokyo University. With the exception of Professor Ikegami who was prevented by illness from being present, the authors of the “Research Tour Papers” were seated in front of the meeting to answer questions. Questions were classified according to the four papers in addition to general questions. Naturally, the authors of the papers could not be expected to answer the general questions and the active participation of other members in the discussion was earnestly desired.

One example may illustrate the interesting exchange of views. Right in the beginning of the tour, the attention of the party had been attracted by the red-painted sacred bridge spanning the Ōtani River and the red “torii” (gate of a Shinto shrine) of Chūgūji which had aroused unusual interest.

Much of the discussion devoted to the origin of the “torii” was concerned with the theory of continental influence. Replying to these questions, Mr. Kondō explained the different theories: viz., that the “torii” constitute an original Shinto development, that they are the result of the amalgamation of Shinto with Buddhism, and that they are due to the influence of Chinese architecture. He stated that, at the present stage, it was difficult to decide which of these theories was correct. Mr. Mori maintained that the Shinto “torii” represented a different tradition from its Chinese counterpart.

At 1.10 p.m., the meeting came to a close and the party proceeded to the sanctuaries of Nikko. Unfortunately, rain started falling again when the party drove down the Iroha slope and arrived at Umagaeshi. Nevertheless, the four groups could go through with the program and visit Toshōgū, Rinnōji, Futarasan Jinja and the Daiyō-in Mausoleum.

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1) Japanese names of shrines and temples have been retained. Jingū, Jinja, and the ending-gū indicate Shinto shrines; the ending-jī Buddhist temples.
III Execution of the Program

B. Tokyo

Monday, September 1. Light rain.

Total number of participants 69, including 22 foreign scholars; 2 groups.

A discussion meeting took place in Room D of Sankei-Kaikan. The subjects of the "Research Tour Papers" and their authors were as follows:

Kenichi Sakamoto (Kitano Jinja), On Shrine Shinto Since the Meiji Restoration; Ichi Oguchi (Tokyo University), Foundation and Characteristics of the "New Religions";

Masaumi Kubota (Risshō University), Belief in Hokke-kyo and Its Development in Japan;

Shinchō Kamimura (Taishō University), Buddhist worship of the Masses; Tokuichi Iwamoto (Kokugakuin University), Present State of Sectarian Shinto.

Chairman was Professor Ichirō Hori of Tohoku University and Mr. Woodard, Director of the International Research Institute for Religious Culture, vicechairman.

After the meeting, the party drove in two motor coaches to Yasukuni Jinja and arrived in front of the inner "torii" at 10.10 a.m. After listening to an explanation of the significance of the washing of the hands at the cistern, the party observed the ceremonies of the day which were in progress from the vestibule adjacent to the main hall. Then followed a talk by a Shinto priest on the rituals celebrated at Yasukuni Jinja which closed with a question-and-answer period.

From there, the party headed towards Meiji Jingū, driving up leisurely the main avenue to the inner "torii." There, Professor Anzu of Kokugakuin University and the author of the present report offered some comments in view of further elucidating the questions discussed at the Nikko meeting.

Standing in front of the real thing, concrete information could be given on the different ways in which "torii" are built, and it was pointed out that many are covered with cypress bark or are made of unpeeled lumber. It was further stressed that in Shrine Shinto the feeling of purification experienced by the individual in the restful natural surroundings of the shrine played a greater role than the attributes of the deity enshrined there, which shows the necessity of understanding this type of religious psychology.

The main shrine was burnt down during the last war but a new hall will be constructed shortly. Since the ceremony of moving the spirit had not yet been performed, we were allowed to inspect the construction site of the inner worship hall. This gave us a unique opportunity of deepening our understanding of Shinto architecture.

At noon, we were entertained at a luncheon party given in the Memorial Hall by the Chief Priest of Meiji Jingū. After lunch, we visited the marriage hall and listened to an explanation of the ceremonies and customs of a Shintō marriage. When this was over, the party went to Risshōkōseikai.

The second Training Hall was packed from the first to the third floor with several hundreds of faithful who were practicing "hōza." In this organization, "hōza" means a meeting for deepening the faith in which groups of 20 to 30 people gather around a lay leader called "branch chief" or "branch vice-chief," mutually confess their faith and receive immediate guidance from the leader. Tens of groups were deeply absorbed in this practice and paid no attention whatever to the guests from abroad. After an address by the Founder welcoming the visitors, these foreign scholars opened a barrage of pointed questions concerning the belief of the organization.

Of special interest was the statement by the Founder that the object of worship was a "Mandala" painted by himself flanked right and left by "kamidana" (Shinto family shrines). Particularly noteworthy was his declaration that these "kamidana" enshrined together all gods worshipped in Japan, but that the "Mandala" in the center reigned over all these gods. This constitutes a complete departure from the co-existence or amalgamation of Shinto and Buddhism as evidenced in Japan's religious history. The ascendency of the "Mandala" over the other gods may be regarded as an extreme development.

After a brief rest in the Gyōgakut-in, where we were invited for tea, we drove off to Ikegami Hommonji through a large gathering of faithful folding their hands.

Like Meiji Jingū, this temple is a typical example of the religious institutions destroyed by the war. Of the large-scale prewar structures, only the "Repository of the Scriptures" and the five-story pagoda escaped destruction.

In the front court of the temple, we were treated to a demonstration of the "Ten Thousand Lanterns and Standards" pageant held each year at the occasion of the festival celebrated on December 12. Before the start of the regular Buddhist service at the "Founder's Hall," the robes of the bonzes, from the chief abbot down the ranks of the other bonzes, were passed in review; then, with the ear-splitting sound of the big
drum, the service began. The whole party assisted.

From there, we hastened to Asakusa, where we had obtained special permission to inspect the temple treasures. After listening to an account of the Asakusa Temple in the inner sanctuary, we went in a drizzling rain through an arcaded walk to "Dembō-in," the residence of the chief abbot. This structure lies in a famous garden, designed by Kobori Enshū, spreading stately with a width and depth quite surprising for this busy downtown neighborhood. Enjoying the view of this garden, the party was invited to watch a tea ceremony in the Edo Senke style. Every participant was given a small replica of the renowned big lanterns in front of the main hall of the Asakusa Temple, a gift which was highly appreciated.

IV Execution of the Program

C. Kamakura

Monday, September 1. Light rain.

Total number of participants 160, including 88 foreign scholars; 3 groups.

A discussion meeting was held at the same time as the Tokyo group meeting. "Research Tour Papers" and their authors were as follows: Mitsuo Satō (Taishō University), The Characteristics of Buddhism in the Kamakura Period; Eiji Shirai (Tsuruoka Hachimangū), Religious Art in the Kamakura Period; Minoru Okada (Tsuruoka Hachimangū), Development of the Worship of Hachiman-God; Shōkin Furuta (Hokkaidō University), On Zen.

Chairman was Professor Hideo Kishimoto.

According to schedule, the party left at 8.40 a.m. in three motor coaches and drove to Kōtoku-in, commonly known as the Kannon of Nagaya. There, the party visited the well-kept Japanese garden and the Great Buddha of Nagaya. Several participants from Burma performed the worship by prostration, which presented a very impressive sight. From there, the party proceeded to the Hachimangū.

In front of the Hachimangū, singing and dancing started in the adjacent Kagura (ritual dance) Hall. The robes of the dancing girls contrasted pleasingly with the green of the trees in the background and offered a beautiful spectacle. In the main hall, the chief priest recited prayers, and the participants from Burma, acting as "model worshippers," performed a formal ceremony. Then, the party visited the "Treasure Hall" and the Kamakura Museum of National Treasures.

At the Enkakuji, the venerable old Reverend Asahina spoke on the position of Rinzai Zen and the history and functions of the temple. A look at "zazen" and the "sarira" followed.

At the Sōji-ji, the party was allowed to enter the "Great Hall of the Bonzes" and watch the practice of Zen. The participants were struck by the austerity of the Zen observance. In the main hall, Professor Reihō Masunaga of Komazawa University spoke on the history and present state of the Sōto sect and Sōji-ji. Later, the party had tea at the "Shiundai".

V Execution of the Program

D. Ise

Friday and Saturday, September 5 and 6. Fair.

Total number of participants 165, including 94 foreign scholars; 3 groups.

Departure from Tokyo at 8.50 a.m. by the express "Sakura". At 2.25 p.m., the party left Nagoya Station for Ise in specially composed express cars. On the platform of Ise Nakagawa Station, where trains had to be changed, the governor of Mie Prefecture welcomed the party. Arrival at Uji-Yamada Station at 4.20 p.m. Thanks to the good offices of the city of Ise, the party could hear an Ise chorus song (Ise-ondō) in front of the station. Those who wanted, about half of the participants, visited the Outer Shrine; the others went straight to their quarters for the night: Asahi-kan, Futami-kan, and Futami Kannon Hotel.

In the evening, a meeting was held in the main hall of Futami-kan. Chairman was Professor Kishimoto.

At the outset, the governor of Mie Prefecture delivered an address of welcome; then, the chief of the Education Section of the Shrine Office gave a lecature on the shrine followed by slides "The Shrine in the Four Seasons." Finally, a discussion was held.

Authors and titles of the "Research Tour Papers" were as follows: Yoneo Okada (Shrine Shintō Head Office), The Position of the Ise Grand Shrine in Shrine Shintō; Toshiaki Harada (Kumamoto University), Indigenous Beliefs of Japan.

Questions concerned the relation between Amaterasu Omikami and the present Emperor.

Next morning, September 6, at 9.30 a.m., favored by a blue sky, the party visited the Inner Shrine and later watched a "kagura" dance.

The same eyes which had been struck by the superb artistic skill embodied in Nikko's Tōshō-gū, the product of the amalgamation of Shinto and Buddhism, looked upon the most refined decorative forms in
the stern simplicity of the inner sanctuary, and the foreign visitors were deeply impressed by the austere beauty of the shrine.

At 11.40 a.m., the party bade farewell to Ise, when the specially composed express cars pulled out of Uji-Yamada Station and headed for Kyoto and Nara.

2. FIELD TRIP TO NARA AND TENRI

It was past one o'clock in the afternoon when the party arrived at Sakurai Station, the point of departure for their research in the Nara-Tenri area. Although hot weather had been expected, the stifling heat seemed almost unbearable.

The party split into four groups and boarded as many buses which departed one after the other. The first two went straight to the inner "torii" of Miwa Jinja, where they were welcomed by the priest of the shrine and proceeded along the gateway to the front shrine. After the "model worship", the visitors listened to a lecture by Professor Harada of Kumamoto University, saw a "Kagura" dance and then were shown to the Memorial Hall where they had tea. After a welcoming speech by Chief Priest Nakayama, some questions were asked and the party left by bus. Outside the village, the lovely scenery of Yamato basking in the autumn sun passed along the windows and listening to the explanations of the guide, the party drove on the Hōryūji.

Buses No. 3 and 4 had gone from Sakurai towards Miwa and stopped for a while on the road in the neighborhood of Ninoguchi, where Mr. Hirai of the Japanese Cultural Research Institute of Kokugakutin University talked about Mt. Miwa, whose beautiful figures was lying in front of the visitors. Then, the two groups moved on towards Hōryūji, where they arrived at 2.15 p.m. Alighting at the frontgate, they passed through the corridor and in a lounge set up there listened to explanations of the guide, the party drove on the Hōryūji.

At 5.30 p.m., the whole party left Hōryūji. The sun was getting low and the country road on which the buses were scuttling along towards Tenri, headquarters of the Tenri sect, brought a little more refreshing coolness. During the ride, Prince Mikasa requested that the time of the lectures in Tenri be shortened, seen that the party was fairly tired.

Having arrived at Tenri headquarters about 5.30 p.m., the party was welcomed at the shrine by the head of the sect, then entered the shrine and sat down to listen to a talk by Mr. Ueda of the Head Office, went through the eastern corridor to the "Hall of the Foundress" where Mr. Nakayama, also of the Head office, gave another talk. Since it was the time of the evening service, a number of faithful could be seen performing their devotions. The members of the party then repaired straight to their quarters for the night.

The problem of lodging the party in the Tenri area had required a good deal of planning, particularly since the number of foreign participants increased just before the trip started. Quite a few wanted Japanese-style accommodation, while others preferred the Nara Hotel. Finally, the choice and allocation of rooms could be arranged to everybody's satisfaction, but our minds were not at ease until everybody had settled down comfortably. Although we felt that we had not done enough to make them recover from the exhaustion of the long journey, we had to ask them to put up with what was available.

A reception was scheduled for 7.30 p.m.; and in order to help our guests relax, we had passed on word that everybody should come in "yukata" (Japanese dressing gown). Fortunately, the whole party, forgetting the weariness of the day, turned out and assembled in the hall. First, the head of the sect pronounced an address of welcome, followed by speeches by the president and the head of the General Affairs Bureau; then, everybody relaxed over a "sukiyaki" dinner. Complying with the wishes of the foreign vistiors, the head of the sect had presented them with "happi" (coats); and many of them could be seen donning the cherished garments and emptying their glasses. A chorus by the members of the girls' club who had served at table gave the signal for breaking up the party. Everybody retired at once and the events of the first day had come to an end.
The following morning, September 7, some participants were up early and, although this was not on the formal program, watched the morning service, while others visited the reference museum. At 8.30 a.m., all met in the dining room for breakfast; then, the party went by bus to the reference museum located in the mansion in the foudress's native village and inspected everything from the first floor upwards. They also saw with great interest the masks worn at the Tenrikyo celebrations. From there, they went by bus to the library where they inspected for about 20 minutes an exposition of books dealing with religion. Later, a discussion meeting lasting about 30 minutes was held in the auditorium, presided over by Professor Kishimoto of Tokyo University, while the head of the sect, Messrs. Ueda and Nakayama from the Head Office and Professors Moroi and Fukuya of Tenri University replied to questions which touched upon subjects like materials concerning the Foundsress of Tenrikyo, the relationship between the concept of the soul and burial, the problems of evil and future life, the relations of Tenrikyo to other religions, particularly Buddhism, etc. Although the time was short, a number of important questions could be discussed.

After the discussion, the party returned to the dining room and on the second floor, the "kagura te-odori" (posture dance), which forms part of the Tenri, ritual was enacted while the head of the sect commented on it.

At 1 p.m., departure for Nara. Arrival at Todaiji at 1.30. Visit to the "Hall of the Great Buddha." Following the mountain road winding between the trees of the temple precinct, we came to "Nigatsu-dō" (February Hall) and "Sangatsu-dō" (March Hall). Having finished with sightseeing, we went by bus to Kasuga Jinja in order to make up for the lost time. Leaving the vehicles at the parking lot, we approached the main hall on the front avenue; and after the "model worship", we took seats at both sides of the site arranged in the center for "kagura." Professor Hori of Tohoku University made some comments and the party witnessed the old-style "kagura."

Then followed a visit to the museum, where an exposition of Buddhist art was introduced by the museum director.

For the visits to the Byōdō-in and the Fushimi Inari Shrine scheduled next, the party was divided into two groups. The first group arrived in front of the main gate of Byōdō-in at 5.30 p.m. Facing the reconstructed and restored Phoenix Hall from the garden in Heian-style, the party listened to a talk, then made the round of the interior and, passing through the garden, emerged on the banks of the Uji River. Watching the rapids flowing by, the group detoured to the parking lot from where the buses brought them straight to Kyoto.

The other group arrived at the Fushimi Inari Shrine at 5.40 p.m. A priest welcomed them; then, they worshipped at the main shrine; after an address by the chief priest, they saw the "kagura" and then followed a guide through the "Thousand Torii" to the innermost sanctuary. Some went on to a few more spots in the mountains and then everybody went down the mountain to a resting-place set up in the plain near the shrine, where during a brief stopover the party listened to a report on the "Inari."

It was 6.50 a.m. when the buses started on the last leg of that day's trip. The lights of Kyoto were blazing when we arrived at the Station Hotel somewhat after 7 p.m. A little later, the buses from Byōdō-in also arrived safely in front of the hotel. The participants staying there got off; then, the buses brought the others to other respective lodgings and the field trip to Nara and Tenri was over.

75 Japanese and 98 foreigners who continued their journey from Ise took part in the Tenri area tour, while 35 Japanese joined the party at Tenri, for a total of 205.

3. FIELD TRIP TO THE KYOTO AREA

The party that had arrived in Kyoto in the evening of September 7, departed at 9 o'clock of the following morning in two groups; the first, in three buses, going to Higashi-Honganji, and the second, also in three buses, heading for Nishi-Honganji. Each group listened for about thirty minutes to a commentary on the huge wooden structures and looked at the old and young people worshiping there. Both groups then converged on Yasaka Jinja and later visited Chion-in. At Yasaka Jinja, some people just came on pilgrimage and immediately became an object lesson. Around 11 a.m., the whole party arrived at Heian Jingū. They paid homage at this shrine modelled after the Imperial Palace in Kyoto, then had tea while admiring the beautiful shrine garden.

At 2 p.m., the party started out again on what might be called a Zen itinerary. First, the participants assembled in the "Hall of the

Gajin Nagao: Professor, Kyoto University.
Law" of Myōshinji, where they marvelled at the Dragon in the ceiling and listened to lectures by the old Zen-master Mumon Yamada and "koji" (honorary title of Buddhist laymen) Shinichi Hisamatsu. The talks were very impressive, but the sight of the Zen hall which the party visited next made everybody stand agog. On each side, right and left, about seven or eight bonzes were sitting high on top of thick cushions piled one above the other. From time to time, two bonzes, shouldering more than four foot long sticks called "keisakuten" (warning rod), quietly walked up and down in front of them. Ordinarily, nobody from outside is allowed into these quarters, but they had been thrown open to us for this day. From time to time, the sharp sound of the "warning rod" hitting somewhere around the shoulder could be heard even outside the hall.

From there, we drove straight to Arashiyama; and sitting in the chief abbot's room in Tenryū-ji, we slaked our thirst with juice. Although this is also a Zen temple, questions and answers were ruled out and Chief Abbot Seki just gently bowed his head in welcome; then, the party spent 20 minutes in conversation in the Sōgenji garden spreading against the background of Arashiyama.

The party split again into two groups, the first going to Kitano Jinja, while the second visited the stone garden of Ryōanji. Sitting in front of a small, green, moss-covered garden next to the stone garden, a group of people made no move to get up. They were arguing on the contrast between the stone garden and the garden covered with moss, their severity and loveliness, and particularly which of the two gardens represented the initial stage of Zen and which its culmination.

The following day, September 9, the party left the hotel, as on the previous day, at 9 a.m., spent about one hour sightseeing in the Kyoto Imperial Palace, and then went to Kyoto University where, at 10.30, the closing ceremony took place. At noon, a reception given by the President of Kyoto University in honor of the foreign participants was held at the Miyako Hotel. After the reception, the Rokusai-Nembutsu Dance (invocation of Buddha on the six evil days of the month) was held at the Tenmangū of Kichijō-in. This dance evoked the interest of the members in more than one sense. Floating on the peculiar rhythm of folk music, the masterful beat of the drum and the evolutions of the Lion Dance naturally found much favor, but what struck the visitors most was that the dance was performed by young amateurs from the village. Moreover the fact that this dance, which in its original form accompanied the invocation of Buddha as a means of social education, has been preserved up to this day as a function of Tenmangū, a Shintō shrine, also aroused much interest as an example of syncretism.

About 3 p.m., the party climbed Mt. Hiei. Unfortunately, the sky was dark with clouds and neither the Kyoto region nor Lake Biwa was visible. The inner part of the peculiarly shaped Komponchūdō was a step deeper like a basement, and in the dark interior flickered the dim flames of votive lights. Then, the "goma" ceremony began. From the first place on the low floor, a flame sprang up and attracted the attention of the whole audience. On that day, the reading of sutras also took place. The "shōmyō" (praise of Buddha) of Tendai is well known as embodying the oldest traditions in Japan. For a while, we listened intently to the voice ringing out loud now, then coming down to a murmur.

After about an hour, the ceremony was over and we left Komponchūdō. By then, the weather had become threatening and thick drops of rain fell under the roar of thunder. We abandoned the plan of visiting other shrines and descended from the mountain in a pelting rain. By 6 p.m., we were back in the hotel and all official functions in the Kyoto area had come to an end.

But a special public lecture meeting was held at 7.30 p.m. on September 8 in the Kenden Hall in front of Kyoto Station. Under the skilful chairmanship of Professor Tetsutarō Ariga, the President of the International Association for the History of Religions in Europe and Japan, Professor R. Pettazzoni of the University of Rome, delivered a lecture in Italian on the subject: "Some Parallel Phenomena in the Historic Development of Religions in Europe and Japan," which was interpreted by Professor Soichi Nogami. Then, Professor G. Mensching of Bonn University spoke in German on: "Tolerance and Truth in Religion," for which Professor Keiji Nishitani acted as interpreter. Both lectures offered valuable suggestions on some important problems of the history of religions and made a deep impression on the audience.
4. FIELD TRIPS OF POST-CONGRESS

I. Studies in Buddhism

At 9 a.m. on September 10, a party of 30 members including 24 foreign scholars left the Station Hotel for Nishi-Honganji. In the Hinkaku of the temple, professors from Ryōkoku University commented on the history of the Jōdo sect and old block-printed books. The most colorful part of that day's studies, however, was a round table discussion in the Kikokutei of Higashi-Honganji, attended by Ryōshin Soga and Daieishi Kaneko. The unusually lively meeting started off with a question addressed by Professor S. Hook to Rev. Soga: "What is the relation between 'satori' (enlightenment) in Buddhism and scientific knowledge?" Reflecting on it now it seems very significant that, taken in its entirety, the discussion synthesized on outline of the Shinshū doctrine.

The morning session lasted longer than expected and it was almost 1 p.m. when the party arrived at Daitokuji. After a brief rest at Ruth Sasaki’s Ryūsennan, a maigre lunch was served by a group of bonzes in the library of Daitokuji. Just about this time, a heavy thunderstorm brought a refreshing coolness and the trees in the temple grounds looked doubly green and luxuriant. After lunch, the party had an opportunity of appreciating the old art treasures of Daitokuji; then, everybody was free to visit Daisen-in and Ryūkō-in or to take part in a tea ceremony at Kohōan.

The last place visited on that day was Nanzenji. The library of this ascetic institution shaded by old pine trees was wrapped in the calmness of the afternoon, when the group sat around the old Zen-master Shibayama and held a discussion. Rev. Shibayama spoke of his own religious experiences emphasizing that Zen experience is beyond the ken of rational analysis and conceptual description. The discussion centered on the similarities of these experiences with or differences from Western religiosity and particularly Christian mysticism.

On the same day, another group visited Shintō shrines, and the following day, a group of about 15 went on a tour devoted to fine arts, while a number of members inspected Christian institutions.

September 12 and 13 had been set aside for a field trip to

Mt. Kōya, in which 13 foreign visitors took part. Leaving Kyoto early in the morning, the party arrived at Kongōbuji at 11.10 a.m. We had just been shown into the wide inner hall, when from a sky that had been hanging threateningly all morning a torrential rain poured down. We enjoyed the rain on top of the mountain with the relaxed feeling that the end of ten hectic days had come.

After a welcoming speech by the chief abbot, who is also the president of the University, we had lunch, then rested for a while. Before starting out on our afternoon tour, we listened to a lecture by Dr. Yoshiaki Nakano dealing with the peculiarities of the Shingon sect in which he touched on the five subjects of Mandala, Goma, Kuyō (memorial services), "sokushin jōbutsu" (becoming a Buddha in one's earthly existence), and scorial action of a religious believer; he thus explained concisely the tenets of esoteric Buddhism. Since the rain had stopped, we took a look at the interior of Kongōbuji, then headed for the inner sanctuary. We got off the bus at Ichi-no-hashi, then walked long the sanctuary gateway flanked by dark cypresses. The Sanscrit characters inscribed on the numerous tombstones and the various "Jizo" (Ksitigarbha, guardian deity of children) statues wearing pinafores aroused the interest of the foreign participants who asked many questions about them. In front of the inner sanctuary, Dr. Nakano again spoke briefly on the life of Kōbō Daishi; then, inside the main hall, the Rev. Tentan Ueda performed the rites of Kōbō Daishi while explaining their meaning. The flame of the "goma" which was lit during the rites filled the interior of the dark sanctuary with a reddish glow. Having watched the ceremony intently for about an hour, the participants asked a series of questions concerning the various kinds of rites, their purposes and their relations to "goma". At 5.30 p.m., the party repaired to the guest house for the night and spent the free time enjoying a Japanese-style bath or taking a walk. The supper, maigre dishes proper to Takano in pure Japanese style, beautifully arranged on small tables, delighted the whole party, and the rest of the evening was filled with animated conversation on esoteric Buddhism, Zen and similar subjects.

On the 13th, the weather was fine. At 7 a.m., we assisted at the ritual in the Fumon-in. It was in the form of "rihi-sammi" (understanding and absorption), and was commented upon by Rev. Ueda. We spent a leisurely hour looking at the garden of the guest house bathed in the clear light of a serene morning and went to the monastery at 9.30 a.m. Under the guidance of Rev. Ueda, we made a minute inspection of the Kompon Tower, the Golden Hall, the

Yoshinori Takeuchi: Professor, Kyoto University.
Masaaki Hattori: Lecturer, Kyoto University.
"Mikage-do" and the Shrine, and the esoteric doctrine which attaches a dogmatic meaning even to small details evoked considerable interest and provoked a number of questions. At noon, the party had lunch at the Fumon-in with the officials of Takano, and representatives of the participants and the Committee expressed their gratitude. Both recognized that it was a mistake to regard the Christian value system as something absolute and voiced the impression that, as a whole, the Conference had proved extremely fruitful for deepening the mutual understanding between East and West.

At 2 p.m., we reached Reihoan, and after listening to a short expose by Mr. Chikyō Yamamoto on the art of esoteric Buddhism, we could visit the sights of the place and also see the drawing of the "Advent of the 25 Bodhisattvas," whose special exposition had been suspended due to excessive humidity. At 4 p.m., the party started to descend the mountain by way of Daimon, reached Kyoto Station by 7.30 and borke up.

II Studies in Shinto

On September 10, two foreign professors together with several Japanese started out at 9 a.m. from Kyoto station in a number of taxi cabs. The party first drove to Yoshida Jinja. Already perfectly familiar with the proceedings, the two professors washed their hands and rinsed their mouths with the clear water of the cistern in the shrine precinct which mirrored the verdure of Mt. Yoshida. Thanks to the particular kindness of Chief Priest Oya, we were allowed to enter the inner gate and look at the imposing square main shrine built in reddish style, and investigated the history of the worship at the shrine in the form of questions and answers.

The most interesting sight, however, in Yoshida Jinja undoubtedly was one corner in Sajōshō (place of religious services). Surrounding the octagonal Daigengū, a national treasure, were the shrines dedicated to all the gods of all countries, the Tōsai Shinmyōgū and the remains of Hashinden. We also had the participants in the "Tsuina" (exorcism) ceremony specially dressed up for us in front of the shrine office.

Having spent too much time on Mt. Yoshida, we hastened to Kamo Miyo Shrine in Shimokamo. It lies at a point where the Kamo River and the Takano River flow together, and is surrounded by beautiful woods. We arrived in front of the shrine while listening to an explanation of the relation between the upper and lower Kamo shrines based on the myth of the red-lacquered arrows attached to Tama-yoriihime-no-mikoto. The acting chief priest welcomed us. Historically, Kamo Jinja ranked second only to Ise Jingū, being held in high esteem by the court and the people alike. An Imperial princess was chief priestess of this shrine, and every 21st year, the transfer of the deity in observance of the court anniversaries was celebrated. The main shrine with its typical slanted style is a national treasure, and the altogether 23 buildings make this shrine one of the most important cultural monuments testifying to the richness of the old Kyoto culture.

Most of the gods worshipped here appear in the classical records or are historical personages. Needless to say, there were a lot of questions concerning the existence of a principle governing all gods, the relations between the gods, the foundation of Shinto ethics, etc. The discussion, touching on questions like the pattern of the development of theology in religions, continued while we were driving towards upper Kamo.

At the Kamo Wake-ikazuchi Shrine, the chief priest showed us a special rod used in the purification of individuals, and demonstrated the ritual of the "tamagushi" (a branch of the sacred tree, Cleyera ochinchnea, decorated with strips of cloth or paper). The chief priest gave us a great deal of information about the life in the country, particularly with reference to the old Kamo clan, and the ceremonies of the Aoi festival (the festival of Kamo).

We had lunch at the "Place of Exorcism," near the "Bridge Shrine," a building consisting only of roof and pillars, letting the wind blow through freely. It is, however, a national treasure.

Leaving Kami-Kamo, we transferred at Keihin-Sanjō to the electric train and headed for Ishitōjimizu Hachimangū. The weather finally turned bad, and a heavy downpour only made the sultry heat worse. But the rain had stopped when we arrived at the Hachiman village. We took the cable car to the top of the mountain, watched the "Sato-kagura" (sacred dance performed by lay people) on the large plaza in front of the gorgeous main shrine, and drank sacred wine after our formal worship. All the musicians taking part in the "sato-kagura" belong to families that traditionally have performed this dance, and there were quite a few old people among them who transmit a rich musical heritage. The chief priest was kind enough to tell us about the history and religion of the Hachimangū.

Since we had some time left, we took a rest in the shrine office and had tea. Then, the party admired the garden enclosed with masonry.
in which the shrine office is located and the many artificial flowers used for offerings at the festival of Ishi-kyomizu Jinja. Enjoying the view of the Kyoto plain lying before us, we went down the mountain in high spirits.
OVERSEAS PARTICIPANTS

ALI, A. M.  Indonesia  Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia.
AMES, V. M.  U.S.A.  University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati.
ANANDA, Ceylon  Kyoto University, Kyoto.
ANTWEILER, A.  Germany  University of Münster, Münster.
ARRIETA, J.  Spain  Sophia University, Tokyo.
AUNG THAN  Burma  University of Rangoon, Rangoon.
BAMMATE, N.  Afghanistan  Liaison officer, division of Relations with
Member States, Bureau of Official and External Relations, UNESCO.
BANDHRANGSI, S.  Thailand  Mahachul Al Ongkorn Buddhist Uni-
versity Bangkok.
BASU, A. D.  Great Britain  School of Oriental Studies, The University
of Durham, Durham.
BELAIEF, G.  U.S.A.
BELAIEF, L.  U.S.A.
BEOUCHE-BROCCHERI, M.  Italy
BEOUCHE-BROCCHERI, P.  Italy  University of Tokyo.
BLACKER, C. E.  Great Britain  University of Cambridge, Cambridge.
BLEEKER, C. J.  Holland  University of Amsterdam.
BLOCK, M. B.  U.S.A.  Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
BOUQUET, A. C.  Great Britain
CALLAWAY, T. N.  U.S.A.  Seinan Gakuin University, Fukuoka.
CAMPBELL, J.  U.S.A.  Sarah Lawrence College, New York, N. Y.
CASSARD, F.  U.S.A.  Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
CAUDILL, W.  U.S.A.
CLAVIER, H.  France  Université de Strasbourg, Strasbourg.
DAMAS, L. C.  France  Ecole Française d’extreme-Orient.
DANDEKAR, R. N.  India  Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,
Poona.
DANIELS, F. J.  Great Britain  University of London, London.
DILLER, E. V. N.  U.S.A.  Mills College, Oakland, Calif.
DUMOULIN, H.  Germany  Sophia University, Tokyo.
EDER, M.  Austria  Nanzan University, Nagoya.
EDSMAN, C. M.  Sweden  University of Uppsala, Uppsala.
EKLUND, H. O.  Sweden  Lunds University, Lunds.
ELIADE, M.  U.S.A.  University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
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<td>Chung Chi College, Hong Kong.</td>
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<td>FITZGERALD, C. P.</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australian National University, Canberra.</td>
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<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>Sophia University, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Islamic Culture and Arabic Sing University, Hyderabad.</td>
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<td>St. Paul University, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>HEIN, N.</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Yale University, New Haven, Conn.</td>
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<td>HOBALLAH, M.</td>
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<td>University of Al Azhar, Cairo.</td>
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<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>New York University, New York, N.Y.</td>
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<td>HPE AUNG, BURMA</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Institute for Advanced Buddhist Studies, Rangoon.</td>
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<td>HUSAINI, I. M.</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>American University, Cairo.</td>
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<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>The University of Tokyo, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>JANSSEN, H. L.</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>University of Oslo, Oslo.</td>
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<td>India</td>
<td>State University of Gammu and Kashmir, Srinagar.</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>Tokyo Metropolitan University, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>KEILBACH, W.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>University of München, München.</td>
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<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.</td>
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<td>KOPPERS, W.</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>University of Vienna, Gentzgasse.</td>
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<td>KRAMERS, R. P.</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion, Shatin.</td>
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<td>KRUSE, H.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Sophia University, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>LANCKOWSKI, G.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Deutsche Forschungs Gemeinschaft.</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Institute d’Égyptologie, Palais du l’Université, Strasbourg.</td>
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<td>LIEBENTHAL, W.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan.</td>
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<td>LÖWITH, K.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg.</td>
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<td>MAI-THO-TRUYEN</td>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>Association for Buddhist Studies, Saigon.</td>
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<td>MARINGER, J.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Nanzan University, Nagoya.</td>
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<td>MAYER, F. H.</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Tokyo Gakugei University, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>MEHDIHONG, J. K.</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Ecole Superieure de Paris, Cambodia.</td>
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<td>MENSCHING, G.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>University of Bonn, Bonn.</td>
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<td>MORGAN, K. W.</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Colgate University, New York, N.Y.</td>
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<td>NAGA THERA</td>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>Viet Nam Buddhist Therarada Sangha Order, Saigon.</td>
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<td>NEMESHEGYI, P. X.</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Sophia University, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>On Pe, Burma: The Buddha Säsana Council.</td>
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<td>PEACHEY, P.</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Mennonite Central Committee, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>PERETTI, P.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Sophia University, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>PETTAEZONI, R.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Rome University, Rome.</td>
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<td>PEZZALI, A.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Ministry of Education of Rome, Rome.</td>
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<td>POULIOT, V. M.</td>
<td>St. Thomas Institute, Kyoto.</td>
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<td>PUNYANUBHAV, S.</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>RAMACHANDRA, K.</td>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>Religions Digest, Talangama.</td>
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<td>RANGANATHANANDA,</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Ranakrishna Mission, Delhi.</td>
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<td>REICHEL, G. M.</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion, Shatin.</td>
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<td>RENÉ DE BERVAL</td>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>Société des Etudes Indochinoises.</td>
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<td>RHODES, E. F.</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>St. Paul’s University, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>ROCHEDEIEU, E.</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>University of Geneva, Geneva.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROSS, F. H.</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Southern California School of Theology, Claremont, Calif.</td>
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<td>ROUSSET, H.</td>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASAKI, R. F.</td>
<td>First Zen Institute of America in Japan, Kyoto.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCHIFFER, W.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Sophia University, Tokyo.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JAPANESE PARTICIPANTS

Abe, H. The Tokyo University of Education
Abe, M. Nara Liberal Arts University
Abe, S. Kyushu University
Aiba, S. Gunma University
Aihara, I. Komazawa University
Akashi, M. St. Paul's University
Akizuki, K. Hirosaki University
Amano, H. Tohoku University
Ami, Y. Ochanomizu Women's University
Anzu, M. Kokugakuin University
Aochi, S. Ryukoku College
Aoyoshi, K. The Church of Christ in Japan
Arita, T. Kyoto University
Asano, J. Aoyama Gakuin College
Asayama, E. Fujisawa Commercial High School
Ashikaga, A. Kyoto University
Awazu, Y. Akita Municipal High School
Azumi, E. Hirosaki Gakuin Junior College
Ban, K. The Osaka University of Foreign Studies
Bando, S. The University of Tokyo
Date, T. Meiji Shrine

Doi, K. Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
Doi, M. Doshisha University
Endo, A. Doshisha University
Fujihara, K. Gifu University
Fujii, S. Fukuoka Gakugei University
Fujimoto, C. Meijyo University
Fujimoto, K. The Konkokyo Kyogaku Research Institute
Fujimura, M. Ryukoku College
Fujita, K. Hokkaido University
Fujita, T. St. Paul's University
Fujiwara, R. Ryukoku College
Fujii, Y. Aichi Gakugei College
Fujiiyoshi, J. Kyoto University
Fukagawa, T. Ministry of Education
Fukatsu, F. Bethesda Deaconess Motherhouse
Fukaya, T. Tenri University
Fukuhara, R. Ryukoku College
Fukui, K. Waseda University
Fukui, N. Seisan College
Funabashi, I. Otani College
Furuno, K. Kita-kyushu University
Furusaka, M. Komazawa University
Furuta, S. Hokkaido University
Gakko, Y. Tohoku University
Gamo, T. Ogikubo High School
Go, M. Okayama University
Goto, M. St. Paul's University
Goto, S. Shinjo Kita High School
Hadano, H. Tohoku University
Hagihara, T. Kibune Shrine
Hagiwara, T. Tokyo Gakugei University
Hamada, H. Institute for Research in Religious Problems
Hanayama, S. The University of Tokyo
Harada, T. Kumamoto University
Haragawa, S. Tokyo Union Theological Seminary
Hashimoto, H. Kanazawa University
Hashimoto, T. Tohoku University
Hata, Y. Konkokyo Gakuin
Hattori, M.
<table>
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<td>HATZUZAKI, S.</td>
<td>St. Paul’s University</td>
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<td>Hitotsubashi University</td>
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<td>Toyo University</td>
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<td>Komazawa University</td>
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<td>Shuchin University</td>
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<td>Nihon University</td>
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<td>Seizan College</td>
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<tr>
<td>HISAKI, Y.</td>
<td>Kyoto Municipal Fine Arts University</td>
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<td>HISAMATSU, S.</td>
<td>Tokyo Union Theological Seminary</td>
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<td>HIYANE, A.</td>
<td>Tohoku University</td>
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<td>Waseda University</td>
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<td>HOKUSAI, T.</td>
<td>Ryukoku College</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOSHINO, G.</td>
<td>Seisoku High School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHARA, S.</td>
<td>Kyushu University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJIMA, M.</td>
<td>Adachi High School</td>
</tr>
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<td>IKEDA, A.</td>
<td>The University of Tokyo</td>
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<td>IKEDA, S.</td>
<td>Kansai University</td>
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<td>IKEDA, S.</td>
<td>Hiroshima University</td>
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<tr>
<td>IREGAMI, H.</td>
<td>Showa Medical College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IREGAMI, K.</td>
<td>The Senior High School under the Tokai University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKOMA, E.</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Mission, Head Quarter, Tenriko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKUTA, K.</td>
<td>Tohoku University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAI, S.</td>
<td>Doshisha University</td>
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<td>IMANISHI, J.</td>
<td>The University of Tokyo</td>
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<td>INAGAKI, R.</td>
<td>Nanzan University</td>
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<td>INOKUCHI, T.</td>
<td>Ryukoku College</td>
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<td>INOUE, H.</td>
<td>Yokohama Municipal University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INOUE, K.</td>
<td>Kakizaki High School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INOUE, Z.</td>
<td>The Hyogo University of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISHIDA, Y.</td>
<td>Kyoto University</td>
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<td>Taisho University</td>
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<td>Keio University</td>
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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS.

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Sakamoto, H.
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Sakata, Y.
Saki, A.
Sakuma, K.
Sakurai, T.
Sanada, C.
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Sasaki, T.
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Shirayama, T.
Shinohara, H.
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Sone, K.
Suetsuna, Z.
Sugahara, S.
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Suzuki, Y.
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Takasaki, M.
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Takaya, M.
Takeda, C.
Takeda, S.
Takanaka, S.
Takuchii, M.
Takudchi, Y.
Takezono, K.
Takumi, H.

Kyushu University
The Tokyo University of Education
Otani College
Rissho University
Tohoku University
Toyo University
Tamura High School
Sophia University
Aichi Gakugei University
Taisho University
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Taisho University
Shiogama Girl's High School
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Izumo Oyashiro Kyu
Nihon University
Kyoto University
Ryukoku College
Shimizu Construction Co., Ltd.
Tokyo University of Education
Kanazawa University
The University of Tokyo
Tokyo Buddhist Educational Institute
Taisho University
Hokkaido Gakugei University
Komazawa University
The University of Tokyo
Waseda University
Tokyo University of Education
Osaka University
The Aichi University of Liberal Arts and Education
Aichi University
Tokyo University of Art
Aoyama Gakuin College
St. Paul's University
Tohoku University
University of Nagoya
Tokyo College of Pharmacy
Hirosakigakuen Seiai High School
Kokugakuin University
Toyama University
Catholic University of Nagoya
Akita University

Aoyama Gakuin College
Musashino Women's College
Ryukoku College
Tokai University
The University of Tokyo
National Student Aid Foundation
Kyushu University
Yasaka Shrine

Taisho University
Tohoku University
Shizuoka University
Komazawa University
Kokugakuin University
Meiji Shrine
Koyasan College
Meiji Gakuin University
Doshisha University
Saikyo University
Taisho University
Bunkyo High School
Kyoto University
Osaka Educational University
Bukkyo University
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

TAMAKI, K.
TAMURA, K.
TAMURA, Y.
TANABE, S.
TANAKA, E.
TANAKA, H.
TANAKA, O.
TANAKA, S.
TANASE, J.
TANI, S.
TANIGUCHI, M.
TANIGUCHI, T.
TAYAMA, S.
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TODA, Y.
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TSUJI, N.
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Tsubo, S.
UCHIDA, M.
UCHINO, K.
UEDA, S.
UEDA, Y.
Ueda, Y.
UEHARA, T.
UEMURA, T.
UIJIDOKO, S.
UMEDA, Y.
UMERUZU, T.
UNDO, G.

Toyo University
Toyo University
Nagoya University
Kansai University
Tokyo Kasei Gakuin College
Chuo University
Kokushikan (Buddhist Society)
Ryukoku College
Tezukayama Gakuen
The University of Wakayama
National Diet Library
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Kokugakuin University
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Keio University
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The University of Tokyo
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Gunkanji (Buddhist Temple)
Minobu Jinkyo Leper Asylum
The Okurayama Institute for Cultural Research
Meiji Gakuin University
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Tokyo University of Education
Waseda University
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Tenri University
University of Southern California
The Shrine Shinto Head Quarters
Ministry of Education
Taisho University
Musashino Women's College

UNNO, T.
UNO, M.
URAL, K.
USUKI, H.
WADA, K.
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YAMAGUCHI, S.
YAMAMOTO, K.
YAMAMOTO, S.
YAMAMOTO, S.
YAMAMOTO, T.
YAMANAKA, Y.
YAMANE, T.
YAMAOI, T.
YAMASAKI, K.
YAMASAKI, T.
YAMAUCHI, T.
YAMAZAKI, H.
YAMAZAKI, T.
YANAGAWA, K.
YANAGITA, T.
YASHIRO, K.
YASUDA, T.
YASUI, K.
YASUMOTO, T.

Nihon University
Hokkaido University
Toyama High School
Taisho University
Komazawa University
The University of Tokyo
Kawasaki Industrial High School
Tokyo University of Education
St. Paul's University
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Nihon University
Tohoku University
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Osaka Christian College
Tokyo University of Education
Doshisha University
Showa Medical College
St. Paul's University
Shoin Theological College
Chitose High School
Tokyo University of Education
Hosei University
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

YOKOYAMA, N.  
YOKOYAMA, S.  
YONEZAWA, T.  
YOSHIDA, Y.  
YOSHIKURA, T.  
YOSHIKURA, Y.  
YUKI, H.  
YUKI, R.

Miho Shrine  
The Otani Study for Religion  
Hirotsuki Gakuin Junior College  
Hachiman Shrine  
Yokohama National University  
Shinshu University  
Shikoku Christian Junior College  
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